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Richard Lowenthal

Amalrik: Letters and Comment

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Editorial Assistants: Peter Howard, Jenny Coates, David Buchan

Editorial office: Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London, W.1.
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DEVELOPMENT VERSUS UTOPIA IN COMMUNIST POLICY

Richard Lowenthal *

IT is hardly accidental that indigenous communist revolutions have hitherto taken place only in underdeveloped countries. Far from being responses to the 'contradictions' of a highly developed capitalist system that has reached the utmost limit of its possibilities, these revolutions have typically occurred in countries whose traditional, pre-capitalist order has been effectively disrupted by the impact of foreign capitalism and of a limited modern capitalist sector, but in which certain essential preconditions for the all-round growth of a modern capitalist economy were lacking. Communist revolutionary movements in such countries have thus been analysed—just like nationalist revolutionary movements in the same countries or in other countries faced with a similar situation—as the responses of frustrated intellectual élites to the phenomenon of partial stagnation in the midst of disruptive social change, and to the continued rule of traditional élites whose legitimate function had perished and whose values were no longer generally credible, but for whom no effective 'bourgeois' successors had arisen. Both types of movements are carried to power when important groups become convinced that poverty and backwardness, national humiliation and dependence, injustice and lack of hope, can be ended only if state power is used for a concerted effort to change the economic and social structure and the values governing conduct. Both rely on the demand for forceful measures against the traditional holders of power and privilege, and on a programme advocating fast investment by the state and politically directed mass education. Both types of revolutionary movements, therefore, create political regimes that consciously seek to achieve by political means an advance in all-round development that their societies had failed to produce 'spontaneously', i.e. by the unco-ordinated actions of individuals following their own interests and beliefs. Political regimes that set themselves this kind of task, and that seek both to extend the power of the state and to activate the people in its service, while limiting the right of their subjects to engage in any public, organized advocacy of particular opinions and interests, are now often described as 'mobilization regimes'[1] or, as I should prefer, 'dictatorships of development'. In the frequent cases where the dictatorship is exercised and the mobilization accomplished

* This is an introductory and concluding part of the chapter by Richard Lowenthal from *Change in Communist Systems*, edited by Chalmers Johnson, shortly to be published by Stanford University Press (copyright 1970 by the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University).

[1] Following David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago, 1965).

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by a political party or mass movement enjoying a more or less monopolistic position, we may also speak of 'movement regimes'.[2]

THE characteristic rise of both communist and nationalist revolutionary movements under the leadership of the intelligentsia of underdeveloped countries, and the subsequent creation of movement regimes devoted wholly or partly to the task of politically forced development, can be understood only in terms of the structural and cultural differences between the decaying traditional societies of the countries concerned and the type of traditional society from which modern development first originated in the West. The crucial fact is that the difference between the advanced Western societies and those underdeveloped countries is *not* just that of different stages in a single evolutionary process, as if the underdeveloped countries were simply lagging behind the West on a basically similar road to modernization (as seems to be implied, for instance, in Walt W. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*).[3] Rather it is a structural and cultural difference between their historical starting points: the underdeveloped countries have started from radically different traditional societies and therefore can achieve modernization, if at all, only by means of a radically different process.[4]

As Max Weber was the first to point out, the original growth of a modern society based on individual mobility and security, rational experimentation and continuous efforts to increase and improve production was made possible in the West only by a unique combination of structural and cultural factors in its history.[5] These factors were the early development of rational speculation in Greece and the early struggle in Jewish and Christian prophetic religion against the influence of magic beliefs; the early growth of religiously sanctioned communities not based on ties of kinship, opening the way to cohesive social units transcending clan and tribe; the value placed on the uniqueness of the individual by Christianity and on productive physical labour by Western Christianity; the development of the Western medieval city as a non-tribal community of self-governing, self-protecting, and self-improving individuals, leading eventually to the growth of an independent urban middle class; the creation of the modern state, combining bureaucratic regularity and efficiency with respect for the codified rights of the subject and the validity of contract under the rule of law; and finally

[2] Robert C. Tucker, 'Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes', *American Political Science Review*, no. 2, 1961, pp. 281–89.

[3] *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[4] I have developed this point more fully in my article 'Government in the Developing Countries: Its Function and Its Form', in Henry W. Ehrmann, ed., *Democracy in a Changing Society* (New York, 1964), pp. 177–215.

[5] Relevant passages can be found in many parts of Weber's work, but above all in his essay on the Protestant Ethic in vol. I of the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, and in the posthumously published *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*.

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the subordination of the daily lives of Western men to the rational discipline of continuous productive effort and continuous saving and reinvestment of profits (the 'spirit of capitalism') under the influence of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Equivalents for each of these factors, or indeed for several of them, may have existed in one or more non-Western traditional societies, but the combination of all of them is unique to the West. Only this combination has made it possible for the unco-ordinated efforts of countless people to 'better themselves'—to improve their knowledge, their morals, their material well-being and their social standing—to set in motion the modern dynamism of social change without the guidance of any politically imposed plan of development.

I do not, of course, mean to deny that political measures intended to promote economic development have played a role in Western economic growth; we need only recall the age of mercantilism and of the early colonial companies, the importance of educational and social policies for the rapid development of modern industry, and the role of protectionism and government enterprise in certain latecomer countries of Europe. In no Western country, however, have these measures been central to the overall process of modernization. Nowhere in the West did this process have to be conceived as a primary political task, to be achieved only by the deliberate enforcement of major changes in the economic and social structure by the state, and by the deliberate re-education of the people to the adoption of new values by a political movement. Yet both nationalist and communist movements in under-developed countries justify their claim to a monopoly of political power by proclaiming the need to 'put politics in command' in order to achieve development.

Nor can this need be denied in principle; for where the historic preconditions for spontaneous social change as displayed by Western societies are wholly or partly lacking, it seems obvious that effective modernization [6] can be brought about only with the help of a substantial measure of political co-ordination and initiative, whatever the ideology of the modernizing political activists. If there is not a modern state with a trained bureaucracy, one has to be created. If there is no enterprising middle class willing to invest in production, the government may find it necessary both to provide the enterprise and to extract the savings needed for investment. If the peasants are too poor to save and the landowners unwilling to invest, the peasants may have to be liberated and the landowners to be expropriated; at least, traditional

[6] Throughout this article the term 'modernization' is used to mean the economic, social and cultural features of modern development, but no assumption is made about a necessary connexion between successful modernization and a particular political system. In our context the question of what changes must take place in the political system as development advances is a subject of investigation, and will not be judged in advance. In particular, it is not assumed that successful modernization necessarily implies an advance towards political pluralism. The concept of 'politically forced modernization' is central to this study. The concept of 'political modernization' is never used.

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life-styles must be changed by a combination of economic, fiscal and educational measures. If primitive superstition, narrow tribal loyalties, caste barriers or specific family forms sanctioned by traditional religion stand in the way of economic and social mobility and of nation-wide communication and integration, the obstacles have to be overcome by a 'cultural revolution' (in the sense of Bolshevik Russia or Kemalist Turkey in the 1920s, rather than of Maoist China in the 1960s), which in our century only political movements inspired by militant ideologies seem able to bring about. If traditional contempt for manual labour and low esteem for material values prevents the upper classes from taking a serious interest in production and the lower classes from accepting the need for continuity and discipline in industrial work, their attitudes have to be changed by some mixture of coercion and re-education.

Though none of these tasks of politically forced development can be said to make one particular type of political system inevitable, it is evident that some types are better suited to the job than others. On the one hand, a traditional oligarchy is bound to be opposed to modernization, and a traditional autocracy can cope with it only if it manages to preserve autocratic authority while radically interpreting traditional values—a feat so far accomplished only by Japan and unlikely to be repeated in our century. On the other hand, a pluralistic democracy of the Western type, with its built-in respect for minority rights and legal procedures, will find it very difficult to overcome the resistance to modernization presented by entrenched privileged classes, tradition-bound religious communities and self-sufficient tribes. Most likely to succeed would appear to be political systems that combine strong governmental powers, severely limiting the representation of independent interests and the expression of independent opinions, with a modernizing ideology that legitimates these powers by invoking the urgency of material and national progress and the will of the people. This applies particularly if a government can base itself on a privileged political movement devoted to re-educating the people and to mobilizing them for participation in carrying out government and party policy—in other words, in changing society and themselves. There is thus a natural correspondence between the task of politically forced development and the rise of development dictatorships or mobilization regimes in general, and of movement regimes of either the nationalist or the communist type in particular.

THE most effective dictatorship of development so far has been the Communist Party dictatorship in the Soviet Union; in a number of respects it has become a model for all others, communist and non-communist alike.[7] Yet in classical communist ideology, the task of

[7] See Richard Lowenthal, 'The Model of the Totalitarian State,' in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917–1967* (London, 1967).

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modernization played no central role. Lenin started from the Marxist assumption that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' would first be achieved in advanced industrial countries; when his Party seized power in backward Russia, he regarded this as due to one of the 'zigzags of history'[8] and expected the communists of Western and Central Europe soon to follow suit. It was only their persistent failure to do so that forced first the Bolsheviks and later the victorious communist parties of other underdeveloped countries to attempt politically forced modernization.

Yet in Marxist ideology, the ultimate goal that gives meaning to all communist effort is not the modernization of a particular country, but the attainment of the classless society on a world scale. That objective is defined as a social order in which, thanks to the expected rise in the levels of technical productivity and general education, there will no longer be any scarcity of material goods or any need for an occupational division of labour between those who carry out manual or subordinate tasks and those who perform intellectual or directing tasks. Because there will be neither problems of distribution nor a social hierarchy implicit in the structure of production, there will also be no need for any coercive apparatus and no distinction between rulers and ruled. The remaining tasks of social administration will be performed, just like the higher directing tasks of production, by all the members of society taking turns.

Of course, this vision of a classless and stateless society is based not on a scientific analysis of the trends of social development, as Marx and Lenin claimed, but on a number of ideological assumptions that are either unproven or demonstrably wrong. The expectation that the rise of productivity will eliminate the scarcity of material goods assumes a limited elasticity of human material wants and a limited growth of the world's population—hence it depends on future human decisions that may be influenced but cannot be foreseen with certainty. The view that the need for an occupational division between subordinate and directing tasks in production will disappear with advances in technology and education is contrary to experience in the century since Marx sketched out his prophecy. Technological progress has tended to make the 'higher' tasks of production and administration more complicated, widening rather than narrowing the gap between them and the remaining tasks of manual or subordinate labour, and educational progress tends to equalize only people's chances—not their abilities—to acquire the knowledge needed for mastering the more complicated tasks. Finally, the belief that all need for social coercion will disappear once the

[8] See Lenin's report to the Seventh Congress of the Bolshevik Party (March 1918) on the Brest peace treaty with imperial Germany: 'The more backward the country which, owing to the zigzags of history, had to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for it to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations. To the tasks of destruction new tasks are added, incredibly difficult tasks, viz. organizational tasks. . . .' (*Selected Works*, London, n.d., vol. VII, pp. 285–86.)

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problems of income distribution resulting from material scarcity are solved is based on an absurdly narrow view of the causes of social conflict.

In fact, far from being scientifically deducible from the Marxian analysis of capitalism's 'laws of motion', the belief in the eventual disappearance of all social conflict was the axiom on which that analysis was constructed—an axiom derived from Marx's utopian heritage. The vision of a society without conflict has been the core of every utopia ever invented by philosophers and prophets in search of release from the unbearable personal and social conflicts of their time, and it is utopian also in the strict sense of being inherently impossible. But in its Marxist version, this utopian vision of the classless and stateless society is presented as a goal for political action whose attainment is guaranteed by the 'laws of history': we are dealing with a secular religion, in which history is viewed as the movement of mankind towards its salvation on earth, and revolutionary practice as the way to fulfil this destiny.

Thus in contrast to nationalist movement regimes, which may have no higher goal than the achievement of complete independence and the effective modernization of their country (a pragmatic task limited in space as well as in time), communist regimes are officially dedicated to the struggle for the utopian goal of a classless world society, a struggle that is not only worldwide but unending, since its goal can never be achieved. Yet there exists no equally fundamental difference in the circumstances under which these two types of movement regimes have come to power: both have led victorious revolutions in underdeveloped countries only, and both have been confronted after victory with the need to prove their effectiveness in the immediate tasks of politically forced development. Moreover, each type often finds it necessary to take actions commonly associated with the other. Nationalist regimes have frequently felt compelled both to take forcible measures against native privileged classes and to seek international support against privileged foreign capitalist firms and the imperialist powers protecting them. Communist regimes, for their part, have regularly discovered that in the interests of survival they have had to give priority to the immediate tasks of consolidating their power at home and developing their country's productive forces, even if they view these tasks as mere stages on the road to world revolution and communist utopia. Indeed, the parallelism in the actual situations and immediate problems of both types of regimes, and the contrast between the utopian goals proclaimed by communist doctrine and the limited range of policies available to communist regimes in practice, are so striking that some analysts have properly raised questions about just how important are the effects of the ideological differences for the behaviour of such regimes. Is the goal of the classless society really more than an energizing 'myth' of limited operational relevance for the content of communist

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policy? [9] Does it really make a difference that one type of regime claims to be carrying out revolutionary transformation at home and risking international conflicts strictly as a means of achieving national independence and development, while the other type claims to be promoting national development and power strictly as a means of fostering social revolution at home and abroad?

In fact, the different ideologies of communist and revolutionary nationalist movements in underdeveloped countries do have observable consequences of crucial importance both before and after the seizure of power. First, though the commonly accepted view that both types of movement are led by the intelligentsia is broadly true, it must not be allowed to blur the substantial differences in leadership composition between the communist and most of the nationalist parties. The intelligentsia of those countries typically consists of a mixture of sons of the traditional upper classes with educated people of lower social origin. But the share of the sons of landowners or even merchants and of people with bureaucratic or military experience *before* the revolution appears to be considerably higher in the central and provincial leadership of the nationalist parties than in that of the communists.[10] Second, communist ideology appears to be generally more effective than nationalist ideologies in preserving the newly privileged élites from corruption by the temptations that follow the conquest of power [11]; to this extent, communism seems the better energizing 'myth'. But for our study, the crucial operational difference is the third: communism and revolutionary nationalism in power tend to lead to different strategies of politically forced development, different kinds of imposed social change

[9] For the fullest statement of this view, see John Kautsky, *Communism and the Politics of Development* (New York, 1968). For an earlier critique by the present writer, see Richard Lowenthal, 'Communism and Nationalism', *Problems of Communism*, no. 6, 1962.

[10] Comparative studies of communist and national-revolutionary political élites are still extremely rare. John Kautsky quotes Robert C. North's pioneering analysis, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford, Calif., 1952), which refers to 'the basic similarity in social origins of the largest portion of both Kuomintang and Communist leaders'; but North's own figures do not bear him out. Comparing the Kuomintang Central Executive Committees of 1924, 1926 and 1929 and the communist politbureaus up to 1945 in terms of the occupations of the members' fathers, he gets indeed a closely similar representation of the traditional upper class (wealthy landlord, scholar landlord, scholar official, scholar) with 34 per cent for the KMT and 33·4 per cent for the CP, and again 8·5 per cent 'other landlords' for the former and 8·3 per cent for the latter. But for the bourgeois element (merchant scholars, wealthy merchants, other merchants) he finds 46·8 per cent in the KMT and only 8·3 per cent in the CP; whereas 'wealthy peasants' and 'other peasants' account for only 6·4 per cent of the KMT and 41·7 per cent of the CP leaders with another 8·3 per cent of workers' sons added in the communist case (p. 47).

[11] Though communist regimes are hardly immune from corruption, I know of no communist dictatorship in which corruption has been as blatant among the higher ranks as in Sukarno's Indonesia, Nkrumah's Ghana or the later stages of Kuomintang rule in China. On the other hand, the army and bureaucracy of Kemal's nationalist regime in Turkey appear to have preserved a high reputation for integrity throughout.

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and different unforeseen effects on the evolution of the movement regimes themselves.

IN economic policy, all dictatorships of development, whether nationalist or communist, are committed in principle to the struggle against vested interests that obstruct the nation's economic development; but the nationalist regimes are not ideologically committed to a precise model demanding all-out nationalization or collectivization. In practice, the victorious nationalists may well find that radical changes in land ownership and tenure are required to liberate the peasants, break the power of the landed oligarchy and raise productivity in the long run; and those who shy away from drastic measures in this field are likely to fail in their self-set task of modernization, as did the Kuomintang on the Chinese mainland. Nowadays most nationalist regimes impose state control over major foreign enterprises on their soil, for symbolic if not for practical reasons, by nationalization with nominal compensation or other equally effective arrangements. They establish plans for the development of diversified national industries and undertake substantial public investments where private funds and private initiative are not available, thus creating publicly owned and managed industries in key sectors. But they are unlikely to go beyond this programme unless forced by circumstances that they perceive either as wilful obstructions of their development plans or as technical necessities. For instance, they may be moved to nationalize native-owned industries and banks, as in Egypt, if the owners appear unwilling to co-operate with the national plan. Or they may hand over expropriated land to state-managed collectives if peasants with independent farming experience are lacking, as in Algeria, or more generally if division of the expropriated land would render existing types of cultivation uneconomical, and if conversion to other types would require a prohibitive amount of capital investment.

The communists, on the other hand, are committed by their long-range aim not only to achieving economic development, but to preventing both development 'by the capitalist road', and more generally the consolidation of new classes. This means, first of all, that they will typically nationalize *all* private industry and may lose scarce managerial skills in the process; medium-size and small enterprises in particular are usually run by owner-managers, and their contribution to development is often difficult to replace. Nor does it help much if the communist leaders are conscious of the problem and would like to wait. Once the owners perceive the implications of the communists' long-term programme and see them as enemies, they become a potential danger to communist rule; at this point the communists feel compelled to destroy their economic power base, even though they cannot yet replace their function. That is what happened in Russia during the early months after the October Revolution. Lenin had at first instituted a system of 'workers' control' rather than immediately nationalizing most factories; but he soon found the resulting friction between workers and owners

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too risky in conditions of civil war. Hence the key industries were fully nationalized by the end of June 1918 and the nationalization of all industries was completed in December 1920.

The Chinese communists, operating in far less developed conditions and gaining control of the main industrial centres only towards the end of the civil war, were at first able to win the co-operation of many private industrialists by a solemn assurance of long-term toleration.[12] Yet the strains of the Korean War led to a tightening of controls by the end of 1950, and in late 1951 to the 'Five-Anti' campaign (in which workers and employees of private firms were called upon to denounce the owners for economic crimes, thus enabling the government to raise a heavy capital levy from them as 'fines'). In late 1952, after announcing the end of the 'rehabilitation period', the regime proclaimed as its policy goal the transformation of all private enterprises into 'joint enterprises' under state direction, and this goal was in fact reached much faster than originally planned.[13] Nonetheless, the Chinese seem to have succeeded in retaining the co-operation of most of the former managers.[14]

The Yugoslav communists started fastest of all. An estimated 54 per cent of Yugoslavia's industry was nationalized while the Second World War was in progress under a very broadly interpreted decree of November 1944, which provided for expropriating all persons who had collaborated with the Axis powers or fled abroad. A law ordering the complete nationalization of all industries of national importance (as well as of transport, banking and wholesale trade) was passed in December 1946, and a second law covering the remaining industries in April 1948, on the eve of the break with the Soviets.[15]

In all these cases, the communist regime's commitment to long-term ideological goals characteristically converged with its immediate interest in maintaining itself in power in such a way as to produce measures that would be premature or irrational in terms of 'pure' economic development. Moreover, the situation is bound to recur. Thus preventing development 'by the capitalist road' also means preventing the unhampered growth of an individualistic peasant economy beyond a certain point, since such growth inevitably leads through competition to social differentiation and the emergence of a kulak class of incipient

[12] See the 'Common Programme' adopted by the Chinese People's Consultative Conference in September 1949; T. J. Hughes and D. E. T. Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China, 1949–1960*, 2nd ed. (London, 1961), p. 20; Ygael Gluckstein, *Mao's China* (Boston, 1957), pp. 192 ff.

[13] The process was speeded up in 1955 and virtually completed by September 1956 (Hughes and Luard, pp. 93–95; Gluckstein, pp. 203–6).

[14] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, Calif., 1966), p. 282. The flexibility shown by the Chinese communists in retaining former owners as managers rather than liquidating them seems to have been due to their belief that people's consciousness may be transformed along with their social functions—if the pressure is strong enough.

[15] George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism* (New York, 1962), pp. 90–96.

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rural capitalists, a development perceived by the regime as a threat both to its future goals and to its present control.

Again, Lenin had hoped to avoid this danger by gradual, evolutionary methods, using the state's economic power to guide the peasantry along the alternative road of voluntary 'co-operativization'[16]; and as late as 1928–29 Bukharin was still convinced that the Soviet Union could both contain its kulak minority and use the peasants' surpluses to finance an industrialization programme without resorting to the new revolutionary upheaval that forced collectivization was bound to mean.[17] Yet a growing sector of Bolshevik opinion came in the course of the 1920s to be alarmed by the increasing influence of the small minority of prosperous 'capitalist' farmers in the villages and by the limits that the growth of the peasants' informal organizations (the 'land associations' based on the pre-revolutionary communes) might impose on the extraction of funds by the state and hence on the pace of industrialization. Finally, Stalin came to share this alarm in the winter of 1927–28, when he found it nearly impossible to make the peasants sell at low, state-fixed prices the amounts of grain needed by the growing town population.[18]

Faced in this critical form with the *economic* difficulty of effecting the transition to industrialization, Stalin interpreted it as a *political* problem resulting from peasant obstruction under kulak leadership. Rather than tolerate any force that might push Russia towards development by a road other than that prescribed by communist ideology, he decided to impose what he later described as another revolution, equal in importance to that of October 1917 but distinguished from it by being accomplished 'from above, on the initiative of the state'[19] —the 'liquidation of the kulaks as a class' and the forced collectivization of the whole Soviet agriculture within a few years. The next step towards Utopia had to be taken, at once and regardless of cost, as soon as experience showed that the spontaneous development of society was tending to create increasingly powerful obstacles to the attainment of the goal.

[16] Lenin, 'On Co-operation', *Selected Works*, vol. IX, pp. 408–9. First published in 1923.

[17] See Nikolai Bukharin, 'Lenin's Political Testament', *Pravda*, 21 January 1929 (referring to Lenin's article 'On Co-operation'); and see also Bukharin, 'Notes of an Economist', *Pravda*, 30 September, 1928. A slightly condensed English translation of the latter is printed as an appendix to Bertram Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York, 1957), pp. 295 ff.

[18] According to official figures, kulaks in 1927 amounted to only 3·9 per cent of the village population, and accounted for 13 per cent of the grain production. It was the increased grain consumption by poorer peasants rather than the kulaks' ill will that limited supplies to the towns. But there was evidence that the 'land associations', typically led by well-off peasants, were more influential than the village soviets until they were officially dissolved by the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 (Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, London, 1960, pp. 336–40). See also Alexander Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924–1928* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), and Alec Nove, *Economic Rationality and Soviet Politics* (New York, 1964), pp. 17–39.

[19] The formula comes from the official '*Short Course*' *of the History of the CPSU*, edited under Stalin's personal direction and first published in 1938.

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The Chinese communists in turn, aware of the terrible human and economic price the Soviets had paid for forced collectivization, originally hoped for a gradual and voluntary collectivization. As late as the end of 1952, their policy called for the socialist transformation of agriculture to be completed in the course of three five-year plans, starting at that date; by March 1954, less than 1·5 per cent of peasant households had been organized into Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives, with a target of 20 per cent for the end of 1957.[20] Yet during 1954 heavy flood damage reduced the grain harvest, and the state-controlled grain market was plunged into crisis as during the winter and spring of 1954–55 many peasants rushed to buy from the state stocks; the Party and the government reacted by curtailing sales and sending out their cadres for 'house-to-house appraisals' to judge the peasants' 'real' needs and expose 'hoarders'.[21] It was in the light of this need for tighter control of the peasants that the government first started a speed-up of collectivization: the number of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives jumped during that same winter from 90,000 to 670,000. After a brief pause for consolidation, Mao gave the signal for all-out collectivization in July 1955; this coincided with the discovery that capital investments for industrialization were lagging behind the targets of the first five-year plan, and with the decision to increase investment dramatically during the following year. From then on, targets were constantly raised and overtaken, until by the end of 1956 some 96 per cent of all peasant households had been organized in producers' co-operatives—83 per cent of them in the fully collectivized type.[22] Mao had cast aside his gradualist long-term plans because in a critical economic situation tighter control of the peasants had suddenly become urgent; and once high-pressure collectivization had proved the most effective means of control, there was no turning back.

In Yugoslavia, there were hardly any kulaks to be fought following the radical land reform of the early post-war years; nevertheless, the first five-year plan, adopted in 1947, called for collectivizing half the country's arable land by 1951. Progress towards this target was slow at first, and at the time of the break with the Soviets, in mid-1948, there were only 932 'rural working co-operatives', holding only 2·6 per cent of the arable land.[23] But the regime's first reaction to the break was an effort to speed up both industrialization and collectivization. Though the country's precarious international situation precluded the use of terrorist violence against the peasant majority, the application of economic pressures succeeded in raising the number of collectives to nearly 7,000, holding almost one-fifth of the arable land, by the end of 1950, before the introduction of economic reform policies first stopped

[20] Hughes and Luard, op. cit., p. 150.
[21] Gluckstein, op. cit., pp. 136–41.
[22] Hughes and Luard, op. cit., pp. 150–54.
[23] Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 97.

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and later reversed the movement.[24] The Yugoslav case, however, appears to be atypical because of the interaction of international and domestic factors both in starting and in limiting the movement of forced collectivization. Tito's original decision to embark on a more radical domestic policy in mid-1948 was probably motivated by the need to preserve the morale of his Party cadres after the break with Stalin; yet the need to preserve popular support in the face of growing Soviet pressure subsequently limited the forms that policy could take and finally, together with the need for Western economic aid, contributed to its demise.

What seems to emerge from both Russian and Chinese experience is, however, a more general principle. This is that a party dictatorship committed to a utopian goal cannot be content with a single revolutionary upheaval, however radical and profound; rather it must attempt to impose on society repeated 'revolutions from above', because the economic growth achieved by politically forced development is accompanied by spontaneous social changes that run counter to the utopian vision. The point is not that the communist rulers are forcing the pace merely because they are impatient to reach the final goal: their Marxist readiness to work their way through a number of historical stages in order to create the economic and cultural preconditions for utopia is precisely what distinguishes them from less realistic utopians of the anarchist or millenarian type. The point is that members of a communist-led society, in pursuing their interests within the framework set by the regime for the sake of economic development, tend to create new social strata, and that the more successful groups among them, in seeking to consolidate their advantage, usually form new centres of social power. It is for this reason that the communist regime, in order to preserve both its freedom to approach its final goal and the monopoly of power needed for that purpose, feels compelled again and again to intervene forcibly to prevent the consolidation of ideologically undesirable new class structures. It cannot preserve its control of the direction of social development without repeatedly wrenching society from the path it would 'naturally' take, since all natural paths lead away from the utopian goal.

In particular the problem is bound to reappear as the growth of nationalized industry, with its attendant bureaucratic administration and planning machinery, leads to the emergence of a specialized stratum of engineers, managers and economic administrators—people who must be given certain privileges to make them contribute to economic development, yet whose consolidation as a privileged class would threaten the attainment of the utopian goal. For a nationalist dictatorship of development, not committed to the utopia of classless society, none of these problems need arise; hence there is no need for the kind of recurrent revolutions from above that occur in com-

[24] Ibid., pp. 272–73.

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munist political systems. This is why nationalist movement regimes may become 'extinct',[25] in the sense of ceasing to be revolutionary, much more easily than communist ones.

THE specific, long-term programme of economic and social transformation and the repeated revolutions from above are not the only observable effects of the ideological commitment that distinguishes the communist strategy of development from that of a nationalist movement regime. We must mention at least two other differences. The first concerns cultural revolution. Communism, as a secular religion, is equipped with a militant atheist philosophy that enables it to attack the traditional beliefs obstructing modernization with a far more ruthless enthusiasm than most nationalist dictatorships of development can muster.[26] However, this also means that communist regimes cannot be content with merely denouncing the obstructive aspects as such; the communists are committed to a frontal attack on traditional religion, and such an attack can be difficult and dangerous. The second difference concerns relations with the advanced, capitalist West. For the nationalists, conflicts with Western imperialists are part of an uncompleted struggle for final emancipation from the remnants of colonial rule, particularly from Western economic privileges, to be continued as long as Western resistance to those limited objectives makes it necessary; for the communists, these conflicts are part of a worldwide struggle that can end only with the total demise of the capitalist order.[27] Hence the communist outlook, as distinct from that of the nationalists, implies a basic unremitting hostility to the Western powers which, though it need not lead to major war, excludes the possibility of substantial Western capital aid and requires a long-term, high-priority effort in the field of armaments and the basic industries on which their production depends. The combined result of excluding substantial Western aid and giving long-term priority to arms production and basic industries is that a communist regime will normally have to demand from its subjects heavier and more lasting sacrifices than a nationalist one in order to obtain the same degree of success in development.

It is now apparent why, though all regimes devoted to politically forced development are characterized by a concentration of great power in the hands of the government and limitations on pluralistic political freedoms, only regimes inspired by communist ideology tend to acquire 'totalitarian' powers in the full sense of an institutional monopoly

[25] The evocative expression is from Tucker's article 'Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes', op. cit.

[26] The exceptions are the Kemalist and Mexican revolutionary movements with their anti-religious fanaticism.

[27] A few nationalist leaders, notably Sukarno in Indonesia and Nkrumah in Ghana, have gradually come to adopt a similar attitude, but only as a result of failures in development and the intensified ideological needs arising from those failures; such an attitude has served as a prelude to the collapse of their regimes.

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over policy decision, organization and information by the ruling party, and of the freeing of the state from all legal limitations in the exercise of its tasks. The attempt not merely to speed up development by political means but to enforce development of a special type along lines that society would not naturally take, requires beyond the original destruction of anti-developmental institutions and social forces the repeated 'revolutionary' (i.e. violent) intervention by a dictatorial state to prevent or reverse the spontaneous growth of ideologically undesirable social phenomena. The effort to destroy not merely specific superstitions and anti-modern traditions, but traditional religion itself in the name of a 'scientific' world view embodied in the official ideology, requires the monopolistic imposition of that ideology on all media of information and instruction. The decision to maintain for an indefinite time an attitude of basic, unremitting hostility to the non-communist world implies the need for long-term economic sacrifices so great that no scope is left for a free expression of different interests and opinions. Communist regimes thus constitute both the extreme, totalitarian form of a dictatorship of development, and the specific form whose ideology does not recognize any built-in limits on its own function short of the attainment of utopia on a world scale. Yet contrary to the assumption of communist ideology, experience has shown that such built-in limits do exist.

IN contrast to revolutionary nationalist movement regimes, then, communist regimes in underdeveloped countries—the only communist regimes that have so far arisen from indigenous revolutions—are characterized by a dualism of goals. Owing to the conditions in which they come to power, they aim at politically forced development; owing to communist ideology, they aim at achieving the classless society. Both goals, moreover, are closely bound up with the power interests of such regimes. Their leaders see rapid, successful modernization as necessary for survival in a presumably hostile world; it is also likely to increase the number of non-party citizens at home who loyally accept the regime for its contribution to their welfare, to general progress, or to the strength of the fatherland. The approach to utopia, on the other hand, serves to legitimate the communist leadership in the eyes of party members, and thus to cement the internal cohesion of the regime; and, the utopian goal can be invoked also to justify crushing any potential centres of independent social power that arise in the process of development.

In some respects, these commitments to utopia and to modernization reinforce each other. Not only is belief in the secular religion of communism a source of inspiration to the party's cadres, immunizing them against the cynicism and corruption of power and assuring their continued ascetic dedication after victory, but also it may encourage the ordinary worker to keep up his effort while accepting prolonged material sacrifices in the hope of receiving some ultimate reward in

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the historical Beyond.[28] Conversely, practical success in quickly increasing the nation's economic and military power may strengthen the cadres' confidence in the scientific truth of the ideology guiding the leaders, and their conviction that further stages on the road to the classless society will be attained with similar promptness.

Yet in other respects the two commitments are in stark, irreconcilable conflict: for development in the sense of catching up with the economic and military capacities of the advanced Western nations is achieved most speedily by subjecting people to the discipline and rationality of production by a combination of coercive threats and material incentives, whereas utopia can be approached only as more and more people are willing to work for the common good, not from fear of deprivation or hope for individual advantage, but out of an enthusiastic faith. This leads to opposite strategies for the planned re-education of the masses: for the sake of the final goal, the communist regime ought to aim at creating a 'new man', a man free from the egoistic ambition and avarice characteristic of class society; yet for the sake of rapid development it must aim at educating and manipulating 'economic man', the type that has created the modern industrial society precisely by pursuing his own self-interest. Communist doctrine may, of course, try to reconcile the conflict by arguing that the new, communist man will emerge only as material abundance takes the place of scarcity, and that 'economic man' and his self-interest are needed to enable society to traverse the intermediate stages quickly.[29] Yet on the one hand, the need for self-sacrificing enthusiasm, at least among the active communist minority, cannot be dispensed with in the earlier stage either; and on the other hand, the materialist education of the masses may well make it increasingly difficult to reconvert them later to the ideals of communist man.[30] The fact remains that the more successful the regime proves in inculcating materialist values, the speedier national development is likely to advance—but the sharper the conflict between its long-term aims and the spontaneous interests of the masses, conceived now in an increasingly materialist frame of reference, is likely to be.

In the history of the communist regimes in question, this basic contradiction between the goals of utopia and modernity appears in the form of a succession of concrete policy conflicts. As we have seen, development requires not only that expert managers and administrators be trained but also that they be given authority in production, security in the enjoyment of material privileges and some influence on policy. Yet the security of a privileged stratum is incompatible with the goal of a classless society, and its influence on policy would

[28] The analogy with the influence of the early puritan religion on zeal for work was stressed by Maurice Meisner.

[29] Cf. the early Soviet criticism of the Chinese communes along these lines.

[30] This counter-argument has been used not only by Mao, particularly since the Socialist Education campaign of 1964, but increasingly by Fidel Castro.

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tend in a conservative direction and inevitably come into conflict with the total power of a party committed to that goal. Hence communist regimes in developing countries sooner or later experience conflicts between two kinds of élites: the élite of revolutionary veterans identified with the utopian orientation, and the new technocratic élite aspiring to influence in the name of rational economic development. Although the veterans' generation necessarily dominates the party apparatus at first, the party's interest in preserving its power may eventually cause some key leaders to take an independent position, leading typically to a 'generation crisis' in the party and to a major change in its composition.

Again, the choice between the use of ideological and material incentives and of coercive measures in economic life is likely to cause different kinds of conflict at different stages of development. During the most dramatic phase of industrialization, one major issue is the need for inequality of rewards in order to stimulate both the growth of the new stratum of engineers and managers and the ambition of gifted workers to acquire skills, earn promotions, and initiate technical improvements; here conflict arises between the long-term egalitarian ideals of communism and the need to raise productivity. At this stage, the consumption of the mass of unskilled workers new to industry has to be kept so low that their education to working discipline can be assured only by intense propaganda, increasingly supplemented by economic penalties and direct coercive threats. As the level of industrial productivity advances and the influx of untrained labour from the countryside slows down, mass coercion may become both less necessary because of the greater range of available goods and less useful because of the need to promote a sense of positive responsibility for the maintenance of machinery and the quality of the products, rather than mere submission to discipline. At this stage a major shift from the role of coercion to the use of material incentives, familiar from the history of capitalist industry, becomes rational. But if carried out in a communist dictatorship, such a shift is likely to reduce the political power of the agencies of coercion; moreover, it will tend to reinforce the role of 'economic man' and correspondingly to reduce the importance of communist ideology in the life of the working masses. At this stage, therefore, conflict is likely to turn on the relative importance of economic tasks and ideological tasks in the activity of the ruling party.

Finally, once the structural obstacles to economic development have been removed, economic growth may be expected to proceed most rapidly if further violent upheavals are avoided and all productive classes can go about their daily business with a sense of both personal and social security, that is, without fear not only of new waves of terrorism but of further sudden, politically imposed changes in their social situation. Any revolution from above, undertaken by the regime in order to prevent the consolidation of new class differences

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and to preserve the party's freedom to work toward its long-range goal, is bound to disturb that sense of security, hence to interfere with the continuity of growth and to cause economic losses that may be severe. It follows that revolutions from above will be initiated only after serious policy conflicts between the advocates of renewed revolutionary change and the defenders of steady economic growth. In such conflicts, the supporters of a new turn of the revolutionary screw will typically argue that the economic losses caused by the break in continuity—say, by forced collectivization or by a wholesale purge of the managerial personnel or by the introduction of the 'communes' in China—will be merely temporary, since the new measures, besides assuring the party's hold on power and the next step towards the utopian goal, will also unleash new forces of popular initiative in production whose impact will more than compensate for the initial setback. But the closer the development of a communist country approaches the level of a modern industrial society, the more difficult it will be to sustain such an argument.

THE dynamics of communist regimes in developing countries thus appear to be characterized by recurring conflicts not only between the two kinds of goals pursued by those regimes, but between two types of social change arising from their policies. As the communists succeed in destroying the obstacles to modernization rooted in the structure and culture of the given traditional society, in inculcating a new discipline of production and new 'materialist', achievement-oriented values, and in creating a framework for the operation of material incentives, the tendency to further economic development becomes increasingly spontaneous, or self-sustaining, in the sense of no longer depending on deliberate political action. However, this new type of spontaneous change, being based on the material self-interest of individuals, also tends to create new class differentiation, and thus comes into recurrent conflict with the other goal of the regime, the classless society. Hence the communists seek again and again to undo those ideologically undesirable by-products of economic development and spontaneous social change by using their monopoly of state power to impose centrally manipulated social change guided by their ideology—in other words, by initiating repeated revolutions from above. For change in the direction of utopia does not become spontaneous—that, indeed, is what is meant by calling a goal 'utopian'.

Yet in this persistent conflict between development and utopian goals, and between the tendencies of spontaneous social change and the policies of imposed social change, the balance of forces itself is changing in the course of time, and that in two different ways. On the one hand, we observe throughout the history of these indigenous communist regimes a kind of natural alternation in which periods of revolutionary upheaval are followed by periods of consolidation and economic progress, and these in turn by new revolutionary upheavals,

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though the alternation does not seem regular enough to be properly described as cyclical. On the other hand, it seems evident that the very success of economic development tends in the long run to strengthen the forces of spontaneous, self-sustaining change, which are typical of modern societies everywhere, while making the cost of further imposed revolutionary change not only higher and more obvious, but less likely to be recovered by a new upsurge of enthusiasm. Our argument, then, suggests the existence of a long-term trend toward the victory of modernization over utopianism: as communist-governed, developing societies approach the level of advanced industrial societies, the arbitrary reshaping of their social structure by ideologically guided political power—in Marxist terms, the reshaping of their 'basis' by their 'superstructure'—becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible. But once a communist party regime recognizes that permanent revolution has reached its limit, it becomes extinct as a movement regime and turns into an essentially conservative bureaucracy; and such a change of function and values is bound to affect its institutional structure as well.

* * * * *

THE foregoing analysis has in fact been based on a version of the much-criticized totalitarian model of communist party dictatorship —a version that shares with other versions the selection of a 'syndrome' of specific institutional features that may be used to define the concept. In our version, as introduced in the early part of this essay, there are only four such features: an institutional monopoly of policy decision, organization, and information for the ruling party and the freeing of the state from all legal limitations in the exercise of its tasks.[31] (It will be seen that the last point, adapted from Lenin's definition of dictatorship, implies the possibility of terror.) But whereas some other versions, once influential and now widely criticized, portrayed totalitarianism as a political system essentially resistant to change,[32] we have followed those authors who emphasize the role of totalitarian dictatorship as a powerful agent of thoroughgoing, centrally manipulated and recurrent social change imposed from

[31] This version has been long used by me. See my articles: 'Stalin's Testament', *Twentieth Century*, London, March 1953; 'Our Peculiar Hell', *Dissent*, Autumn 1957; 'The Permanent Revolution is on again', *Problems of Communism*, no. 5, 1957; 'Totalitarian and Democratic Revolution', *Commentary*, June 1960; 'Stalin and Ideology', *Survey*, July–September 1960; 'The Revolution Withers Away', *Problems of Communism*, no. 1, 1965; 'The Model of the Totalitarian State', in Royal Institute of International Affairs; *The Impact of the Russian Revolution, 1917–1967* (London, 1967).

[32] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (first published 1951); Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (first published 1956). In his revised edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), Friedrich has changed his account of the role of terror, but holds that the Soviet political system is still essentially totalitarian in the sense of his definition. Miss Arendt, on the other hand, states in her new introduction to the latest paperback edition (New York, 1966) that the Soviet Union ceased to be totalitarian after Stalin's death, but she indicates no other causes of the change.

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above with a view to transforming society in the direction of a preconceived, utopian goal—of 'permanent' or at any rate recurrent revolution from above.[33] We have further suggested that the specific dynamism of the revolution from above requires the extreme concentration of power in the specific totalitarian institutions, which in turn require the utopian goal and the dynamism of imposed change for their legitimation.

Our underlying thesis is that although the conscious purpose of a totalitarian dictatorship is to change the social structure without changing the political system, the planned social change results inevitably in unintended and indeed unforeseen political change. In another part of this chapter we have tried to describe and analyse how this political change comes about in cases where the ideologically guided transformation is accompanied by, and frequently conflicts with, the modernization of an underdeveloped society. For studying this question, the case of the Soviet Union is clearly of crucial importance as offering the longest period of the successful modernization and transformation of an underdeveloped country by a totalitarian communist regime. We started with three hypotheses. First, that in the process of development, planned revolution from above leads to recurrent conflict with unplanned, spontaneous evolution from below, which tends to take a different direction. Second, that with the success of development, the forces of evolution from below tend to get stronger and the forces of revolution from above weaker until the process of recurrent revolutionary transformation loses its momentum and finally comes to a standstill because the cost of further imposed transformations to the regime itself, in terms of economic strength and international power, is seen by the regime as prohibitive. Third, that the loss of revolutionary dynamism, by depriving the totalitarian political institutions of their legitimation, is bound to become a major cause of change in these institutions.

The first of these hypotheses—the recurrent conflict between the two tendencies—has been confirmed for the three countries examined. The second hypothesis—the loss of revolutionary momentum as a result of successful development—clearly applies in the Soviet case, and less clearly, because of the precipitating role of exogenous factors, in the Yugoslav case. In the Chinese case, it has so far received an indirect and negative confirmation at best—because the pursuit of the permanent revolution appears to have stopped development at an early stage, but also because utopianism appears to have been reinforced by the extraordinary objective difficulties of development. The third hypothesis—crisis and change in the political institutions of the party dictatorship following an end of revolutionary dynamism—offers a key to the understanding of the post-Khrushchev replacement of one-man leadership by bureaucratic oligarchy in the Soviet Union, as well

[33] Above all Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War* (first published 1942; reprinted New York, 1965).

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as to that of the continuing political experimentation in Yugoslavia; both systems, though preserving the political monopoly of the communist party, have by now departed from the totalitarian model in different ways.

I should like to conclude these reflections by referring to a suggestion of Alex Inkeles. In discussing the need to integrate the study of communist systems more effectively with the general body of the social sciences, he observed that whereas the totalitarian model has had its uses for an understanding of the former, at the present stage of our knowledge and of the development of communist societies it must necessarily be supplemented by use of the 'developmental model' and the 'model of the industrial society'.[34] In this essay I have tried to show that where communist dictatorships in underdeveloped countries are concerned, the totalitarian and the developmental models do indeed describe two interconnected and conflicting aspects of one and the same process, but that where the model of the industrial society takes sway, the totalitarian model begins to lose its relevance.

BUT if a communist regime tends to lose the revolutionary momentum characteristic of totalitarian political systems as it approaches the level of an industrial society, how are we to describe the new political forms of its post-revolutionary, and therefore potentially post-totalitarian, phase? May we say that a new kind of political system has emerged?

We have described three kinds of typical conflicts between utopian and developmental tendencies in communist regimes, and have examined in each case the political consequences of a victory of the developmental approach. In the conflict between the revolutionary veteran élite and the post-revolutionary expert élite, a victory of the experts leads, in one form or another, to a major change in the party's composition, and hence in its outlook. In the conflict over the role of moral and material incentives, a victory for economic man leads to a growing acceptance of materialist values, and in due course to a major decline in the role of coercion, a corresponding decline in the political and economic power of the security police, and the disappearance of mass terrorism as an instrument of policy. In the conflict over the continuation of the revolution from above, the ultimate disappearance of revolutionary dynamism leads to a critical change in the party's image of its role in society and therefore to a crisis in its political legitimation.

Clearly, these three kinds of political change not only are rooted in the same process of development, but tend to reinforce each other. But they do not occur simultaneously nor even necessarily in the same sequence in difference countries. Thus the drastic change in the

[34] Alex Inkeles, 'Models and Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society', *Survey*, July 1966.

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composition of the CPSU that followed Stalin's mass liquidation of the revolutionary veterans did not end the Party's utopian commitment to permanent revolution (or indeed Stalin's own), though it helped to prepare the ground for resistance to later revolutionary projects based on a realistic recognition of their cost. The change in Party membership also helped to reinforce the climate of materialism, but it took 15 years of further industrial advances to bring about the disappearance of forced labour as a major sector of the Soviet economy. The end of mass terrorism, in turn, obviously made further revolutions from above more difficult, but by itself did not convince Khrushchev that he could not continue to launch such transformations by non-violent means.

In Yugoslavia the external threat from Stalin forced the regime by 1952–53 to discontinue both mass coercion and the attempt at permanent revolution; but though both changes must have weakened the position of the veteran élite, the veterans' defeat was not consummated until 1966! The example illustrates the truth that the effect of developmental pressures on communist regimes makes itself felt slowly and not in a straight line; indeed, as the case of China shows, these pressures are not necessarily irresistible.

Let us now look at the combined effect of the three changes on a communist political system.[35] When they have all taken place, we still find a communist party holding a monopoly of political power. That party now largely consists of a post-revolutionary generation of fairly well-educated members, including a considerable number of economic and technical experts. The regime is neither using mass coercion nor trying to impose revolutionary transformations on society, but seeks simply to increase its national power and economic productivity. But although it has in practice renounced the specific goals of communist ideology and the totalitarian dynamism that flowed from it, it has still preserved most of the totalitarian institutional framework. The monopolistic party is still in a position to control all mass organizations (though in Yugoslavia it does so less strictly than in the Soviet Union), and it may still act as a power above the law if it chooses (though in Yugoslavia it does so less frequently). The party's monopoly of information even in Russia has been weakened by the effect of foreign contacts, foreign technical and scholarly literature, foreign communist newspapers and foreign broadcasts; but part of those changes are still reversible, and though they suffice to make the official manipulation of opinion less than total, they do not permit the formation of independent opinions except by a very small élite.

[35] With respect to the Soviet Union, I have developed some of the points that follow in my papers 'The Soviet Union in the Post-Revolutionary Era: An Overview', in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics since Khrushchev* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968); and 'Von der gelekten Revolution von oben zur spontanen Evolution von unten', in Richard Lowenthal and Boris, Meissner, eds., *Sowjetische Innenpolitik* (Stuttgart, 1968).

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Yet though the totalitarian institutional framework has in the main been preserved, the basic relation between the political system and the development of society has been reversed. Formerly, the political system was in command, subjecting an underdeveloped society both to forced development and to a series of revolutions from above. Now, the political system has to respond to the pressures generated by an increasingly advanced society. Formerly, the communist political superstructure was concerned with forcibly transforming the system's economic and social basis, contrary to the generalizations derived by Karl Marx from the evolution of the industrial society in the West. Now, the economic and social basis of the countries under communist rule, having reached a state of development comparable to that of the modern West, is beginning to transform the political superstructure in the manner familiar from the Marxist interpretation of history.

ONE of the first signs of this reversal of roles is a reduction in the range of government and party activities and an increase in the legal and social security of the individual. As the leaders lose the belief, and the subjects the fear, that further major upheavals may be imposed on the social structure from above, and as the climate of mass coercion evaporates with the dismantling of the apparatus for imposing it, the regime loses the power to mobilize the people except in national emergencies. 'Spontaneous' mass demonstrations and 'voluntary' participation in political study groups disappear from everyday life, and the sphere of privacy and autonomous leisure, in which the party and its mass organizations do not normally intrude, is correspondingly extended.

Next to the autonomy of the private sphere, there develops a growing autonomy of intellectual life. The natural sciences, recognized as indispensable for the country's economic and military progress, are the first to win the struggle for independence from dogmatic ideological control. But as the society becomes more complex and the ideologists less secure, the need for sophisticated techniques of economic planning facilitates the autonomous development of economics as well; and as unplanned and unforeseen phenomena occur because of the society's spontaneous evolution, empirical social research has to be encouraged to enable the rulers to find out about them and respond to them. Finally, the decline in the authority of the official faith, and particularly the growth of moral problems unforeseen in its canonical writings, stimulates a desire for autonomous development and experimentation in literature and the arts, for which the growing autonomy of leisure provides a market. The regimes tend to respond by permitting a greater variety in form while only maintaining a censorship of content against ideas liable to foster political opposition or undermine social discipline.

In the most general terms, it is the growing differentiation of an advanced society that faces communist rulers with new problems and

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demands; and though spontaneous development in a framework of state ownership of the principal means of production does not, at this stage, confirm their fear of a rebirth of capitalism, it does confront them with a variety of conflicts of opinions and interests that require policy decisions. In Soviet economic policy, the proponents of strict central planning with modern mathematical methods stand against the supporters of increased managerial autonomy oriented to flexible prices on the market; the advocates of priority for armaments and heavy industry against those who stress the claims of agriculture and chemicals or of industrial consumer goods. In military policy, the nuclear missile lobby is fighting the defenders of maximum conventional flexibility; in foreign affairs, the enthusiasts of all-out aid to national-revolutionary regimes in developing countries are opposed by the sceptics. In the handling of the scientific and literary intelligentsia, the bureaucratic supporters of rigid control are at odds with liberal spokesmen for those professions who assert that the most loyal of citizens cannot do creative work without some freedom to experiment.

Soviet political leaders, anxious to preserve their monopoly of decision-making, will not permit these conflicting interests and opinions to be represented by independent groups or organized factions; yet they know that well-informed decisions require the airing of conflicting arguments in their councils and at times even in public. As a result, they have established a variety of forums [36] for the discussion of such issues to supplement their discussion inside the top bureaucracy—a device amounting to the encouragement of interest articulation by informal and impermanent bureaucratic groups. The Yugoslav leaders, with their stress on 'socialist self-management', have long gone much further in institutionalizing the articulation of interests in chambers of producers, but continue to prevent their aggregation by rival political tendencies or factions. In either case, the open voicing of disagreements on policy questions by party officials acting as informal spokesmen for conflicting interests has become a necessary element of the decision-making process, so much so that participants must feel assured that no serious harm will come to them if their cause is defeated. To this extent, policy conflict inside the ruling bureaucracy has become legitimate even in Russia, though the top leadership still reserves the right to decide which particular issues will be discussed and for how long.

What has emerged, then, is a political system in which both the spirit and the procedures of single-party rule—the regime's concept of

[36] Under Khrushchev, the holding of enlarged Central Committee meetings with hundreds of outside experts—specialists in industrial planning and management, or in agriculture, or in cultural affairs according to the subject—and the publication of the minutes of those discussions served this function, among others. Though this practice has been discontinued under his successors, the publication of opposing views in specialized journals and occasionally in the daily press has become even more frequent; but care is now taken that no member of the Politbureau, the ultimate 'arbitrating' body, should express personal opinions on controversial issues until a decision has been reached.

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its own role and its manner of governing—have been profoundly altered by the change in its functional relation to society. The communist party can no longer claim that its task is to use state power to transform the social structure in accordance with its utopian goals; it knows it must react to the pressures and demands of society. But wishing to keep its monopoly of power, it is not resigned to conceive of government as a mere representative of the needs of society—for a truly representative regime would have to be a pluralistic regime, permitting independent, organized groups to struggle for their opinions and interests and to reach decisions by coalitions and compromises. Rather, the post-revolutionary party regime sees itself as an indispensable, authoritative arbiter above the various sectional interests, recognizing their existence but regulating their expression and limiting their representation while retaining for itself the ultimate right of decision. Unable to continue its revolutionary offensive against society and unwilling to be reduced to a mere expression of the constellation of social forces at a given moment, it is neither totalitarian nor democratic, but *authoritarian*: it is on the defensive against the forces of autonomous social development, a guardian clinging to his role after his ward has reached adulthood.

One symptom of this defensive situation of a communist party ruling an industrial society is its search for a new ideological legitimation. No longer able to justify its rule as a dictatorship of the proletariat needed to achieve full communism, it claims that its guardian role is necessary to assure a steady growth of production and welfare (which will eventually lead to communism), to prevent the penetration of foreign influences hostile to the country's socialist achievements, and generally to maintain national unity, independence, and greatness. As the fate of Khrushchev's attempt to reorganize the Party as an agency of economic super-management has shown, the argument that a party dictatorship is needed for steady economic progress has little plausibility in an advanced country—even for the party bureaucrats themselves. Accordingly, the tendency to give an increasingly nationalist interpretation to the old legitimizing slogans about the need for ideological unity and the defence of socialist achievements appears to become universal among post-totalitarian communist regimes.

At the same time, the renunciation of further revolutions from above and the acceptance of the primary need for continuous economic growth lead to a strong emphasis on rationality, not only in the running of the economy but in the methods of bureaucratic government. The improvisations of dynamic, personal leadership come to be distrusted, while the predictable regularity of bureaucratic procedures—in the application of the party statutes, of the administrative rules, and of the law—comes to be stressed. A regime thus committed to bureaucratic rule necessarily shows a tendency to become both oligarchic and conservative, and to favour the consolidation of the privileges of the 'new class'.

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Yet there exists an increasingly obvious conflict between the wish for bureaucratic rationality and stability on the one hand and the nationalist transmutation of communist ideology on the other, a conflict that reflects the persistent contradiction between the requirements of legitimizing the party dictatorship and the growth conditions of an industrial society. The ruling bureaucracy will tend to be rational and legal in its methods so long as it does not feel threatened in its privileged positions by pressures from below; but once such pressures make themselves felt, it will be quick to proclaim that the fatherland is in danger and to tamper with the legal guarantees in the name of a national emergency. This, at any rate, has been standard practice for post-totalitarian communist systems up to now. It seems to reflect the basic dilemma of these new authoritarian dictatorships, which, in contrast to the totalitarian dictatorships they have succeeded, have found it necessary to tolerate certain limited elements of pluralism but are still seeking to keep them under tutelary control.

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SOVIET AND CHINESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

David Luck

RECENT events should give pause to those analysts who detected in Russia's post-Stalin social and political development a stable trend towards increased rationality and humanity in decision-making. The persecution of the intellectuals since the Twenty-third Party Congress, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', the effort to rebuild a Russian-led world communist movement undertaken at the Moscow communist conference, the Soviet role in the Middle East, all suggest that economic and social modernization do not necessarily 'cause' or make inevitable a parallel political tendency. In short, political sociology and political analysis are not identical for the Soviet case.

In all political systems, and particularly in those where power is highly concentrated, such as Russia today and China before the Cultural Revolution, executive politics is a partly autonomous sphere. This is clearly the case with foreign policy even in a relatively pluralistic system like that of the United States. And in matters of both foreign and domestic policy it is certainly even more so in Russia and was so in pre-Cultural Revolution China. If we admit the partial autonomy of communist executive politics,[1] then the necessity of élite analysis for macroscopic explanation and prediction should be clear. This entails 'Kremlinology' in the sense of an essentially speculative search for indicators of élite interrelations, values and decisions,[2] but also something else: comparative historical élite analysis using a common framework.

To do so, we elaborate and apply one aspect of Weber's 'charismatic' and 'bureaucratic' ideal types of leadership style. Such efforts have been made before in the analysis of Russia and China, but only on unsystematic, non-comparative bases[3]; we will attempt a systematically comparative approach. By the 'ideological charismatic' mentality is meant an inclination to rely on ideas, exhortation, persuasion, socialization, common values, or 'charisma' itself for purposes of mass mobilization.[4] The 'bureaucratic' style denotes a ten-

[1] This is the product not only of broader circumstances, but also quite simply of the men themselves: FDR *v.* Eisenhower, De Gaulle *v.* Daladier, a Stalin *v.* a Brezhnev.

[2] Cf. Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, for a fine recent example of this approach.

[3] For applications to Russia, see S. P. Huntington and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Political Power*, and Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power*; on China, see H. Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization*, Lewis, *Political Leadership*, and Barnett, *China After Mao*.

[4] In order to simplify what will be a rather complex analysis, we will define 'charisma' as implying ideology . . . though not necessarily the reverse.

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dency to emphasize organization, specifically, concrete negative and/or positive sanctions for mobilization. Both these definitions, it must be remembered, are idealizations. The following analysis will show that most individuals and groups reflect only differing 'mixes' of the two tendencies, especially in the Chinese case.[5]

THE following comparison will be cast in three sections. First, two broad historical sketches: of Soviet politics during 1917–22, 1922–29, 1929–39 and 1939 to the present, and of Chinese development during 1911–27, 1927–49 and 1949–65, which will highlight some points for comparison. Second, a specific comparison of three aspects of events in China during 1965–69 with two periods in Soviet political development, 1917–29 and 1933–39, which will seek to explain some of the similarities and differences pointed up in section one. A concluding section examines possible alternative futures for Chinese political development in the light of the comparisons and recent events in Russia and China.

Looking briefly at the communist power seizure in Russia and China, important differences are immediately apparent. In Russia, a half-industrialized, partly-urbanized society disrupted by the First World War, the Bolsheviks took control through a quick urban coup d'état. Following this they fought a rural but relatively short and conventional civil war to consolidate their urban power. In the Chinese case, the social disruption was much greater. China was just beginning a painful industrialization, and lay fragmented in the aftermath of dynastic collapse. All of this chaos was exacerbated by support given to regional warlords by outside powers attempting to preserve spheres of influence. Finally, the very inexperienced Chinese Communist Party leaders lacked even a 'nation' to make a revolution in, so disintegrated a society was China during 1911–27, and so lacking in national tradition was the Chinese political culture.

Because of these differences and difficulties the communist power seizure in China was neither so rapid, nor achieved by the same means as in Russia. Instead of an urban coup and short, conventional civil war, the Chinese communists had to fight a bitter four-year political

[5] It is also worth asking whether these types as reflected in non-ideal reality are in some sense 'universals'. Certainly in the comparative communist realm a real basis for the analytical distinction does exist. Marxist-communist ideology, on the one hand, socializes many of the individuals in a given communist movement into thinking and appealing to others in quite 'idealistic' terms, despite the manifest anti-idealistic content of the original ideology. On the other hand, whenever a communist movement has attempted to seize and maintain power, certain organizational requirements have been created to which, from all evidence, many personalities in the movement have responded. This has definitely been true in the Soviet and Chinese communist cases. As for the intriguing question of the universality of something resembling Weber's distinction between activist types, we leave it open. But John Lewis, 'Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat . . .' (*China in Crisis*, p. 481), suggests this universality.

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struggle, and then a 22-year rural, largely guerrilla civil war, participating along the way in a world war, before being able to enlist war-generated peasant nationalism, attain central power, and reintegrate China.

Concomitant with these initial sociological contrasts are certain differences in élite structure and type. The Russian revolution was made by two relatively distinct types of activist, coming from two quite distinct environments. On the one hand, the leadership included a number of cosmopolitan, ideologue-intellectuals who had spent much time outside of Russia, writing, proselytizing, thinking more about ultimate ends than the concrete means to attain them. During the crucial years of 1914–17, these men—Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Rykov—were either outside Russia or huddled in the cities, philosophizing, debating, scarcely at all involved in what another section of the leadership was doing: creating the bureaucratic means necessary for the seizure and maintenance of power. Involved here were men who had never left Russia, who had spent most of their political lives in hiding, or in prison. They were the organizers of the underground, Stalin, Kuganovich, Molotov, Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and the rest.

Except for Stalin, who during the pre-war years sometimes circulated among the Party's intellectual leaders, these two types had rarely interacted. Both stayed pretty much within their separate environments, and the war had cut them off for another three years. Then, suddenly, they came together in Moscow and Petrograd and were catapulted into power, bringing with them widely divergent perspectives on ideology and organization. It appears that the intellectuals initially saw bureaucratic organization as something to be used solely for the implementation of ideologically-determined policy, if at all, and felt rather uncomfortable with it. Trotsky's statement, when asked about a Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to the effect that he would 'just issue a few revolutionary proclamations and close up shop', well sums up this early attitude. In making this generalization, though, we do not imply that the ideologue-intellectuals were completely ignorant of certain other potentials of a large bureaucratic organization. Lenin in particular eventually recognized its significance for domestic political competition, but died before he could check the Stalin-led master bureaucrats. Trotsky also possessed an organizational genius of sorts, but not of the sort possessed by the men from the underground.[6]

Flung into power with these intellectuals were the organizers, personified and led by Stalin. They had built the Party structure during

[6] Trotsky's genius was one which led him to *build* an organization to attain an *ideological* goal. But he possessed no inclination to use that organization for a purpose other than its original one. Thus Trotsky built the Red Army and led it to victory in the civil war, then scarcely three years later let Stalin remove him from the Military Commissariat.

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and before the war, had lived *in* it, not above it, and were now far more inclined to regard it as an end in itself and as a road to power than were their distant intellectual overlords. Marxist ideology concerned them hardly at all, except, in Stalin's case, as a means to distract the intellectuals while manipulating organization to secure their downfall.

And this is exactly what Stalin did during 1922–29. He first took a rightist policy stance, isolating hyper-leftist Trotsky from the other intellectuals, and by 1924 had eased him off the Military Commissariat. Stalin then swung even further to the right, all the while playing on personal antagonisms, and aligned with Bukharin, Rykov and Tomski against his erstwhile allies Zinoviev and Kamenev. These two finally united with a belatedly-awake Trotsky, but again too late; Stalin soon had all three removed from the Politbureau and Secretariat, replacing them with cronies from his secretarial hierarchy. In all the other top Party organs and below, supporters of the deposed intellectuals were replaced by men directly or indirectly enlisted by Stalin. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomski,[7] meanwhile, accepted all this, only sensing their danger when Stalin attained his absolute Politbureau majority and began a policy swing to the left. They fought back with the few organizational resources remaining to them, but were quickly vanquished. By 1929, then, Stalin had completely packed the higher Party, state, police and military organs with men he presumed to be his complete adherents.

During 1929–33 they behaved as if they were, accepting the collectivization atrocities. By the 1934 Party Congress, though, some of these hardened creatures—probably led by Kirov, a man who had come up in Zinoviev's Leningrad apparatus and retained vestiges of ideological idealism—had had enough blood and terror and desired an economic relaxation.[8] At the Congress they may have formed a Politbureau majority large enough to force concessions from Stalin. Also, many Party and state functionaries were beginning to drag their heels in revulsion against the terror and as vested interests in stability began to crystallize.

From these facts two possible explanations may be drawn for what happened next, the Great Purge, and both seem partly correct. First, Stalin's terrible paranoia magnified the events of the Seventeenth Congress into a direct threat to his personal power position, a threat which he wanted to eliminate once and for all. Second, he sought to shake up the bureaucracies, especially the economic hierarchy, to destroy crystallized vested interests and in general to make people work as if their lives depended on it.

[7] Tomski, allied on a policy basis with the Bukharin right, was a trade union bureaucrat; he is the only major exception to the otherwise polarized state of Soviet bureaucrat-ideologue conflict during the later 1920s.

[8] Cf. Rostow, *Dynamics of Soviet Society*, p. 55; also, Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite*.

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The holocaust of 1934–39 appears to have satisfied both of Stalin's motivations. The old intellectual opposition and the new, real or potential, Party, state and military bureaucratic oppositions were decimated, with the survivors thoroughly cowed. Even the police purgers were purged and re-purged. And the economic bureaucracy, though bloodied, was in some awful way reinvigorated. Personal cliques, 'family groups', mutual protection societies, and all forms of vested interest were broken up in the whirlwind of institutionalized paranoia, backstabbing and liquidation.

Little need be said about the ensuing years, those of the Second World War and between war's end and Stalin's death. What appears to have happened is that during the 1940–45 lull in intra-bureaucratic terror, the interests in stability and economic rationality reconstituted themselves, even entering the Politbureau in the person of Malenkov. Stalin tolerated this for a while, as post-war Russia struggled to rebuild, but there are indications that he was creeping towards another massive blood-purge, for which the Leningrad massacre was a trial run. From the scanty evidence available, he was frustrated in this design only by the manoeuvres of Beria and his allies. Consequently, with Stalin's demise, Soviet society was able to enter a period of rationalization and humanization, though of a limited, erratic and unstable kind.

These years of Khrushchev's rise and the post-Khrushchev collective leadership featured the weakening of the police terror apparatus and the substitution of less violent mechanisms of political competition, and then a struggle between Khrushchev's own dictatorial ambitions and the Presidium's collective leaders. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin the collective leadership principle has triumphed for the time being, bringing with it several ambivalent trains of policy. The economic liberalization begun under Khrushchev has continued, but the overall foreign and cultural policy lines have taken an increasingly neo-Stalinist direction. The Soviet military-industrial complex and its allies in the Party seen to be gradually pushing the Kosygin-led moderates into the background.

IN our attempt, however, to explain the Chinese political present and define the Chinese future, it will be more useful to refer in the main not to the Soviet present, but to Soviet politics during 1922–29 and 1933–39, and compare these with several aspects of Chinese political development.

The crucial initial sociological point of difference was that the Chinese Communist Party was founded in an environment far more disintegrated than the one in which the Russian Bolsheviks had succeeded just months before. One immediate consequence may have been the willingness of the inexperienced leadership to abide by Stalin's order to form a united front with the 'bourgeois-nationalist' Kuomintang. This was done in 1923, and until 1927 the élite structure of the Chinese Party bore a strong resemblance to that of the Soviet Party

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during its pre-revolutionary years. In the cities leadership consisted of a few ideologue-intellectuals, personified by the educator-philosophers Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu, while elsewhere in the cities but mainly in the rural areas other men worked at a basic organizational level among the miniscule proletariat and the peasant mass.

In 1927, however, this structure changed drastically. With the impending success of his Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek pre-empted the communists, turning on them and nearly exterminating the Party's urban-intellectual section. Only a scattering of survivors escaped the cities to join the peasant organizers in the countryside. This, of course, is an exact opposite of what had earlier occurred in Russia. Unlike Kerenski, Chiang had plenty of military power at his disposal and was willing to use it.

In a sense, pushing the comparison forward several years, it might even be suggested that Chiang behaved in 1927 as 'China's Stalin', with his purge of the Chinese communist intellectual leaders. Yet this comparison is less useful analytically than the preceding. For the most important and lasting result of Chiang's coup was not the slaughter of the communist ideologue-intellectuals, but rather the elimination, through a long KMT control over the major cities of China, of the split élite environment which had facilitated the development of the nearly dichotomous ideologue-bureaucrat split in Russia. If allowed to continue in China, this dual environment would probably have reproduced the bifurcation in the communist élite, whatever Chiang had done in 1927. But he controlled the cities and from then on there was not to be a set of Chinese cosmopolitan, internationally-oriented, urban ideologue-intellectuals, with bureaucratic types building organization elsewhere. Instead, all the leaders worked in similar environments, using both ideology and organization to mobilize the peasantry. And this over a period of 22 years.

What happened to the two leadership styles over this long and difficult civil war period might be described as a further 'compression', a compression within individual personalities and between individuals of originally differing tendencies. Bureaucratically- and ideologically-inclined leaders and tendencies did not generally conflict, but were integrated in the long years of rural revolutionary practice. For sheer physical survival, they had to be. As Tang Tsou puts it:

> In the conduct of inter-party struggle as a means of unifying the party . . . the CCP departed at an early date from Stalin's practice of bloody purges and developed a new style of inner-party life.
>
> In accordance with this diagnosis, the CCP established a practice of opposing 'mechanical and excessive struggle' within the party. Instead of investigation, arrest, and imprisonment in inner-party struggle, it placed primary reliance on the method of 'criticism and self-criticism' in order to resolve inner-party conflicts

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> . . . to achieve unanimity in thought, and to 'cure the disease and save the person'.
>
> The development of this more moderate form of inner-party struggle took place at a time when the CCP was still a minority party constantly threatened . . . and when the communists *had to achieve unity in order to survive.* (Emphasis added.)[9,10]

With the two tendencies thus integrated, the Chinese communists were eventually able to attain power. They enlisted mass nationalism while the KMT decayed, using both organizational methods and ideological appeals to further that mobilization. And after they took control and reintegrated China there was no quick bureaucrat-ideologue split as had been the Soviet case. The principal reason for this seems clear: the long and arduous socialization of the civil war had fused the ideological and bureaucratic styles within the mind of each important Chinese communist leader. Moreover, it had strongly bound most of these leaders to each other on a personal basis. Neither set of bonds was perfect (see note 10), but they were to endure for quite some time, long enough to continue to highlight the striking difference between Chinese and Soviet political development. Indeed, except for the 1954 Kao Kang affair, which appears to have been more of a matter of Kao's regionalistic inclinations than anything else, the élite remained outwardly united for about seven years. Where by 1925 Soviet political competition was approaching a complete bureaucrat-ideologue polarization, the Chinese communist élite during 1949–56 seems to have experienced relatively little crudely power-oriented infighting, and none at all along bureaucrat-ideologue lines.

In more detail, 1950–56 saw a shift of the entire élite in a bureaucratic direction. Under the first Five-Year Plan the Soviet Union was adopted as the economic development model, with all the bureaucratic industrial, commercial and agricultural trappings. Other manifestations of the same trend were Mao's relegating himself to a more figurehead-like leadership role, with Liu and Teng Hsiao-ping

[9] Tang Tsou, 'Revolution, Reintegration, Crisis . . .', *China in Crisis*, p. 318.

[10] Yet it is also reasonable to suppose that some differentiation, in a structural if not in a psychological sense, remained. John Wilson Lewis argues that Mao during the civil war functioned and thought primarily along ideological-charismatic lines of mobilization, while out in the field Liu Shao-chi was more attuned to organizational mobilization (see Lewis's article in *China Briefing*, p. 17; see also *China in Crisis*, pp. 450–51). As a description of a rough division of labour this analysis seems valid and accords with our feeling (see note 5) that any communist movement at any time and place will to some degree offer both bureaucratic and ideological environments, and include at least *potentially* separable bureaucrats and ideologues. But Lewis also suggests that Mao and Liu at this early date differed on general mobilization strategy. Such may have been the case, yet Lewis's evidence is not convincing. It seems more likely that Mao and Liu, despite their differing mobilization environments—the secure caves of Yenan and the uncertain territory behind Japanese lines—thought about and encouraged mobilization along both bureaucratic and exhortative lines. Under the long-term pressure of war, in sum, only a slight structural basis for a future élite split along rough ideological-bureaucratic lines existed, not the psychological fact of the split.

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taking increased operational responsibilities; the effort of Liu and Peng Chen to regularize the legal code; the removal of reference to the 'thought of Mao' from the new constitution[11]; and last and most important, the 'Hundred Flowers' attempt to relax controls on the intelligentsia, which both Mao and Liu appear to have sponsored.

The middle and late fifties, however, saw this trend stopped, and then sharply reversed as a number of forces combined to make the latent bureaucrat-ideologue differentiation more manifest, though still far from dichotomous or irreconcilable. The most important of these was the outcome of the 'Hundred Flowers' relaxation: a torrent of anti-regime criticism from the intelligentsia. A second factor may have been Russia's increasingly revisionist domestic and foreign policies, particularly the downgrading of Stalin.[12] Third, the bureaucratization of China's economy and society may finally have reached a point where the more potentially ideological leaders began to feel things had gone too far. Finally, the agriculture sector of the economy with its Soviet-style collectives was lagging behind heavy industry; not yet disastrously so, but again enough to bother the incipient ideologues, Mao in particular.

The élite response to these circumstances was twofold, and it appears that almost all the principal leaders initially agreed on both measures. The more potentially-bureaucratic leaders, their still-strong ideological propensities also aggravated by some of these adverse developments, apparently swung leftward with Mao and were willing to try a less-structured, more exhortative mobilization strategy. Thus they embraced the vociferous anti-rightist campaign, led by none other than Liu Shao-chi. It prepared the way for a second move, the momentous 'Great Leap Forward' effort in the economy.

Just as the 'Hundred Flowers' bureaucratic initiative failed politically, though, so the ideological mobilization drive of the 'Great Leap' was an economic disaster, and one with even greater political effect. As the 1956 failure, in combination with other factors, had just begun to differentiate overtly between bureaucratic and ideologically tending leaders, so the 1958 fiasco pushed them still further apart. But still not to an irreconcilable distance, as indicated by the events of 1959–65. Both extreme bureaucratic and hyper-exhortative mobilization styles had been tried and found wanting, and their proponents may now have desired time to lick wounds and think things out. This was most true of the Maoist ideologues, since their defeat had been the more recent, more crushing, and most dysfunctional of the two.

In addition to these defeats Soviet behaviour during the 1957–59 period may also have had a temporary reintegrative effect on the two tendencies. Irritated by Chinese ideological pretensions and struck

[11] Gene T. Hsiao, 'Background and Development . . .', *Asian Survey*, June 1967, pp. 392–94.

[12] Which perhaps started Mao thinking about ways to trump the Soviets ideologically along the road to 'communism'.

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by the excesses of the Great Leap, the Khrushchev leadership began to cut off economic and technical aid, refused to lend direct military backing to China in the Quemoy crisis, and reneged on its nuclear-sharing commitment. All of which may have inflamed the common nationalism of China's bureaucratic-ideologues and ideological-bureaucrats, helping them compromise for longer than might otherwise have been the case.

Their truce was hammered out during the eighth plenum, at Lushan. On the one hand, the most articulate critic of the Great Leap (Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai) was sacked along with several of his close military associates and replaced by the more guerrillaist Lin Piao. But on the other hand, secret police bureaucrat Lo Jui-ching moved up to head the General Staff. More revealing of the slant of this compromise was Mao once again resigning himself to a figurehead position, in handing over operational responsibilities to Liu and Teng. The policy result was soon apparent: a decided turn to the bureaucratic right, in an effort to salvage the economy from the wreckage of the Leap. Peasants' private plots were encouraged, village markets permitted, while the communes were drastically scaled down and the cadre system regularized. In brief, Liu and Teng had moved to recreate the bureaucratic environment, and were to spend the next five years operating in it; Mao retreated to a different environment: his own mind's 'Caves of Yenan'.

These measures saved the economy and perhaps the regime, as China struggled through the 'three bitter years' and the rebuilding period of 1962–65. During the first span, revolts were reported in several provinces, while in other areas Party organization broke down and PLA restiveness increased, all of which appeared to threaten the existence of the regime. Under these trying circumstances the ideologues kept quiet and the façade of élite unity was preserved despite the bureaucratic upswing.

From 1962 to 1965, though, a third series of events and trends, both internal and external, once again shattered the façade and brought élite political competition along clearer bureaucrat-ideologue lines out into the open. The economic recovery, under bureaucratic auspices, undoubtedly strengthened the tendencies of men already inclined to favour concrete incentive mobilization, while irritating the more ideological leaders, especially the inactive, frustrated Mao. Nonetheless, the fact of economic recovery gave him some margin for whatever anti-bureaucratic measures he had been concocting while so long inactive. He very definitely had been thinking in such terms, for, in contrast to the politico-economic re-bureaucratization and social relaxation, his ally Lin Piao had since 1960 been leading a successful ideological drive within the PLA, one that quieted the restiveness of the 'bitter years'. From 1962 on Mao sought to extend this drive to society as a whole, in the intelligentsia-targeted 'Socialist Education Campaign' and the more general exhortation to 'learn from

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the PLA'. But these efforts were not very successful. Liu and Teng probably saw to that.

Yet another precipitating factor may have been that Mao had begun to feel his age and, according to his interview with Edgar Snow, was quite aware of his approaching death and what it might mean for the ideological tendency in China, particularly among the post-civil war generation. He felt that China's youth would need some sort of 'revolutionary' socialization. Mao quite likely also believed that his death or its imminence might set off a vicious succession struggle, one which he preferred to settle beforehand, rather than leave to be determined after his passing.

As during the two previous cumulations of élite-splitting circumstances, finally, external factors placed a crucial role. The Soviet Union continued its revisionist drift under Khrushchev and his successors, at least in Chinese eyes, with the test-ban treaty and the Tashkent settlement. China herself suffered a stunning series of foreign policy setbacks: the decline of Indian neutralism, the collapse of the Algiers Conference, a great loss of prestige in Africa, Nkrumah's fall, the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, and in Vietnam, where the massive American commitment during 1965 probably forestalled a rapid communist victory.

As Hinton suggests,[13] the Vietnam situation may have actually triggered the Cultural Revolution. With its foreign affairs in a shambles, and a long-term military confrontation against both Russia and America an immediate prospect, Mao and Lin apparently came to a final decision that China's internal affairs had to be set in order for the long siege to come. The Socialist Education and PLA emulation drives had been early moves in this direction, but these had become bogged down, and the duumvirate then embarked on a series of measures which, they hoped, would resocialize a whole generation, win the succession struggle for the ideologues, shake the bureaucracies to their roots, and gird China for a long struggle against a 'Moscow-Washington' axis.

THESE measures and events, the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', can be analysed in three aspects, two of which are usefully comparable to developments in Russia during the 1920s and 1930s, and one of which is distinctly Chinese. All three aspects have intertwined in such a way as to make comparison to the Soviet case, where a gap in political competition separated the events of the 1920s from those of the 1930s, extremely difficult. But the effort will be made, because the preceding comparison of Chinese and Soviet political development in terms of bureaucrat and ideologue types may help explain both the 'why' of similarities and differences in

[13] Harold C. Hinton, *Policy-Making and the Power Struggle* . . ., p. 13.

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each comparable aspect of the Chinese case, and the fact of near-simultaneity of the two aspects in China. That comparison may also throw some light on the third aspect, though it lacks a Soviet precedent.

The first aspect of the Chinese situation, the top-level conflict between the Maoist Cultural Revolution Group and some of the more bureaucratically oriented leaders, is similar to Soviet politics during the 1920s only with respect to the general terms of the struggle: the two leadership tendencies are present in both cases. But they are much more clearly dichotomized in the Soviet one. This difference immediately strikes us, as does another which is related to it and equally significant. In Russia of the 1920s the bureaucrats routed the ideologues, while in China, at least at the uppermost élite level, approximately the reverse has occurred. The reason for this reversal is twofold, both reasons deriving from the Chinese lack of dichotomy in the leadership tendencies.

That is, despite the conflict over power and policy between China's 'ideologues' and 'bureaucrats'—the split *between* individuals—the split *within* individual personalities on both sides of the overt struggle is not nearly so clear, due to lingering effects of the long civil war compression and to the 1949–56 continuation of solidarity. First, several of the Maoist 'ideologues' (Mao himself, Lin and Chou En-lai) still retain considerable bureaucratic political skill, at least so far as top-level manoeuvring is concerned. Second, the 'bureaucrats' still have strong ideological propensities, propensities perhaps strong enough to keep them split on certain policy bases and prevent them from uniting around any one leader or organization until too late to prevent their defeat. In comparative terms, the Soviet ideologue-intellectuals, a relatively pure type with the possible exception of Lenin (who died too soon to prove the exception), appreciated primarily the policy-administering, not the political competition potentials of large bureaucratic organization; the Chinese 'ideologues', with very much more bureaucratic experience, appreciate both. (And Mao, perhaps 'China's Lenin', is not yet dead, thus providing the 'ideologues' with the leader they lacked in Russia.) The Soviet bureaucrats of the 1920s, again a relatively ideal type from a relatively homogeneous and differentiated environment, cared little about ideology and were willing to support quite pragmatically all of Stalin's organizational and policy machinations; the much more ideologized Chinese 'bureaucrats' are still very policy-oriented, so much so that they might well allow the Maoists to take them by surprise, keep them leaderless and split several ways on a policy basis, and purge them one by one.[14]

[14] Oksenberg, 'Comments', in *China in Crisis*, pp. 487–500, and Lucien Pye, *Authority Crisis*, p. 24, are among those criticizing the idea that the Chinese bureaucrat-ideologue split is at all dichotomous; for a rather dichotomized view, cf. Barnett, op. cit., p. 114.

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The events of 1965–69 do seem to bear out these comparative generalizations. In late 1965 Mao emerged from several years of obscurity and called for the Cultural Revolution to begin, at first only as an intensification of the lagging Socialist Education and 'learn from the PLA' campaigns, but met with little positive response. Peng Chen controlled the crucial Peking Party apparat, while Liu and Teng controlled most of the rest of the Party bureaucracy, and they apparently took Mao's new initiative no more seriously than they had taken the previous two. At this rebuff Mao retreated to Shanghai, to all appearances giving up the Cultural Revolution, and remained completely silent for some six months, amid rumours of his death.

His proxy, Lin Piao, though, engaged the 'bureaucrat' with the most powerful organizational association, General Staff head Lo Jui-ching, in a vitriolic foreign policy debate. While doing so Lin said relatively little against other élite potential anti-Maoists, thus attempting to split the opposition before it saw itself as an opposition. He preached military guerrillaism, anti-Sovietism, and caution against Lo's argument for a reconciliation with Russia in order to strengthen China's conventional military capacity, and his espousal of a more active Chinese role in the Vietnam war, perhaps even direct intervention. Lo's potential 'bureaucratic' allies, however, appear to have wanted a rapprochement with Russia for quite different reasons, or wanted none at all. Peng Chen, despite his bureaucratism, remained rabidly anti-Soviet; while Liu and Teng are reported to have wanted closer relations with Russia only for the purpose of securing economic aid, not for a more aggressive foreign policy.[15] The not-so-pragmatic Chinese 'bureaucrats' were split over policy and Lin Piao acted accordingly with his isolation and destruction of Lo.[16] In short, this was another reversal of what had happened in Russia of the 1920s, where the master bureaucrat Stalin had first isolated and deposed military commissar Trotsky before turning on the rest of the ideologues.

Lo fell in November 1965, and, perhaps more certain that the Vietnam war would not soon engulf China, Mao and Lin began to attack the rest of the top level, real or potential bureaucratic opposition. Peng Chen, then Lu Ting-yi, then Liu, and finally Teng were

[15] Donald S. Zagoria, *Asian Triangle*, chap. III, esp. pp. 67–83; see also his *China in Crisis* article, pp. 237–38.

[16] In fact, it may even be that during late 1965 Peng Chen actually helped Lin against Lo. As just mentioned, Peng may have agreed with Lo in the matter of general mobilization styles, but they parted company on attitudes towards Russia. Beyond this, Lin was not yet attacking Peng; he and Lin had long been personal associates, and Peng had also been close to Peng Teh-huai before the latter's 1959 dismissal, a dismissal which Lo probably played an active role in securing. That Peng Chen allowed the 1965 Peking publication of Wu Han's 'Dismissal of Hai Jui', a transparent call for Peng Teh-huai's rehabilitation, also suggests the existence of considerable hostility between Peng Chen and all who played major roles in deposing Peng Teh-huai. At any rate, Peng Chen appears to have given Lo no real help against Lin.

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isolated, made scapegoats and purged.[17] By the end of 1966 the Maoists could feel secure in their control over the top-level organs of the major bureaucracies. In a nearly complete reversal of what had happened in Russia during the 1920s, they had fragmented and purged the bureaucratic opposition at the central élite level.

At the middle and lower echelons, though, matters had not been so clearly resolved. With some local military backing, many provincial Party and state apparats had as yet been little affected by what had gone on at the top or by the late 1966 Red Guard rampage. Throughout 1967, therefore, the Maoists were to try to extend their power downwards and outwards, in a set of moves that may be compared to Soviet developments during the 1930s.[18]

TWO questions about this second aspect of the Cultural Revolution need to be answered: why it occurred at all, in some ways similar to the Stalin purge, and why, in what far more important ways, it differed? The basic motivation for the lower-bureaucracy purging aspect of the Cultural Revolution may have arisen from the fact that, again, the Maoist ideologues retain a considerable knowledge of bureaucracy and bureaucrats. In other words, they are sensitive to the problems of bureaucratic crystallization, family-grouping, vested interest formation, and so forth,[19] and one facet of their response resembled Stalin's. They tried to purge the major hierarchies by way of denunciation and seeking scapegoats.

A second Maoist purge motivation may also have resembled

[17] Peng Chen fell in March 1966, as the Maoists attacked 'Dismissal of Hai Jui' and his protection of its author. After some verbal grappling, the Cultural Revolution Group advanced army units loyal to Lin towards Peking, at which Peng capitulated. Then Party propagandists Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang were attacked and purged for failing to bring the intelligentsia into line. At this, Liu finally sensed danger; returning in mid-1966 from a trip overseas, he found that what we will later analyse as the second aspect of the Cultural Revolution—the Red Guard assault on his Party apparats—was in full swing. He called out Party work teams in an effort to fragment the rampaging youths, and then made what John Israel describes as a 'fifty-day bid for power' (see 'Red Guards . . .', *China Quarterly*, April–June 1967, p. 6) in August–September 1966. Liu tried to convene the Central Committee, where he probably had a bureaucratic, numerical majority. But just as the Soviet ideologues had deserted one another at crucial points, just as Peng had deserted Lo, so bureaucrat Teng Hsiao-ping seems at this time to have forsaken Liu. Refusing to second Liu's call for a plenum, he went over to the Maoists and helped set up a new committee, a stacked deck, much like Stalin's congresses of the later 1920s. It met, and soon after began the degradation of Liu as 'China's Khrushchev' and, more recently, as a 'renegade, traitor, and scab'. Teng's demotion also began at this meeting, his desertion to the Maoists having done him no more good than the vanquished Soviet ideologues' obeisances to Stalin had done them 25 years before.

[18] For another comparison between China today and Russia of the 1930s, see Schurmann, 'Attack of the Cultural Revolution on Organization and Ideology', *China in Crisis*, pp. 552–62. This comparison is cast in terms quite different from mine: Schurmann emphasizes external factors at both ends of the comparison, and his comparison is not developmental.

[19] Data on, for instance, the age of personnel in the provincial Party apparats may be found in Teiwes, *Provincial Party Personnel*.

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Stalin's, in quality if not in degree: paranoia.[20] In 1934 Stalin invented a conspiracy against his person, and it may be that the Maoists felt the same way about their power positions, as in their accusing Lo of plotting a military coup. That accusation rings no more true in the Chinese case than did Stalin's against the old Bolshevik and new bureaucrat oppositions. Yet this sort of peculiarly paranoiac behaviour has been far less common in the Chinese case than in the Russian, and is apparently not taken as seriously when it does occur. For this reason we attach considerably less weight to psychopathology as a Maoist motivation than for Stalin. Analysis of several outstanding differences between the two purges suggests the same conclusion.

The most important of these is that Stalin's was a true blood purge, taking the lives of several million Soviet bureaucrats and citizens, while Mao's has been far less murderous and systematically violent.[21] Violence and killings have marked the Cultural Revolution, but they have been far more the result of local anarchy than central planning. In terms of the comparison, the primary reason for this difference may again be that the Chinese purge is being conducted by men who are predominantly ideologues, not master, monster bureaucrats, and, more significantly, ideologues with a relatively humane and populistic ideology. That ideology was tempered during the long years of war and, as so well summarized by Tang Tsou, tends to emphasize subjectivism and the possibility of individual thought reform. All of which is a far cry from Stalin's bureaucratically bestial calculations, which could arrive at only one solution to the problem of opposition: *liquidation of objective categories of people.*

One more point of ideological difference is relevant here. Stalin's 'ideology', in so far as it existed at all, consisted of a fanatical desire for the quickest possible industrialization of Russia. His blood purge was probably one of the shorter routes. But the rapid economic development component of Maoist doctrine has been markedly de-emphasized since the collapse of the Leap Forward. So where Stalin's purge had both economic and political motivations, the Cultural Revolution has clearly not been designed greatly to accelerate production; if anything, the Maoists intended it to shore up the political foundations for what they now proclaim will be a long industrialization period.

This outstanding difference in the amount of fatal violence has been accompanied by differences in the mechanisms of purge, differences much more important than superficial similarities in making

[20] Analysts attaching far more significance to this motivation than I include Philip Bridgham, 'Mao's Cultural Revolution', *China Quarterly*, January–March 1967, and Stuart R. Schram, 'Comments', *China in Crisis*, p. 787, who regards Mao as senile. I doubt it.

[21] At the *élite* level compare Donald Klein, 'State Council and Cultural Revolution' (demotions), *China Quarterly*, July–September 1968, with the various sets of *death* figures on the Stalin purge presented by Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled.*

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scapegoats and name-calling. In Stalinist Russia the primary mechanism was a secret police penetration of the Party, state and military hierarchies, and of the populace. Secondarily, each level within each hierarchy was encouraged to attack the level directly above it. In the Maoist purge, though, the two principal instruments were the mobilization of the non-Party masses, led by the student youth in an attack on all levels of the state and Party bureaucracies, and the army as penetrator of the other three hierarchies and of the general population.

The difference in vertical purge mechanism derives directly from Maoist ideology. Mass participation in the struggle against 'authoritarian bureaucracy' is supposed to give the post-civil war generation a 'revolutionary mass-line' socializing experience. As for the key horizontal role of the military, that role may be explained in terms of the crucial position military organization has always occupied in Chinese communist political development[22]: in winning the civil war, and in saving the regime during the 'bitter years'. Consequently, in so far as its content is still integrated with past bureaucratic practice, Maoist ideology is specifically oriented towards military organization. That organization continues to be Lin's Red Army, which from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution has been penetrating other organizations of all levels. Numerous military men have moved on to the Central Committee, into the central state administration, into the Revolutionary Councils. They now dominate the propaganda-communications network and the secret police, and brought the Red Guards under control when their anarchic acts went beyond even the ideologues' tolerance level.[23]

THE growing indiscipline of the Red Guards and the partial fragmentation of the military that seems to have occurred at the same time brings up the third significant aspect of the Cultural Revolution, one that finds only a slight precedent in Russia of the 1930s. Namely, that the whole process began to escape Maoist guidance during 1967–68. Several reasons for this partial loss of control, however, can be appreciated in terms of our comparison. In China the top-level ideologue-bureaucrat struggle which comprised Soviet politics during the 1920s and something comparable to Stalin's 1930s' anti-bureaucrat purge have, as we have seen, been telescoped together, due to the long compression of the two tendencies and their sudden decompression into two quite undichotomous styles.

This evidently created more complications than the Maoists could

22 Chalmers Johnson, 'Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective', *Asian Survey*, January 1968, p. 4.

23 Data on the military penetration of other institutions may be found in Chu-yuan Cheng, 'Power Struggle in Red China', *Asian Survey*, September 1966, p. 473; and Ralph L. Powell, 'Increasing Power of Lin . . .', *China Quarterly*, April–June 1968, pp. 40 and 57.

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handle. Though a vital strand of our argument has been that the Maoist ideologues possess considerable bureaucratic skill, it remains true that they are not master bureaucrats of the Stalin ideal-type. Where Stalin could push Russian society to the brink of disintegration in 1938, even allowing the secret police briefly to escape his control,[24] he at the last second drew back, purged the purgers, and ended the holocaust. The Maoists, confronted with more complex calculations, possessing less of the bureaucratic ability to make them, and more ideologically inclined to press the destruction of bureaucracy (as distinct from the destruction of bureaucrats) farther than was Stalin, went too far in their attack on China's integrative institutions and let the Cultural Revolution run somewhat out of their control.[25]

Nevertheless, by mid-1967 and increasingly during 1968–69 the Cultural Revolution Group seemed to be developing a stronger appreciation of this problem, and began to take reintegrative measures, all the while ambivalently attempting to pursue its anti-bureaucratic goals. The Maoists called for 'three-way alliances' between the military, Red Guards and 'reformed' Party cadres at all levels, and for the creation of new provincial revolutionary committees under Peking guidance. In addition, they made some important top-level policy compromises with the provincial army commanders and the central economic apparatus, compromises which facilitated the calling of, and were apparently formalized at, the Ninth Party Congress. Whether the Maoists will by these means succeed in what seems to be a determined effort to rebuild a communist political system, or whether there are other feasible alternative futures for Chinese political development, will be discussed below.

ANY effort to define futures for a political development which has been as complex as China's must by necessity be highly speculative. The complexity, the completely qualitative nature of our approach to it, and our inability to take account of future external variables—such factors as the interaction between American and Soviet political competition and foreign policy, and Soviet and Chinese—all of which are far beyond the scope of this article, combine to make prediction a tenuous undertaking. Yet some conclusions, based on the Chinese-Soviet historical comparison, on current developments in Russia, and on the meagre information which exists about present conditions in China, can tentatively be drawn.

[24] Ezhov's attempts to get out from under Stalin come to mind here, as does General Blucher's reported 1938 plan to march on Moscow.

[25] Another important element complicating the Maoists' calculations has been the regionalist tradition, a tradition which finds little echo in the tightly centralized Russia which the Bolsheviks inherited. This Chinese tradition was manifest in the Manchu dynastic decline, the warlord period, and Chiang's inability to reintegrate China before the Japanese attack. During the Cultural Revolution the refusal of a number of provincial commanders to follow central orders may be another manifestation.

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One future which might be regarded as feasible involves a 'Chinese Stalin', with China going through a terror-bureaucratic phase. Tao Chu at one point excited comment in this connexion; he was held to be the sort of 'tough' and possibly terroristic bureaucrat who might logically be expected to come to power after the passing of the revolutionary-ideologue generation, just as happened in Russia. But Tao has since fallen on hard times, along with many of his bureaucratically-inclined comrades. He was apparently purged for opposing the extension of the Cultural Revolution into the provincial Party apparats. More generally, given the telescoping in phases of political competition described above—China, we suggested, may be having as much of a Stalinist phase right now as it is going to have for some time—given the disruption of all the bureaucracies, given the subordination of the police to the military, and given the dominant role of bureaucratically-skilled ideologues at many organizational levels, it does not seem likely that a Stalin-type will soon ascend to power with the means to mobilize and rule through terror.

Perhaps a little more realistically, might the so-called 'bureaucratic', 'pragmatic', individuals and groups somehow coalesce and reintegrate China, skipping the Stalinist phase of Soviet development and bringing China to where Russia is today? This is the 'optimistic' view of the Cultural Revolution's ultimate outcome,[26] but while seemingly more feasible than a terrorist outcome, it is not much more so.

For one thing, just how 'rational', 'pragmatic', and 'humane' are Soviet politics today? More so than under Stalin, assuredly, but not stably so. Despite the surface of solidarity, Soviet political competition and policy have been in a state of flux and regression since Khrushchev's fall. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and subsequent repression of the liberal communists, the assertion of the 'Brezhnev Doctrine', the Soviets' monolithic pretensions at the world congress, Soviet behaviour in the Middle East, all indicate that the Kremlin's progressive elements are fighting and slowly losing a delaying action against the Soviet military-industrial complex and the neo-Stalinist faction of the Party. Kosygin remains in the Presidium, of course, and the economic liberalization continues, but this policy line appears increasingly as only a holdover from the Twenty-third Congress, when the progressive elements were somewhat stronger than they are now. Cultural policy, given the repression of the liberal intellectuals and the 'unofficial' anti-semitic campaign, is clearly drifting in a Stalinist direction. And foreign policy, though here the progressives seem to have considerable Party support—possibly including Brezhnev—against the military-heavy industry coalition, has evidenced the same drift, albeit slower. In short, while no complete reversion to the Stalinist pattern is soon likely, no further humanization

[26] Cf. Pye, op. cit., where it is forecast that the outcome of the Cultural Revolution will politically parallel the economic changes made in the aftermath of the Great Leap.

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of Soviet political competition and rationalization of policy is in immediate prospect either.

For another, just how 'rational' and 'pragmatic' is or was the Chinese opposition to the Cultural Revolution? Our analysis suggests that while generally less ideologized than the Maoists, these 'bureaucrats' still have strong tendencies in that direction, tendencies which would likely continue to influence policy greatly if they were to reorganize and attain power. Indeed, the content of their pragmatism, especially in the foreign policy sphere, is difficult to appreciate. But if Lo Jui-ching's ideas are at all representative, then perhaps another few years of Lin's sort of verbal brinkmanship plus striking behavioural caution would not be such a bad thing. In any case, the analysis also suggests that, in a pattern approximately reversing the Russian of the 1920s, the bureaucatic opposition is leaderless and disarrayed, too much so for it to attain anything approaching an absolute victory. They have been beaten; not so badly as were the Soviet ideologues by the Soviet bureaucrats, but badly enough to prevent China from entering a 'Khrushchev' or even a 'Brezhnev' phase for a long time to come.[27]

[27] Late last year several other alternative futures also appeared plausible. They seem less so now, but are still worth noting. For one, if the Cultural Revolution lasts long enough, or if Mao dies before reintegration is achieved, might regionalism increase to the point of neo-warlordism and the collapse of communism in China? (Analysts advancing this hypothesis include Scalapino and Johnson, op. cit.) Certain trends in this direction exist (see note 25), but on the whole it may be that a combination of factors pointing in the opposite direction will be sufficient to prevent either a further degeneration towards warlordism or some other form of communist collapse. Among anti-regionalist psychological factors should be counted an awareness common to all factions in the Cultural Revolution of the history of regionalism and what it did to China, a common and intense nationalism, and the strong probability that men such as Mao, Lin and Chou possess a somewhat higher order of ability to calculate anti-regionalist action than did the Dowager Empress and Yuan Shih-kai. A number of structural factors also militate against a long-term return to regionalism. The military institution now exists as a much more respected, more united, and more integrative force than was the case during the early years of the Republic, and this is true despite occasional localist assertions by the military. Also, the structure and legitimacy of the Party have not been so badly damaged as some observers had thought; that the Maoists have for some time been engaged in a determined effort to rebuild the Party is clearly indicated by the calling of the Ninth Congress and its proceedings. In this connexion, cf. G. Bennett, 'China's Cultural Revolution . . .', Asian Survey, January 1970. The economy and the economic bureaucracy appear to have come through the Cultural Revolution in relatively good shape, certainly in much better shape than was the 1911–27 situation. Similarly, the networks of communication and transportation are much better developed now, both of which should facilitate the army's integrative role. Finally, the role of external powers has been reversed as between the years of Republican collapse and the Cultural Revolution. Before and after 1911 outside powers were able to foster regionalism by supporting warlords. No such access exists today. Instead the outside world, particularly Russia, is used as an integration-producing hate-symbol. The sum of all these psychological and structural factors makes most unlikely the regionalist, non-communist alternative future. And perhaps this is just as well. For then reintegration, if ever achieved, might be attainable not by 'pragmatic' bureaucrats, or ideologues, or even calculating 'terror bureaucrats', but by a more megalomaniacal activist type, a Chinese Hitler, another twentieth-century Ghengis Khan.

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IT is also doubtful, though somewhat less so, that the Cultural Revolution Group has or will achieve an absolute victory. The Maoists do control the tops of the major hierarchies, in so far as these hierarchies still exist, but this is exactly their problem. In a number of entire provinces and in large areas within others central orders are still not being carried out properly or at all, despite universal lip-service to the 'Thoughts of Mao'. In several of these provinces conservative military leaders and other factions interested in terminating the Cultural Revolution seem to have linked up. In fact, by the middle of 1967 a general stalemate in the provincial-level Cultural Revolution seems to have been reached.

The Maoist response to local stalemate has varied from place to place, but beginning about then the most frequent has been compromise. They pronounced 'Maoist' many revolutionary committees which are anything but. They also accommodated provincial and central military and economic interests in allowing the gradual curbing of Red Guard activities. And in what must have been the most painful compromise of all, the Maoists had to call for the formation of 'three-way alliances, implicitly admitting that quite un-'reformed' local Party cadres were successfully riding out the Cultural Revolution.

During 1968–69 these trends seem to have accelerated at all levels. At the top, several of the most ideologically-vehement members of the Cultural Revolution Group were purged, with arch-red Wang Li falling hard. This may have occurred because of a misfired power play on Wang's part, but it seems more probable that the virulent ideologue was purged in order to maintain the Group's alliance with Chou's economic bureaucrats and the military. It may also have occurred as part of the now-successful Maoist campaign to gain support for the 1969 calling of the long-delayed Ninth Party Congress and the formal anointment of Lin Piao as Mao's heir. The Congress came off, Lin was anointed, and Chou remained close to Mao, both moves possibly intended by Mao to balance the remaining ideologues in the Group: his wife, Kang Sheng, and Chen Po-ta.[28]

Of course Chou has long been considered to be something other than a strict Maoist; all of his past institutional associations and his ambiguous role in the Cultural Revolution to date suggest otherwise. Only recently have a number of analysts realized that Lin may fall in the same ambiguous category.[29] It is now noticed that he has a long history of association with the military bureaucracy, and not just as a guerrillaist but as a large-scale organizer and strategist: his division inflicted the first large-scale conventional defeat upon the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War, and he organized the offensive that drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea. His political

[28] On the Ninth Congress, cf. *Peking Review*, 11, 14 and 28 April 1969.
[29] Cf. Kikuzo Ito, 'Dilemma of Mao . . .', *China Quarterly*, July–September 1968, p. 25; Bridgham, '. . . Cultural Revolution in 1967 . . .', ibid., April–June 1968, p. 23; and Zagoria, his *China in Crisis* article, p. 266.

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skills have also been more widely acknowledged, and the possibility admitted that he might have worked his way into Mao's confidence during the post-Lushan years by behaving more 'guerrillaistically' and ideologically than was the real case. So far as his actual behaviour during the Cultural Revolution is concerned, all his public remarks (unlike Chou's) are thoroughly Maoist; but as the Cultural Revolution slipped increasingly out of the Maoist grip and the necessity for compromise became clear, Lin's words and Lin's actions, the latter as measured by the behaviour of army units in most areas of China, did not accord. Since 1967 the military has been instrumental in crushing the Red Guards and in keeping Chou's economy on its feet.

This suggests the hypothesis of an alliance within the Cultural Revolution between Lin and Chou. Both are ideologically articulate, both have also long functioned in bureaucratic environments, and both have lately proven themselves to be clever politicians. If such an alliance was formed at or before the Ninth Congress, or if it crystallizes within the next year or two, it would not be surprising if they or their younger protégés were to purge the Cultural Revolution Group of its remaining hyper-ideologues after the passing of Mao.[30]

Given the possibility of this alliance, in the light of the Maoists' many compromises with bureaucratic reality, and in the light of the fact that an extremely serious élite schism was once before compromised (in 1959), it seems most probable that some sort of reaccommodation of the ideological and bureaucratic tendencies will characterize Chinese political development over, say, the next decade. What sort of domestic policy might be expected from such a compromise regime? One result may be a new balance between bureaucratic and ideological styles of mobilization, a better balance than has characterized Chinese politics since the failure of the Hundred Flowers set off the 10-year oscillation of extreme exhortative and extreme incentive modes that led into the Cultural Revolution. This balance might resemble the relatively successful 1950–56 pattern, though with somewhat larger ideological and more coercive bureaucratic components, allowing for the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and the rapid growth of China's population.

Whether a compromise regime and a balanced mobilization policy, if actually achieved, could last beyond the 1970s for a span sufficient to industrialize China is quite another question. This again will depend heavily on the external factors emphasized above, particularly on Sino-Soviet relations. A war between Russia and China is and will remain a realistic possibility, one which a miscalculation on either

[30] Something similar to this hypothesized army-economic alliance may have occurred earlier at lower levels, though data are scarce. One appropriate indicator may be the pushing in many provincial radio broadcasts of an army-economy-Party alliance, with Lin's name always prominently featured. And again, this alliance is suggested by the military's 1968 role in curbing the Red Guards, and in 1969 by its carting them into the country for agricultural work.

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side—or on the Russian side, a calculation—could cause. It is also possible that American foreign policy could eventually bring the two states closer together, to a point where Russia might resume economic aid.

Holding external factors constant, however, and assuming industrialization were to proceed under the leadership of men like Lin and Chou, it might not be the best thing that could happen. Yet considering the other alternative futures, it might be very far from the worst, at least where foreign policy and the danger of a nuclear war being sparked somewhere along China's Asian periphery are concerned. For in their bureaucratic tendency, such men are Stalin-like calculators and can probably be deterred from launching direct aggression to the north or south by the credible threat of a Soviet or American nuclear response. And in their guerrillaist ideological tendency, the development of an Asian region prosperous and nationalistic beyond the threshold of successful communist insurgency may be sufficient to turn them inward for the very long time that it will take China to industrialize. Whether an appropriate balance between resources allocated for direct military deterrence and those allocated for regional construction is ever achieved, though, primarily depends not on China's or Russia's political development, but on America's.

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FINNISH COMMUNISM

Kevin Devlin

THE Extraordinary Congress of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) which took place on 14 and 15 February 1970 was largely a formal affair. It approved the carefully prepared reunification plan and it avoided all controversy. It stood in striking contrast to the Fifteenth Congress (in April 1969) which was the stormiest and most controversial in the Party's 50-year history, and which marked the climax of a bitter factional struggle which had brought Western Europe's third-strongest communist party—and the only one participating in government—to the verge of an open split.

In part, this struggle reflected the divisive impact of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia on European communism in general. Nowhere else, indeed, has communist disunity over the issues raised reached such proportions. Only in neighbouring Sweden has the challenge to the Party leadership become as threatening as in Finland; and there the numbers involved were much smaller, the Party much less important in national political life and the internal crisis less acute.

In order to appreciate the significance of this struggle in the case of Finland, which despite the formal reunification is far from over, one must glance at the background—the SKP's half-century history [1] and the unique geopolitical relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union in the post-war period.

Finnish communism began in blood and bitterness. The country's declaration of independence in December 1917 (after a century as a Tsarist province and seven centuries of Swedish rule) was followed by a short but savage civil war, pitting bourgeois-nationalist forces against a Red Guard fired by the Leninist example. When General Mannerheim, with German help, crushed the revolutionary army, the survivors fled to Russia, where the Finnish Communist Party was founded in exile. In 1928 police raids largely broke up the underground apparat set up in accordance with Comintern instructions. Two years later, following an anti-communist campaign by a right-wing organization, the SKP was declared illegal. A record of repeated failure, in short—and yet the tradition of class militancy established during the twenties and thirties laid the foundation of the SKP's future strength as the party of social protest.

Meanwhile, the new Finnish state was meeting the problem of relations with its mighty neighbour with a policy of what might be

[1] See John H. Hodgson, *Communism in Finland* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1967); Bengt Matti, 'Finland', in W. E. Griffith, ed., *Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change and the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 371–410; and James H. Billington, 'Finland', in C. E. Black and T. P. Thornton, *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1964).

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called anti-Soviet neutralism. Two wars within a few years ended that policy. The primary purpose of the Soviet attack on Finland in November 1939 was to strengthen defences on the Leningrad front, and the Finns could have obtained peace by acceding to the Kremlin's territorial demands. A secondary, more tentative purpose—suzerainty over the former Tsarist province—was indicated by the installation of a puppet communist government under Otto Kuusinen[2] at Terijoki on the Karelian Isthmus. However, the Soviet military offensive met stubborn, effective resistance; and the tentative political plan fared even worse. The entire nation, including communists, rallied to the anti-Soviet war effort: the Secretary-General of the SKP, Arvo Tuominen, was to have been Premier of the Terijoki government—but instead of accepting this doubtful honour he defected from the Party and called on Finnish workers to join in the fight against the invaders.[3] In the hard-fought Winter War there were lessons that the cautious Stalin would not forget: the readiness of the Finnish nation to take up arms in defence of its freedom, and the fact that Finnish communists were not immune to the virus of militant patriotism.

The settlement which the Russians imposed on the outmatched but undefeated Finns in 1940 was not punitive, consisting mainly of territorial annexations to guard the Leningrad marches. What is interesting is that they did not insist—as they could have done—that the Finnish Communist Party be relegalized as part of the settlement. This was one striking example of the Soviet leadership's fairly consistent tendency to subordinate the interests of the SKP (and of other foreign communist parties) to its own *raison d'état*.

However, the destiny of the SKP and the course of Finno-Soviet relations were both fatefully changed in 1941 when, following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, the Finnish government decided to wage what was essentially a revanchist war as 'co-belligerent' (not ally) of the Third Reich. When the Finns again admitted defeat in the 'Continuation War' (1941–44), they then had to fight a third war, to expel a German expeditionary force in accordance with the armistice terms imposed by the Russians.

This defeat, within the wider context of the Allied victory over the Third Reich and the advance of the Red Army into Central Europe, transformed Finland's geopolitical situation. Premier (later President) Paasikivi summed it up in late 1944 when he said that henceforth the first principle of Finnish foreign policy would have to be to avoid anything which would be harmful to Soviet interests. There was no doubt about it: Finland lay within the Soviet 'sphere

[2] Otto Kuusinen, one of the founders of the SKP with Yrho Sirola, later became a member of the Soviet Presidium and Politbureau; his daughter Hertta has been one of the top leaders of the Finnish CP since it was relegalized in 1944.

[3] During his exile in Moscow, Tuominen had been for a time secretary to Stalin. His three books of memoirs have been a mine of information and speculation on Finnish and international communism.

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of influence'. But while this severely limited her freedom in international affairs, it had much less effect on her domestic policies. The roots of Nordic democracy ran deep in Finland, which had never known feudalism or serfdom, and the Soviet victors made no attempt to dig them up. When they did exert pressure, it was mainly to help the local communists and to hinder right-wing social democrats like Veino Tanner—within the framework of constitutional democracy.

OF course, Soviet power could and did favour the fortunes of the relegalized Finnish Communist Party. The SKP was also helped not only by the tradition of class militancy mentioned earlier, but by the fact that the social democrats were deeply divided; and in late 1944 the communists joined a strong grouping of secessionist left-socialists in a new electoral front organization, the SKDL—the Finnish People's Democratic League. In the 1945 elections the SKDL became, and has remained, one of the four major forces in Finnish politics, the others being the social democrats, the agrarians or centrists and the conservatives. At the same time the SKP became, and has remained, one of the Big Three in the West European communist movement. Like the Italian PCI and the French PCF, it can count upon receiving between a fifth and a quarter of the national vote; and its electoral strength has been remarkably stable—in the seven general elections since the war its share of the total vote has varied between 20 and 23·5 per cent.

In the first post-war years the SKDL not only had the votes; it also had a substantial share of governmental power. At the beginning of 1948 the communists and their left-socialist allies of the SKDL held six portfolios, including the Premiership and the key Ministries of Defence and the Interior. Then came the crisis of March 1948—a turning-point in the history of the SKP and of Finno-Soviet relations—and within a few months ministerial power was a nostalgic memory for the communists.

The crisis began at the end of February—as the Czechoslovak communists were in the process of seizing power: an ominous conjuncture—when Stalin sent President Paasikivi a note calling for a Soviet-Finnish 'treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance analogous to the Hungarian-Soviet and Rumanian-Soviet treaties' which had just been signed, and which were clearly part of the Stalinist consolidation of the East European satellite regimes.

As President Paasikivi stalled for time—for a full month—the SKP launched a propaganda campaign against 'rightist' forces, and riots took place in Helsinki and other centres. In view of subsequent developments, it seems questionable whether this activity represented serious preparations for a communist coup d'état, as several writers have surmised.[4] Nor is it clear what role the communist Minister of

[4] See Billington, op. cit., p. 129 and Hodgson, op. cit., p. 205n.

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the Interior, Yrho Leino, played in the domestic crisis: in this writer's opinion, the commonly accepted story of how he gave Finnish army leaders secret warning of communist plans for pre-coup violence must be regarded as unproven.[5] At any rate, if there was any danger of an attempted coup, the anti-riot measures adopted by the army put an end to it.

Meanwhile, a seven-man mission with three moderate SKDL members, including Leino and Premier Pekkala, left for Moscow to bargain with the Russians on the demand for a treaty. In the course of the negotiations the Soviet line suddenly, magnanimously changed. Stalin settled for a friendship treaty, based largely on the draft that Paasikivi had prepared for bargaining, that was certainly *not* 'analogous' to the ones signed with Hungary and Rumania. Finland did not have to enter into a military alliance with the Soviet Union, as had seemed inevitable, and her neutrality was recognized.[6] One may speculate on the reasons for Stalin's leniency—in brief: it seems that he had much to lose and little to gain, strategically, by an attempt to incorporate Finland in the emergent belt of satellite states. What is certain is that his calculations were based primarily on the interests of his own regime: those of the Finnish Communist Party must have been of little or no concern to him.

The 1948 treaty institutionalized the 'special relationship' between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, its scope was limited. It gave the USSR decisive influence over Finnish *foreign policy*; but it left Finland's domestic sovereignty almost intact and her Western-Nordic democracy completely intact. This fact was reflected in the subsequent fortunes of the Finnish Communist Party.

In the elections of June 1948 the SKDL suffered its worst electoral setback, dropping from its post-war peak of 23·5 per cent of the popular vote to its lowest level, 20 per cent, and losing 11 of its 49 Diet seats (out of 200). But worse was to come. The new social-democratic Premier, K.–A. Fagerholm, refused the SKDL's demand for key ministries (Interior or Foreign Affairs), so that the communists were not represented in his government. (With the onset of the Cold War, the French and Italian Communist Parties had already been excluded

[5] Two months after the March crisis the Finnish Diet passed a vote of non-confidence in Leino, on the grounds that he had handed Karelian Finnish refugees of Soviet citizenship back to the Russians. President Paasikivi called on him to resign; Leino, backed by the SKDL deputies, refused to do so, whereupon the President dismissed him. Shortly afterwards Leino was expelled from the Communist Party (and divorced by his wife, Hertta Kuusinen). In 1958 Leino was about to publish his memoirs when the Finnish authorities suppressed the book—reportedly on the demand of the Soviet Embassy. On 22 February 1962 the Copenhagen newspaper *Information* published what it said were excerpts from the relevant chapter of the suppressed memoirs. These extracts indicated that Leino had *not* given any secret warning of an impending coup to the army.

[6] Under the treaty Finland bound itself to resist aggression by Germany or her allies directed *through Finland* against itself or the Soviet Union; but Finns would fight only within Finland, and only after 'mutual consultations' with the Russians.

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from their respective governments.) They were to remain out of government for 18 long years, while the other three major parties rang the changes on coalition combinations, at an average rate of a change a year. During that period the Soviet Union occasionally intervened in internal Finnish politics—notably in 1958, when they brought about the fall of Fagerholm's second government, and in 1961, when they in effect blocked the presidential candidature of the socialist-backed independent, Honka. But they did *not* at any time intervene, by invoking the 1948 treaty or otherwise, to obtain the re-entry of the Finnish communists into government, although they could clearly have done so had they wished. Again, and consistently, the interests of the SKP were subordinated to Soviet *raison d'état.*

Despite this, the SKP remained unconditionally loyal to the Kremlin. Organizationally as well as ideologically, indeed, it was the most Stalinist of all the West European parties. Thus, its reaction to the setback of 1948 was to institute a prolonged purge, during which more than 10 per cent of the members were expelled or excluded by the withholding of new Party cards. In part this was due to the background of the leaders. As one observer put it: 'Virtually all of them had been trained in Moscow, where they had watched silently as large groups of Finnish communists who had fled to the Soviet Union in 1918 and afterwards were gradually destroyed by Stalin's secret police.'[7]

The publication in 1956 of Khrushchev's 'secret speech' denouncing Stalin's crimes touched off a wave of often heated debate in many Western communist parties, but if there was any unrest in Finnish communist ranks, it was not reflected to any notable extent in the Party press. Similarly, the Party's reactions to the Poznan rising, the Polish October and the crushing of the Hungarian revolution were governed by the same unconditionally pro-Soviet reflex. By the same token, of course, the Party had to respond to the change in Soviet positions signalled by the Twentieth Congress. The result was a new Party programme, adopted in 1957, which paid at least lip-service to some of the new concepts introduced by the Twentieth CPSU Congress, such as the possibility and desirability of a peaceful road to socialism. Significantly, however, there was no reference to the Soviet Congress's condemnation of Stalin's crimes. As late as 1961 the Chairman of the SKP, Aimo Aaltonen, reportedly told a meeting of Party officials:

> Undoubtedly criticisms of Stalin have gone too far. Stalin certainly had his faults, but during the time he was in power there was need of iron discipline and a firm grip on the Party. During Stalin's time the CPSU was strengthened, and it is only because of what he accomplished that it is today possible to consolidate the Party's political activities on the firm ground he left.[8]

[7] Matti, op. cit., p. 387. The author notes that 'according to Tuominen, at least 20,000 Finns were purged in East Karelia alone'.

[8] Cited by Matti, op. cit., p. 390.

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It was perhaps characteristic of this Stalinist mentality that the SKP was notably reluctant to admit the scandalous existence of the Sino-Soviet conflict—and equally characteristic that once it did so, in 1963, it became one of the most unconditional supporters of the Soviet side.

NEVERTHELESS, the forces of revisionist change were beginning to move within the solid ranks of the SKP. In 1961 a group of ex-communists and left-socialists founded the journal *Tilanne* ('Situation'), which became a forum for the kind of free debate that was forbidden in the Party press. *Tilanne's* constant sniping at the neo-Stalinism of the Party leadership and its calls for a communist-socialist alliance to follow the peaceful, democratic road to socialism helped to encourage revisionist reassessment within the Party.

More important pressures for change came from the Party's non-communist allies of the SKDL. For two decades this electoral front organization served as an instrument of the SKP's policies. Communists occupied the great majority of the SKDL's Diet seats, and the Secretary-General of the SKDL was always a communist. But non-communists formed a comfortable majority of the League's membership; and in the mid-sixties they began to flex their political muscles. In February 1965 a non-communist candidate, Ele Alenius, challenged Hertta Kuusinen of the SKP for the vacant post of Secretary-General, and was elected by a majority of the board. Alenius promptly made it clear that the organization was no longer a docile communist-controlled front. In a programme address to the SKDL council a month later he pointed out that most of the 150,000 members were non-communists (the SKP itself had less than 50,000 members), and indicated firmly that continued collaboration would require radical changes in communist positions: the Party would have to show itself more genuinely independent of Soviet influence, and commit itself more fully to the peaceful approach to democratic, multi-party socialism. Moreover, the SKDL would have to work out its own political programme through free internal debate; and a basic aim of that programme should be the eventual achievement of a left-wing alliance—which, said Alenius, should include the social democrats as well as the communists.[9]

Under the influence of Alenius's challenge a spirit of critical rebellion spread with remarkable rapidity within the ranks of the SKP itself. In June 1965 an unprecedented ideological debate began in the columns of the Party press (the daily *Kansan Uutiset* and the theoretical organ *Kommunisti*) over such questions as the approach to socialism, the relevance of Leninist formulations to Finnish conditions, internal and external democracy and relations with other political forces.

In October 1965 the Central Committee responded to this debate by issuing an ideological statement which must have been the product of heated debate and divisions, but which did demonstrate a reluctant

[9] *Kansan Uutiset* (SKP daily), 30 March 1965, and *Tilanne*, May 1965.

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retreat on many of these newly controversial issues. Thus, the 'October Manifesto' explained that the Party would work for a peaceful transition to socialism, but within the unalterable framework of the class struggle, and recognized that it 'cannot alone determine . . . the future direction of development'. Again, while clinging stubbornly to the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat (renamed 'the hegemony of the workers'), the statement pledged commitment to 'the rights of free speech, assembly and organization, the right to strike and express free opinions, free elections and the same rights under law for those opposed to the government as for those supporting it . . . during the transition to socialism *and under socialism*', but balanced this again by rejecting as 'idle thoughts' any idea of a return to capitalism once socialism had been achieved.[10]

The shift in the Party's positions may have been reluctant, but it was also unmistakable. Otto Kuusinen, who had died a year earlier in Moscow, was spared the bitter knowledge that the Party he founded was capable of making even a passing reference to 'the crimes against socialist law and offences against democracy which have taken place in the USSR and certain other socialist countries'.

Change fed the appetite for more change, as the dikes of dogmatism crumbled after half a century. The intra-Party debate continued, and the pressures for revisionist reassessment, coming particularly from the communist labour and youth movements as well as from the 'New Left' elements of the SKDL, were maintained. And already, as *Tilanne* noted,[11] three distinct groupings within the Party could be discerned—anti-Stalinist progressives like the trade union leader, Erkki Salomaa; centrists led by Secretary-General Ville Pessi, who were prepared to accept limited change, preferably in phraseology, but stressed continuity; and the hard-line dogmatists led by Chairman Aaltonen, whose attitude is summed up in his remark that 'lice have eaten into the Party banner and the main thing now is to get rid of these vermin'.[12]

As it turned out, it was the 'vermin' who got rid of him. The Fourteenth SKP Congress in January 1966 was a turning-point for the Party and a defeat for the Stalinists. After nearly two decades of power Aaltonen lost his post as Chairman to the 'moderate-revisionist' trade union leader, Aarne Saarinen. His hard-line deputy, Oiva Lehto, was also ousted and replaced by the progressive Erkki Salomaa. While the progressives advanced and the hard-liners retreated, the centrists held their ground: Ville Pessi remained Secretary-General. The progressives were still a minority in the leadership—but a minority in whose direction the tide of events was flowing.

A few months after the Fourteenth Congress national political

10 *Kansan Uutiset*, 21 October 1965 (emphasis added).
11 Unsigned editorial, *Tilanne*, October 1965.
12 Cited by Katerina Brodin, 'Finland's Government', *Survey*, no. 62, January 1967, p. 138.

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developments strengthened the position of the progressive communists. In the elections of March 1966 the social democrats made substantial gains, becoming the strongest single party, while the communists and the Centrist (formerly Agrarian) Party both lost ground [13]—a fact which strengthened progressive criticism of the former Aaltonen leadership. There followed two months of complicated negotiations which ended with the re-entry of the communists into a 'grand coalition' government of the centre-left, after 18 years of political isolation.

AGAINST strong opposition in his own ranks the new social-democratic leader and Premier, Rafael Paasio, brought about this socialist-centrist-communist coalition by presiding skilfully over abrupt and radical changes in his Party's attitudes not only towards the communists and centrists but towards the Soviet Union—this last shift being dictated by the unique realities of the 'special relationship'. But the communist re-entry into government was something less than a triumph. The Party demanded the strategically important Ministry of Education, but meekly accepted the refusal of the request. It asked for four portfolios, but was content with three. The net result was two communist ministers (Social Affairs and Communications) and one non-communist SKDL deputy minister (Finance)—the progressive Alenius. And each of the three had to share control of his department with an associate minister from another party: the SKP was in government, but on probation.

The main result of the 'grand coalition' was not to produce any significant increase in Soviet influence over Finnish affairs, but to give the country a broad-based centre-left administration which was capable of taking urgent but unpopular economic measures, so that *Kansan Uutiset*, the 'Voice of the People', was soon anxiously explaining to the people why it was necessary to increase taxes. At the same time this development has an important influence on the internal struggle within the SKP. Moved by political opportunism, the centrist grouping led by Pessi and Hertta Kuusinen moved closer to the progressive wing, and away from Aaltonen's neo-Stalinists.

At the same time, however, the conservatives were beginning to fight back. As in the Austrian factional struggle following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, their strength lay in the local *apparatchiki*, notably in industrial towns like Turku (Aaltonen's own power-base), Tampere and Kuopio. For a time they were somewhat restrained by the habit of Party discipline, but by the summer of 1967 it had become apparent that an organized counter-attack was developing. The fire of the

[13] The social democrats won 55 seats out of 200, compared with 38 in the 1962 elections. The SKDL dropped from 47 to 41 seats and the centrists from 53 to 49, while the left-wing socialist splinter-party of Aare Simonen went from two to seven seats. These figures are, however, deceptive: thus, the SKDL's percentage of the vote dropped only slightly, from 22 to 21·2, although it lost six seats, whereas the left-wing socialists gained five seats, thanks to an electoral agreement with the communists, although their votes dropped by 40 per cent.

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dogmatists was concentrated on the parliamentary record of the progressive-centrists, their conciliatory (or opportunistic) attitude to the social democrats, and the new draft programme on which they were working.

By October 1967 the struggle was brought into the open. At the beginning of the month, in reply to a conservative attack, Deputy Chairman Salomaa declared:

> In our Party there is an organized opposition in operation . . . which from the very beginning has had a negative attitude towards the decisions of our Fourteenth Congress. Its attitudes are dictated by the struggle for power. . . . It tries to ride with Marxism-Leninism and canonizes itself as its sole defender. And what is really provocative is [the claim that] only this group supports and maintains good and fraternal relations with the Soviet Union and its Communist Party.[14]

A week later the Turku Party organization stepped up the counter-offensive with a statement demanding that 'a special congress of the Party be summoned as soon as possible to reorganize the Party leadership. The special congress should express its opinion that the policy pursued by the Party leadership since the Fourteenth Congress is harmful to the working people.'

During October 1967 the growing struggle was also exacerbated by the publication of the new draft programme, which touched off another round of often polemical debate. The new draft was a predominantly revisionist document which dropped many dogmatist formulations and declared, in a phrase reminiscent of Italian communist ideologues, that 'the Finnish CP aims at realizing socialism in a peaceful, democratic way, which means that the steps towards socialism would be a series of reforms, the precondition for which would be a parliamentary majority supporting [such] reforms'.[15] In December 1967 the Central Committee debated what Pessi euphemistically called 'differences of opinion' within the Party, and decided that efforts must be made to avoid polemics and restore Party discipline. But the main result in practice was a decision to revise the controversial draft programme: the struggle went on, becoming steadily more bitter.

Four months later the Central Committee (or, more accurately, its progressive-centrist majority) issued a long statement defending its participation in the government and other domestic policies, while admitting and deploring 'the characteristics of factionalism which have led to the weakening of Party discipline, the violation of Party regulations and organizational principles, injuring democratic centralism as well as engaging in a kind of conscious effort to weaken the prestige

[14] *Kansan Uutiset*, 2 October 1967.

[15] The SKDL had by this time produced its own, more revisionist programme, which was adopted at the SKDL congress in May 1967. This fact, of course, made it more difficult for the centrist communists (dare one call them Pessimists?) to make concessions to the counter-attacking conservatives.

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of the Party leadership, the Central Committee and the Politbureau, to the detriment of the Party'.[16] The factionalist activities of the dogmatist opposition were described in vague outline:

> Unfounded and degrading criticism of Party policies, which often is also aimed at the SKDL leadership, the Diet [parliamentary] group and our ministers, as well as the accusations that revisionism has become prevalent in our Party and all other branding of persons, instead of discussion based on fact, injure Party unity and prevent the free discussion and clarification of matters of principle. This type of activity appears concretely in many forms: in speeches, in writings and reports, as well as in numerous letters and leaflets distributed to various circles, and also in the fact that the internal differences of the Party have been brought to the attention of the mass [i.e. front] organizations.

After that, the Central Committee's conclusion seemed weakly anti-climactic: 'It is imperative that all sides strive for unity through the exchange of opinions and friendly discussions, that all forces of the Party rally in support of its political line, that all organizations once again respect regulations and organizational decisions, and that all factional activity within the Party be terminated.'

Three days later a *Kansan Uutiset* editorial went to the heart of the matter. It said that the way ahead for the SKP—through a policy of left-wing electoral alliances—lay in 'honouring the rules of the [democratic] game' by demonstrating enduring commitment to 'the parliamentary form of government, the multi-party system, the equitable approval of the operations of the opposition . . . as well as the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association and the like . . . principles and institutions . . . [whose] continuance will be assured also during the transition to socialism and under the conditions of socialism'.[17] Revisionism and recognition of environmental realities went together; but to the embittered neo-Stalinists this was betrayal of the revolutionary cause. The battle was joined.

IN June the Central Committee—still preserving the fiction of unanimity—debated the worsening situation behind closed doors and then issued another statement. This revealed that the internal struggle had reached the point where something like a rival party within the Party had emerged. An unspecified number of local Party organizations were systematically ignoring directives by the leadership and campaigning against its positions. The Turku and Uusimaa districts were the only ones mentioned by name—in connexion with a statement that 'when necessary, reports on Party decisions and Party political policy will be made directly to the basic organizations by Central Committee representatives': [18] in other words, the leadership majority would attempt

[16] *Kansan Uutiset*, 11 April 1968.
[17] Ibid., 14 April 1968.
[18] Ibid.

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counter-factionalist activity by sending emissaries to cells in conservative-dominated areas. It was suggested that Turku communists might find it necessary 'to consider measures for reorganizing the district leadership which would help towards unity of the entire district organization'. The statement also revealed that an unspecified number of local Party groups were withholding dues from district committees. (This presumably cut both ways, with revisionist cells withholding funds from conservative district apparats, and vice versa.[19]) Again, 'as a result of the disagreements, a break in relations has occurred between the editorial board of *Uusi Paiva* ('New Day') and the leaders of the Turku district [the archconservative Aaltonen—K.D.], and activity has begun against the district leadership'.[20]

The communiqué called on 'those Party functionaries who have wilfully misinterpreted the Central Committee decision and policy to give up that type of behaviour, which has increased the dissensions and the danger of disintegration'. It followed this appeal with a not-so-veiled threat, that 'in future the Central Committee will, in each individual instance, take appropriate measures for the preservation of Party discipline', adding darkly that 'some unavoidable personnel changes must be effected in the Party machinery'.

By this time another, external, source of dissension had emerged to deepen the rift between the opposing factions—the springtime of 'socialist democratization' in Czechoslovakia, and the interventionist pressures that were already being applied by the Soviet Union and other authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe. Like other Western parties, the progressive-centrist wing of the SKP had an obvious political stake in the Czechoslovak reforms. As early as 19 March a *Kansan Uutiset* editorial concluded that if the Dubcek regime continued on its reformist course 'valuable results can be expected, not only from the viewpoint of Czechoslovakia, but also from that of the entire communist movement'. Equally, the conservative opposition could, and did, support the interventionist pressures in order to strengthen its claimed status as the only reliably pro-Soviet faction.

In mid-July the divided Politbureau announced its support for the French Party's pro-Dubcek proposal for a conference of European

[19] In December 1968 24 cells in Turku, representing about 1,000 of the 4,500 district members, 'dissociated' themselves from the district committee. In February 1969 the rival factions selected rival lists of delegates to the Congress. At the time of writing it is not known how the Congress will deal with this organizational dilemma.

[20] This was not the first or last example of conflict between a district Party leadership and its official organ. In the autumn of 1967 conservative *apparatchiki* in the city of Kuopio dismissed the editor-in-chief of the local Party paper—whereupon the communist journalists went on strike until he was reinstated. In general, communist journalists, like trade union leaders, were on the progressive-centrist side, and they were collectively denounced at the 'shadow congress' which the hard-line delegates held in Helsinki on 30 March 1969. Jorma Simpura, editor-in-chief of *Kansan Uutiset*, was a frequent target of conservative attacks: the free debate which he allowed to develop in 1965 led to the turning-point of the Fourteenth Congress.

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communist parties to discuss the Czechoslovak situation.[21] The majority leadership welcomed with undisguised relief the tragically deceptive outcome of the Cierna-Bratislava talks. Then came the invasion, and the moment of truth.

Given the long tradition of solidarity with the CPSU, reinforced by the demands of the 'special relationship', it is remarkable that the progressives and, more hesitantly, the centrists reacted to the invasion with such promptness and firmness. *Kansan Uutiset* commented at once that 'the USSR will find it unusually difficult, perhaps impossible, to justify—at least to the fraternal parties in the West—the necessity, to say nothing about the right, of military intervention', adding that no 'principles of international law [can] be found [to justify] actions of this kind'.[22] The Politbureau issued a statement saying that it could not 'understand' the necessity for the 'measures' used, and considered that they had 'harmed the whole international workers' movement'.[23] This was approved by the Central Committee a few days later by a vote of 24 to nine. The SKDL, predictably, was more outspoken in its criticism of the invasion, which its leadership described as a violation of socialist principles, calling for the withdrawal of the occupation troops. Communist youth and student organizations were also more blunt in their criticism of the invasion.

But the challenge of the invasion also opened rifts in the opportunistic alliance between progressives and centrists. Thus, a few days after the invasion Secretary-General Pessi delivered a speech in which he pointedly avoided criticizing the Soviet intervention, saying that there was not yet sufficient information at hand to enable him to 'draw definite conclusions as to the reasons for and consequences of the developments in Czechoslovakia'—to which he hoped that a 'political solution' could be found. The SKP, he went on, must avoid all steps which would exacerbate an already 'difficult situation'; in particular, there was 'no reason to question [our] solidarity with the Soviet Communist Party and the fraternal parties of other socialist countries'.[24]

At the same meeting, as reported in the same issue of *Kansan Uutiset*, Chairman Saarinen sounded a very different note:

> We have ample experience that no communist party can be considered infallible, not even the Soviet Communist Party. Thus, we cannot offhand assume that the estimations and actions of the leadership of the CPSU are always correct, and this applies also to the situation in the CSSR. I am not at all more convinced than before that the judgment of the CPSU has been fully grounded and its measures correct, and this is the opinion of the great majority of European communist and workers' parties. . . . We oppose all enmity towards the Soviet Union and her Communist

[21] *Kansan Uutiset*, 20 July 1969.
[22] Ibid., 22 August 1969.
[23] Ibid., 23 August 1969.
[24] Ibid., 26 August 1969.

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> Party, but we want to reserve for ourselves the right to pass independent judgment on its views and actions.

In another speech a few weeks later Saarinen stressed that the good relations which the SKP wished to maintain with the CPSU must be based on the principles approved by both Parties: 'equality, independence, and *non-interference in each other's internal affairs*'.[25]

This last proviso had now become more relevant, as the Czechoslovak crisis intensified the factionalist struggle in Finland. As progressives criticized the invasion, and centrists equivocated, the dogmatists hastened to approve it, in an obvious effort to gain Soviet support for their cause. As a series of district organizations (Turku, Tampere and others) proclaimed this approval, the fact was gratefully reported by interventionist media avid for any crumb of support. Commenting on the crisis a week after the invasion Deputy Chairman Salomaa (the named target of an attack by *Trud*) justified the leadership's critical stand, and added:

> Certain SKP district organizations as well as numerous Party sections have presented contrary views. These have even been sent outside our country's borders. It is regrettable that the five Warsaw Pact countries involved have not published the official positions of our central organizations but the views of these minorities instead. . . .
>
> The unanimous appeal of the Czechoslovak CP to communists of all countries, emphasizing our internationalist responsibility for defending the human face of socialism, has not permitted us to remain indifferent. We could not refrain from adopting a position, although in doing so we have had to repudiate the line of the USSR and the other four Warsaw Pact countries.[26]

Towards the end of October the Central Council of the communist youth organization decided by 20 votes to three to dismiss its secretary for international affairs, Seppo Kanerva, for seeking the factionalist support of the East German regime. His main offence was that he had published in the East German journal *Forum* an article explaining that six district organizations of the SKP had 'adopted resolutions condemning the erroneous attitude of the Central Committee of the SKP [on Czechoslovakia], and supporting the Soviet Union'.[27] The article added:

> Within the Finnish Union of Democratic Youth . . . there is an opposition to the anti-Soviet and anti-communist line adopted on this issue. It may become necessary for this opposition to leave the Union . . . and to found a really communist youth organization.

However, Soviet support for the hard-liners—or, rather, Soviet acceptance of *their* support—was limited to the Czechoslovak issue. In the

[25] Ibid., 16 September 1968 (emphasis added).
[26] Ibid., 29 August 1968.
[27] Ibid., 29 October 1968; Kanerva's article appeared in *Forum* of 1 October 1968.

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main, the CPSU seems to have left the embattled Finnish factions to fight it out on their own—which they did with a will. This apparent line of non-intervention was maintained even after Saarinen had clashed publicly with the Soviet delegate, Konotop, at the belated fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the SKP. After the latter had delivered a speech in which he justified the 'well-founded' intervention, the Chairman declared in the name of the SKP: 'We hope that the unheard of, abnormal situation which was created on 21 August within the international communist movement will be rectified as soon as possible.' [28]

Municipal elections early in October added fuel to the flames of factionalism. The SKDL suffered one of the worst electoral setbacks in its history, falling to 17.2 per cent of the vote, a loss of five per cent compared with the last local elections. The hard-liners rejoiced in this as proof of the bankruptcy of revisionist policies. The progressive-centrists, reunited by the shock, drew the opposite conclusion—of the need to persevere in the Fourteenth Congress course and win back the trust of the voters. Observers agreed that public reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been a major factor but, understandably, Party spokesmen preferred not to touch upon that (although the Secretary-General of the SKDL, Aimo Haapanen, did so). The statement which the Central Committee issued later ignored Czechoslovakia and focused on another factor:

> The internal dissensions within our Party, the effects of which have been felt for a long time in our operations, became a major factor in causing the election setback. The severe and rending criticism which in recent years has been levelled from within our movement at leading elements of our Party and of the SKDL, our ministers and our parliamentary group also served to weaken our electoral strength.[29]

But Czechoslovakia *was* a subject of heated debate at that November plenum. By the familiar margin of 24 to nine the committee adopted a resolution welcoming the Soviet-Czechoslovak 'normalization' agreement reached in Moscow in October—and, as *Le Monde* reported, rejected the demand of the nine conservatives that the Party 'approve completely of the Soviet Union's action in Czechoslovakia'.[30]

THE November plenum also adopted, with the same division, the controversial second version of the new draft programme of the SKP. This document represented a move towards institutionalization of the revisionist course. The commitment to constitutional democracy and reformist gradualism was reaffirmed, as was the goal of alliance with the social democrats, and the draft repeated the pledge that

[28] Ibid., 30 September 1968. The anniversary celebrations had been planned for late August, but were postponed at the last moment because of the invasion.
[29] Ibid., 9 November 1968.
[30] *Le Monde*, 12 November 1968.

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bourgeois freedoms, including the right of opposition, would be maintained in a socialist Finland:

> Socialist democracy does not mean the elimination of the democratic rights and institutions attained through the mass struggle of the workers, but rather, the continuing development of them. What will be needed in Finland from the very outset of the building of socialism is a political power of rule that enjoys the clearly expressed support of the majority of the people, that develops the democratic heritages and observes legal procedures, and that guarantees the rights and freedoms of all citizens. The decisions and official acts of a socialist political power of rule are based on the will of the majority of the people. Its laws and norms of justice apply equally to everyone. An opposition that observes the constitutional laws of the socialist state and its prevailing system of justice has the right to be operative. The socialist state must see to it that the laws are observed and that the attainments of socialism are preserved.[31]

Even more controversial, perhaps, were the new draft statutes prepared for the Congress. This document marked a radical shift away from organizational Leninism. This extended to nomenclature. The 'Central Committee' sacred to Marxist-Leninists was to be replaced by a 'Party council' and the Politbureau by a 'Party committee'—to conform to 'the language and organizational forms generally used in our country'. Except for the Chairman and Secretary-General, they would have different memberships and 'a distinct division of responsibility'. Members would be chosen by the Party congress, not the top leadership, and could normally be replaced only by a new congress. Ideological qualifications for Party membership were dropped, following the example set long since by the Italian Party: 'Any Finnish citizen who is 18 years of age and who approves the programme and the regulations of the Party . . . may be accepted as a Party member.' In presenting the draft Leo Suonpaa of the Politbureau explained:

> The Party's organizational principle is defined as being Party democracy, with the membership having the highest power of decision. . . .
>
> One of the most timely and central reasons for revising the statutes is the modernization of the Party programme. . . .
>
> A second basic reason for revising the statutes is that the present regulations, with their excessively severe demands upon members, have not corresponded to the actual situation for a long time.[32]

According to the old statutes, however, the adoption of the draft at the Congress would require a two-thirds majority, whereas the draft programme would require only a simple majority. As the opposing factions marshalled their forces for the showdown at the Congress, it

[31] Cited by Erkki Rautee of the Programme Committee in *Kansan Uutiset*, 1 December 1968.
[32] *Kansan Uutiset*, 8 December 1968.

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became apparent that, while the new programme would probably go through, perhaps with some non-essential modifications forced by the conservatives, the new statutes would have a tough passage.

At the end of November hard-line leaders held a conference to plan their co-ordinated strategy for the Congress struggle. Those present included Aaltonen and the boss of one of the larger district organizations, Markus Kainulainen of Uusimaa.[33] Commenting on the meeting, *Kansan Uutiset* said it had 'produced a new theory, namely that it is impossible to carry out socialist reform if even one opponent of socialism is left in the government or parliament', adding: 'It was clearly seen that the opposition's intention is to purge reformist leaders and members who support the decisions of the Fourteenth Congress . . . and to turn the Party into a narrow sectarian organization.'[34]

The struggle intensified as district organizations held conferences to select delegates for the Congress. When these local battles had ended, the hard-liners dominated eight of the 17 districts—but it did not follow that all the delegates allotted to those districts would be hard-liners. The pattern of district struggles and local compromises had now become too complicated to master. It was generally accepted, however, that out of the total of 479 delegates, about 220 could be considered as conservatives. This would leave the Saarinen leadership with around 260—a figure which, however, would include perhaps 60–70 centrist followers of Pessi and Hertta Kuusinen, who would be more inclined to make concessions for the sake of Party unity.

The outlook was uncertain, and it was made more so by the last-minute intervention of the Russians. A week before the Congress a four-man delegation containing representatives of each faction—Saarinen for the progressives, Pessi for the centrists and Taisto Sinisalo of the Politbureau for the conservatives—left for talks with Brezhnev and Suslov in Moscow. The resulting communiqué gave nothing away, with its formal reference to 'identity of views'. The Soviet leadership was certainly concerned about this spectacular demonstration of disunity in a strategically important party, not only for ideological reasons, but because its state interests were directly involved. Thus, it could by no means be taken for granted that the Soviets would support the 'pro-Soviet' faction. It was certainly not in Soviet interests to have a Finno-Soviet crisis erupt at this time—and the Social-Democratic and Centre Party organs indicated clearly on the eve of the Congress that continued governmental collaboration with the communists might become impossible if the hard-liners prevailed at the Congress. On the other hand, the CPSU might be able to use its presumed influence with the conservative 'loyalists' to induce them to lessen their attacks on the progressive-centrist majority.

However, there was no hint of compromise in the 'shadow congress'

[33] In November the Politbureau had taken the unprecedented step of calling on all Party members to boycott the Uusimaa Party paper, *Tiedonantaja* ('Reporter').
[34] *Kansan Uutiset*, 30 November 1968.

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which some 200 conservative delegates held on 30 March. According to the report in *Kansan Uutiset*, the mood was one of militant intransigence:

> Representatives of eight district organizations of the Party met in Helsinki on Sunday. In the six-point resolution it was noted that in order to reunite the Party, an agreement would be sought according to which those fighting consistently for Marxism-Leninism might have a majority in the Central Committee.
>
> The resolution demands that the confidence in the people's democratic press must be restored by changes of personnel, for instance in *Kansan Uutiset*.
>
> It was reported that those criticizing the present leadership held the view, concerning the draft statutes of the Party, that they cannot be approved at the Fifteenth Congress of the Party at Easter. The reason was said to be that the new statutes would mean a weakening of the collective leadership of the party.
>
> In the resolution it is said furthermore that the congress must determinedly reject rightist revisionism, which is the main danger to the Party.[35]

There was no sign of capitulation on the progressive side, either. Saarinen, back from Moscow, commented dryly that the opposition's demand for a majority in the new Central Committee was 'most astonishing, and is in contradiction to Marxism-Leninism, since a minority cannot dictate what the majority should be'.[36] In the same issue of the Party daily the Union of Communist Journalists sharply rejected the 'slanderous' attack on them, 'which only shows that the opposition tries by hook or by crook to influence the impending Congress . . . [and] rise to power at the cost of organizational disintegration and the abandonment of co-operation between the working-class parties'.

THE congress of confrontation got off to an ominous start on 3 April. Almost immediately, the proceedings were interrupted by a struggle over the rival Turku delegations—hard-liners claiming all 45 seats allotted to the district, and progressives claiming 10 on the basis of their cell strength. Heated discussions lasting into the night failed to bring agreement, and next day the credential committee's compromise proposal, rejected by the conservatives, was put to the vote. This was that the Turku conservatives should have all 45 seats, while the progressives would have 10 non-voting seats as observers. It was approved by 263 votes to 214. There was almost exactly the same division of votes (262 to 214) when the conservatives entered their own candidate against Salomaa for a seat on the Congress presidium. Polarization was complete.

The expected showdown came on the morning of the third day;

[35] *Kansan Uutiset*, 31 March 1969.
[36] Ibid., 1 April 1969.

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and again it was the result of conservative intransigence. This time they presented a challenge that could not be evaded or met by a majority-backed compromise. They demanded that the Congress elect not the 35 full members of the new Central Committee, as required by the statutes, but only 10 of them, leaving the other 25 to be nominated later by the district organizations.[37] They further demanded that the main political debate be interrupted to settle this issue; otherwise, they warned, they would leave the Congress. This ultimatum was rejected by the now familiar margin.

At this point some 160 conservative delegates walked out and proceeded to open what amounted to a rival congress in other Party premises, with the declared intention of continuing 'the struggle for such a composition of the Central Committee as would make it possible for Finnish communists to continue functioning as one party'. The large Tampere delegation stayed behind in the main congress 'for tactical reasons', as a conservative spokesman explained. During the next two days individual delegates returned, until finally about 100 out of 479 were attending the rival assembly.

In their absence the Congress proceedings went more smoothly. The new, revisionist programme was adopted by a show of hands.[38] The new statutes could probably also have been put through, but as a conciliatory gesture it was decided to postpone the matter until the next congress. The main effect of the walkout, however, was to facilitate the election of a new progressive-centrist leadership. Saarinen and Salomaa retained their posts as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The centrist Ville Pessi, aged 67, resigned after 25 years as Secretary-General, and was replaced by a progressive young trade unionist from northern Finland, Arvo Aalto (Pessi remaining in the Politbureau, with responsibility for inter-Party relations). The 12-member Politbureau contained only one conservative, and only a few hard-liners could be identified among the 35 full members and 10 alternate members of the Central Committee. The progressives had profited from the intransigence of their opponents.

In his closing speech Saarinen combined conciliation with firmness, stressing the need to restore unity and discipline. However, a five-point resolution adopted in the last session took a tougher attitude. The third point summed it up:

> The Congress requires the Central Committee and Politbureau to take immediate measures to put an end to the activities of the organized clique, which are in conflict with the basic political line and statutes of the Party.[39]

[37] This demand was first made by the four conservative members of a 10-man elections committee, in the obvious hope of obtaining thereby a higher proportion of places in the leadership than a congress vote would have given them.

[38] Presenting the programme, Saarinen stressed communist-socialist co-operation, and in doing so smoothly abandoned a basic communist doctrine: 'No working-class party can in advance claim for itself the leading role' in a socialist society.

[39] *Kansan Uutiset*, 8 April 1969.

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The 'organized clique' was not intimidated by this vague threat. On the same day Taisto Sinisalo, the former Politbureau member who had become the faction's main spokesman, announced that the conservatives would hold a national conference on 26–27 April to discuss plans—and, in reply to questions, admitted that the formation of a new 'Marxist-Leninist' party was among the possibilities being considered.

In fact, neither the new leadership nor the opposition was capable at this stage of implementing such 'maximalist' statements: the one could not restore discipline, and the other could not proceed to a formal split. This was partly due to Soviet pressure. Russian sympathy for the loyalists and distrust of the revisionists[40] was more than balanced by state interests which dictated support of progressive-centrist policies; and Arvid Pelshe of the Soviet Politbureau made this preoccupation fairly clear in his Congress speech. Above all, the Russians wanted to avert a split in the SKP (the *Pravda* report simply ignored the conservative walk-out). Pelshe stayed on after the end of the Congress, and at an embassy dinner on 9 April he bluntly told representatives of both sides that anyone who promoted such a split was irresponsible, and no friend of the Soviet Party.[41]

A few days later Secretary-General Aalto announced that the leadership had 'taken the initiative' for talks with representatives of the rebellious districts; but at the same time he stressed that unity could be restored only 'on the basis of the decisions reached at the Congress', and warned that if this approach failed, 'we shall obviously have to resort to other means in the near future'.[42] Secret talks began next day, but on 24 April Sinisalo announced that the leadership's proposals had been rejected, and that the opposition would go ahead with the convention planned for that week-end.

The result was a further intensification of the conflict. The 2,000 conservative delegates set up what amounted to a rival apparat—a 95-member council (Central Committee), a 15-member executive committee (Politbureau), a Presidium of three and a secretariat of two. The council would conduct 'further negotiations' with the Saarinen leadership for one month, the convention decided. Then, in mid-June, an extraordinary Party congress should be held, at which a new Central Committee must be formed in the manner demanded by the opposition—25 of the 35 members nominated by the district organizations. There would be 'absolutely no compromise' on this point, Sinisalo told reporters.

On the eve of the convention, however, the Central Committee had

[40] A Moscow Radio commentary on 13 April rebuked the SKP for its 'fundamental error' in dropping the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

[41] Accounts of this incident were published next day by several non-communist Helsinki papers—but not by *Kansan Uutiset*. Most reports suggested that, while Pelshe had rebuked both sides, he had been more critical of the conservatives.

[42] *Kansan Uutiset*, 14 April 1969.

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already committed itself to a rejection of such demands,[43] and Saarinen promptly met intransigence with intransigence. The leadership could not violate Leninist principles by negotiating with an organized opposition; it could discuss 'normalization' only with separate district organizations. On 30 April *Kansan Uutiset* reported that the opposition had formed a rival district committee in progressive-dominated Helsinki, and intended to do the same in other districts. Once more a final split seemed to be near.

But once more political realities—and renewed Soviet pressure—intervened. On 14 May *Kansan Uutiset* reported that both sides had agreed to set up a seven-member committee to continue negotiations. It was composed of three progressives, three conservatives and a representative of Tampere district, which had sympathized with the conservatives but had declined to join the Congress walk-out.

AFTER nine months of difficult negotiations the progressive-centrist leadership of the SKP and the conservative opposition faction finally reached an elaborate compromise agreement which averted a final split.

The agreement hammered out at a meeting of the joint 'reconciliation' commission on 3 January 1970 was endorsed both by the national organization of the opposition and by a plenum of the progressive-dominated Central Committee (January 6–7).[44] In the 'package deal', the present leadership finally accepted the opposition's demand: the progressive-centrists would have 20 Central Committee members and the conservatives 15, while the balance in the Politbureau would be 10 to six.

The final agreement was substantially the same as one that had almost been reached through hard bargaining four months before; most of the differences then remaining (but not all) have been resolved in favour of the conservatives. A major reason for this has been that the present leadership felt more urgently than the opposition the need to go forward as a united party in the March 1970 elections. Against these concessions to the conservatives, the progressive-centrist majority has gained one very important point: the opposition has formally approved of the SKP's continued participation in the centre-left coalition government (socialist-centrist communist), which began in 1966 after the SKP had spent 18 years in hard-line opposition.

At an Extraordinary Congress on 14 February the SKP formally approved the plan. The progressive leadership knew only too well that if the Party entered the elections in a state of disunity, or even

[43] The resolution of 23 April insisted that the opposition disband its 'parallel organizations', and stated that measures for restoring unity must be approved by all district organizations before the leadership could consider convening an extraordinary congress.

[44] The terms of the agreement were published in the Party daily, *Kansan Uutiset*, of 8 January.

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with the two parts of it producing rival candidates, it would face the prospect of catastrophic electoral losses. For this and other reasons the Soviet Union exercised pressure for a reconciliation. It was anxious that the communists should continue to participate in the coalition government: what seemed to be a concession on the part of the die-hards appeared as a distinct advantage from the Soviet point of view.

But although the 'package deal' has been accepted by both sides, that does not mean that it was satisfactory to either of them. One striking feature of the protracted negotiations has been that they have been concerned with the *machinery* of reunification, and not with the *substance* of it. They dealt primarily with such questions as the composition of the leading bodies of the Party and the problem of the parallel organizations that have already come into existence during the conflict. But although the profound ideological and political differences between the factions have been papered over, they are far from settled. The agreement was very much an *ad hoc* compromise; the electoral platform of the Party steered clear of the internally divisive issues.

The results of the national elections held on 16 March 1970 proved, however, to be very disappointing for the Communist Party. It has suffered a major set-back despite its 'united' posture, having lost five out of its 41 seats in Parliament. Its Social Democratic rivals have lost only four out of 55 seats, but their position has been strengthened vis-à-vis their partners in the old coalition whose losses were relatively greater (the Centre Party lost 13 out of its 50 seats). The electoral triumph of the Rural Party and its 'Poujadist' leader, Vekko Vennano, permits it in certain circumstances to hold the balance on the new Parliament. The Social Democratic leader, Rafael Paasio, has been elected as its President with the support of their votes.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party met on 21 and 22 March to discuss the new political situation and to face the results of its electoral failure. Reporting this meeting, *Pravda* (24 March 1970) stressed the need for and the possibility of recreating the old coalition. But whatever the outcome, the swing to the right has clearly weakened the Finnish communists and the divisions within the Party are bound to re-emerge, now that the leader of the 'reunited' Party, Mr. Saarinen, has lost his own parliamentary seat. The issues that have divided the factions in the past will make it difficult to agree either on its political tactics or on the new version of the present controversial Party programme. On the other hand, while the agreement between the factions provides that the 'parallel organizations' set up by the conservatives are to be dissolved, in practice things will not be so straightforward, and the domination by the factions of 'their' existing districts will continue, with the conservatives now having a better chance to make headway against their opponents. Thus the unity achieved remains precarious. This is not peace, but a cease-fire.

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CANADIAN COMMUNISM

William Rodney

SINCE its birth in May 1921 at a secret convention held near Guelph, Ontario, few ancillary communist parties have mirrored the shifts and changes of policy followed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union so closely and consistently as has the Communist Party of Canada (CPC). Except for a brief flirtation with Trotskyism in the 1920s, largely through the person of Maurice Spector, the Party's Chairman, and an even briefer exposure to the corrosive theory of 'North American exceptionalism' put forward by Jay Lovestone of the American Communist Party, the relationship between Toronto and Moscow has been consistently stable and relatively untroubled. Recent events in the world of international communism—if, as Eric Hobsbawn suggests, such a world still exists—have done little to modify the connexion between the two Parties.[1] The CPC remains staunchly loyal to the USSR as its unqualified endorsement of the CPSU at the congress of world communist parties held in Moscow in June 1969 confirms.

Such disciplined public conformity, however, occludes the uncertainties and difficulties which beset the Canadian communist movement at the present time, and veils the state of flux which now characterizes the Party. Membership, which in 1938 reached a claimed peak of 18,000, is declining while the Party's contact with Canadian youth has all but vanished.[2] Significantly, except for its earliest years, the CPC's present strength of less than 3,000 hard-core members is the lowest in its history.[3] Taken as a percentage of population, this estimate is manifestly smaller than any comparable figure since the CPC's birth. Indeed, until the mid-1940s the CPC's strength in per capita of population was greater than any of the other communist parties in the Western English-speaking world.[4] In

1 Eric Hobsbawn, 'Problems of Communist History' *New Left Review*, no. 54, March–April 1969, p. 85.

2 Sam Carr, 'Canadian Communists Hold Important Session', *International Press Correspondence*, vol. XVIII, no. 37, 30 July 1938, p. 886.

3 Ian Greig, *The Assault on the West* (Petersham, Surrey, 1968), pp. 337–38, lists the CPC's strength as 'about 3,500 (including the Communist Party of Quebec)'. According to Peter Worthington in 'Canadian Reds Reverting to the Stalinist Line', in the Toronto *Telegram* (19 April 1969), delegates to the CPC's Twentieth Convention were selected on the basis of one per 10 Quebec Party members, and one for every 20 members throughout the rest of Canada. On the basis of his estimate that '100 delegates and about 100 observers' attended, Worthington puts the Party's strength at '1,880 card-carrying . . . members in Canada'. The *Canadian Tribune* (9 April 1969) states that 138 delegates, of which 12 officially represented the Parti Communiste du Quebec, assembled in Toronto. Using Worthington's ratios of delegates to membership yields the figure 2,640 for Party membership. Such estimates, of course, do not take into account secret members or 'sleepers' known only to select CPC leaders.

4 See, for example, Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York, 1957) and *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (New York, 1960); Kenneth Newton, *The Sociology of British Communism* (London, 1969); and William Rodney, *Soldiers of the International* (Toronto 1968).

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more practical terms and in relation to the Dominion's growing population—now over 20 million—the CPC's miniscule membership accurately reflects its almost total lack of influence within the country. The Party has no representative in the federal House of Commons nor in any of the provincial legislatures, and except for a handful of individuals serving in elected municipal office, has no significant contact with the country's political life.

While many of the reasons for the CPC's lack of influence within the Dominion are of its own making, a great share of the vicissitudes it has experienced stem directly from Soviet policies and practices: changes in Comintern line, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, treatment of minorities within the USSR, Hungary in 1956, and, more recently, Czechoslovakia. Since the end of the Second World War the disciplined consistency with which the Party has accepted the Soviet line has more than offset any influence it acquired during the 1930s through its campaigns to organize the unemployed, through its considerable successes in the trade union field, and from the widespread response it evoked for its sustained efforts on behalf of the Spanish nationalists.

Since 1960 the Party's unity and strength have undergone further and perhaps more rapid erosion than at any other period since it was formed. Once more the abrasive pressures to which the movement is being subjected emanate from external sources over which it has no control. The growth of Quebec separatism in Canada forced the emergence of a French Canadian Communist Party—the Parti Communiste du Quebec (PCQ)—in 1965, while on the west coast a small pro-Peking faction, the Progressive Workers' Movement (PWM) came into being in 1964 following the CPC's approval of Moscow's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the CPC has experienced further difficulties. The Party leadership's initial silence following the Soviet invasion caused at least 30 Party members on the west coast, including a school trustee in the Vancouver area, to resign. Among those who left the Party, though for reasons not yet fully revealed, was Homer Stevens, Secretary Treasurer of the United Fishermen and Allied Workers' Union, an important Party figure and controversial personality in the west coast trade union movement. In breaking with the Party the dissidents charged that the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops was not in the true interest of socialism. To neutralize that charge the CPC's Central Executive Committee (CEC), after meeting in October 1968, countered with the argument that the intervention in Czechoslovakia was vital for world socialism and for the preservation of peace and security.

During the interval between the CEC's October pronouncement and the CPC's Twentieth Convention held in April 1969 the issue of Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia continued to haunt the Party. Two Central Committee members, Charles Boylan, editor of the Party publication *Scan*, and Charles Caron, were expelled from the CPC

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and denounced for supporting Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. At the convention a new Central Committee 'purged' of 'liberals' was confirmed by the 138 delegates. Those who were not re-elected included such stalwarts as Phyllis Clarke, chairman of the Toronto Metro Committee, Rae Murphy, editor of the CPC's principal publication, the *Canadian Tribune*, John Boyd, who represented the Canadian Party in the Prague offices of *Problems of Peace and Socialism—World Marxist Review* in North America—Joe Gershman, editor of *Vochenblatt* (Canadian Jewish Weekly), Tom Morris, son of the late Party Leader, Leslie Morris, Alf Stenburg, former head of the now defunct Communist Youth League, Professor David Goldstick, and Stanley B. Ryerson.[5] The removal of Goldstick and Ryerson from the Central Committee is, perhaps, the most significant of the changes endorsed by the convention, for both are among the few Party members who can be described as intellectuals. Goldstick teaches philosophy at the University of Toronto while Ryerson, whose family has long been prominent in the field of education, is the author of two volumes which attempt to interpret Canada's history in Marxist terms.[6] Such changes, which William Kashtan, the Party Leader, claims have brought new elements into the Central Committee, 'particularly those with strong ties in the working class', confirm that the CPC is undergoing a general tightening of discipline designed to curb 'permissiveness, organizational looseness . . . a weakening of the concept of the Party as a Party of unity of will and unity of action'.[7]

Apart from the admitted impact of Czechoslovakia upon the CPC the recent resignations and expulsions have illuminated other issues of critical importance to the Canadian communist movement. Kashtan has specifically listed the national question, the organization of a new communist youth movement, the role and character of the Party and correct identification of what constitutes the main danger to the CPC as the main problems facing the Party.[8] However, he has avoided answering charges levelled by dissidents during the pre-convention period that the Party leadership is composed of 'physically and mentally old people', and that the CPC's administration was already too bureaucratic and rigid. There is no question that the Party leaders—Kashtan, W. C. Beeching, A. Dewhurst, Sam Walsh and others—are relatively old, and that their rigidity and bureaucratic ways stem in great measure from a lifetime of servile loyalty to the CPSU. Kashtan,

[5] The New Central Executive Committee, editorial and other Party appointments are listed in the *Canadian Tribune* (9, 16 and 23 April 1969). Worthington, op. cit., also notes a number of individuals who have been demoted or expelled from the CPC.

[6] Stanley B. Ryerson, *The Founding of Canada* (Toronto, 1960) and *Unequal Union* (Toronto, 1968).

[7] William Kashtan, 'Twentieth Convention of the Communist Party of Canada', *World Marxist Review*, no. 7, 1969, p. 73.

[8] Ibid.

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the present Secretary of the Party and its first native-born leader, came through the ranks of the Young Communist League (YCL) during the 1930's, as did Dewhurst, Sam Walsh and other current stalwarts. W. C. Beeching, the new editor of the *Canadian Tribune*, is a product of the hunger marches of the same decade and survived service in Spain with the MacKenzie–Papineau Battalion, a Canadian unit in the International Brigade. The Party leaders are well aware of their difficulties and have even, although rarely, acknowledged them publicly. Leslie Morris, who became Secretary-General in 1962 and who died in November 1964, admitted at the CPC's Eighteenth Convention (27–30 March 1964) that the Party was politically isolated, that it had failed signally to attract the young, and that the average age of its members was well into the fifties.[9] That these deficiencies worry the Party leaders is undoubted; whether they can be resolved is another matter.

DESPITE its minuteness and its evident lack of influence in the Dominion, the Canadian Party nevertheless remains not only one of Moscow's most loyal supporters but, in its own way, one of its most important. Its particular relations with the CPSU, however, have been conditioned from the outset by two factors over which neither Party has had any significant control. The first of these is the pattern of immigration to Canada which, to a very considerable extent, has had a distinct bearing upon the CPC's composition. In its ultimate sense immigration has been responsible for what has become a local variation of the nationalities problem which has plagued the Soviet Party. The second factor is the obvious one, Canada's proximity to the United States, which continually impinges upon the CPC and the CPSU, colouring their actions and their relationship. As one of two communist parties established in the very heart of capitalism, and because of the relatively unrestricted political conditions under which the CPC exists compared with its American counterpart, the Canadian Party almost involuntarily assumes a greater importance than is suggested either by its size or by its lack of representation in the orthodox parliamentary sense. Because the Party is so small and therefore has little to lose politically, and because it is a strategically located and trustworthy ancillary, it has been used by Comintern and succeeding Soviet agencies to infuse or extract men, money and messages into and from the United States. From the Party's earliest days it has been involved in the travel arrangements of Comintern agents—Professor Valetski's clandestine entry into the United States in the 1920s is a notable example—and in the acquisition of Canadian passports, naturalization certificates and other useful documents. The CPC's active participation in the nether world of espionage, as revealed by the *Report* of the Royal Commission in

[9] According to the *Canadian Tribune* (9 April 1969), the average age of the 138 delegates who attended the Twentieth Convention was 47.

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1946, further dramatizes its role as one of the Soviets' useful supporting units. While such activities on the part of the CPC may have been more commonplace before the Second World War when Soviet intelligence services were still in the throes of being organized and made operationally effective, there is little evidence to confirm that the Canadian Party has been totally or permanently relieved of such tasks. The Soviet Union's attempt to exploit an obscure Party member, George Victor Spencer, who, because of his job as a postal clerk, was assigned to collect names and addresses of immigrants, including those deceased, is a recent example.[10]

But this aspect of the CPC's *raison d'être* should not be exaggerated. It is the CPC's role as a Marxist party of the Leninist variety, totally loyal to the USSR, attempting to project itself within the particular political, social and economic conditions that prevail in Canada, that is primary and important. Certainly it is a role that has been overlooked by historians and only now is coming into focus, particularly in the context of the Party's impact upon Canadian trade union development and the emergence of a Canadian socialist party.[11]

FROM the start the CPC has drawn its rank and file from ethnic communities settled in Canada, particularly from Finnish and Ukrainian immigrants. Indeed, communist-controlled foreign-language ancillaries such as the Ukrainian Labor Farmer Temple Association (ULFTA), now known as the Association of United Ukrainian Canadians (AUUC), and the Finnish Organization of Canada (FOC), became the Party's financial mainstay. Many of those who joined did so simply because through their publications and premises such organizations provided literary and social contacts that were otherwise denied because of linguistic difficulties and differences of habit and custom.[12] In contrast to the relatively apolitical membership of the language groups, the majority of the CPC's leaders—Tom Bell, Tim Buck, Florence Custance, J. R. Kavanagh, John MacDonald, William Moriarty, the Buhays and others—originated from the British Isles. Most, in addition, were skilled craftsmen with considerable trade union experience. The bulk of the Party membership, however, was poorly educated and untrained, characteristics which prevailed until modified by the drift of intellectuals—the late Margaret Fairley and Stanley Ryerson are good examples—and unemployed artisans into the CPC's fold in the 1930s.

The state of the Party at the end of its first decade was pinpointed with unusual acumen and considerable frankness by the Comintern.

[10] See *Commission of Enquiry into the Complaints by George Victor Spencer* (Ottawa, 1966).

[11] For example Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto, 1968).

[12] Elizabeth Wangenheim, 'The Ukrainians: A Case Study of the "Third Force"', in Peter Russell, ed., *Nationalism in Canada* (Toronto, 1966).

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> The ECCI [Executive Committee Communist International] emphasizes that the Communist Party of Canada still remains mainly a propagandist organization, with a small membership and with weak connexions with the broad masses of the Canadian workers. The membership of the Party . . . is only about 4,000, only a minor percentage of which are native born, and the Party is divided ideologically and by deep-rooted federalism. It has still very weak roots in the decisive industries and factories and practically no shop nuclei. . . .[13]

As a result, the CPC, despite the strait-jacket of the 'class against class' policy promulgated at Comintern's Sixth Congress in 1928, made a concerted effort to create an effective communist movement within the Dominion. During the 1930s new organizations were established among the immigrant communities, and for the first time serious attempts were made to co-opt French Canadians into the Party. Despite the imprisonment of eight leading Party members, including Tim Buck, the Party leader, the CPC, taking advantage of the conditions created by the Great Depression, made substantial headway. Its membership increased to a claimed 15,000 and the Party succeeded in infusing itself into the labour movement with a good measure of success.[14] Within the CPC campaigns initiated by the Party against the passage of the Padlock Law in Quebec in 1937, the rise of fascism in Europe, the invasion of China by Japan and, until its repeal in 1936, against Section 98 of the Criminal Code, effectively diverted attention from its own difficulties. Such efforts also succeeded in masking the great terror unleashed by Stalin then reaching its full spate in the Soviet Union.

IT was not until after the Second World War that major problems within the communist-dominated language organizations and the communist movement in Quebec began to appear. Domestically, the pace of economic development, increasing mobility and better education, enabled the younger generation to escape from the relative isolation which language and custom previously imposed upon the immigrant and French Canadian communities.

Within the Finnish community, the Winter War and Soviet policy towards Finland caused a certain disillusionment in a hitherto loyal rank and file. More damaging by far, however, were stories of life in the USSR circulated by a new brand of post-war immigrant, those who began to arrive in Canada via the displaced persons camps, and, after February 1948, from Czechoslovakia. The new arrivals soon constituted a small but growing source of opposition to the CPC and its language ancillaries. Against the panorama of the Cold War, sharp internal divisions began to manifest themselves within the Party. On the trade union front,

[13] Attorney-General of Ontario Record Group, Box Nine, Envelope 15, Moscow, 3 October 1929.

[14] Sam Carr, 'Canadian Communists Hold Great Convention', *International Press Correspondence*, vol. XVII, no. 56, 24 December 1937, p. 1390.

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where it had achieved considerable influence in the Automobile, Electrical, Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Unions, and in the vital field of Great Lakes shipping, the CPC lost ground decisively.[15]

Once again, external events in the Soviet Union superimposed themselves upon the Party's domestic difficulties. From the emotional paralysis created by the Doctors' Plot in the USSR a major rift developed within the Canadian Party. Initiated by J. B. Salsberg, the Party's labour organizer and a leading figure in the communist-controlled United Jewish People's Order (UJPO), it focused on the growing concern within the Order over the CPSU's treatment of the Jews in the Soviet Union. The nature and magnitude of the division within the context of the Canadian communist movement may be gauged by an unprecedented release by the Labor-Progressive Party (LPP), as the Party then styled itself, in May 1956.

> Differences of opinion between J. B. Salsberg and the rest of the national executive developed and persisted from 1949, when he first declared that the dissolution of Jewish cultural institutions in the USSR and actions against prominent Jewish writers had been carried out by crude administrative means, without public discussion and in disregard of the interests and desires of Soviet Jewry. He therefore advocated intervention by the Labor-Progressive Party in the form of direct enquiry to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union asking for an explanation. . . . Salsberg was right and the national executive wrong.[16]

For his initiative Salsberg was removed from the LPP's secretariat in 1953 and from the National Executive in 1954. He was not, however, expelled from the Party. In the light of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the CPSU's Twentieth Congress and following the LPP's public confession of error, Salsberg was unanimously re-elected to the National Committee.

His rehabilitation and the apparent healing of Party divisions caused by the episode was of brief duration. It ended abruptly when he praised anti-Soviet demonstrations in Poland. Buck and the LPP leadership, in an attempt to maintain international communist solidarity, resorted to the argument that national communism was against the principles of the Canadian Party's founders. Against the background of Soviet intervention in Poland and Hungary, however, polycentrism within the LPP quickly revealed itself, coming to a head between October 1956 and the Party's Sixth National Convention (19–22 April 1957).

> It was this bitter hostility [of Buck and other leading functionaries] to those [Salsberg, Stewart Smith, etc.] fighting for a new relationship [of the Canadian Party] to the CPSU and the attempt to block

[15] Horowitz, op. cit. See also R. A. Sullivan, *Red Sails on the Great Lakes* (Toronto, 1960).

[16] *Canadian Tribune*, 16 July 1956. After going underground at the beginning of the Second World War, the CPC was reactivated publicly under the legal fiction of the Labour-Progressive Party in 1944 in order to avoid prosecution.

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> discussion that caused the resignation of the six Quebec leaders of the party, headed by comrade [Gui] Caron. . . . By now (1 Dec.) over 200 comrades have left the party in Quebec.[17]

At the Convention the challenge to Buck's leadership posed by the dissidents was easily defeated. It resulted instead in the resignation of Salsberg, Stewart Smith, Harry Binder and Sam Lipshitz. According to the Party the break was inevitable.

> The four who have resigned are flying false flags of 'democracy' and 'anti-Stalinism'. What they really have raised is the banner of revisionism and distortion of Marxism-Leninism.[18]

On that note, however, the LPP began a concerted effort to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Canadian public. Nevertheless, the impact of the resignations was considerable. Buck, at a news conference held in October 1959, admitted that Party membership, which, he claimed, stood at 8,000 before the controversy, had dropped to under 6,000.[19]

The aftermath of the Salsberg affair has not yet died away. The UJPO certainly has not increased in strength or become a more effective Party auxiliary. Reports of Soviet and East European governments' policies and actions towards the Jews within their boundaries have aroused further unrest, caused resignations of younger members, while the deaths of old-timers such as Jacob Penner have left gaps that so far have not been, and probably cannot be, filled. The removal of Gershman, the editor of *Vochenblatt*, is the most recent indication that differences within the UJPO have not yet subsided.

SINCE 1960 a second major upheaval has begun within the Ukrainian sector. Although less dramatic than the turmoil created by the Jewish question and the resignation of Salsberg, Smith and others, it may well be more damaging since the AUUC is still one of the Party's major sources of members and funds. The new difficulty was pinpointed publicly early in 1968 by John Kolasky, a Party member of long standing, in a book entitled *Education in the Soviet Ukraine*.[20] Kolasky's revelations bring into the open an element of unrest that has been endemic in the CPC's Ukrainian wing since the late 1920s. Some indication of the nature and extent of that ferment, much of which has been caused by news of Soviet policies and practices filtering out of the Ukraine, may be gauged from the CPC's dispatch of a special delegation headed by Tim Buck which visited the Ukraine in March–April 1967. The delegation's report to the CPC's Central Committee in January 1968 confirmed that use of the Ukrainian

[17] *National Affairs Monthly*, January 1957, p. 8.
[18] *Canadian Tribune*, 27 May 1957.
[19] *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 10 October 1959. It was at this Convention that the Party reverted to its original title, the Communist Party of Canada. See the *Canadian Tribune*, 19 October 1959.
[20] John Kolasky, *Education in the Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1968).

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language was being discouraged by the Soviets, and is generally critical of Soviet policy in the Ukrainian Republic. Subsequent publication of the report has brought a sharp reaction from the Ukraine. A letter addressed to the CPC's Central Executive Committee signed by many of the Ukrainian Republic's leading citizens expresses surprise and dismay that a report prepared by a delegation from a fraternal communist party could provide 'grounds for the falsification of facts and the fanning of an anti-Soviet campaign'.[21] The communication from Kiev attempts to refute the general tenor of the CPC delegation's findings by claiming that the report unduly stresses the language question, and that it belittles 'the majestic achievements of the Ukrainian people' since the establishment of Soviet power.[22] Although the significance given to the report by the CPC or its impact upon relations between the Canadian and Soviet Parties is difficult to assess, there is little doubt that the CPC's unqualified support of the Brezhnev doctrine and its efforts to tighten internal discipline have more than made up for any coolness that may have developed between Toronto and Moscow.

Although Kolasky's book is essentially a study of personal disillusionment with the CPSU and, unintentionally, a reflection of the ferment amongst the nationalities and amongst Soviet intellectuals that is now becoming increasingly evident within the Soviet Union, it is equally revealing of the Canadian Party's dilemma over its language organizations. What makes the book so interesting in the context of both the CPC and the CPSU is that Kolasky, now in his fifties, a dedicated Party member once deemed sufficiently trustworthy by the CPC to be sent to the Ukrainian Higher Party School in Kiev, could, through his observations and experiences over two years (1963–65), come to the conclusion that Soviet policy towards the Ukrainians was premeditated, that it was nothing less than a calculated attempt to stamp out the Ukrainian language and customs, and to impose the Russian language and culture upon the Ukrainian minority.

Kolasky, who has now been expelled from the CPC, was not a run-of-the-mill Party member. Indeed, in a Party whose educational level has always been low, he can be described as an intellectual. A teacher, he holds a B.A. from the University of Saskatchewan, an M.A. from Toronto and an education degree from Manitoba. Again, in the context of the ferment of intellectual opposition within the USSR, Kolasky, perhaps unwittingly, has himself figured. He is mentioned in relation to a petition submitted to the Minister of Education by S. Y. Karavanski, a Ukrainian intellectual now serving a seven-year prison term at the Vladimir labour camp. Karavanski was arrested in 1965 and imprisoned without trial.[23] According to information trickling out of the Ukraine,

[21] *Communist Viewpoint*, vol. I, no. 4, September–October 1969, p. 59.
[22] Ibid.
[23] George Luckyj, 'Turmoil in the Ukraine', *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1968, pp. 18–19.

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Kolasky evidently saw a petition or letter sent by Karavanski to the Soviet authorities which accused Soviet officials in the Ukraine of breaking the law through deliberate discrimination against the use of Ukrainian as a viable language of instruction in schools and universities. In allowing Kolasky to see the petition Karavanski was accused of consorting with foreigners. But while Kolasky, born in Cobalt, Ontario, of Ukrainian parents, might technically be considered a foreigner, as 'a communist of 30 years standing', as Karavanski pointed out, he could scarcely be considered untrustworthy.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kolasky's book is that in common with the arguments that are basic to the intellectual dissent within the USSR, it emphasizes the view that the Soviets' departure from the laws of the state is unwarranted and illegal. Fundamentally, it bases its case upon the writings of Lenin and the Constitution of 1936, and the argument is buttressed with documents and statistics drawn solely from Soviet sources. The book has caused considerable discussion within the Canadian Party, and has attracted a good deal of public attention. Since it was published in English it is difficult to assess its impact upon the dwindling proportion of Ukrainians in Canada, including rank-and-file AUUC members, whose primary language is still Ukrainian. What the long-run impact of Kolasky's criticism of Soviet practices in the Ukraine may have upon the Canadian Party and its relations with the CPSU can only be conjectured. Since the proportion of Ukrainians within the Canadian communist movement is still almost half of the CPC's total strength the possible repercussions are clear.

AS for the remaining language organizations it is not amiss to say that similar unrest and erosion has been taking place within each ancillary. Soviet action in Hungary created a shock wave from which the CPC never fully recovered, while the impact of Czechoslovakia upon the Party is a further setback, the full import of which is still not apparent.

What can be said with more certainty is that the Canadian communist movement, like the Dominion itself, is at a crossroads. There is no hard evidence to indicate that the Party has grasped the nature and extent of the very real social and political changes that have taken place and are still taking place in the country. Certainly, as Kashtan himself has indicated, the CPC has failed to attract the new generation of dissenters, the so-called 'New Left', including the considerable contingent of young Americans who have come to Canada to avoid the United States draft.

> It is not enough to say we are relevant, that we are the vanguard. We must earn it every day by our work amongst the working people, the students, women, farmers and intellectuals. The most important

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> thing we must do in this connection is establish our presence and be part of the growing movements all around us.[24]

In French Canada the PCQ remains small and ineffective. It has been unable to translate the dissatisfaction over Quebec's position within the Canadian federal structure as voiced in that province to the Communist Party's advantage. Although the CPC in 1962 endorsed a resolution approving Quebec's right to secede from Confederation, the Party has now rejected that position. Kashtan, who was born in Montreal, has since stressed that 'there is no future for [Canada] . . . if it is broken into separate parts'.[25] Speaking in Toronto at the CPC's Twentieth Convention, he again outlined the Party's position on English-French relations within the Dominion.

> Bi-lingualism and bi-culturalism cannot wipe this [i.e. oppression and economic inequality of French Canadians] out. Neither can the substitution of civil rights for individuals, replace the collective rights of the French Canadian nation. The crisis will therefore deepen, as it is in fact doing, as long as the reality of the two nations and its consequence is ignored and is not embodied in a new relationship of equals in a voluntary partnership, based on a new Canadian Constitution.
>
> Such a Constitution must be based squarely on the recognition of the right of the French Canadian nation to self determination, the recognition of its right to a national state.
>
> The Communist Party stands opposed to the fragmentation of Canada, a process which would weaken the political unity of the working people of both nations against their common enemies, monopoly capitalism, and Canadian and U.S. imperialism.[26]

This, as clearly as any statement, reveals how far the CPC has departed from its original stand on Quebec. Equally, it indicates the leadership's reluctance to decentralize administrative control of the Party.

To the CPC imperialism in its many guises remains the major threat to communist movements everywhere.

> It is not so easy to see its hand when it undertakes ideological subversion. We, like many other parties have been slow in seeing this side of imperialist strategy and have tended to underestimate this more cunning and subtle line which is directed to establishing Trojan horses within the socialist camp, within the national liberation movement, within Communist and Workers parties. In reality of course ideological subversion and military action are part of one package, to change the course of world history and alter the balance of world power in favour of imperialism'.[27]

[24] William Kashtan, 'Twentieth Convention Communist Party', *Canadian Tribune*, 9 April 1969. See also Kashtan's earlier article, 'The 20th Convention of Canadian Communists', in the Party's new journal *Communist Viewpoint*, vol. I, no. 1, March–April 1969, p. 6.

[25] *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 19 May 1969.

[26] *Canadian Tribune*, 9 April 1969.

[27] Ibid.

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Even more revealing are Kashtan's references to the two major questions which were predominant before the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties which convened in Moscow on 5 June: China and Czechoslovakia.

Referring to the recent border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops, Kashtan once again put the Canadian Party unequivocally on Moscow's side.

> Our party condemns these provocative actions undertaken by the Maoists which are nothing less than a betrayal of socialism and of internationalism. These events bring home the fact that what has emerged in China in the course of the so-called cultural revolution is a military bureaucratic dictatorship, with the Communist Party, the Young Communist League, the trade union movement and other public institutions destroyed, and replaced by 'revolutionary committees' under the control and direction of the military forces.[28]

Turning to Czechoslovakia he took an equally firm stand.

> In drawing attention to these more recent events we do not close our eyes to what transpired in Czechoslovakia where an effort was mounted to take that country out of the socialist community. The decisive action of the five Warsaw Treaty states prevented it and history will surely record the fact that the imperialist counter-offensive against the forces of socialism and progress, prepared over a long time, suffered a severe defeat as a consequence of this action.
>
> Our October [1968] Central Committee meeting supported this action and the steps taken by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to normalize the situation, and we are confident this Convention will uphold that position.[29]

Both the Czech and the Chinese problems, Kashtan argued, originate from the same source.

> If the recent events in China have their 'logic' in the left opportunism of Maoism: the events in Czechoslovakia have their 'logic' in right opportunism and revisionism. Both left and right opportunism have their roots in nationalism, in a negation of proletarian internationalism, in anti-Sovietism. Both roads finally lead to a weakening of the leading role of the working class and of the Communist Party, and strike at the very foundations of socialism.[30]

In outlining the Canadian Party's position at the Convention, Kashtan made it very clear that the CPC regards the USSR as the decisive force in the communist world's struggle against imperialism.

> . . . this [i.e. Soviet primacy] is not to deny the independence and sovereignty of each Communist Party. But the assertion of that independence and sovereignty does not and cannot lie through the

[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid. See also 'Statements of the Central Executive Committee Communist Party of Canada (dated 22 and 28 August 1968)', in *Horizons*, no. 27, 1968, pp. 11–12.
[30] Ibid.

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> road of anti-Sovietism. . . . One can't be for socialism and against the Soviet Union. This is why our Party will never take the road of anti-Sovietism no matter how disguised.[31]

Despite the example of Czechoslovakia, the CPC's unqualified approval of the Soviet action in that unfortunate country and its endorsement of the Brezhnev doctrine at its Convention and at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow, came as no surprise.[32] It merely follows in the tradition of conformity and bureaucratic docility established by the Comintern which required all member communist parties to accept every word and deed without a murmur. But the cost of conformity, together with the impact of the CPC's decision 'to base itself firmly upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and the organizational principles of democratic centralism', has been high.[33] Dissatisfaction within the Party, based upon the fear that the CPC, because of its recent performance, has been irrevocably confirmed as a mere tool of the Kremlin, and that any possibility of making contact with the country's youth has been shattered, is still evident. Such arguments however, are totally rejected by the hard-liners in control of the Canadian communist movement. Their confidence rests on the knowledge that as long as their Soviet paymasters consider that there is the slightest possibility of the CPC being useful to the USSR, its continued existence, however anachronistic in the context of Canadian conditions, is assured. At the same time, by its very continuation as a political entity, the Canadian Party, as one observer has put it, confirms that Stalin is not dead after all.

[31] Ibid.

[32] William Kashtan, 'International Meeting—an Historic Event', *Communist Viewpoint*, vol. I, no. 4, September–October 1969, pp. 12–13. Also 'Outstanding Event in the World Communist Movement', *World Marxist Review*, no. 9, 1969, pp. 22–23.

[33] William Kashtan, 'Twentieth Convention of the Communist Party of Canada', *World Marxist Review*, no. 7, 1969, p. 73.

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AMALRIK'S 1984 AND AFTER

The publication of the Amalrik essay, Will the USSR survive until 1984? (Survey, *no. 73*) *stimulated a good deal of interest and controversy in the Western press. The majority of commentators praised its intelligence, although some of them were critical of the thesis itself. However, there were also some hostile critics who either implied that Amalrik is a KGB agent or at least is unwittingly being used by it. We publish below some material on and by Amalrik dealing with, or relevant to, this controversy.*

JOURNEY TO SIBERIA

Max Hayward*

ANDREI Amalrik is among the growing number of Soviet intellectuals who in recent years have suffered imprisonment, deportation to a remote part of the country, or confinement in a lunatic asylum for protesting against actions of their government which they find morally inadmissible, for putting to a practical test the rights they theoretically enjoy under the Soviet Constitution, or for refusing to accept unwritten conventions that intolerably restrict their creative activity and private life. Pavel Litvinov, the grandson of a former Soviet Foreign Minister, and Larissa Daniel (the wife of the writer imprisoned in 1966) have been exiled to Siberia for demonstrating in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia; two of Amalrik's associates, Alexander Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, were sentenced to forced labour in 1968 for circulating, among other things, documents about the trial of Sinyavski and Daniel. These are only two of dozens of cases, many tried behind closed doors in cities other than Moscow—which means that the outside world hears only the vaguest rumours of them.

What happens to people who have been sentenced to forced labour has been described in the remarkable book *My Testimony* by Anatoli Marchenko, who spent six years (1960–66) in the notorious labour camps of the Potma district. Amalrik's book is the first circumstantial account to reach the West of what it means to be 'exiled'—the punishment that Litvinov, Larissa Daniel and others are now undergoing. Amalrik was arrested in 1965 on a charge of 'parasitism', that is, failing to have regular employment—though the real reason, as he plainly saw during the proceedings against him, was the fact that he was a nonconformist in his literary and artistic tastes, showed an active interest in *avant-garde* painters such as Anatoli Zverev and Dmitri

* An introduction to Andrei Amalrik's *Involuntary Journey to Siberia* (translated by Manya Harari and Max Hayward) which is to be published in October by Collins & Harvill Press.

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Plavinski (who are forbidden to hold exhibitions in the Soviet Union), and occasionally met foreigners (including an American diplomat) who shared this interest. In several ways his case was analogous to that of the poet Joseph Brodski who in the previous year (1964) was sentenced to five years' exile nominally for 'parasitism' (but in reality for his poetry: probably the most talented being written in Russia today). Brodsky was allowed to return to Leningrad the following year after world-wide protests and intensive efforts on his behalf by some of his compatriots, notably the late Frieda Vigdorov, a journalist and Deputy of the Moscow district Soviet, mentioned in Amalrik's book, who made a record of Brodski's trial, thus contributing greatly to his release.

The decree on 'parasitism' passed under Khrushchev in 1961 was originally intended to help clear the big cities, mainly Moscow and Leningrad, of vagrants, alcoholics and workers guilty of absenteeism by deporting them to underpopulated and inhospitable areas to which it is not easy to attract free labour. It was soon found a convenient way of dealing with 'awkward' intellectuals as well. In a sense it was a resumption on a minor scale of Stalin's policy of supplying labour to Siberia and the Far North by the mass deportation of 'undesirables'. There was an even earlier precedent, as Amalrik mentions, in Peter the Great's decree under which vagrants were rounded up for work in his factories in the Urals. Then, as now, it was not effective in economic terms.

LIKE Brodski, Amalrik was released before his term came to an end—not as a result of any outcry on his behalf but through patient efforts on the part of friends (including Alexander Ginzburg) and his lawyer to get his sentence reversed as a miscarriage of justice. The story of his dealings with the Soviet authorities over the period of his detention, trial and exile throws much light on some salient features of a totalitarian structure in decline: the present Soviet system since—and because of—the death of its creator offers the first such spectacle in history (the nazi system was smashed by outside forces before it was fully fledged). Two aspects of this decline are very evident from Amalrik's testimony: one, the tendency for the post-Stalin bureaucracy, even the police, to take some account of the law, such as it is, in dealing with people who have fallen foul of it. They may still honour it more in the breach, but at least they wish to *appear* to be observing it. There is a marked contrast with the flagrant arbitrariness of Stalin's times. As one of the officials in his case actually put it to Amalrik: 'The Committee [i.e. the KGB] isn't what it was. In the old days you would have disappeared for 20 years. . . .' Secondly, the striking development of interdepartmental rivalry in the bureaucracy. Amalrik cites much evidence that, in dealing with his case, the ordinary police and the secret police were working at cross-purposes, and even fighting each other—the ordinary police being inclined, on the whole, to take a more rational, common-sense view of its functions. Amalrik shows

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that someone like himself, who is prepared to insist on his rights, can to a certain extent exploit these bureaucratic rivalries—unthinkable in Stalin's time, when the hierarchy of power was strictly pyramidal, with a vertical subordination going right up to Stalin at the apex, and no nonsense about overlapping horizontal jurisdictions (this was the essence of 'pure' totalitarianism, never achieved by Hitler). The emergence of 'bureaucratic pluralism' may be the one most important feature of post-totalitarian decline: important in the sense that it points a possible way to gradual political change.

After losing his fight against the KGB's move to have him expelled from Moscow as a 'parasite', Amalrik was sent to work on a collective farm near Tomsk in Siberia. About half his book is taken up by a description of life and work among the most underprivileged section of the Soviet population and gives a valuable picture of a world which to most educated Russian city dwellers seems as remote as any foreign country. The gulf between the intelligentsia and the ordinary people (i.e. the peasants) has always been great in Russia. Partly because of their ignorance of it, the nineteenth-century intellectuals tended to idealize 'the people' and look to them with varying degrees of mysticism, as a source of light, and even salvation. The experience of Soviet intellectuals, through enforced contact with 'ordinary people' as prisoners in concentration camps, and latterly as 'parasites', sharing their life in kolkhozes, has been, on the whole, sobering and disillusioning. In *The First Circle* Solzhenitsyn has described his own disenchantment with his earlier 'populist' ideas and his realization that peasants, being no better and no worse than other people, must be judged each on his merits, as an individual. Amalrik was even more disillusioned by his experience, and though one may find his judgments somewhat too harsh, there is no doubt about the general validity of his observations. He shows that the Russian peasant has in Soviet times become a curious social hybrid. As a result of forcible collectivization in the early thirties he has lost his peasant instincts and his proprietary attachment to the soil, but at the same time he has not developed the outlook and habits of a worker. The result is a kind of rootlessness which may be paralleled in other countries only by migratory agricultural workers. But the Soviet peasants (who account for a little under half of the total population) do not have the mobility of agricultural workers elsewhere—they cannot leave their collective farms without permission and they are not even allowed to carry the identity cards without which no Soviet citizen can travel inside the country. They are the victims of a literally arrested economic development, consigned to a limbo between industry and agriculture.

IN his essay *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (written after his book and published in *Survey*, no. 73), Amalrik reaches sombre conclusions about the chance of change in the Soviet system

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as a result of internal social pressures and shifts. From his book it is easy to see the origin of this pessimism: the inertia, ignorance, apathy and lack of solidarity of the peasants he observed in the kolkhoz near Tomsk made him feel that the ordinary people in the Soviet Union are incapable as individuals or *en masse* of any initiative, and that they are readily manipulated by the authorities to whom, despite their passive discontent, they are entirely submissive. Not all Russians would share this view, but it is undoubtedly widespread in Moscow intellectual circles. It has led, in Amalrik's case, to grave doubts as to whether Russian society has the inner resources to change spontaneously, rather than in response only to directives 'from above'. The corruption of traditional values, the destruction of natural ties (such as the peasant's feeling for the soil)—so Amalrik seems to be saying in his essay—have gone too far to make any self-regenerative process conceivable.

There are certainly arguments against this view. Perhaps the best is the example of Amalrik himself. It is clear from what he says of himself that, like others who have chosen the same path of defiance, he has no particular 'ideology', but only an almost blind belief in the need to assert one's rights, in so far as they have been officially defined. He has concluded, like many of his contemporaries, that it is rarely effective to resist the encroachments of a bureaucratic police state in the name of an idea, or on the basis of moral indignation. It does make sense, on the other hand—and not merely as a last despairing, existentialist gesture—to study the rules and regulations, and quote them at one's persecutors. Amalrik may represent a tiny minority, but in an era of apparent social stagnation and political impasse, perhaps only minorities have any prospect of growth. If more and more people insist, as Amalrik does, on their rights as defined in Soviet law, there is a chance of evolution without the external conflict (a Soviet-Chinese war) that he postulates in his essay as the only possible agent of change.

Russia was always notoriously deficient in a sense of law, but the trend in the nineteenth century was toward a gradual increase of respect for law (even in the lower reaches of society) and the establishment of legal institutions. There are signs—of which Amalrik's book provides evidence—that this trend, after decades of arbitrary rule, is slowly reasserting itself. The example of Yugoslavia, which has moved furthest in the evolution away from 'pure' totalitarianism, shows that progress towards a kind of *Rechtsstaat* is possible without radical change in the political structure. The evidence of Russian history in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (and now in the post-Stalin period) would suggest that a general feeling of the need for law, springing from a desire for stability in which all are ultimately interested, is the only 'natural' antibody that a society is likely to develop against the wasting disease of bureaucratic arbitrariness. As Amalrik says in his book: 'Those in high office ought surely to reflect that without a

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proper rule of law they themselves may one day share the fate of Sinyavski and Daniel. As long as we live in a State that violates its own laws, nobody from the rulers of the country down to unregistered attic dwellers, will have any sense of responsibility for their actions, or feel assured of their personal "safety"'.

Judging by the continuing arrest of protesters in the Soviet Union, there is admittedly not much sign that the holders of high office have reflected very profoundly on these lines, but there is nevertheless a great difference from Stalin's time: they hesitate to resort to indiscriminate terror, and the growth of 'bureaucratic pluralism', among other factors, does appear to impose considerable restraints; people are not arrested without some technical reason, and the desire to give an appearance of due legal process is, if anything, stronger than under Khrushchev. One cannot help feeling, therefore, that there is considerable wisdom in the advocacy by some Soviet intellectuals of a legalistic pragmatism which *may* be favoured by a logical trend in the history of their society. For some of the most sceptical, this is indeed almost an article of faith. The gifted mathematician and poet, Alexander Esenin-Volpin, in a statement on the trial of Sinyavski and Daniel, expressed it like this: 'I do not believe in anything, or try not to; in all my reflections I try to proceed from nihilism, from extreme philosophical scepticism—not applying it, however, to juridical and logical norms.' It remains to be seen whether this faith is well grounded in reality, that is, whether 'juridical norms' can become the main cohesive force in a society that for too long was held together only by terror.

'WILL THE USSR SURVIVE . . .?'—A PERSONAL COMMENT

Anatole Shub

DURING my first visit to the Soviet Union—it was in the autumn of Khrushchev's disastrous harvest (1963)—I had a strong sense of historical *déjà vu*. It seemed to me that the Soviet 1960s resembled the Russian 1860s far more than they did any comparable period in Western or Central European experience. Analogy is dangerous; but it seemed to me that Russia had already had its confident despotic Nicholas I in Stalin, and the disappointments of its half-reforming Alexander II in Khrushchev, who in the Cuban crisis, moreover, had submitted to a defeat as clear as that of the Crimean War. The young Soviet intellectuals considered themselves 'new men', in immemorial fashion, disdaining the pretensions of official ideology and searching for new modes of thought. It was about time, I thought, that somebody began to write *What is to be Done?*

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Nothing in the last six years—including my own two years as a Moscow correspondent—has significantly altered my view that the Soviet regime is in a state of what my friend Andrei Amalrik calls 'decrepitude', and that the great problem for the regime, as for those who live under it, is a *way out*—out of the *cul de sac* into which Lenin, Stalin and their heirs have led Russia in its relations with the outside world and the Soviet ruling hierarchies in their relations with society. Meanwhile, Academician Sakharov has written at least one new version of *What is to be Done?*—a work of considerable merit which, however, presumed a degree of goodwill and self-confidence on the part of the Soviet leadership that has not, in the event, been evident. Scarcely had Academician Sakharov concluded his plea for encouragement of Czechoslovakia's experiment with 'socialism with a human face' than the Red Army terminated the experiment.

It is the great merit of Andrei Amalrik's *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* that it is free both of presumptions of goodwill on the part of the rulers and of sentimentality concerning the virtues and possibilities of the ruled. His analysis of the state of mind of Soviet workers and peasants is the most valuable part of his study, precisely because it is so uncompromisingly depressing, so free of populist illusions about the special sanctity of the Russian *muzhik*. Amalrik is by no means the only Soviet intellectual who has arrived at a similar view—witness the portrait drawn of the Russian people in Tarkovski's film 'Andrei Rublev', which is less about the real Middle Ages than it is about the Soviet Union today. It is, of course, encouraging that such young men as Amalrik and Tarkovski have risen, clear-eyed, above the swamp.

The crucial question, of course, is how many such young men there are. To this question, a foreigner cannot even begin to approximate an answer, because of the limitations on human contact imposed by the Soviet police state—barriers formidable enough in Moscow and Leningrad, but insuperable in provincial cities which foreigners can visit only rarely and briefly, or not at all. Amalrik *may* be virtually unique, the 'least typical' Soviet citizen of Moscow, as one critic put it. On the other hand, who can pretend to know precisely what is going on in the minds of young scientists at Novosibirsk and Dubna, or of historians at Tomsk, or of naval officers at Kronstadt?

What I do know is that Andrei Amalrik was the most incisive political mind—Russian or foreign—that I encountered in my time in Moscow. I realized this in our first conversations, before I had ever read a line he had written, long before he even talked of writing *Will the USSR Survive . . .?* He was, and is, clearly an 'original'. Although the breadth of his knowledge and the acuteness of his perceptions were formidable, his two most impressive traits were a distinctive determination to arrive at independent judgments (to 'do it himself' intellectually), and an instinctive, visceral scepticism toward all ideas, including his own. The more 'grand', romantic, comforting or fashion-

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able an idea, the quicker Andrei was to resist it—to roast it over the bunsen burner of historical fact, hammer at it with formal logic, and expose it to the multicoloured lights of his personal experience. Even after he had come to certain definite convictions, he preferred to be tentative in stating them, always welcomed an argument which might lead him to revise them, and seemed far happier posing impossible questions than providing simple answers. In short, his approach was more like that of Socrates the subversive doubter than of Plato the metaphysician or Aristotle the system-builder.

Before living in Russia, I would have strongly doubted whether such a mind could exist and develop under Soviet conditions—in the same way that, for so many years, so many outsiders were certain that 'Abram Tertz' could not possibly be a young Russian literary critic named Andrei Sinyavski, but had to be an old Jewish communist or (as some said) a Pole.

Even now, when Amalrik has become a world figure, many of the kindliest, best-intentioned Western scholars find it incredible that he should have developed—*independently*—not merely an original mind but a remarkable grasp of the Western thinking about his country. Thus, in the otherwise excellent preface to the French edition of his essay, it is suggested that Amalrik *must* have learned what he knew about Western ideas on Russia, and Western modes of thought generally, through *me*—that I *must* have given him Western books, magazines, articles, etc. In fact, the only foreign language Amalrik reads is German, and the only German books I saw on his shelves were East German art books. I never gave him as much as a single newspaper clipping, nor was there any need to do so. From our first meetings, I realized (a) that he had read, studied and reflected more deeply on Russian and European history than I ever had; and (b) that he had a far more 'Western' (empirical, sceptical, historicist) turn of mind than I do, since I am often subliminally seduced by the *mystique* of Russian populism. A Voznesenski prayer to the Blessed Madonna of Vladimir moves me; it irritates Andrei Amalrik. In our conversations, I nearly always ended up cast in the role either of a *narodnik* or of a naïve American liberal, while Amalrik was consistently the tough-minded 'Western' debunker of fuzzy illusions.

I recall, for example, Amalrik's long, clinical dissection of the classic history of Russian civilization by Professor Paul Milyukov, the Constitutional Democrat who became Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government in March 1917. 'Milyukov's own history proved', said Andrei in essence, 'that the territorial expansion of the Russian Empire went hand in hand, for centuries, with the suppression of Russian freedoms. But then, Milyukov imagined that he and his liberal friends could fix everything simply by transplanting Western constitutional structures to Russia. And, when he became Foreign Minister, the first thing he did was to reaffirm Tsarist claims to Constantinople!' Amalrik knew his Milyukov far better than I did, and cared for him

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considerably less; I lost the argument by a knockout within an hour and a half. When Amalrik began dissecting specific passages of Klyuchevski or Spengler, or talking of Kieven Russia (his speciality at Moscow University), the only prudent course, in my state of relative illiteracy, was to listen. Andrei did not suffer fools gladly. His knowledge of current Soviet politics was equally acute.

I mention all this not in order to acquire 'fame by association' with Amalrik, but because the experience taught (it seems to me) two general lessons which go beyond Amalrik's biography, let alone my autobiography:

First, all of us outsiders who, *faute de mieux,* are occasionally dubbed 'specialists' or 'experts' on Russia will be best advised to adopt an attitude of the utmost circumspection toward what goes on in the Soviet Union generally,* and in the minds of Soviet citizens particularly. Even with the gaps in knowledge enforced by censorship and isolation, *they know their country far better than we do.* (By 'they' I mean mainly the intelligent, educated Soviet citizens, although I dare say a bright Ukrainian *kolkhoznik* might surprise even the best Western specialists on Soviet agriculture.)

Soviet citizens' knowledge of the outside world, too, has been incalculably broadened by the transistor radio making foreign broadcasts readily accessible. I recently heard about a Russian living in Kutaisi, of all places—who was not only totally familiar with the standard fare provided by the BBC and the Voice of America, but had become an expert on Japanese fashions and cuisine through Radio Tokyo.

Second, my experience with Andrei Amalrik taught me to marvel at the mysterious indomitability of the human spirit under even the most difficult conditions. I hope I shall never again underestimate the inherent moral intelligence of Russians, Chinese or any other prisoners of totalitarian systems. In Solzhenitsyn's *First Circle,* one of the characters is described as having known instinctively, as a young boy, that all the lies at the Moscow Trials were lies; he could tell it, feel it, simply by reading them in *Pravda.* Some Western readers expressed incredulity at this passage. But Solzhenitsyn was not being a *romancier.* He was stating simple truth—about himself in this case, but doubtless about many others, then and later. Andrei Amalrik was and is one of them. He used almost the same language as Solzhenitsyn's in describing to me his own boyish reactions to the post-war lies of Stalin and his successors.

Fittingly, along the walls and shelves of the Amalrik's room in the communal flat on Vakhtangov Street, there were, when I last saw it,

* Consider, for example, the way in which the myth of Stalin's 'third wife, Rosa Kaganovich' was accepted in the West for nearly two decades—even by such a knowledgeable man as the late Boris Nicolaevsky. It took the flight of Svetlana Alliluyeva to end the myth; she simply *knew* that Kaganovich never even had a sister Rosa.

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many marvellous modern Russian paintings (some by his lovely wife Giselle) but only two photographs. One was a recent, bearded photograph of Solzhenitsyn, which had become a kind of ikon in the homes of many Russians for whom Solzhenitsyn is *the* symbol of courage and integrity. The other photograph—which illustrates Andrei Amalrik's particular turn of mind—was the celebrated phony *Pravda* montage right after Stalin's death, showing a statesmanlike Malenkov alongside Stalin and Mao.* Amalrik was only 15 years old when the montage appeared, but recognized its historic quality immediately and preserved it through the years as an ironic symbol—not merely of the Soviet falsification of history, but of the transience of communist political relationships.

When we both looked at the *Pravda* montage just after the Ussuri incidents of March 1969, he could not honestly say whether, at the time he clipped it out in 1953, he already had more than a premonition of the fragility of the Sino-Soviet 'friendship' depicted in the benign visages of Stalin and Mao. But it is a fact that he began talking about writing 'Will the USSR Survive . . .?' well before the Ussuri incidents awakened L. I. Brezhnev, for example, to the perils implicit in a hard 'two-front' policy towards both China and the West. Indeed, Amalrik had already made several of the same points in letters much earlier to Soviet newspapers (which, needless to say, were not published). He is one of those 'naturally superior human beings' of whom Solzhenitsyn writes, and the comparison made by Professor Sidney Monas * with the nineteenth-century prophet Pyotr Chaadaev situates Amalrik in more appropriate intellectual company.

Due to circumstances beyond his control, Amalrik's essay was completed under pressure and in some haste. He originally talked of writing a full-length book; and he had barely started it when the KGB searched his apartment on 7 May 1969 as part of a massive swoop-down on Russian democrats (*e.g.*, former Major General Pyotr Grigorenko was arrested the same day in Tashkent). Because Amalrik would doubtless have preferred to write at greater length and leisure, I for one do not wish to parse his every sentence, place his every word under a microscope, in the manner of what long ago was called the New Criticism.

Still less do I wish to demean him by discussing the nasty aspersions on his character (not the first example of Westerns doing the KGB's work for it). Even if I did not myself have ample grounds for confidence in his integrity, even had I never met Andrei Amalrik, the word of that authentic hero Pyotr Yakir would be more than enough for me —certainly as against the insinuations of sneaky character assassins

* The original photo had been taken at the signing of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950, with Malenkov several yards and numerous officials away from Mao and Stalin. *Pravda's* artists in March 1953 eliminated all the others and brought Malenkov alongside Mao.

* In the book edition of the Amalrik essay by Harper & Row.

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who hide behind the privileged anonymity of Western 'analysts' and their dossiers, usually containing the Emperor's new clothes. The only words for such people are Russian: '*Kak vam ne stydno*?' (Have you no shame?)

What I would much prefer to do would be to resume the leisurely dialogues we used to have over steaming glasses of Giselle Amalrik's strong tea. Since that is impossible, at least for the time being, I do feel a personal obligation to Andrei to indicate, *grosso modo*, my own reactions to various parts of his essay. The reader should be warned that, where we now disagree, more likely than not (as I know from past experience) Amalrik will prove to be right and I, once again, an incorrigible American optimist.

I agree with Amalrik that Russia's future will depend largely on how rapidly the new 'middle class' organizes itself to take advantage of the historical opportunities which the defeats of a decrepit regime will doubtless present. I am somewhat less pessimistic than he is about the evolution of the officially tolerated Soviet intelligentsia (perhaps because I do not know them as well as he does). Nevertheless, it seems to me that as time passes and the regime becomes more and more clearly anachronistic, the discontent now largely affecting literary circles will spread through the scientific and technical intelligentsia to the Party itself, and perhaps even to elements within the Party leadership. I do not expect this to happen overnight, nor even perhaps within the next decade. Such an evolution may indeed, as Amalrik indicates, come too late to avert an even more reactionary military dictatorship based on sheer chauvinism. Yet all those who know Russia recognize that there are no watertight compartments separating active members of the 'democratic movement', loyal but critical intellectuals, economic managers and Party officials. A definite intellectual osmosis has been going on for some time and is bound, it seems to me, to continue. The current Soviet economic crisis should, I would think, accelerate the process.

I DO not find Amalrik's vision of Soviet disintegration in a war with China as fantastic as have some Western critics. I rather suspect, in fact, that Kremlin 'hawks' have been restrained from preemptive action against China largely by their fear of the consequences within and on the borderlands of the Soviet empire. The morale of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people has not been seriously tested since the Second World War—and the events of 1941 were certainly such as to make any future Soviet ruler think twice before committing Russian troops to extended combat. I, for one, am inclined to believe that the Kremlin would not have ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia if it had not already been assured that (a) the West would do nothing and (b), more important, the Czechs would not fight. The behaviour of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia and the reactions of ordinary Muscovites during the anxious days between the invasion and

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the Moscow agreements of 26 August 1968 demonstrated a considerable edginess and insecurity.

To be sure, in a war with China all kinds of racist feelings could be mobilized to stimulate morale on the home front; but, as Amalrik points out, such a war would necessarily be long and difficult if waged solely with conventional weapons, as it would be once China acquired sufficient nuclear capacity to threaten half a dozen Soviet cities. Therefore, if such a war did break out (as Amalrik predicts) by the early 1980s, the disintegration of the Soviet empire might indeed be a likely result.

Most critics, including myself, find it easier to accept Amalrik's prophecy of the loss of Stalin's post-war protectorates in Eastern Europe than his belief that the USSR itself would be rent by nationalities conflicts. The evidence has, certainly, been far clearer in Eastern Europe —from the Titoist heresy of 1948 to the Erfurt crowds chanting '*Willy, Willy, Willy Brandt*!'. The true state of the nationalities problem within the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is one of the matters about which we outsiders know least and should observe the greatest discretion. If anti-Russian feeling seems fairly evident in the Baltic States, and a sense of cultural superiority obvious in Armenia, the situations in the Ukraine and in Central Asia are most confused and contradictory.

Nevertheless, among the sillier accusations raised against Amalrik's essay is the charge by some Great Russian nationalist émigrés that he is fundamentally 'anti-Russian'. Such a charge betrays a misreading both of Amalrik's character and of Russian intellectual history. In predicting anti-Russian movements among the other Soviet nationalities, Amalrik writes with both sorrow and anger—anger at the Russian Tsars and General Secretaries whose oppressions have driven, are driving and (in his belief) will drive the other Soviet peoples into the same anti-Russian passions as the Czechs and Slovaks were driven on 20 August 1968. Amalrik is no Marxist, but he passionately shares Marx's belief that 'no nation can be free so long as it oppresses other nations'. Nor is he a Leninist, but he would be the first to volunteer the observation that matters were more hopeful when Lenin at least proclaimed the principle of self-determination, accepted (under duress, to be sure) the independence of Finland and the Baltic states, and did encourage genuine cultural (though not political) autonomy among other Soviet nationalities. He is, of course, fully appreciative of the fact that the Georgian Stalin was the worst Muscovite-centralizer and Russifier of them all.

Amalrik forecasts the disintegration of the old Russian Empire not with joy but with despair—the despair of a Russian who wishes freedom and humane civilization for his people rather than the false imperial 'glory' which has enslaved it. In fact, his very despair is in a venerable Russian tradition.

In a perceptive critique in the *Novoe Russkoe Slovo* (29 January 1970), Mikhail Koriakov has cited several examples of this tradition.

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He starts with the famous lines of the poet Pechorin, a contemporary of Herzen's:

> *How sweet it is to hate one's fatherland*
> *And eagerly await its annihilation!"*

As Nikolai Berdyaev commented, Pechorin's lines 'could only be written by a Russian, and moreover a Russian who terribly loves his country'. Koriakov also draws interesting parallels between Amalrik's essay and two of Professor George Fedotov's articles, 'Can Russia Survive?' (1929) and 'The Fate of Empire' (1947). In both essays, Fedotov recognized Ukrainian and Georgian strivings for independence, and the attraction of Adzerbaydzhan and Kazakhstan toward the Asiatic centre of Islam. In 1929 Fedotov was already concerned that the advance of Japan from the Far East would soon be followed by the advance of China. Koriakov concludes his critique by noting the prediction of Konstantin Leontjev (died 1891) that the Slavs 'will burst like a soap bubble and dissolve, not much later than all the others, in the same hateful all-European bourgeoisie and then will be trampled (serves them right!) by a Chinese invasion.'

So that Amalrik's prophecy of the dissolution of the empire in a Sino-Soviet conflict is hardly 'anti-Russian' but very Russian. Should such a conflict indeed break out, the consequences for the USSR might well be those dolefully forecast by Amalrik.

However, I wonder if, within a decade, China will still resemble the China of Mao Tse-tung's declining years. Must it continue to be so internally dogmatic? Must it continue to be so tactlessly bellicose in its revolutionary pretensions? Must it—and this is the most important question of all—remain in isolation, refusing to exploit the world power balance, and particularly the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle, to its own advantage? Much, of course, will depend on the conduct of other powers—the United States, in the first place—but much will also depend on Mao's successors. Prediction is impossible—which is to say that China, by the time it *can* engage Russia in mortal combat, may no longer wish to do so.

Thus, although I believe Andrei Amalrik's analysis of Soviet realities to be uncommonly sober and clear-eyed, I sense something of the mythical in his approach to China. I have been reproached elsewhere for over-attachment to the historical analogy between today's Russia and that of a century ago. I suspect that Andrei Amalrik may be too taken, perhaps unconsciously, by the analogy of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5 as the catalyst of the Russian revolution of 1905. I do not doubt that the present Kremlin rulers could blunder into a similar disastrous adventure; but I am not at all sure that the Chinese would afford them this dubious pleasure. Perhaps, to clarify the possibilities on both sides of the Amur and Ussuri, we need a Chinese 'fish' to discuss the realities in Peking as lucidly as Andrei Amalrik has analysed the state of the Soviet Union.

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AN OPEN LETTER TO KUZNETSOV

DEAR Anatoli Vasilevich,

I wanted to write to you as soon as I heard over the radio your appeal to people in general—and also to me—and your article 'The Russian Writer and the KGB'. I did not do this at once because I was living in the countryside from where my letter would scarcely reach you. But perhaps it has turned out for the best that I am writing to you several months later. First, I have heard of (I have not yet read) your other letters to the Pen Club and to Mr Miller and have been able to understand you better.

Second, it might have appeared that my voice—a voice which comes to you from the country which you have forsaken—would have sounded forth at the same time as the voices of those people in the West who condemned you for your flight and the method you chose for it.

This is not altogether so. I believe that if you as a writer were unable to work here or to publish your books in the form in which you wrote them, then it was not only your right but in a certain sense also your duty as a writer to leave this place. And if you were not able just to pack up and go as anybody in the West can do, then the persistence and cunning which you displayed to this end merits only respect. The fact that you used the methods of your persecutors and twisted them in this way round your little finger is in no way, I think, reprehensible, but the fact that you by your non-return and by means of a frank article turned an ominous report into an inoffensive, amusing piece of work does nothing but harm to the art of reports which exists only in our country.

However, in all that you have written and said while you have been abroad—at any rate as far as I have heard—there are two things that seem to me incorrect and which I therefore want to object to with all frankness.

YOU speak all the time of freedom, but of external freedom, the freedom around us, and you say nothing of the inner freedom, that is, the freedom according to which the authorities can do much to a man but by which they are powerless to deprive him of his moral values.

But, seemingly, such freedom and the responsibility attributed to it is a necessary prerequisite of external freedom. Perhaps in certain countries the freedom to express his thoughts is as freely available to a man as the air he breathes. But where this does not exist, such freedom, I think, can only come about as the result of a stubborn upholding of his inner freedom.

You say that the KGB has persecuted and blackmailed the Russian writer. Of course, what the KGB has done can only be

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condemned. But one does not understand what the Russian writer has done to oppose this. To struggle against the KGB is terrible, but what in effect threatened a Russian writer if before his first visit abroad he had refused to collaborate with the KGB? The writer would not have gone abroad—which he probably wanted to do very much—but he would have remained an honest man. In refusing in general to collaborate in this way he would have lost a portion, perhaps a considerable portion, of his external freedom but would have achieved a greater inner freedom. You keep saying they summoned me, they ordered me, the censorship always forced me on my knees, etc. It seems to me that if you had continually made concessions and done what you condemned in your heart you would not have deserved better treatment at the hands of the KGB or the censorship.

I think that I have a right to reproach you for this. I have always tried not to do that which I would condemn in my heart. I not only did not enter the Party as you did, but neither did I join the Komsomol, nor even the Pioneers—although as a small boy I was repeatedly urged to do this. I preferred to be expelled from university and to give up my hope of becoming a historian rather than to correct anything in my work which I myself considered correct. I preferred in general not to send my verses and plays to Soviet publishing houses rather than to mutilate them in the hope that they would be printed.

It would take a long time to relate how the KGB paid attention to me and so I will merely touch on the point you write about. In 1961 I was courteously invited by the KGB to write a general account of the mood of the intelligentsia and I equally courteously refused, upon which the matter ended.

In 1963 I was taken by night to the Lubyanka and ordered to write a report against an American diplomat to the effect that he had subjected me and other Soviet citizens to malicious ideological brainwashing. I again refused, although on this occasion they had threatened me with criminal proceedings. In 1965 I refused outright to talk with them which cost me an exile in Siberia. But the main thing is that by living in this country and by continuing to write and do what I consider right, I can at any moment be sent to prison again or be dealt with in any other fashion. That is why I think I have the personal right to reproach you.

But perhaps I have no right to do this. Above all, because I am almost 10 years younger than you and I was only lightly touched by that most terrible period which coincided with your youth and in which you were formed as an individual. Even now the regime exists, perhaps not only, but mainly, on the interest from the capital of fear amassed in those times. And it is a matter not only of the KGB but the fact that the whole atmosphere of Soviet life and of Soviet education is such that a man is already conditioned to meet with the KGB and to enter into the same relations with it as you did.

Perhaps there is one other reason why I have no right to reproach

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you, and that is that it can be objected against me that although you repeatedly compromised and even went as far as dishonourable submission, you thereby achieved—albeit in mutilated form—the publication of your books, received recognition as a writer in your own country and thereby made a contribution to its culture, whereas my plays, be they good or bad, belong only to me or to a narrow circle of people; neither in the eyes of the authorities nor in the eyes of society am I a writer and therefore whatever I say or write is of no importance to anybody; that my 'literary honesty' is, in the final analysis, of no more consequence for me than the virginity of a 40-year-old woman.

Again, you may answer my reproach by saying that much in life happens by chance, that it is not only that I have proudly rejected any opportunity of success in the conditions of this regime but that I have been rejected in certain circumstances, that if matters had turned out differently and I had been allowed to publish my article or play after certain changes had been made, would I have stood out against this offer—and having once taken the path of compromise how far would I have gone along it? And would I have written and done things in my life of which I would now be ashamed? This is also true.

Finally, ought one in general to reproach a man who has declared so emphatically that he has broken with his past and has not been afraid to speak of things which many people carry with them to the grave and has thereby shown, albeit partially, how the shameful mechanism of oppression works in our country?

NEVERTHELESS, I do reproach you. Not because I want to criticize you personally, but because I want to criticize the philosophy of impotence and self-justification which runs through all you have said and written in the West. 'I was given no other choice', you seem to be saying, and this sounds like a justification not only for yourself but for the whole of the Soviet creative intelligentsia—or at least for that 'liberal' part of it to which you belong.

You condemn, directly or indirectly, certain of its representatives, but inasmuch as you do not direct one word of condemnation to yourself, blaming the authorities for everything, I do not understand how you can make any demands on the rest. You want to say that you are all victims of oppression, but it seems to me that no oppression can be effective without those who are prepared to submit to it. I sometimes think that the Soviet 'creative intelligentsia'—that is, people accustomed to thinking one thing, saying another and doing a third—is as a whole an even more unpleasant phenomenon than the regime which gave it birth. Hypocrisy and the acceptance of things as they are foisted on it has become so much a part of it that it considers any attempt to act honourably as either a crafty provocation or madness. I have met people—and you have probably met more—who while secretly hating the authorities do everything they are ordered and, what is more, in doing so they hate the authorities even more. But

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they have an even stronger hatred for those who, in the words of your letter to Mr Miller, 'struggle noisily against' the authorities.

This is because the enraged authorities, making no distinction, may lash out not only at those who 'struggle noisily' but also at those who 'hate secretly'.

I do not mean that all those who desire greater freedom for themselves and their country should go to Red Square with banners. However, they ought to reject the customary cynicism which equates truth and lies, to believe in some moral values even if they are absurd and to try to acquire inner freedom. How this is to be done must obviously be decided by each person himself. Not everyone can come out openly against those conditions in which we live and maybe this is not always the best method. But it is always better to be silent than to utter falsehoods, better to refuse to publish any of your books than to put out something which is completely contrary to what one had written in the beginning, better to refuse a trip abroad than to become an informer through it or to 'report' by means of a false poem, better to refuse a press conference than to declare publicly that creative freedom exists in our country. If an individual person or the whole country actively wanted to be free they must achieve freedom somehow even if it be by means of non-co-operation with their oppressors. But sometimes to obtain this one must risk even the freedom one has—which, as I understand it, you were afraid to do.

The question which was often put to you in the West, namely, why do the people in the USSR not change the government if it is so bad, seemed to you naïve. This question seems completely reasonable to me. I would reply to it in this way: it is not that the people do not change the government because the government is good but because we ourselves are bad. We are passive, ignorant and fearful; we deceive ourselves with primitive myths and tangle ourselves with bureaucratic ways; we permit our most active citizens to be destroyed; the majority of us do not understand our situation; our intelligentsia is venal, frightened and deprived of moral criteria. Gradually, however, we are beginning to find in ourselves strength—and this means that sooner or later much can change. But you do not talk in this fashion. Willy-nilly, you are trying to create the impression that all struggle is useless and that those who 'struggle noisily' are also hypocrites to a greater or lesser degree when they declare themselves to be 'for the Soviet regime', and as being opposed only to its particular or general shortcomings as do Sinyavski or Solzhenitsyn.

Nonetheless, it is Sinyavski who is in prison and it is Solzhenitsyn who is 'persecuted and tormented'. But you, being totally against this regime and therefore a 'true opposition', remained silent and did what you were told by the authorities.

I think that all this is false. The word 'Soviet' by itself is scarcely a good defence against the regime. Perhaps the regime sees the greatest danger in those people who say that they are 'for the Soviet

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regime' but who understand by 'Soviet regime' not at all what the regime would wish. Not being personally acquainted with either Sinyavski or Solzhenitsyn I cannot judge how far their public position is sincere. It seems to me, however, that it deserves only respect in every case, as does the position of Daniel and many others. As for their books—and I consider Solzhenitsyn the most significant contemporary Russian writer—I suggest that they are not Soviet and not anti-Soviet, but simply literature which wishes to be free.

Judging only by his books, it is impossible to say that Solzhenitsyn is 'persecuted and tormented'—he gives the impression of a man capable of standing out against persecution, he has already once preserved his inner freedom in prison and will evidently do so again if he is once more put in jail. From this we can all derive strength.

And when you say that you wish to write freely and that it was for this that you fled to the West I understand you and I react with respect to the pragmatic coolheadedness with which you managed to do this, but when you try to prove that your 'secret hatred' and open collaboration here constituted 'true opposition', hinting thereby that the opposition of Sinyavski or Solzhenitsyn is false, and at the same time put yourself forward in the West as the herald of this opposition, then I believe that you place yourself in a false position.

The KGB would scarcely be able, as you put it, to destroy the '*samizdat*' in two days and play a cat and mouse game with it. Perhaps the KGB could arrest dozens of '*samizdat*' distributors in a matter of two hours—and the fact that the KGB does not do this proves, it seems to me, not its playfulness (although a game is being played) but the uncertainty in which the KGB and the regime as a whole find themselves. Apart from this, '*samizdat*' is distributed not among individuals as you say but among thousands.

It seems to me that the pitiful role in which the KGB has placed you and many of your colleagues has forced you subconsciously to overestimate its power. You write that we are living in an Orwellian world, but if this is so you have contributed your mite to this world by your submissiveness and mystical attitude towards the KGB.

But, however that may be, you have now entered another world and have brought your 'secret hatred' to a place where it can become open, but, alas, it will provoke neither an answering hatred nor feelings of warm sympathy—rather a sympathetic curiosity, but sometimes, as you have already been convinced, even a hostile curiosity.

It is in connexion with this that I want to address to you my second reproach.

THE impression is created that many people in the West have a very poor idea of the actual situation in our country and in particular of the situation of writers. Possibly this is because for people brought up since childhood in a different culture and with different social principles it is as hard to understand another world as it is to

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speak immediately in another language. Another reason is that information about many facets of our life does not in general reach the West or reaches it in very small quantities. In addition those people whose obligation it is to supply the West with information consciously or unconsciously distort it. Therefore, it is not only the right but also the duty of every Russian who desires that Western public opinion should better understand his country and even by its authority help to achieve greater freedom for it, honestly to inform independent public opinion of what is happening in our country. To inform, but not to seek sympathy and even more not to try to provoke pity as you seem to me to be doing.

I think that your complaints move nobody, just as nobody is moved by my complaints or by those of anybody else, inasmuch as everyone has the strength to bear the misfortunes of others. I believe that the more calmly and objectively we illuminate the situation of the writer in our country and the less dramatically we point out to so-called 'progressive Western public opinion' its dishonesty towards us, the quicker we will be able to destroy the false reputation which the existing regime in our country has been able to create for itself abroad.

I speak of dishonesty because it is dishonest, when one enjoys complete freedom of speech and other freedoms in one's country or is obtaining for oneself greater freedoms and greater influence, to collaborate in any way with a regime which deprives its citizens of these freedoms and of any influence to seek this or that justification for this regime or to enter into any contacts or dialogues with it.

I think that we have no right to condemn these people because their own problems cause them greater anxiety than all our sufferings, still less have we the right to demand that they crawl into our skins and themselves experience what we have to do. But also we ought not to complain to them, to seek their sympathy or to be offended if we do not find it. We must only speak the truth to them and to anyone who will listen, about the situation in our country. For it is our country itself which needs this in the first instance.

And I think we are still within our rights to say to them: if not only freedom for us but the principle of freedom in general is dear to you, think a little before you travel for the purposes of 'intellectual dialogue' to a country where the very concept of freedom has been distorted and think 10 times before, in admiration of the Potemkin villages, you write reports on Russia which are full of a false significance.

In your desire to convince Western public opinion that the situation of the writers and of the whole people in our country is very grim you repeat several times that we have an allegedly fascist regime. But the point is not whether this is true or not but that until fascism was overthrown and exposed there were many people in the democratic countries who admired fascism or at any rate found in it certain merits. Perhaps they believed that fascism was not suitable for themselves but that it was perfectly all right for the Germans and Italians. Many people also

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hoped that if it were gradually drawn into the respectable society of various international organizations fascism would give up its bad ways. So that I do not know that your analogies achieve their aim.

I also do not know whether you acted correctly when you asked Mr Miller as President of the Pen Club to occupy himself with the fate of writers in Russia. Mr Miller, irrespective of what sort of writer or person he is, in his position has been compelled to occupy himself not with literature and its fate but with the politics surrounding literature—so it seems looking at the situation from Russia—and in the sphere of these politics has made it his task to bring the Soviet writers' organization into the Pen Club. From the point of view of politics this would possibly constitute a great victory for Mr Miller, but what would it give from the point of view of literature? What gain would there be to our country if Kochetov or Evtushenko were to go to Menton and state that creative freedom exists in the USSR? Is the position of the East German writers better than the position of Soviet writers because East Germany is a member of the Pen Club? In my opinion politics and art are incompatible and even opposed and therefore any politics which are carried out around art not only always harm the interests of art for the sake of purely political motives but also introduce into it a spirit of compromise which is foreign to art.

THIS is in general what I wanted to say to you. And one more thing: do not take to heart all that you hear in the West. The reproach has been made against you that as a result of your non-return the situation in our country will become even worse, that many of your colleagues will not be able to travel to the West. I do not think that the situation has become worse. The harm lies not in the fact that a routine pseudo-liberal piece of verse will not be published or that its author will not be allowed to travel abroad, but in the fact that many talented poets and prose writers have been deprived of the opportunity of becoming known: some are in general ceasing to write and others are embarking on the path of pitiful conformism. Here, your non-return will change nothing for good or ill. If you can explain this in the West it will be most important.

This is all right, providing you can convince the West that your relations with the KGB were the rule rather than the exception for the Soviet literary milieu. You hint, for example, that several well-known poets were, like yourself, informers. It seems to me, however, that the important thing is not that writers serve the KGB but that literature, like the KGB, fulfils a service function: the important thing is not whether your hints are justified or not but that all this poetic-political deception which flourished in Khrushchev's time and has proved to be not particularly needed by his successors bears as little relation to independent art as the writings of Kochetov. It even appears to me that Kochetov's sincere obscurantism deserves greater respect than the false

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rebelliousness of those who, together with vodka and caviar, were for a long time an export necessary to the regime.

I am writing to you in answer to articles and letters published openly by you and I therefore consider my letter to be open. Since I wish to have it published I wanted to write as briefly as possible but it has turned out unusually lengthy: either I cannot write or I wanted to touch upon too many things all at once. Nonetheless, I am sending you this letter through the *Daily Telegraph* and I should be very glad if this respected newspaper will publish it. I would wish this above all so that people in the West should know that there is in our country another point of view with regard to your non-return than that which has been expressed in the Soviet press by your former colleagues.

Anatoli Vasilevich, I warmly and sincerely congratulate you on being now in a free country and I hope that this will be a big step for you on your path to inner freedom. Therefore I wish above all for you that your books which are written and published in conditions of freedom will turn out better and more interesting than those which were published under your name in the USSR.

Respectfully,

Andrei Alekseyevich Amalrik,
Vakhtangova Street, no. 5
Apt. 5.
Moscow.

I WANT TO BE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY

SEVERAL decades of terror gave rise in my country not only to an atmosphere of fear but an attendant atmosphere of universal distrust and suspiciousness. Consequently when people appeared who dared to do what no one had dared to do earlier, or what was punished by immediate arrest, there were rumours about nearly all of them that if they were acting so boldly it must be by the permission or on the instructions of the secret police. These rumours originated with those who, from congenital or inculcated cowardice, would never themselves dare to do anything displeasing to the regime and could not understand that there might simply be people more courageous or desperate than themselves.

When, therefore, similar rumours about myself reached me I always felt upset but realized that they were inevitable. Also I was well aware that none of my friends or people to whom I am well known would take such a rumour seriously for a second and that none of my ill-wishers would dare to make such a statement publicly knowing they had not a single fact to support it. This is the situation in my own country.

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Unfortunately I have discovered that there are also people in the West who follow the logic that 'if someone behaves unlike every one else, then there must be something fishy'. Moreover they permit themselves to give wide publicity to their inventions, while admitting that they have 'no answers, only suspicions'. It seems to me that if one has 'only suspicions' one should not in general publicly blacken someone—these 'suspicions' after all are not merely of academic interest, they concern human honour and dignity.

However since several American newspapers have already published a story that I might be a KGB agent, I would like to make public what I myself think about this.

As I understand this story was first put out by Mr Bradsher in the *Washington Evening Star* of 26 November 1969. When I first heard about this article I intended to write a short letter to the editor of the newspaper in order to refute the 'suspicions' contained in the article. I assumed that it was written in a manner which, although unpleasant for me, was nevertheless measured and restrained. When I finally succeeded in getting hold of the article and reading it I found that it was nothing but a bucket of slops poured on my head. I do not wish therefore to write to the paper which printed such an article but will give it to American correspondents in Moscow and will be grateful to any American paper which will publish it.

Although Mr Bradsher begins his article in a semi-inquiring tone, it leaves the impression that he is not so much trying to investigate the question of who I am, as deliberately to blacken me. He distorts and juggles with facts, makes unpleasant allusions and reveals a typical police mentality incapable of looking at anything simply and feels himself obliged to seek something hidden and dishonourable underneath. At the same time he is determined not to make any assertion on his own personal responsibility, but refers all the time to certain 'specialists', 'a defector from the USSR', a 'man who knew Amalrik well a few years ago'—all of whom remain anonymous. This sort of article could well appear in *Pravda* with the sole difference that I would be called an agent of the CIA instead of the KGB.

Nevertheless, not being in a position to sue Mr Bradsher for defamation but wishing to defend myself, I will reply to his arguments in detail.

THE first argument is my open letter to the 'Soviet novelist Anatoli V. Kuznetsov, who recently defected to Britain and denounced secret police control of Soviet writers'.

'This letter', continues Mr Bradsher, 'seemed to analysts here intended to destroy Kuznetsov's role in the West as a valiant defender of writers' freedom, and thereby to destroy his usefulness in anti-communist propaganda'. He adds that I 'rebuked him for his own admissions of serving the KGB as an informer'.

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In my letter I criticize Kuznetsov by no means for revealing 'secret police control of Soviet writers'. In my eyes Kuznetsov's only courageous act was that he honestly spoke about his co-operation with the KGB and so partially revealed the mechanism for controlling writers. This is what I say in my letter.

Nor do I criticize Kuznetsov for fleeing abroad as some inattentive readers of my letter have supposed. On the contrary I wrote that if he could not work freely in the USSR, it was not only his right but his duty as a writer to escape to a place where he could write what he wanted and publish what he wanted.

I criticize Kuznetsov for the fact that having got abroad he tries to fully justify his activity as an informer and his conformism in the USSR, attributing everything to the cruelty of the regime, and he justifies the cowardly and passive behaviour of the majority of the Soviet intelligentsia which wants to be 'pitied' because it is not free but is not willing to make the slightest effort to seek that freedom. Thus I wrote that if we want to change the regime in our country, we must all take a share of personal responsibility for this.

I hope that Anatoli Vasilevich Kuznetsov has correctly understood the sense of my rebukes which I made not to 'compromise his role in the eyes of the West', but to show him that the independent people of his country neither take the same attitude towards him as the official Soviet press, nor that of those who value him from the point of view of his usefulness to 'anti-communist propaganda'.

It is hard for me to judge whether my letter 'destroys' this 'usefulness' or not, but I should like to say that for me 'propaganda' is the most revolting word, and that when I wrote my letter I was not thinking of communist or anti-communist propaganda but of the dignity of the Russian writer.

Mr Bradsher completely misrepresents my letter. I wrote that judging by his books Solzhenitsyn does not give the impression of a 'persecuted and tormented' man, that he is capable of withstanding any persecution, that he has already retained his inner freedom and dignity in prison once and will, I am sure, retain them again if he is once more put behind bars, and I add that we can all draw strength from Solzhenitsyn's example.

But Mr Bradsher presents this part of my letter thus: 'Amalrik said "it is impossible to say that Solzhenitsyn . . . is persecuted and tormented" and added coolly that he could survive a further term of imprisonment'.

Mr Bradsher distorts my letter to Kuznetsov several more times. He writes: 'Amalrik claimed he preferred to remain silent and suffer than to lie for privileges', and concludes that, since I am silent and at the same time 'apparently do not suffer' nevertheless, this raises a big question. In fact all I said in the letter is that it is better for people who cannot openly protest against the regime simply to keep quiet, rather than write and say the opposite to their own views.

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THE second argument is my return from Siberia, where I was exiled by the KGB, before my sentence was up. 'In 1966 the Russian Supreme Court revoked the sentence', writes Mr Bradsher, 'and Amalrik returned to Moscow. A revocation was unusual, being allowed to return to Moscow even more unusual'. And he goes on: 'Perhaps he bought his way out of Siberian exile by agreeing to co-operate'.

Here again Mr Bradsher distorts the facts or simply does not know them.

The review of sentences is the most ordinary practice, connected not with agreements behind the scenes but with the simple fact that many cases are dealt with extremely incompetently by the lowest organs, and sentences are imposed manifestly without cause, and this forces the higher organs to change them somewhat, even if such cases have been 'cooked up' by the KGB. As for those who were convicted under the decree of 4 May 1961 like me, I do not know of a single case in which a person convicted for political reasons has served his full sentence under this decree, so crudely and unlawfully were these cases dealt with. The poet Joseph Brodski's sentence was reviewed, like mine, and he was able to return to his native Leningrad ahead of time. Much has been written about his case in the West and his poems have been published there. The poet Batshev (from the SMOG group) and the artist Nedbailo also returned to Moscow from exile before their sentences were up. According to Mr Bradsher's logic, one should declare all of them agents of the KGB.

Even more absurd is his assertion that 'permission to return to Moscow is unusual'. Such permission is withheld only in cases where a person is convicted for 'particularly dangerous state crimes' (including those under article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) or is a recidivist. In all other cases, if the convict lived in Moscow before and has relations there who are willing to take him, he can return. Thus in 1962 Ginzburg returned to Moscow after his first term of imprisonment and in 1969 Belogorodskaya returned—I mention those cases which are known in the West. Sometimes even a person convicted under article 70 of the Criminal Code may return. Thus in 1965 General Grigorenko returned to Moscow, released from Leningrad's psychiatric hospital prison. According to Mr Bradsher's logic, all of these are also agents of the KGB.

In the case of a change of review of sentence a return is even more obvious. There is no hope of a review of sentence and practically no hope of a return to Moscow in those cases where the authorities carry out an 'exposé'—with reports in the press, 'meetings of workers' and so on, as they did with Sinyavski and Daniel and Ginzburg and Galanskov. In the majority of ordinary cases, such as my own was in 1965, things are not quite like that. Mr Bradsher is on the whole badly informed about the law and judicial practice of the USSR, otherwise he would not have said that I wanted to 'test the law according to which the writers Andrei D. Sinyavski, Yuli Daniel and

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others were committed to prison for having sent their works abroad'. There is no law in the USSR forbidding one to send one's works abroad. Sinyavski and Daniel were formally convicted not for sending their works to the West but for their 'anti-Soviet character'. From this point of view it made no difference whether they published them in the West or circulated them in typescript among their friends in the USSR. By my publications I simply want to prove that, in the Soviet Union as well as in the West, there is no such law and that all prosecutions for this reason are illegal.

'Analysts found it curious', Mr Bradsher further writes, 'that both the 1965 arrest and the May raid (i.e. the search in 1969–*A. A.*) occurred in the presence of Americans . . .', i.e. he wants to give his readers the impression that they were a special KGB fabrication. In reality I was arrested on 14 May 1965, without any witnesses; even my father, who was gravely ill, and my friends were only able to find out where I was after two weeks. If Mr Bradsher were really interested in the circumstances of my arrest and release—he would first have to read my book *A Reluctant Journey to Siberia*, to which he refers in his article and where I wrote in detail about all this. I think that he would then refrain from his unpleasant and unproven assertions.

As for the search of 7 May 1969, it really took place in the presence of American correspondents and that, I think, gave the KGB no pleasure at all.

THE third argument concerns my constant contact with foreigners and my friendly relations with certain American correspondents in Moscow. 'The dissenters, who have defended Daniel and Sinyavski, who publicly warned of a resurgence of Stalinism and who have denounced the invasion of Czechoslovakia', Mr Bradsher writes, 'are able to do none of these. They are kept by the KGB from such familiarity with Westerners'.

Even according to Mr Bradsher's policeman's logic, one must assume that since these 'public protests and warnings' at any rate became known in the West and received wide publicity, some, if not all, of the 'genuine dissenters' must have had friendly and confidential relations with Westerners in Moscow, in as far as all *samizdat* gets to the West through channels other than Tass and Novosti.

In addition, one cannot draw this conclusion, since it is well known to Western journalists in Moscow that many dissenters have met and meet foreigners and both sides go to each other's houses.

I think that Mr Bradsher has drawn a rather distorted picture of the complete absence of contact between Russians and foreigners, because he himself during the four years of his work in Moscow never once spoke with a single Russian, except for officials, and what is more in general did not know a single word of Russian.

The KGB, indeed, hinders Soviet citizens' contacts with foreigners; in this they are helped by the 'super-wariness' of certain Western

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correspondents in Moscow, who are afraid to go beyond the four walls of their office and in every encounter with a Russian see 'an agent of the secret police'.

Mr Bradsher because of his gloomy suspicions allows himself other absurdities. He writes, for example, about how my wife and I were able to go on 4 July to a reception at the American Embassy when agents of the secret police were standing at the gates. We went in because we had an invitation, because of which no one would stop us. But we would generally be able to go in answer to any invitation, because, as Mr. Bradsher must know well, at the beginning of the reception there are so many guests walking about that none of them is asked for his invitation and the KGB agents are simply not in a position to check on everyone.

Wishing at all costs to discredit me, Mr Bradsher is trying everything to cast me in a bad and distorted light, even using the fact that I like collecting paintings, whilst my wife, an artist, has sold some of her pictures to Americans. 'He has been a purveyor of underground art', thus Mr Bradsher characterizes it. He tried 'to ingratiate himself with the wives of several successive American ambassadors'—he warns later on.

In my opinion only a petty man could write in such a way.

THE fourth argument is that my book *1984?* is unpatriotic; I publicize myself through Western journalists, deceived by me, as 'a daring member . . . of the band of dissenters'; Western radio stations broadcast the content of my book to Russian listeners; and all this transfers the indignation at my lack of patriotism on to the 'genuine dissenters'. This cunning plan was drawn up by the department of 'black propaganda' at Novosti, in which I worked, and was then unmasked by the anonymous 'defector from the USSR', who speaks according to Mr Bradsher as an expert on Russian patriotism.

I think that this plan is nevertheless too complicated for mere simple-minded people, who are concerned with Soviet propaganda and counter-propaganda; what is more it would demand the cessation of the jamming of Western broadcasts, just for the narration of my book. But this is not the point.

Here, Mr Bradsher, as in the case of my letter to Kuznetsov, again resorts to direct falsification. I write that the sole hope of the whole world for the best future is not race war, but interracial co-operation, the best example of which would be co-operation between the USA and China; Mr Bradsher, in order to prove my 'anti-patriotism', represents this passage as a 'proposal for co-operation between the United States and China which would overthrow the Soviet system'. I wrote that in the event of a prolonged war with China in the border regions of the Soviet Union, tendencies towards national separation would make themselves felt more and more strongly; Mr Bradsher calls this 'an advocacy of regional nationalism in the Soviet Union'.

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Mr Bradsher also tries in every possible way to play up my work for the Novosti press agency, which is concerned mainly with propaganda in foreign countries. In fact I did work for them, as did thousands of other supernumerary journalists who do not undergo any special test. I interviewed Moscow producers and wrote articles about the theatre and painting; but as soon as the KGB again started taking an interest in me I was immediately dismissed from my work with Novosti, and they even refused to give a reference stating that I had worked for them for two years. After this in order not to be expelled from Moscow again I began distributing newspapers for the Post Office. One has to be endowed with a great imagination or a great lack of information in order to draw from this Mr Bradsher's conclusions.

So far as my 'anti-patriotism' is concerned, without distortion it is possible to find in my book harsh judgments about my country and about my people. It may be that the ordinary Russian, if he were given the opportunity to read or hear my book—and contrary to Mr Bradsher's opinion he will not be given such an opportunity—would find some passages in my book unpatriotic. But I consider that the best patriot is not the man who papers over his country's failings but the man who exposes the wounds so that they can be cured. It may be that it is unpatriotic to criticize one's country and to warn it of threatening dangers, publishing a book abroad for this purpose. But I have no other possibility. And besides, I consider that it is time for my country to overcome its national and social inferiority complex, which leads to every criticism from within or without being considered as something terrible.

I love my country, in which I was born and grew up, and I cannot think without tears of its extraordinary fate. To be separated from it would cause me great grief, but with bitterness I confess that I am not enraptured by my country. If I had been able to make a choice before my birth I should have preferred to be born in a small country fighting for its freedom with weapons in its hands, like Biafra or Israel.

THE fifth argument is that in spite of the publication of my books abroad I have still not been arrested. My arrest is a kind of litmus paper which is to indicate whether I am a KGB agent or not. As far as I could understand Mr Bradsher is not the only man who thinks like this.

To pose the question in such terms to me seems extremely immoral. My country is not a Roman arena. I am not a gladiator, and the Western world, in the name of which Mr Bradsher begins to speak with pathos towards the end of his article, is not the Roman plebs, watching excitedly or coolly to see whether the gladiator will really die or whether it is only a circus trick.

When I was writing my books and intending to hand them over

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for publication I realized that I was risking imprisonment, and I was ready for it and am ready for it now. But I thank God for every day of freedom which is given to me and which I spend at home with my wife. It seems to me that an honourable man who believes in God should not say: 'He has not yet been arrested—that is very suspicious', but rather 'Thank God he has not yet been arrested, that means there is one more free man on earth'.

Mr Bradsher's anonymous 'specialists' have not after all occupied important positions in the secret police of a totalitarian state, and for this reason I think they are scarcely competent to judge who should be arrested straight away and who later. I think that the people in the KGB are reasonably sensible from the police point of view, and that they will arrest me when the fuss abroad has died down, and interest in me and my books has fallen away; and they will not try me for my books but will trump up some minor pretext. And before arresting me they will try to blacken my character as they tried to do with all the others. For this reason I think that Mr Bradsher's article will have delighted the KGB.

As far as the date of my arrest is concerned, a bureaucratic regime does not hurry by its very nature and because it knows that no one will escape it. Marchenko was arrested six months after he had begun circulating his book about Soviet prison camps; Grigorenko seven months after his famous speech at Kosterin's funeral; Bogoraz-Daniel and Litvinov seven months after their appeal 'To world opinion'; Yakhimovich 14 months after his letter to Suslov condemning the trials of dissenters; Gorbanyevskaya 15 months after she had taken part in the demonstration in Red Square; and so on. I do not think that they have begun making an exception just for me.

In the West, moreover, the names are well known of Russian writers whose books have been published abroad, and many of whom nevertheless live in freedom; and it is certainly not necessary to commission a special agent to write books in order to 'soften the bad impression created abroad by the savagery of police repressions'.

There are many more inaccuracies in Mr Bradsher's article. He does not even know my name, calling me several times 'Andrei Aleksandrovich' instead of Andrei Alekseyevich. But I think all this is not so important since I believe I have answered all his arguments. All except one, which seemed to me the most offensive.

'AMALRIK'S name was not found on any of the protests against the trial of Sinyavski and Daniel or the subsequent trials of young dissidents', writes Mr Bradsher, and he draws the conclusion that I 'lack the confidence of other dissidents'.

It seems to me that he ought not to write in this way without knowing me and my friends personally. I am bound by ties of friendship, in some cases long-standing, to many of those who fought and are fighting for civil rights and freedom of speech in our country,

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and the majority of my friends have already paid for their struggle with imprisonment. My friends never doubted me, just as I did not doubt them. I hope that Mr Bradsher wrote this phrase in the heat of the moment, desiring, however he managed it, to give a basis to his suspicions, and that he now regrets it.

But, indeed, I never did sign any collective protests or requests directed mainly towards the Soviet authorities. I never joined any 'dissident group' and never professed to belong to any although I regard these people with great respect, am friendly with many of them, share their aims and try to be useful to them.

When I was finishing my book in a small Ryazan village and watching through the window how after light rain the goats grazed in melancholy fashion, I did not know if the book would ever be published, still less could I foresee that it would attract so much attention. But since this has happened, I wish to be correctly understood.

From childhood the regime under which I was compelled to live was organically alien to me: its culture seemed to be pitiful, its ideology false and the way of life foisted on my fellow-citizens humiliating. I am an individualist by nature and my protest has always been a personal one. I always wanted to uphold my human worth and the right to be free myself. But I do not want to be understood as always thinking only of myself. I would like—and perhaps my example helps here—each of my fellow-countrymen also to feel the significance of his own personality. Only then, I think, is a struggle for common interests possible. Because a struggle for 'common interests' by people with a slave psychology can and does lead only to common slavery.

Therefore, I hope that I will be understood in America, a country created by freedom-loving individualists who have come from all corners of the world. I hope that my books, read not between the lines but exactly as I wrote them, will be the best answer to idle talk about them and to outright slander against me.

But if all the same this rumour sticks in the minds of my readers, I will at least be able to find comfort in the old Russian saying 'good repute lies under the pebbles while bad repute dashes along the path'.

AN OPEN LETTER TO AMALRIK

DEAR Andrei Alekseyevich, I have read your essay with great interest and, while leaving detailed conversation about it for the future, would just like to formulate briefly my impressions. The very importance of the matters raised by you restrains me from a hasty or definitive evaluation.

Once again I am delighted by the precision, honesty and detached

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nature of your position and by the boldness of your act: the very fact of such an initiative is, undoubtedly, a risky step in our conditions, especially at present.

Although I understand and accept the genre of free-ranging reflections which you use, I notice, nevertheless, a difference between the first and second parts of your essay.

The first part makes a very convincing impression by the great detail of its analysis—an analysis of our society which is as yet, in fact, the only one of such breadth and logic. According to my observations, those whom you call 'the middle class' see themselves—and respond to our times—in many ways just as you describe.

However, I cannot fully agree with some of your views, in particular with your forecast of the future of the democratic movement. Although at present its social base is indeed very narrow and the movement itself has been forced to operate in extremely difficult conditions, the ideas proclaimed by it have begun to spread widely throughout the country, and that is the beginning of an irreversible process of self-liberation.

Also, I do not agree with your too one-sided description of the Russian character—but I am not going to charge you with Russophobia, as some critics of your essay are doing in their *samizdat* writings [unofficial underground typescripts]. I see the origin of such charges precisely in your striving for detachment.

I would say that the second part of your essay is less convincing than the first. To predict the future of relations between China and the Soviet Union is certainly a less firmly based undertaking (because of our ignorance of secret diplomacy, the impossibility of reconstructing for ourselves the special atmosphere of international bargaining and agreements, etc.) than to analyse the psychology and ideology of our society, which you have done so successfully.

Lastly, I would like to add to the list of your essay's merits its fine language and the elegance with which you have expounded your thoughts.

Respectfully yours, Pyotr Yakir

Moscow, 28 March 1970.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A POST-MORTEM, II

Pavel Tigrid

[*This description of Soviet-Czechoslovak events between 1967 and the fall of Dubcek is based on the extensive testimony of several officials of the Czechoslovak Communist Party who had a close view of the various negotiations, as well as on documents and personal records both published and confidential. They were put at our disposal by public figures in Czechoslovakia anxious to see them published in the West.*]

THE signing on 3 August of the Bratislava agreement, clarifying the relationship between Czechoslovakia and five other members of the Warsaw Pact, seems to have reassured the Czechoslovak representatives. Notes taken by members of the delegation to the conference at Cierna nad Tisou, which led to the Bratislava agreement, show that Dubcek and his friends were well satisfied with the results of these talks. It was almost as if they regarded them as a sort of 'Czechoslovak victory'; there had, for example, been no mention of the famous warning letter which the Warsaw Five had sent in July, and therefore Prague could surely consider it null and void. And it now seemed certain that the Soviet troops who were still on manoeuvres in Czechoslovak territory could be withdrawn. With regard to foreign policy, the consolidation of the Warsaw Pact, etc., the Czechoslovak Communist Party leaders had agreed to submit unconditionally to Soviet demands, hoping by this demonstration of goodwill to dispel Moscow's fears and to secure the future non-interference of the USSR in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. For their part, the Russians took it for granted that their Prague comrades 'would apply without compromise' the Bratislava agreement; but they understood this application in one sense only, in so far as it would serve as a limitation on the 'Czechoslovak spring'. In this way serious misunderstandings are born.

ON Saturday, 17 August, there was a private meeting of senior members of all the Czechoslovak information services. The atmosphere at this meeting rapidly became gloomy and the pessimism of some of those present was striking; F. Kriegel, a member of the Communist Party Presidium, stated: 'The sword of Damocles is hanging over our heads, on a thread which daily becomes more fragile.' Contrary to expectations, those who attended the meeting were not received by Dubcek but by Cisar, a secretary of the Central Committee, who gave as a reason for the First Secretary's absence urgent consultations with certain important figures 'somewhere in Slovakia'. This

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was correct, since Dubcek was at that moment in the Slovak town of Komarno for a secret meeting with Janos Kadar.

The First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party made no secret of his fears about the future of Czechoslovakia; without actually warning his Czechoslovak colleague of the imminence of the invasion, he made it quite clear that Moscow was prepared to 'resort to extreme methods' should Prague fail to implement the Bratislava agreement immediately and systematically, according to the Russian interpretation of it.

A member of the Slovak Communist Party Presidium has revealed that there was a secret meeting between Brezhnev, Kadar, Gomulka, Ulbricht and Zhivkov 'somewhere in Hungary' on Sunday, 18 August. Describing his meeting with Dubcek the day before, Janos Kadar said that the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party 'was obstinately maintaining its position', that it would not give way and that therefore no agreement was possible. At this meeting, the leaders of the five parties adopted the principle of 'an energetic and exemplary attitude' towards Czechoslovakia.

The report of the general staff of the Czechoslovak army to the Presidium of the Communist Party Central Committee mentions preparations for military action by the Five against Czechoslovakia immediately after the Dresden conference (23 March 1968): this extremity was one of the several ways which had been considered as a solution for the 'Czechoslovak crisis'. The same report suggested, moreover, that the series of Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres in the spring and summer of 1968 'contained many direct or indirect elements' supporting the hypothesis that these manoeuvres were strategically directed against the 'enemy' in Czechoslovakia. It is clear from this analysis, furthermore, that the experts in the Czechoslovak high command had never envisaged the possibility of an attack from anywhere but the west, in other words from the direction of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that the frontiers with the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the USSR and Hungary 'were militarily unprotected'.

CZECHOSLOVAK politicians and army experts are in general agreement regarding the extent to which the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia was motivated by political and strategic considerations. For the verdict of the Soviet military was irreversible: if the events begun in Czechoslovakia in January 1968 had been allowed to continue, it would have led to the general weakening of the Warsaw Pact, since the Czechoslovak element, one of the most important, would be threatened, and would eventually represent a very grave threat to the supreme interests of the Russians. In a confidential report to his government (26 August), Oldrich Cernik, president of the council, gave a sort of exposition on the theme:

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'Moscow considered it essential to make sure of Czechoslovak territory, since for Moscow this was a strategic and military necessity.'

It should not be forgotten either that the political and ideological cohesion of the entire socialist bloc was at stake; according to certain members of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, this was attributable to the 'hesitations and weaknesses' of Russian policy,[1] the real or possible consequences of which had caused no little anxiety, particularly to Walter Ulbricht. As early as the Dresden conference he had made a circular gesture over the heads of the leaders of the five powerful communist parties gathered round the green carpet and prophesied darkly: 'If Czechoslovakia continues to follow the January line, all of us here will run a very serious risk which may well lead to our own downfall.' It is thought that Brezhnev was deeply disturbed by these words, which he repeated to the Presidium of his Party at the meeting of 16 August when the plan for the invasion was finally agreed upon.

It is clear, however, that the aspect of the Czechoslovak evolution, both in the country and the Party, which most disturbed Moscow was its impetuous tendencies and its iron logic which could only lead to the weakening of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as the 'guiding force' of the state. In addition, certain structural changes were effected in the Party and state apparatus during the Prague spring, and this remodelling represented an immediate danger for Soviet mechanisms of control, solidly entrenched in Czechoslovakia for 20 years and hitherto considered impregnable. The purge of the security services, undertaken by Pavel, the Minister of the Interior, is a case in point. On several occasions the minister had informed the Party and the government of his amazement at the large number of Soviet agents in Czechoslovak counter-espionage; during the summer he eventually began the purge, using the list of Soviet agents which his services had provided him with: some 150 agents of the KGB (mainly Czechoslovak citizens working hand in hand with Soviet 'advisers') were 'stellenbosched', that is, they received their full salaries, together with their bonuses—on the sole condition that they ceased to practise their profession. In this way Moscow lost almost all control over this key ministry in the country which was the cornerstone of its alliance system.

Soviet marshals were uneasy about the reforms which General Dzur introduced—with the approval of the Party—into the Czechoslovak army. As Minister of Defence, General Dzur had effectively relieved

[1] In this connexion it is interesting to quote the report in cipher which the Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow, Vladimir Koucky (a man whom it would be difficult to suspect of exaggerated sympathies for the reformist trend within the Czechoslovak Communist Party), sent to his government after the invasion. This 30-page report was concerned entirely with reactions of the cells of the Soviet Party to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Five. According to Koucky, some 800 organizations of the Soviet Party expressed their disagreement with the enterprise.

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of their command or silenced certain Czechoslovak officers known to be passing information to the Russians. In addition, in keeping with the spirit of the spring of 1968, it had been decided that superior officers in the Czechoslovak army would no longer be appointed by simple decree but on the recommendation of the cell and the union of their respective units: this innovation tended to abolish the *numerus clausus* for non-communists and allowed officers enjoying a certain popularity to obtain advancement without their social origin, membership of the Party, or indeed their 'loyalty to the USSR' being taken into account. For Moscow, however, this was one more proof that the Czechoslovak Communist Party was giving up its leading role in the country.

These purges in the two ministries were the subject of several alarmist reports of the 'Soviet group liaising with the high command of the Warsaw Pact' (the headquarters of which were in Prague), which confirmed Moscow's still-growing fears of seeing its influence within the army and the security services of Czechoslovakia weaken dangerously. Later Cernik described these incidents as 'the last drop which made the vase overflow'.

IMMEDIATELY on his return from his short visit to Karlovy Vary, in the third week of August, Ulbricht hurriedly sent Brezhnev the most alarming report possible on the situation in Czechoslovakia. Although the Russians never divulged anything concrete about the contents of this message, Cernik and Dubcek were nonetheless able to deduce from certain allusions that Ulbricht's report arrived in Moscow at the exact moment when the preparations for a possible military intervention in Czechoslovakia were being completed and the Soviet high command was simply waiting for the green light.

In his report, Walter Ulbricht emphasized those aspects of Czechoslovak policy which were causing Moscow the greatest anxiety and, for very interesting reasons, painted them in the darkest colours, stressing particularly that Prague was having 'secret negotiations' with Bonn and other Western countries, that Czechoslovakia and Rumania intended to leave the Warsaw Pact and that these two countries were aspiring to neutrality, which would sound the death-knell for the 'socialist community' in Europe, etc.

It cannot be ruled out that Ulbricht's report on the situation in Czechoslovakia weighed very heavily, indeed decisively, in Moscow's decision. Shortly after the East German leader's return from Karlovy Vary, the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party was hastily convened, on Friday, 16 August. During this session the Soviet rulers agreed *unanimously* that developments in Czechoslovakia represented a constant and immediate danger to the 'political, strategic and military cohesion' of the whole socialist bloc, the defence of which would as a result be 'seriously upset and weakened', according to the opinion of the Soviet marshals (this was reported by Oldrich

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Cernik in his statement to the government on 26 August). The Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party finally came to the conclusion—still unanimously—that it was no longer possible to stop this evolution 'from the inside', since the Czechoslovak Communist Party had ceased to be the 'ruling force' in the country and that, consequently, no other outcome was possible except military intervention. In his report to the government, Cernik made it clear that two members of the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party, Shelepin and Suslov, had expressed some doubt when the vote was taken on the solution to be adopted, arguing that despite the undeniable rise of counter-revolutionary forces, there was still time to settle the Czechoslovak affair by pacific, that is, political, means.

HOWEVER, the Moscow 'hawks' held some trump cards, in the form of reports sent from Prague by the Soviet Ambassador, Chervonenko (and independently of him, by certain KGB agents installed in Prague), the gist of which was identical: the new leaders of the Communist Party, beginning with Dubcek, had no support in the civil or military structures of the Party, and only enjoyed a certain popularity among certain 'revisionist' elements of the intelligentsia. The Ambassador claimed, furthermore, that the great majority of workers supported the USSR, and that if they could not express this it was the fault of a 'handful of rightist elements' within the Party, but at the 'first opportunity' the 'triumph of the sound currents in the Party' would be witnessed. Trusting to these dispatches—which grossly misrepresented the situation—Moscow hoped that the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the five armies of the Warsaw Pact would be a lightning operation, resulting, within 24 hours, in the formation of a new government and a new ruling group at the head of the Communist Party, while leaders like Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, Kriegel and others would be liquidated as 'traitors'. Some Soviet troops would remain on Czechoslovak territory, to ensure that the military and strategic, as well as political and ideological, interests of the Soviet Union would be safeguarded.

One final attempt was made, however—less to avoid the worst than to provide a purely formal justification of the imminent invasion, to be used later. With a mandate from the Presidium of the Central Committee of his Party, Brezhnev sent a long letter to Alexander Dubcek, which the latter received on Monday, 19 August. This missive contained the usual remonstrances, claiming that the First Secretary was no longer in control of his Party, which was no longer in a position to govern a country where the anti-socialist elements were gaining the upper hand; besides reproaches for failing to carry out the agreements of Cierna and Bratislava, however, the letter made not the slightest allusion to the fatal possibility of a military action.

But on the same day the Central Committee of the CPSU met in Moscow, with an agenda which concentrated exclusively on Czecho-

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slovakia; it seems, however, that even this meeting did not clearly decide the question. According to a trustworthy Soviet source, they agreed only on undefined 'severe action' against the 'anti-socialist forces' in Czechoslovakia. This is why the armed intervention of the Five came as such a surprise to the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. From the point of view of Soviet strategy, the invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on the night of 20–21 August entirely according to plan; the Soviet marshals had, therefore, every reason to feel pleased with themselves.

THE story of the first seven days of the invasion is already well known; it has notably been described in the greatest detail in the 'black book', the combined work of a group of Czech historians, published in Prague as a 'collection of research documents'. Although it cannot be found in bookshops, this book has been circulated widely throughout Czechoslovakia and probably abroad too. It would therefore be superfluous to repeat the story of what happened to the Dubcek team during those dramatic days; let us simply consider one of the most striking aspects of the Soviet escapade, i.e. the political *débâcle*, and, furthermore, the total absence of any alternative solution on the part of the Russians, in the event of the first plan proving a failure. Here is a short résumé of the main points of the political plan for the invasion—and of their failure.

It had been arranged that the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting on 20 August, would give priority consideration to the report of Kolder and Indra—two Party leaders who were aware of the exact timing of the invasion—which contained a direct attack on Dubcek's policies. In the 10-member Presidium, Dubcek would be in a minority thanks to the votes of Kolder, Bilak, Svestka, Piller, Barbirek and Rigo, the group which later appealed for help from the 'fraternal armies' of the Five. For purely technical reasons (a delay in the reading of the Indra-Kolder report, the difference between Moscow time and Prague time and the final confusion when it came to the vote, when Piller and Barbirek, insufficiently prepared, did not join the 'dogmatic' group), the Dubcek group was not after all in a minority, which removed all reason for the appeal to the armies of the allies. This first twist to the plan explains why the first declaration of the high command of the Five claimed initially that these armies had entered Czechoslovakia 'in response to the appeal from certain leading personalities in the Party and the state'—a line which Moscow was to give up altogether later on. Employees in Czechoslovak radio and television who had long been in the pay of the Russians, such as Hoffman, Sulek and Marko, did not succeed in turning the communications media over to the aggressors; they were only successful for a few hours, right at the beginning, during which time the radio and television were silent. But later the resistance and the extraordinary exploits of the journalists and other employees of

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radio and television completely disoriented the occupation troops, who had the task of ensuring that they controlled these information media. Instead of being used by the occupier—who could not even find the main transmitters—radio and television led the resistance of the entire nation, in an exceptionally brilliant manner contributing in this way to the total failure of the Soviet objectives.

The occupiers were no more successful in their attempts at effective and permanent interruption of the network of telecommunications. Hence at 9.30 a.m. on 21 August the deputy Polednak was able to telephone President Svoboda to inform him of the meeting of the National Assembly which intended to call a plenary session in order to vote on a condemnation of the invasion. The President of the Republic, already completely isolated in his residence at Prague Castle, was kept informed of events by certain members of the government who communicated with him by telephone, or even personally, after managing to get into the castle by means of fake passes. This was a great comfort for President Svoboda who had earlier received false information according to which the whole government was supposed to have resigned and a new cabinet was to be formed. The only political effort of the Russians was directed to getting the President of the Republic, after 21 August, formally to name the members of the new 'revolutionary government of workers and peasants', presided over by Indra. This was also the message of the pamphlets distributed on the morning of 21 August by the occupation troops; some of them even claimed that Antonin Novotny would be reinstated as head of state. But the failure of this intrigue did not long remain a secret, and the 'black book' tells, for example, of Soviet soldiers burning whole bundles of these compromising pamphlets.

Towards midday the Soviet Ambassador went to Prague Castle accompanied by Indra and Pavlovsky, the former Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow, to persuade the President of the Republic to name a new government and thus 'avoid the worst'. To Chervonenko's great surprise, President Svoboda not only refused to see him but sent a message requesting the delegation to leave immediately. At noon Moscow received another unexpected blow, in the form of a general strike observed on a massive scale; an hour later the 'free radio' put out a declaration by most of the members of the government, 'all those who were able to meet together', condemning the occupation and stating that they were the only legal cabinet.

The situation at the Ministry of the Interior became really catastrophic; Moscow had been relying absolutely on the security services, and not only had the agents in the pay of the Russians failed to take control of the Ministry, but, having set out to betray their fellow-citizens, they were soon hunted in their turn: the free radio had broadcast the numbers of the cars which they used. Those members of the security services who were loyal to their Minister, Pavel, even managed, in the end, to arrest the Soviet agents who had briefly made

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a prisoner of the secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, Cisar. The Ministry of the Interior assistant, Salgovic, was quickly unmasked as a conspirator in the pay of the Russians and found himself effectively isolated.

On the second day of the occupation President Svoboda persisted in his refusal to form a new government and demanded from Moscow a more valid representative with whom to discuss the situation—which amounted to an outright rejection of Chervonenko. During the night of 21–22 August a group of collaborators (Indra, Bilak, Kolder and others) met at the Hotel Praha, in the presence of Soviet officers, but they were unable, however, to formulate any concrete proposals: the traitors themselves were nonplussed by the tidal wave of national indignation against the occupation. There was the same negative result to the negotiations at the Soviet Embassy, during which a quarrel even broke out between Indra and Pavlovsky, both of whom wanted to be president of the council. Ambassador Chervonenko was therefore obliged to inform Moscow both of President Svoboda's refusal to form a new government and of the 'markedly unpleasant and hostile' reaction of the population to the troops of the Five.

The rapid summoning of the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party, which met in a Prague factory in a setting worthy of James Bond, was another setback to Soviet plans: this congress effectively gave the lie to divisions within the Party, which emerged from it more united than ever. And the ultimatum of the high command of the occupation troops, that a new government including Indra, Pavlovsky, Bilak, Kolder and Lenart should be set up by 6 p.m. on 22 August at the latest, remained unfulfilled.

In the evening of 22 August, Brezhnev was forced to recognize that the picture of the Czechoslovak situation which Chervonenko had conveyed to him before the invasion was based on a completely erroneous evaluation. Moscow finally had to bow to the demands of President Svoboda and agreed that together with two of his ministers he should come direct to the Soviet capital for negotiations at the highest level. The first phase of the political action which the Russians had hoped to achieve by military means resulted therefore in crushing failure.

PRESIDENT Svoboda's aircraft took off from Prague for Moscow at 9.30 a.m. on Friday, 23 August. The Czechoslovak government appointed ministers Husak, Dzur and Kucera as members of the presidential party, but at the last moment Ambassador Chervonenko informed President Svoboda that the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party had refused to take part in any negotiations at all unless Indra, Bilak and Piller were also present. This trio therefore also travelled to Moscow, but in a different aircraft.

The reception given to President Svoboda at Vnukovo Airport was impressive, but once the gates of the Kremlin had closed on him

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his smiling hosts were transformed into wild beasts. Soviet participants in such talks, particularly at summit level, have an old habit of resorting straight away to all sorts of psychological pressure, from intimidation to blackmail, via threats to the other party, who must be kept isolated, cut off from all sources of information, so that his determination, his will to resist and his general ability to negotiate may as far as possible be destroyed. On this occasion this treatment was reserved for President Svoboda in the hope that he would abandon all opposition and finally capitulate.

The first meeting only lasted 50 minutes and had a very simple programme: President Svoboda refused to take part in any discussions without certain members of the Presidium, i.e. Dubcek, Smrkovsky and Cernik, at his side; he remained immovable on this point and went so far as to break an ashtray in a fit of temper. On their side, the Russians persisted in the approach in which Chervonenko had failed, namely, to force President Svoboda into forming a new government, a public admission of the danger of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia and the legalization of the entry of the armies of the Five. Should President Svoboda persist in his refusal, the USSR would be obliged—Brezhnev threatened—to declare Bohemia and Moravia autonomous territories under Soviet administration and annex Slovakia as a new Soviet republic.

The first 50-minute interview came to an end with a statement by President Svoboda making it clear that he was not in the least interested in his own fate, that he was old and that his life was not of great importance; then he retired to the apartment which had been reserved for him in the Kremlin. During this time the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party was still sitting, in order to hear the latest news from Czechoslovakia and to see from time to time whether Svoboda 'was not seeing things more sensibly'; Brezhnev sent him letters alternating between threats and conciliation, but to no avail. At this time there also occurred the episode which would normally have its place in a footnote to history if it had not been so important to the events which followed. President Svoboda, feeling depressed, tired and isolated, asked in one of his notes to Brezhnev for permission to telephone his wife. He was allowed to do so, contact was established with Prague Castle using the military lines, and Madame Svoboda answered at the other end more or less as follows: 'There is shooting here in Prague, it's a bloodbath, but the people are with you. Ludvik, do not be afraid, don't give way an inch, everyone loves you, but everything depends on you now and you must help us!' The voice of Madame Svoboda and her touching feminine appeal were a great comfort to the President of the Republic who drew new strength from it: the harsh spell of isolation in the Kremlin apartment was at last broken.

Only in the evening of 23 August were the Czechoslovak leaders eventually brought from Prague to Moscow. They were able to have

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a quick wash, change their clothes and take some refreshment but they were prevented from having any contact with President Svoboda; for the Russians intended to benefit from the old adage, 'divide and rule'. Brezhnev and Kosygin negotiated separately with Dubcek and Cernik, who were naturally completely ignorant of what had been said before their arrival and had no idea of what attitude had been adopted by President Svoboda, nor even whether he was still alive or where he was; it was therefore extremely difficult for them to discern between truth and guile in what their Soviet comrades told them. Alexander Dubcek, physically exhausted and morally shattered, limited himself to repeating that in the absence of President Svoboda he would not nor could not say, decide or sign anything and that in any case his own fate was a matter of complete indifference to him.

The talks began again on Saturday, 24 August, this time in plenary session, with Svoboda, Cernik, Dubcek and others present. The President of the Republic sent a message to Prague asking that before the Czechoslovak delegation returned home 'nothing should be done which might make the Moscow talks more delicate'. The negotiations—if one can so call this sort of *ukaz*—were to continue for a further two days, Moscow having laid down truly draconian conditions backed up by unscrupulous blackmail. 'We have already subdued other small countries, so why not you?' said Brezhnev, and added: 'You needn't worry about the intellectuals; in 50 years' time, there will be a new generation which will be more healthy!'

The decisive phase, which was also the hardest part, of the Moscow talks came right at the end, during the night of 25 August and the following day, up to the time when the Czechoslovak delegation left. For Brezhnev, Kosygin and other members of the Politbureau had finally recognized that any further efforts to create a 'revolutionary worker and peasant' government in Czechoslovakia would be in vain, and they had to resign themselves to confirming the positions of those who, according to the original plan, had been destined to political, even physical liquidation—especially since it was now clear that persons like Indra and Svestka were politically unusable—for the time being, at least.

For the Czechoslovak delegation, the delicate question of what should have been done on the fourth day of the Moscow talks was not so straightforward: let them drag on, or interrupt them abruptly, see if the refusal to sign the Moscow protocol would bring the Soviet participants to make greater concessions, etc. There were so many questions to which there was no answer, on which opinions were naturally divided, and this split among the Czechoslovak Party leaders would become increasingly pronounced during the early weeks of the occupation. For example, Husak, and to a certain extent President Svoboda, did everything possible to come to an agreement with the Russians; on the other hand, Dubcek and especially Smrkovsy tried in every possible way to postpone signing the agreement, emphasizing

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that the composition of the Czechoslovak delegation was entirely fortuitous and had no mandate to sign a treaty of such importance, and that therefore it was imperative to return to Prague so that the text could be ratified by the government and the National Assembly. It is not impossible that the Soviet Politbureau, visibly nonplussed by the political failure of its military expedition, might have agreed to such a compromise, but seeing the fissures within the Czech delegation, particularly at such a crucial moment, in the end the Russians had no reason to be conciliatory. This attitude paid off, for the Moscow protocol, consisting of 15 points, was signed at the desired moment.

THE text of the protocol was never made public, either in Moscow or Prague—if only because of point 14, which stipulated that the contents of the agreement should remain strictly confidential. The authentic version of the protocol of 26 August 1968, translated from the original Czech, is as follows:

1. During the talks questions relative to the defence of the victories of socialism were discussed, taking into account the situation which has arisen in Czechoslovakia, together with certain priority measures dictated by this situation and by the stationing of allied troops in the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Starting from the universally recognized norms of the relations between socialist parties and countries, and from the principles recorded in the documents of the consultations at Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava, the two sides reaffirmed their loyalty to the agreements between socialist countries, the objective of which is to maintain, consolidate and defend socialism and to fight relentlessly against counter-revolutionary forces; this constitutes the international duty common to all socialist countries. Furthermore, the two sides determined that in the present situation, their main task was the concrete and effective realization of the principles and obligations laid down at the Bratislava conference and by the agreement of Cierna nad Tisou.

2. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party declared that the so-called Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party, meeting on 22 August last without the authorization of the Central Committee, was in breach of Party statutes. It took place without the participation of the members of the Presidium and the secretaries of this body, without the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, as well as without the majority of the army delegates and those of numerous other organizations, and is therefore invalid. On its return to Czechoslovakia, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party will take the necessary measures in this connexion. An extraordinary congress will be summoned after the situation in the Party and in the country has been normalized.

3. The delegation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party announced

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that the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party would meet within six to 10 days, with the participation of the control commission of the Party. The task of this session will be to evaluate the progress of normalization of the situation in the country, to take measures likely to improve the working of the organs of the Party and the state, to examine economic questions and questions of the standard of living, to consolidate the Party and state apparatus at all levels, and to relieve of their posts those persons whose continued activity no longer conforms to the imperative of strengthening the leading role of the working class and the Communist Party. This plenum will furthermore apply the resolutions adopted by the sessions of January and May 1968, relating to the consolidation of the position of socialism in the country and to the further development of relations between Czechoslovakia and the other countries of the socialist community.

4. The representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party affirmed the necessity of rapidly implementing a series of measures favouring the strengthening of socialism and of the government of the workers, notably in connexion with priority measures to control communications media so that they may fully serve the cause of socialism, and to put an end to the anti-socialist feeling expressed by the radio, the television and certain organizations which have taken up definite anti-socialist positions. The recommencement of activities by the anti-Marxist Social Democratic Party cannot be tolerated. All appropriate measures will be taken in the interests of the effective realization of these objectives. Party and state organs will watch over the cleansing process of the press, radio and television, by means of new laws and ordinances. In view of the abnormal situation, the execution of these tasks will require certain temporary measures so that the government may energetically repress all anti-socialist intrigue, whether individual or collective. An overhaul of senior personnel in the press, radio and television will be inevitable. As they did at Cierna, the representatives of the Soviet Communist Party now also reaffirmed their complete solidarity with these measures which correspond to the basic interests of the socialist community, its security and its unity.

5. The two delegations discussed the question of the presence of the troops of socialist countries, and it was clearly stated and agreed that these troops would not interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. As soon as the threat hanging over socialism in Czechoslovakia and over the safety of the countries of the socialist community has been removed, the evacuation of the allied armies from the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic will be effected by stages. The command of the allied troops will confer without delay with the command of the Czechoslovak army concerning matters connected with the departure and the new quarters of the allied units in towns and countryside where the local authorities are in a position to ensure public order. The allied troops will be quartered in barracks, exercise terrain and other military

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camps. The problem of the security of Czechoslovakia's frontier with the Federal Republic of Germany will be the subject of a special study. The number of troops, their organization and their distribution in the territory will be arranged in collaboration with the representatives of the Czechoslovak army. Questions of a material, technical or sanitary nature, and other problems connected with the troops temporarily stationed in Czechoslovakia, will be decided under separate agreements by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Any serious disputes will be a matter for the respective governments. The conditions of the stationing and final retreat of the allied armies will be settled by agreements between the Czechoslovak government and those of the other countries concerned.

6. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the government will, where the press, radio and television are concerned, adopt all measures necessary to prevent conflicts from springing up between allied troops and the Czechoslovak population.

7. The representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party declared that they would not allow sanctions, much less reprisals, to be initiated against those functionaries or leaders of the Party who fought for the consolidation of the position of socialism against anti-socialist forces and in favour of amicable relations with the Soviet Union.

8. An agreement was reached on the subject of negotiations which should shortly begin on several economic questions, with the aim of extending and intensifying economic, scientific and technical collaboration between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, notably with regard to the future needs of the national economy so that the economic development plan may be implemented within the terms of the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

9. Complete unity of outlook was recorded with regard to the international situation; it was agreed that its evolution and the aggressive intrigues of imperialism against peace, against the security of nations and against socialism, demand the constant strengthening and increased efficiency of the defensive system of the Warsaw Pact and of other organs, as well as forms of co-operation between socialist countries.

10. The leaders of the Soviet and Czechoslovak Communist Parties confirmed their determination scrupulously to respect the principle of co-ordination of their activities in the field of international relations, with a view to consolidating the unity of the socialist community, peace and international security. The USSR and Czechoslovakia will, in European matters, pursue the policy which they have practised so far and which corresponds to the individual and collective interests of the socialist countries as well as to those of European security; they will resolutely oppose militarist, anti-Soviet and neo-nationalist forces seeking to change the results of the Second World War and to revise the frontiers which at present exist in Europe. The two parties declared

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themselves determined to fulfil all the obligations stemming from bilateral and multilateral agreements between socialist countries. In close collaboration with the other countries of the socialist community, they will pursue the struggle against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism, support movements for national liberation and work in favour of international détente.

11. Concerning the discussion of the so-called Czechoslovak affair in the Security Council of the United Nations, the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party declared that their country had never asked the Security Council to concern itself with this question. The representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party added that their government had given instructions to the Czechoslovak delegate in New York to protest strenuously against the discussion of the Czechoslovak affair in the Security Council or in other organs of the UN, and to insist that this point be removed from the agenda.

12. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the government declared that they would examine the attitude of those members of the government who, while abroad, spoke in the name of the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on matters of an internal and international nature, particularly concerning the implementation of the policies of the Communist Party and the government of the republic. Appropriate measures would be taken in the light of this examination. In this context, the representatives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party consider it necessary to proceed to certain changes in personnel within certain Party and state organizations and bodies, in the interests of the general consolidation of the situation in the Party and the country. These matters will be studied from all aspects after the delegation's return to Czechoslovakia. A thorough inquiry into the activities of the Ministry of the Interior will also be opened; the results of this will determine the measures to be taken to strengthen the administration of this Ministry.

13. The two sides were agreed that early bilateral meetings should take place between delegations from the two Parties and governments to examine in detail and find a solution for problems which might arise from mutual relations, and to discuss current international questions.

14. The two delegations agreed, in the interest of the two Communist Parties and Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, to treat all contacts between the representatives of the Czechoslovak and Soviet Communist Parties after 20 August 1968 as strictly confidential. The talks which have just finished are as a result included in this agreement.

15. The two parties promised, in the name of their respective Parties and governments, to direct all the efforts of both Parties and governments to the strengthening of the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two states so that their eternal fraternal friendship may last for ever.

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THE protocol was signed on 26 August 1968, towards midnight, after which the Czechoslovak delegation received its reward, permission to return to Prague. But just before leaving they had an opportunity of experiencing the fourth (Asiatic) dimension of Soviet policy; as they assembled on the tarmac, the delegation realized with a shock that one of their (reluctant) members, Frantisek Kriegel, was missing. The Soviet partisans of Aryan purity had certainly never allowed this 'Galician Jew' to sit at the conference table[2] and would obviously have preferred to keep him in reserve for a possible trial of 'zionists' and other Czech deviationists, but Dubcek and his party absolutely refused to leave without Kriegel. After several hours of waiting, the president of the National Front and titular member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was eventually brought to the airport and was able to leave with the rest of the delegation.

The return to Prague took place at dawn on 27 August, almost furtively, with no ceremony, official welcome or journalists. All the members of the delegation retired straight away to Prague Castle to rest a little before deciding what the people should be told about the Moscow negotiations, how and by whom. The feelings of the country were in any case somewhat modified: on the one hand, there was joyful relief at seeing the entire Dubcek team return from Moscow so to speak intact, and what was more, with their power confirmed—a real miracle!—on the other hand, the people were impatient to know what *price* had had to be paid for this. A people of 14 million souls had waited for four days, in extreme tension, for the results of the Moscow talks—with an inner presentiment that the news would be bad.

The radio did not broadcast a communiqué on the agreement which had been reached in Moscow until 2.40 p.m. on 27 August. Immediately afterwards, President Svoboda addressed the nation; the effect of this speech was summed up by one of the members of the Communist Party Presidium as follows: 'It was like listening to poor President Hacha . . . it's a new Munich', an opinion immediately shared by the vast majority of the population. 'It's not an agreement, it's rape', said thousands of workers in Prague factories in telephone calls to the radio; 'it's a shameful extorted capitulation', insisted the 40,000 workers of the Skoda factories in Pilsen. In a special communiqué, the National Assembly made known that it 'reserved the right to consider the communication and the proposals of the govern-

[2] Another person who was not admitted to the talks was Nikita Khrushchev. Emerging from retirement, he knocked on the door of the Kremlin on the second day of the negotiations (24 August). He was visibly excited and demanded that Brezhnev be informed of his point of view, which can be summed up as follows: No half-measures to solve the Czechoslovak crisis! Either you manage to turn your military action to political advantage, that is by imposing a government which suits you, or else you should never have got involved in such a step. Above all, no compromise! After passing on his message, Khrushchev was shown the door of the Kremlin without having obtained a personal interview with Brezhnev.

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ment in the light of the preservation of the liberty and sovereignty of the country'.

It was in this atmosphere that Dubcek's voice was finally heard. This unforgettable broadcast, during which Dubcek was often overcome by his feelings, had an overwhelming impact on those who heard it (almost all the Czechs and Slovaks); the great majority of the nation was moved with sympathy for the political and human fate of the First Secretary—but it was a long way from that to becoming resigned to a 'new Munich'. The cornerstone of Dubcek's speech was his often-repeated assurance that the Moscow agreement was based above all on the 'progressive retreat of the troops of the Five from our territory' and that 'our final objective was the accomplishment of the *complete* withdrawal of these troops as quickly as possible'.

It was certainly bold to emphasize this objective, considering that the Moscow agreement tended rather to emphasize the opposite, but Dubcek can in no way be suspected of a deliberate wish to deceive his fellow-citizens; it would seem rather that with his unquenchable optimism he sincerely hoped that everything would turn out all right one way or another.

As the hours passed, doubts began to grow as to whether the attitude finally adopted by the Czechoslovak delegation at Moscow was well founded, and one of the participants in the negotiations even noted:

> We must still ask ourselves whether in August last, we really conducted the Moscow talks with the maximum of efficiency. For it is undeniable that we could have got more from the Russians than we eventually did. For example, Brezhnev was clearly ready to bargain as far as Bilak, Indra and company were concerned; we could therefore either have obtained something substantial in exchange for our agreement to point 7 of the protocol, or have made sure of their definite removal from positions of influence, and thus of the elimination of the conservatives. Of course, we all realized that we would have to give way to the first demand which the Soviet powers put forward in their own interest—that is the question of the presence of their army on our territory—but it was essential to know what the price would be. It has been shown that our first demand was too modest—according to an old principle of ours that there are no small benefices.

At the private meeting of the Central Committee on 31 August, President Svoboda said, among other things (quoted from the minutes of the meeting):

> During this crisis, I was guided by three principles. First, I did not want at any price to see blood flow again and watch corpses pile up. Then it seemed to me that the situation required a political solution, for which legal power had to be restored. Third, I was determined that the people should be able to pursue, under the aegis of the Party, the policy begun in January last. Our Soviet comrades will therefore not interfere in our internal affairs. I am

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> giving you an account, comrades, of what I tried to do not as President of the Republic but rather as someone whose prime concern was that our Party might remain unblemished.
> Therefore, I do not consider the results of the Moscow talks as a triumph—indeed it was not a victory for either side. But nor do I think that one can talk of capitulation or collaboration. People are demanding explanations which at the present time are likely to be misunderstood both by the Party and by the people. Some would no doubt prefer to avoid or evade these explanations, but I want to put you on your guard against such an attitude, for its consequences for our two countries could be incalculable. Two tasks await us today; to promote policies which will have the support of the people, and to abide completely and unconditionally by our Moscow obligations. . . . Personally, I do not see these negotiations as capitulation or collaboration, but as a friendly attempt to find a solution together with our Soviet comrades (*sic*). And if by any chance any of you hesitate to follow the only possible path likely to lead our people out of the present situation—for fear of being called a collaborator—I ask him to resign at once from all his duties.

From the beginning of September there was an active exchange of strictly confidential notes between Moscow and Prague, relating to a proposed pact which would formally legalize the 'temporary' presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. The Russians seemed to be in a considerable hurry to have this particular point confirmed without delay, and it represented in fact the main gain of their expedition of 20 August. A favourable opportunity arose on 13 September when the National Assembly, having heard a long speech by Cernik and the intervention of President Svoboda ('the results of the Moscow talks constitute the only realistic and valid solution'), unanimously approved the actions of the Czechoslovak delegation to Moscow and the fruits of their negotiations. The second stage of post-invasion Soviet-Czechoslovak relations had therefore begun. There now occurred an event which would have a considerable influence on these relations.

A Czechoslovak delegation, led by Lenart, a secretary of the Central Committee, arrived in the Hungarian capital on 26 September to take part in the work for 'the preparatory commission for the international conference of communist and workers' parties'. This commission met at a time when the situation within the international communist movement was clearly strained and the critical attitude of the majority of communist parties to the invasion of the Five had attained public notoriety. Fearing even deeper fissures, Moscow was insisting that a Czechoslovak delegation should take part in the preparatory conference in Budapest. To this end, an emissary was sent to Prague, not a Russian but the Hugarian Komöcsin, secretary of the Party with responsibility for international relations. There exists a detailed account of his talks with his Czechoslovak counterpart

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Lenart, prepared by the latter for Dubcek. It was obvious right from the start what Komöcsin (in other words Moscow) most wanted: 'that the Czechoslovak delegation to Budapest should not uselessly bring up certain delicate matters', or more precisely, the invasion of the Five; the latter promised in return 'not to mention this affair during the discussions'. Before doing the same, Lenart asked whether comrade Komöcsin was sure that none of the 30 participants in the Budapest conference intended to 'put the cat among the pigeons'. 'But that's just the point', replied Komöcsin, 'we must not dwell on it just in case this burning topic comes up on the agenda'. Lenart thought that under these conditions it would perhaps be better if the Czechoslovak delegation refrained from going to Budapest, while declaring its earnest support for the plan for a summit meeting in November. Horrified, the Hungarian comrade objected that such an attitude would give the impression that Moscow was so weak as to be unable—'even in the current situation'—to get the Czechoslovaks to attend such an important conference!

But despite the discretion of comrade Lenart and his assistant Kadorka, who was responsible for the international section of the Central Committee, things turned out rather badly at Budapest: meetings interrupted after five or 10 minutes, the Western communist parties generally hostile to the idea of a summit meeting in November and some bitter criticisms of the intervention of the Five.

One evening, Lenart was paid an unexpected visit by the two chief members of the Soviet delegation, comrades Ponomarev and Katushev (who are considered 'young Turks' in the hierarchy of their Party). After assuring him that personally they regretted what had happened in August, they told him of their own critical attitude towards the affair. According to the terms used by Ponomarev, the main guilty parties were the dogmatic and 'semi-fascist' elements of the Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party, represented chiefly by the military, and the 'centrists' of the Brezhnev type 'who still have the mentality of a district secretary'. The Czechoslovak affair was severely judged by those who the leadership of the Soviet Party considered 'sound' progressives, who were unfortunately in a minority. It was certainly true that the military had suggested that they should form an alliance against Brezhnev, but this suggestion was considered 'dangerous' on several counts, if only because once in power the marshals would hasten to give the post of First Secretary to one of their creatures. In conclusion, Ponomarev and Katushev emphasized that all those who shared their opinion hoped that a settlement of the Czechoslovak affair would be arranged as soon as possible, together with at least partial compensation for the damages caused by the incompetence of Chervonenko and the ambitions of Ulbricht. Since the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was a clear and indisputable fact since 21 August, there was no reason why this should prevent a thorough examination of all possible solutions on a political level. Before the

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conference at Budapest ended, Ponomarev even showed Lenart a note which he intended to send to Brezhnev suggesting a process of gradual, moderate 'normalization', based on confidence in the Dubcek team at the head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It is not known whether this message was received and read by the person it was intended for; however, Lenart told Dubcek about it as soon as he returned, just when the Czechoslovak leaders were about to leave for a second visit to Moscow. In this context, the existence of the message from Ponomarev to Brezhnev, as reported by comrade Lenart, could only be a good omen for the Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations which were about to begin. In any case, Dubcek was quite sure of the positive effect which this report might have on Brezhnev, and he told his closest colleagues: 'Not only do I refuse to give way an inch, but this time I shall also demand apologies for what they did to me in August!'

THE Czechoslovak delegation, made up of Dubcek, Cernik and Husak, arrived in Moscow on 2 October. The talks began straight away, but right from the first meeting—which lasted almost three hours—the Czechoslovak representatives had difficulty in getting a word in edgeways in the face of the onslaught of criticism, recriminations and threats by their partners. For, according to the Russians, the Moscow protocol had been 'systematically and deliberately' violated, the press, radio and television were doing just as they liked, no significant alteration in personnel had occurred, discussions were taking place concerning the early date of an extraordinary congress and of the establishment of a Czech Communist Party, the leadership of the Party was closing its eyes, if not lending its support, to overt or 'underhand' anti-Soviet activities, and the Central Committee had been enlarged by the co-opting of certain eminent unknowns who might as far as anyone knew be 'Western agents'!

Dubcek, surprised by all these accusations, attempted to seek a way out by means of ideological explanation, reaffirmed his unshakeable faith in socialist ideas, and pointed out the damage caused to the international communist movement by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The effort was wasted; his Russian hosts cynically reminded him that it was not a question of an ideological quarrel, that they were totally indifferent to the opinion of the communist parties of Western Europe (especially those who were financially dependent on the USSR) and that the 'construction of a humanitarian socialism' on the lines of the Czechoslovak dream could not possibly be a model for anyone, the more so since the rise of a new 'socialist country' was not foreseeable in the next 50 years. Brezhnev stressed that neither Marx nor Lenin (he knows his classics) mentioned any other model of socialism anywhere, and without the fraternal and diligent intervention of the Five the Czechoslovak attempt would have led to the breaking-up of the socialist bloc and would have 'made us all lose our power'. That was the key to the problem. The Czechoslovak delegation finally

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realized that the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were a guarantee that this power would remain in the right hands; if their presence was still an embarrassment, the Soviet Union was willing to accept in exchange an equivalent number of Czechoslovak soldiers, for whom there would always be plenty of room along the Chinese border.

It was a shock; the total failure of the visit could be read on the faces of the Czechoslovak delegates on their return to the Rusyn Airport on 4 October, towards midnight: they were all pale, embittered and humiliated. Husak said, with the cynicism of an old hand: 'We came, we saw and we lost.'

Despite the late hour, a meeting of the 'faithful' took place straight away in the Central Committee building to discuss the course to follow: Dubcek was conscious that perhaps he had let himself be too intimidated right from the first day of the talks; comrades Spacek and Mlynar, members of the Presidium, wanted to resign immediately. Smrkovsky also had some doubts, but did not falter, thanks to an old pact between Dubcek, General Svoboda, Cernik and himself (which was to be criticized by Vasil Bilak at the plenum of the Central Committee in November 1968), according to which they would either all resign together or not at all. Certain comrades reproached the First Secretary for not having applied the contingency plan which had been worked out before the second visit to Moscow. This plan has always remained secret; we know, however, that its main idea was to forestall the Russians by a Czechoslovak initiative which would suggest the conclusion of a treaty regulating the gradual retreat of the foreign armies; 90 per cent immediately and the rest (Russian contingents) over a period of two or three years; this period could be prolonged by mutual agreement, in the event of too great resistance on the part of the Russians. Once approved by the Party, the government and the National Assembly, this plan was intended to present the Russians with a *fait accompli*. In spite of certain risks which this would have involved—particularly that of lowering the popularity of the Dubcek team among the population—this plan was seriously considered just before the second Moscow meeting by several parliamentary committees and was still on Dubcek's desk marked 'to be examined before carrying out'. But the First Secretary, 'brave but not bold', had not made up his mind to it; besides, strongly impressed by Lenart's report from Budapest, he expected to find his Moscow comrades in a conciliatory mood and ready to accept on the spot the principle of a time limit to the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for him, the opposite happened; clearly, Ponomarev's report had not had any effect.

Cernik was the only one not to be discountenanced and he declared to the small committee, on 8 October (quoted from the minutes of the meeting):

> There is no reason to give way to panic. Even if we never regain such favourable conditions as those which prevailed before August,

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we still have enough scope to develop the work of our Party. We have been reproached for failing to weigh up the implications of what has happened since January. We replied that it was an unquestionably socialist evolution, and that we could not be held responsible for the activities of the communications media after 21 August, since we were not in our country at the time. But we are also of the opinion that sufficient emphasis has not been given to the Moscow agreements; in the Czechoslovak press, for example, one can always find invectives directed against the honesty of our actions. But it is in no way a question of surviving for a few months, or of collaborating, and those who consider that it is impossible for them to work with us are asked not to hinder what we are doing; we will guarantee them safe conduct from the country. We have not accepted the accusation of counter-revolution and we have refuted the ideas contained in the Warsaw letter. The Second World War was followed by the division of the world into blocs, and we also must take this into account. As far as defence and security are concerned, we have told Moscow that none of our citizens will be persecuted for their political opinions and that our security services had no proof of a counter-revolution; we have asked for proof from others if they have it. This week we are signing an agreement concerning the foreign armies. Approximately 10 per cent will remain on our territory, and the role of our army must be clarified in terms of the European military balance: if the foreign armies were to remain on our territory, that would perhaps allow us to reduce the number of our own troops.

Economic reforms encountered no opposition from Moscow.

Will the Congress of the Czech Communist Party take place or not? The USSR was strongly opposed to it, on the grounds that it would be contrary to the Moscow agreement and that it might assume a directly anti-Soviet orientation.

On the subject of federalization, the Russians finally gave way to our arguments. They were particularly concerned about the relations between federal bodies and national ones, lest the latter should carry new dangers within them. In short, the Russians insist that the federal bodies should keep things firmly in hand.

In conclusion, I would say that we have obtained a positive result which 'leaves us room for manoeuvre'. Those who expected victory (total evacuation of the troops, etc.) were bound to be disappointed. For our part, we ask everyone to give their strongest support to government policy. The discussions were frank, hard and difficult—but it could have been worse.

On 18 October 1968 the 'treaty of the temporary stationing of Soviet troops' was ratified, after being approved by the government, and by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia. So the curtain fell on another act of the drama which the communiqué of the Czechoslovak government had described on 21 August 1968 as 'an act of aggression perpetrated for the first time in the history of the international communist movement by the allied armies of socialist countries against a state governed by the Communist Party'.

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DESPITE every effort by the Party leadership to implement the Moscow agreement, the Soviets continued to put pressure on them to carry out the agreement with greater strictness and orthodoxy. As might have been expected, Moscow was determined sooner or later to wipe out the humiliating political defeat which she had suffered. Her best instruments were of course those faithful collaborators whose political life had been saved by article 7 of the protocol. The fact that they were regarded as traitors by the population did not prevent them from continuing their work or from exerting growing pressure on the Party. They had a single goal, corresponding, in fact, to that of the centrists: to smash 'the spring coalition of the Big Four', by eliminating Smrkovsky and a few other progressives. The elimination of Dubcek would follow, together with the annihilation of his reform programme.

Soviet 'occupation diplomacy' was first in the hands of Kuznetsov, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then of a secretary of the Soviet Party, Konstantin Katushev. The latter was sent to Prague towards the end of 1968, and then again at the beginning of April, when the final crisis was reaching its climax with the fall of Dubcek. Both Kuznetsov and Katushev used the same method: they visited Party and government leaders, stressing the Soviet arguments in favour of speeding up 'normalization', and then expressing the dissatisfaction of the Russians with the pace and the direction it was taking. At the same time, these Soviet emissaries (together with the marshals) held ostentatiously amicable meetings with the most hardened conservatives, even when the functions to which they had just been appointed within the Party were of only secondary importance. These visits were seen as a public encouragement of men who were despised by the population and had lost the Party's confidence, and as a demonstration of the trust which Moscow placed in them. Beyond all possible doubt it was thus made clear that these were the men whom the Russians had chosen and to whom they would entrust the future of Czechoslovakia. For their part, the Soviet marshals negotiated directly with the pro-Soviet officers of the Czechoslovak armed forces. In moments of crisis, as was the case in January and April 1969, the Soviet emissaries passed on demands, in the form of ultimatums, to Dubcek, Cernik and Svoboda, thus making it brutally clear to them and to the population as a whole who were the true masters of the country.

AT the beginning of November 1969 the situation of the Party and of the whole country was once again precarious. Moscow was showing profound dissatisfaction at the slow pace of 'normalization'; the population, on the other hand, particularly in Bohemia and Moravia, was dissatisfied with Dubcek's policy of the middle way. In the month of October alone more than 2,000 resolutions were sent to the central seat of the Party in Prague, the majority of which demanded greater resistance to the occupying powers by the Party leadership. On

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7 November, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, Soviet flags were burnt, and once again Soviet tanks stood ready to intervene.

The conservative members of the Central Committee held several private meetings to co-ordinate their plans for the attack which they intended to launch at the session of 14 November. Their position was far from desperate: they were actively supported by the leadership of the Soviet Party, they had maintained or even strengthened their position within the Party apparatus, and thus they constituted a powerful group which at the least was in a position to make serious accusations against the leadership of the Party. But, more important still, their opponents were showing obvious signs of disunity: the centrists among them—notably Husak, Cernik and Svoboda—clearly intended to tone down the post-January reforms. In such a situation the dogmatists' intention was to attack the avowed reformists, like Smrkovsky, Kriegel and Spacek, and isolate them from the centrists and from Dubcek—whose execution they intended to reserve until later. The November plenum would then become a trial of strength between the dogmatists and their more or less open opponents.

The session began in Prague Castle under the presidency of Husak. Dubcek's supporters had prepared a draft resolution which was essentially centrist in spirit. It was decided to let the conservatives take the floor the first day, and to counter-attack later. The first round was opened by Kolder who simply repeated most of the well-known Soviet arguments. These amounted to an accusation against Dubcek's team for being weak and incapable of taking decisions. Other members of the Central Committee, like Novy, Piller and Bilak, criticized the mistakes supposedly made by the Party leadership. The expression 'anti-socialist forces' seemed to have been generally adopted instead of 'extremist forces' to mean 'the enemy'. It was one mark to the conservatives, but it was not the only one. In the course of a private nocturnal meeting of the Dubcek-Svoboda-Cernik-Husak quartet, the First Secretary had found himself isolated. Husak maintained the views which he had expressed in his Bratislava speech, repeating that hostile forces were 'raising their heads' once more and that the conservatives would win if immediate measures were not taken to counteract the 'dangers on the right'. Dubcek wanted this question debated in the Central Committee. It was his opinion that each member of the Central Committee should state clearly what side he was on, and that a general vote of confidence in his policy should be taken.[3] The other three rejected this suggestion, advocating once again a middle-of-the-road attitude which would be equally watchful with regard to the right as to the left wing. During this night-time meeting, the possibility of a quick trip to Warsaw, where Brezhnev was attending the Congress of the Polish Party, was examined for

[3] The practice of voting by acclamation was reintroduced in the Central Committee during the November session. Those in favour of the secret ballot were defeated by 72 votes to 69.

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the first time. The four decided that it would be useful to know the Soviet 'disposition' towards the leadership of the Party. If this disposition was favourable, the position of the leadership would be greatly strengthened in the Central Committee. Furthermore, if Brezhnev should approve the proposed draft resolution, the conservatives in the Central Committee would have no choice but to accept it in the form in which it was presented to them.

Thus, during the night of 15–16 November, Cernik, Dubcek and Husak slipped out of Prague and flew off to Warsaw, where they were immediately received by Brezhnev. The essential passage of the account of the discussions which took place that night is as follows:

> From the outset, it was clear that comrade Brezhnev was in a conciliatory mood. He declared on several occasions that the Politbureau of the Soviet Party and he personally had the fullest confidence in the leadership of the Czechoslovak Party. He wished however to emphasize that the struggle against anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia should be intensified. Comrades Husak and Cernik promised that this struggle would receive special attention, and cited as evidence the resolution which was to be adopted by the Central Committee. . . . Regarding the proposed resolution itself, comrade Brezhnev did not read it with great attention. He implied that he was already familiar with its content from other sources, and declared that he was satisfied with it.

The three returned from Warsaw at 4 a.m. on 16 November, tired but happy. However humiliating (for some) may be the fact that a resolution due to be voted on by the Central Committee of a communist party must first be approved by the First Secretary of another party, it was clear that the conservatives had lost the first round. Although it was only much later that Dubcek agreed to acknowledge that this nocturnal consultation in Warsaw had taken place, the news spread among the members of the Central Committee almost immediately. When, at 9 a.m., the session of the plenum resumed, everyone knew that Brezhnev had approved the resolution and had lent the whole weight of his influence to the four.

However, it was a Pyrrhic victory in more than one way. The four leaders who had been put to the test in Moscow in August—Dubcek, Svoboda, Smrkovsky and Cernik—had, it is true, saved their positions and they remained at the helm. But the price which they had to pay, almost immediately, was not only to promise but to prove that they were determined to put an end to the spirit and the slender achievements of the 'Prague spring'. What had really happened during this session of the Central Committee was that Dubcek had finally been forced to take a centrist position embracing some obvious conservative tendencies—represented particularly by Husak and Cernik—which amounted to the exclusion of Smrkovsky from any prominent political position. The speeches of Husak, Cernik, Svoboda and finally

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of Dubcek himself, at the end of the plenary session, bore striking witness to this change of position.

The final resolution passed by the Central Committee really could not displease Brezhnev or the Czechoslovak quislings. It even became the 'magna carta' of the dogmatic and pro-Soviet elements of the Czechoslovak Party, and in the end, the trampoline for the definitive and final leap of Alexander Dubcek.

AFTER the November crisis had been overcome, a new crisis erupted in January. Dubcek himself said that it was the most serious which the Party had experienced since the invasion. During an extraordinary session of the executive committee of the Party Presidium, the atmosphere became loaded with violent exasperation, comparable to that of the night of 20–21 August. Several members of the Presidium thought that a second Soviet military invasion was imminent; others spoke openly of 'unfortunate events brought to a climax' and of the possibility that these events would bring 'incalculable results'.

A two-day plenary session of the Central Committee opened in Prague on 16 January; it was entirely devoted to discussion of the internal situation in the country. This situation had just worsened suddenly and dramatically, in one night, as a result of the suicide of a young Czech student, Jan Palach. Nonetheless, even before this terrible sacrifice, unique in the modern history of Czechoslovakia, had taken place in Wenceslas Square on 16 January, the dogmatists had launched all their forces in the plenum in a brutal attack. Some asked that an official inquiry should be made into the 'subversive activities' of Smrkovsky; others denounced the members of the committee who had 'signed the 2,000 word manifesto'. Husak accused Smrkovsky of 'Czech nationalism' and declared that while Svoboda, Cernik and he himself were always ready to resign their posts, 'Smrkovsky, of course, would never dream of such an idea'. Strougal declared that 'Party policy at the present time rests on two irreconcilable bases', and made it clear that if the Party was unable to overcome this deep division, it would be incapable of governing the country.

The sacrifice of Jan Palach, and his death on 19 January, the political motivation of the act (essentially a protest against the occupation), and, of course, the profound horror felt by the whole population at this tragedy, interfered with the plans of the dogmatists. Their attack in the Central Committee was ruined after these events and the trend in their favour was slowed down for a time. Dubcek's team feared, however, that the situation would get out of their control. It was reported that incidents had taken place on 18 and 19 January, notably attacks on Soviet army vehicles and demonstrations by groups of young people shouting: 'Hang Brezhnev!' Several telephone conversations took place with the First Secretary of the Soviet Party who was warned by the Czech leaders that a 'tragic situation' could develop if Soviet soldiers, even in small groups, allowed themselves to be seen

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in the streets. Brezhnev assured the Czech leaders of his complete understanding and promised that appropriate orders would be given to the commanders of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.[4]

The decision taken by the Czechoslovak leaders to entrust student organizations with the task of making the arrangements for Palach's funeral, which at the same time made them responsible for the maintenance of order, was shown to be justified. The funeral ceremony was imposing, impressive and dignified to the fullest possible extent. But the calm which had returned to the Party did not last long; the struggles began again. As Jan Havelka, a member of the Central Committee and one of the dogmatists, said in the course of a meeting of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Society, organized according to the excellent methods of fascist gangs: 'It will be us or them. But it will never be us and them. Oil does not mix with water and sooner or later there will be trouble.'

SINCE the January crisis, it was no longer a question of whether there would be trouble, but rather of whether it would give rise to the final crisis, that which would mark the fall of Alexander Dubcek and the accession to power of a new governing team, that is, a team of conservative, neo-Stalinist leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It was equally clear that such a change could come about either as a result of a second Soviet military invasion or from an internal seizure of power or from both at once. In any event, Dubcek's successor could be brought to power by irresistible pressure, or by organized provocation on the part of the country's dogmatists, as well as by the parallel menace of a new Soviet occupation.

The crisis which decided the fate of Alexander Dubcek and of the 'Prague spring' was henceforth known as the affair of the ice-hockey match. It is not to be wondered at: the 16 months of Dubcek's reign were full of absurd happenings, and it might have been expected that it would end farcically.

It all began most innocently. One Friday (28 March 1969) the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team won its second victory over the Soviet team in the world championships in Stockholm. 'They lost their courage on the ice', wrote *Rude Pravo*, announcing the news in large headlines. Another Prague newspaper implied that the 'fantastic and incredible' Czech victory 'should be considered in relation to events which have nothing to do with hockey. . . . The whole country was behind the Czech players, all united in one thought which is known to all. . . .'' Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkovsky, as well as other leaders, had sent congratulatory telegrams to the captain of the Czech team.

[4] The Politbureau of the Soviet Communist Party sent an urgent letter to the Party Presidium in Prague (received in the Czech capital on 18 January) which was also framed in conciliatory terms. While repeating their former fears, the Politbureau promised that Moscow would not intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia as long as the process of normalization continued.

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Indeed, the entire Czech and Slovak peoples had watched the match in Stockholm on television. Immediately after the end of the match, there was an explosion of collective joy, such as had never before been seen in the contemporary history of Czechoslovakia.

However, this popular enthusiasm took on an aggressive aspect, for reasons which have never yet been clearly explained: a group began to throw stones at the windows of the Aeroflot offices in Wenceslas Square, then people forced their way in and set fire to the building. The question is still being asked, in Prague and elsewhere, whether this incident arose spontaneously or whether it was a provocation initiated by agents of the political police.

Liberals as well as conservatives realized very quickly that the hockey match affair represented a danger for the former and an opportunity for the latter. Under these circumstances, Dubcek and his friends did all they could to play down the incident as much as possible; their opponents, however, spared no effort to blow it up into a real crisis.

An urgent meeting of the Politbureau was called. It took place on the morning of Monday, 31 March, and the decisions taken at it were immediately put into effect. The nature of these decisions is known to us thanks to a report (dated 4 April 1969) prepared for First Secretary Dubcek by his secretariat. The most important passages are the following:

> On the afternoon of 31 March the Minister of Defence, Marshal Andrei Grechko, accompanied by a group of officers from the general staff of the Soviet armed forces, landed unannounced at Milovice.[5] At about the same time Konstantin Semenov, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, arrived at Prague airport. Since comrades Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik and others were at this moment visiting our units on the western frontier, Semenov was received in the evening by the Deputy Premier, comrade Hamouz, to whom Semenov gave a verbal account of the Soviet note of protest which he had brought with him.
>
> In this note the Soviet side declared that the counter-revolutionary character of the demonstrations which had taken place in Czechoslovakia on the night of 28–29 March 1969, was beyond doubt. Czechoslovak soldiers took part in these demonstrations. The forces of the extreme right chose this moment to act, so that their action should coincide with a moment of intense emotion. Slogans appeared such as: 'That'll teach you a lesson for Ussuri!' The provocations were organized in co-ordination with foreign forces. The mass information media had constantly taken a provocative and anti-Soviet line. The Party press, including *Rude Pravo*, has joined in these anti-Soviet provocations. The Soviet side considers that the latter constitute a serious breach of the Moscow agreement of August 1968. The extent and nature of the counter-revolutionary actions prove that there are persons

[5] Headquarters of the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

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in the leadership in whose interests it is to continue the anti-Soviet campaign.

For the Soviet side, there is one basic question: Does there exist in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic sufficient determination, and indeed, sufficient goodwill, to cope with this outburst of anti-Soviet passions? The Soviet side proposes that the following solutions should be considered: 1. The Czechoslovak leadership will re-establish order itself; it will radically strengthen the organs of state power, particularly the security forces, re-establish censorship, put an end to the discussions concerning the leading role of the Party and to the controversies with socialist countries. 2. Should the Czechoslovak leadership come to the conclusion that it is not within its power to re-establish order in the country, it will call on the countries of the Warsaw Pact to help it to conquer the counter-revolution. 3. Nothing shall be done (i.e. neither the first nor the second solution shall be adopted) and therefore the countries of the Warsaw Pact will intervene to the extent that they consider it useful.

On the following day, 1 April, at 8.30 a.m., Marshal Grechko called on General Dzur. He left him at 10 o'clock to go to Prague Castle, accompanied by Ambassador Chervonenko and Semenov. The Soviet delegation was received by President Svoboda, Dubcek and Cernik. The conversation was short and took place in an icy atmosphere. Svoboda was furious that Grechko had come to Czechoslovakia unannounced ('These Soviet marshals come and go as if we were a Soviet "*guberny*"', he remarked to his secretary), and Dubcek's attitude was equally dignified and resolute. If we take the report which we have already used:

> . . . Marshal Grechko expressed himself in harsh terms. The Soviet side wished it to be understood that the final warning had been given and that the Czechoslovak authorities must take radical measures. However, the Soviet leaders had come to the conclusion that the supreme Czechoslovak authorities did not intend to put an end to these irregularities. The situation of the Czechoslovak army was untenable and part of this army was in disarray. Semenov declared that the Soviet authorities 'could not find words' to express their indignation at the situation in the CSSR: it was worse than in August last year. In any event, the time for negotiations and discussions was over, and henceforth only actions would speak loud enough.
>
> The meeting ended with an assurance on our part that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party would be summoned at once and that energetic measures would be taken.

In a televised speech on 3 April, Dubcek, acting on the directives of the Presidium, identified himself to a great extent with the basic Soviet ideas and those of their collaborators in the country. He admitted that it was true that 'anti-Soviet and anti-socialist forces exist in our country', that 'the time allowed us for consolidation is not unlimited', and that 'either public order is re-established (*sic*) immediately . . .

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or . . . we will find ourselves in the same situation as we were at the end of last August'.

On the very same day an extraordinary session of the Presidium of the Slovak Party, under the expert leadership of its First Secretary, Gustav Husak, fired a well-aimed shot at the Prague reformists. The Slovak Presidium declared that the violent incidents of 28 and 29 March had 'assumed an obvious counter-revolutionary and terrorist character'. Such adjectives had so far appeared only in the statements of ultra-dogmatists. Later, on 11 April, Husak himself took up this battlecry and declared succinctly that nothing could really remedy the serious situation which Czechoslovakia was in unless changes were made in the leadership. He said that it was 'high time' that radical measures were taken to restore order. With this speech, the crisis entered its decisive phase.

ABOUT 10 days after the hockey match affair everything was ready for the final assault. The 'progressive front' of the Party was rapidly disintegrating. The August 1968 solidarity of the main political leaders had long been a thing of the past. One of these leaders, Smrkovsky, had been publicly reprimanded by the Presidium on 15 April, and this veteran of communist struggles had admitted his errors in *Rude Pravo*. In the press, radio, unions and youth movements the progressives were gradually reduced to silence, and, instead of lucid articles, readers were offered the thin nourishment of worn-out slogans. It was not therefore surprising that a feeling of powerlessness and resignation spread among the intellectuals and the entire population.

In these circumstances the plenary session of 17 April was unprecedentedly short. It only took a few hours to replace all the personnel occupying the main Party posts; the very symbol of the 'Prague spring', Alexander Dubcek, was the first to go, replaced by a new leader, Gustav Husak, whom Svoboda himself introduced on television at 2 p.m. as 'an honest politician of much experience and foresight, dedicated to the Party and to the people'.

The Party Presidium, with 21 members, and the executive committee, with eight, were replaced by a Presidium of 11 members; Alexander Dubcek remained a member, but not Josef Smrkovsky.

Three days after his fall, Alexander Dubcek, the sentimental Marxist who wanted to give socialism a human face, was to be seen with an embarrassed and slightly sad smile on his face, applauding rhythmically in the good old Stalinist manner during a celebration of the ninety-ninth anniversary of Lenin's birth. 'Long live the Soviet Union', 'Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union', cried several hundred fanatics brought in by the carload and lorryload to the congress hall of Prague. Once or twice, Alexander Dubcek seemed to want to join in the chorus. It was a terrifying sight. A few days later he was 'elected' president of the Federal Assembly and was given as an assistant a sad man by the name of Josef Smrkovsky. The

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only question which remained was: when and how would the final blow be struck against the hero of an extraordinary period in the history of Czechoslovakia, and for that matter, of Europe itself?

It did not take long. After months of negotiations with Moscow and innumerable intrigues within the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership, Alexander Dubcek was expelled from the Presidium of the Party and relieved of his function as president of the Assembly. This happened at the September 1969 plenary session of the Central Committee which also saw the elimination from this body of such prominent personalities as Smrkovsky, Slavik, Mikova and others. If Dubcek's final speech was ambiguous in some parts and defensive in others, the fact remains that the former First Secretary did not renounce his belief in the reforms of 1968 and, above all, did not indulge in the humiliating performance of self-criticism.

Finally, in January 1970, Dubcek was sent into diplomatic exile in Ankara. This happened just before a new Central Committee session which saw the lonely hero of the Prague spring expelled from that body too, thus losing his last Party function. Yet once again Dubcek refused to perform the self-critical balancing act. Whatever else may be said of him, the fact remains that he did not 'confess'.

Soon afterwards, Oldrich Cernik was relieved of his post as Prime Minister. In the subsequent purge Dubcek's Party membership was suspended, while Josef Smrkovsky, Josef Spacek, Zdenek Mlynar, Karel Kaplan, Cestmir Cisar and many other prominent reformers were expelled from the Party.

WHAT then remains of the 'Prague spring', apart from a few pleasant memories and a few bitter disappointments? Historically and politically, the most important legacy is probably the failure of the experiment, as it was conceived by the main protagonists and understood by reformist communists and non-communist men of the left throughout the world. The latter, particularly, had placed all their hopes—so often disappointed—in the 'Prague spring'. They hoped desperately that it would reap its harvest. For the first time, they said, a one-party system is changing of its own accord into a human, democratic *and* socialist system, while carefully preserving the characteristics of a classless society freed from the chains of the exploitation of man and from all the other drawbacks of the capitalist system. It was in this spirit that the Prague reformists viewed their tasks and decided on their aims. They tried, with enthusiasm and skill, to carry out a complete revision of the system, but they did not realize that it was already in such a state of disrepair that it was impossible to renovate it effectively and durably.

One year after these events, one of the most prominent personalities among the Marxists who supported the reform movement, the philosopher Ivan Svitak, wrote:

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> The Czechoslovak experiment was a failure because of its own paradoxes, particularly the bizarre role played by a communist party which tried to present itself on the stage of history in the disguise of a democratic organization. It came to grief because of the naïvety of a ruling élite who thought that those who opposed them would be prepared to sacrifice themselves in a great rush of enthusiasm for democracy. . . . The ruling communist élite will never accept a pluralist political system, or if it does, it will only do so on conditions which will make the free play of political forces impossible, in other words, it will never give up its power.[6]

Dubcek and his liberal friends thought that an openly anti-liberal, doctrinaire and bureaucratic dictatorship could be *improved* simply by changing personnel in the main cadres, and perhaps by an enlargement and a rejuvenation of these cadres. In these circumstances, one can only come to one conclusion, however unwillingly: Dubcek's experiment was unrealizable.

[6] *Svedectvi* (Paris), no. 37, September 1969.

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THE HISTORY OF INTER-WAR POLAND TODAY

Antony Polonsky

THE use of history to provide lessons for the present has a long tradition in Poland. The first major historical school in the country, which developed in Galicia in the 1860s and 1870s under Kalinka, Szujski and Bobrzynski, was closely linked with the Galician conservatives who gained control of the province in the 1870s. By attempting to prove that the partitions of Poland had been caused by the weaknesses of the Polish commonwealth and the failings of the Poles themselves, rather than by the machinations of the partitioning powers, it endeavoured to provide the intellectual underpinning for conservative arguments that the Poles should work within the status quo of partition and renounce revolutionary attempts to re-establish a Polish state. The revival of nationalism in the 1890s and the rejection of tri-loyalism, as the acceptance of partition was called, went along with a new interpretation of the Polish past, associated with the names of Smolenski, Korzon and Askenazy, who did what they could to rehabilitate the achievements of the Poles in attempting to modernize their institutions in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

In the inter-war period too the conflict between Dmowski, who had favoured a Russian orientation before the First World War, and Pilsudski, who had attempted to revive the anti-Russian insurrectionary tradition of the nineteenth century, was marked by continual (and often simple-minded) reference to the history of the previous 30 years in order to justify not only the past, but also the present activities of both parties. As Dmowski himself remarked in 1932,

> One of the striking proofs of the spiritual split in our society is the fact that the history of what has taken place in the last few decades, the history of our regaining our independence and of the political activity which preceded it, is presented in two different, mutually exclusive ways. What one side regards as a ludicrous detail, of no importance or consequence, the other sees as an epic deed, of great historical significance; what one side sees as the true precursor of independence, the other sees as a lightheaded and dangerous adventure which did not have disastrous consequences for Poland only because it did not succeed.[1]

TODAY, 50 years after the independence of Poland, the assessment of the achievements and failings of what is now frequently called the 'Second Polish Republic' (as distinguished from the pre-partition state, which was also called a republic or *Rzeczypospolita*, and the People's

1 Roman Dmowski, *Od Obozu Wielkiej Polski do Stronnictwa Narodowego* (Czestochowa, 1932), p. 157.

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Republic which emerged after the Second World War) remains a serious problem for modern historians and publicists in Poland, and one whose relevance to the current political dilemmas which Poland faces is immediately obvious. It is unquestionable that the strength of the 'Partisans' in the Polish United Workers' Party lies, to a great extent, in their appeal to nationalism and in their claim that Gomulka has proved far too yielding to the Russians. Thus it is not at all surprising that Moczar and his supporters have strongly attacked *Polityka*, the weekly edited by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, one of Gomulka's main allies, for presenting what they argue to be a defeatist view of the Polish past, for underestimating the importance of Polish military successes and for failing to give adequate recognition to the achievements of the Polish people in the period of their regained independence between 1918 and 1939.

The whole question of independence—whether it was a desirable goal or merely a bourgeois mirage which distracted attention from the real task of precipitating the proletarian revolution—has long been a problem for Polish socialists. Ludwik Warynski, the founder of the first specifically socialist organization on Polish soil, the 'Proletariat', once said: 'There is a nation more unfortunate than the Polish nation, it is the nation of proletarians.'[2] The hostility of Rosa Luxemburg and her followers in the social democracy of the Congress Kingdom and Lithuania to the idea of independence is well known. It was her views which prevailed in the newly formed Communist Party of Poland (KPP), and in its political platform of 1918 it explicitly rejected Polish independence. It is true that at the Second Party Congress held in Moscow in August 1923 Luxemburgist 'errors' on the question of self-determination were denounced, and it was claimed that 'only the victory of the revolution can give the Polish nation lasting independence in a state (*niepodleglosc panstwowa*)',[3] but this belated conversion remained rather half-hearted and was never credited by the majority of Poles. Indeed, when the Polish Workers' Party was established in January 1942, some two and a half years after Stalin's dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland, it was careful not to include the word 'communist' in its name, and adopted a programme which strongly stressed the importance of the achievement of national independence. The small group of communists organized in Russia under Soviet supervision in March 1943 and headed by Wanda Wasilewska also took the characteristic name of the Union of Polish Patriots.

These concessions to Polish national sentiment did not prove lasting. With the purge of Gomulka and his associates in November 1949, nationalism came to be seen as one of the main obstacles to the building of socialism in Poland, an attitude which was embodied in the historical writing of the years which followed. It was at this time that, as Marian

[2] Quoted in K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 15.

[3] *K.P.P. Uchwaly i Rezolucje* ('The Communist Party of Poland. Decisions and Resolutions', Warsaw, 1955), vol. 1, p. 198.

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Drozdowski wrote in *Przeglad Kulturalny*, the liberal weekly, in October 1957, 'the whole concept of the left (*lewica spoleczna*) in the inter-war period was narrowed so as to include only the communist movement and its ramifications'.[4] Very little actual research was done on the period between 1918 and 1939, a period referred to as 'bourgeois-landowner Poland', and much of the material published consisted of collections of documents which were intended to show that the pre-war Communist Party was the only progressive force in the country, and that those who had been in positions of power before 1939 had continuously and consciously betrayed Polish national interests.[5] As we now know from the post-1956 revelations of *Nowe Drogi*, the theoretical journal of the Party, many of these documents were in fact falsified.[6] Such monographs as did appear faithfully followed Soviet historical models and made the customary obeisances to Lenin and Stalin.[7]

This state of affairs came to an end with the events of October 1956 which brought Gomulka back to power. Crude Stalinist oversimplifications ceased in historical writing, and with Drozdowski's article in *Przeglad Kulturalny* [8] a new atmosphere was created and a new approach to the problems of the inter-war period made possible. In his article Drozdowski attempted to rehabilitate both the record of the Communist Party and the thinking of the non-communist left. Following on from Khrushchev's admission that the dissolution of the KPP in 1938 had been an 'error of Stalinism', he argued that the popular front policy pursued by the Party in the thirties was totally justified, and that the tragedy of the Polish communist movement was that

> in the period of its most encouraging growth, just when it was strengthening its links with the nation, the wrong decision to dissolve the KPP was reached.

The article departed even more from Stalinist orthodoxy in its discussion of the other political groupings of the period. It was highly sympathetic to the traditional parties of the left, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Bund and the Peasant Party. But it also gave a fair and indeed favourable account of groupings which could hardly be described as left-wing, such as the *Front Morges*. the alliance formed in Switzerland by Paderewski, Sikorski and Korfanty, and the more liberal elements in the government itself like the *Naprawa* group. Drozdowski's conclusions were fairly balanced. While stressing the relative weakness of the left

[4] M. Drozdowski, 'O polskiej lewicy spolecznej w przededniu II wojny swiatowej' ('The Polish Left on the Eve of the Second World War'), *Przeglad Kulturalny*, no. 47, 1957.

[5] E.g. *K.P.P. Uchwaly i Rezolucje* (Warsaw, 1955), 3 vols., and *K.P.P. w obronie niepodleglosci Polski. Materialy i Dokumenty* ('The KPP in Defence of the Independence of Poland', Warsaw, 1954).

[6] See Jozef Kowalski's article on the subject in *Nowe Drogi*, May 1956.

[7] E.g. Czeslaw Madajczyk, *Burzuazyjno-obszarnicza reforma rolna w Polsce 1918–1939* ('Bourgeois-Landowner Land Reform in Poland 1918–1939', Warsaw, 1956), or Andrzej Gwizdz, *Burzuazyjno-obszarnicza Konstytucja z 1921 roku w praktyce* ('The Bourgeois-Landowner Constitution of 1921 in Practice', Warsaw, 1956).

[8] Drozdowski, op. cit.

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before 1939 and the 'anti-Soviet and anti-communist obsession' of many of the groups which were part of it, he also emphasized the strength of the revolt against the injustices of the pre-war state and the firm resistance which had developed to the further evolution of the regime in a fascist direction. His article ended with an appeal for further study of the inter-war years and underlined its relevance to the situation of Poland after 1956:

> It is clear that the undertaking of research on the composition of the left in this period, as well as discussion about it in the press, could play a major role in illuminating the drama of the A.K. and the tragedy of the Warsaw rising, as well as the difficulties of our own revolution in the course of which arose and developed People's Poland.

IT is now more than 12 years since the heady days of the Polish October, and more than 11 since Drozdowski published his article; the time is thus ripe for an assessment of what has been achieved in the historiography of the inter-war period since 1956. Perhaps the most striking feature of the historical writing of the last 12 years is the absence of any detailed work of synthesis dealing with the inter-war years. This is partly the result of native caution—of the awareness that detailed monographs will not attract the same attention as a general account would, and that one can therefore be freer in the discussion of difficult problems if one avoids large-scale works. But partly too, the failure to produce general accounts may well be due to a genuine difficulty in assessing the inter-war period. On the one hand, independence was regained, and as Polish communism increasingly ceases to possess any ideological content apart from a rather simple-minded nationalism, this is seen more and more as a value in itself. On the other hand, the state of the inter-war years was anti-Soviet (though it did attempt on several occasions to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union) and it was also politically and socially repressive, particularly after Pilsudski's clash with parliament had taken a bitter turn late in 1928, and even more under the Marshal's incompetent and unpopular successors after 1935.

Thus we still have no adequate history of the Communist Party of Poland in the years between the two wars. Part I of an orthodox *Outline of the History of the Polish Workers' Movement 1918–1939* by Jozef Kowalski, dealing with the years 1918–28, was published in 1958.[9] It was envisaged, as the author stated in his preface, primarily as a history of the Communist Party of Poland, 'the precursor of the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish United Workers' Party', the party which 'represented the historical interests of the Polish working masses and the Polish nation, and which struggled for those interests unswervingly and with much sacrifice'.[10] Further, the book was to

[9] J. Kowalski, *Zarys historii polskiego ruchu robotniczego w latach 1918–1939. Czesc I 1918–1928* (Warsaw, 1958).

[10] Ibid., p. 6.

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> serve as the preliminary step towards collective works, conceived on a broad scale, which would give a full and scientifically based historical picture of the Polish workers' movement in the years 1918–39, and above all of the Communist Party of Poland.[11]

But already in the second edition, which appeared in September 1961, Kowalski felt it necessary to increase the amount of space devoted to non-communist workers' parties, principally the PPS, but also the National Workers' Party, centred on Lodz and western Poland, with its strongly nationalist and Catholic character, and the Christian Democratic trade union movement.

When the next part of Kowalski's work appeared in 1966, it was, as the author admitted in his introduction, only 'formally speaking' a continuation of the *Outline*. Its title indicated its changed scope, for it was now called *Difficult Years: Problems of the Development of the Polish Workers' Movement 1929–1935*.[12] It was also on a quite different scale. Whereas the *Outline* consisted of 435 rather small pages, the new work ran to almost 800 large and closely printed pages. It was not a work of great insight or political penetration, but it was a remarkable attempt to assemble all the available material on the workers' movements in Poland in the period. It was strongly sympathetic to popular front tactics and criticized the Communist Party for its sectarianism and its refusal to co-operate with the socialists. However, even Kowalski has not yet been able to deal with the years 1935 to 1938, culminating as they did in the dissolution of the KPP and the murder of most of its leaders by Stalin.

Another work which has run into difficulties is volume IV of the Polish Academy of Sciences' *History of Poland*, that dealing with the period 1918–39, which is being edited by Leon Grosfeld and Henryk Zielinski. So far only a draft for discussion covering the years 1918–21 has appeared.[13] The editors explain in their introduction why they were not able to bring out a version dealing with a longer period:

> The abandonment of the original intention to publish a trial version of the whole of the first part (1918–26) is primarily due to certain specific difficulties linked with the working out of a synthesis of the period of our second independence. These difficulties arise above all from the state of our knowledge about this period, which is still not completely satisfactory, and from the fact that a great deal of archival material has not yet been absorbed and has often been subject to scientific investigation for only a few years.[14]

The celebrations on the fiftieth anniversary of independence last year, which took place under somewhat unhappy conditions—the special congress of Polish historians called to commemorate the event had to be

[11] Ibid., p. 9.
[12] J. Kowalski, *Trudne lata. Problemy rozwoju polskiego ruchu robotniczego* (Warsaw, 1966).
[13] L. Grosfeld, H. Zielinski, eds., *Historia Polski. Tom IV 1918–1939. Czesc I 1918–1926, Chs. i-xiii (1918–1921) Makieta* (Warsaw, 1966).
[14] Ibid., p. 5.

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postponed because it coincided with the Fifth Congress of the Party—also did not produce any serious attempt at summing up the achievements and failings of the inter-war years. There were a number of brief syntheses published, but they were mostly characterized, as is perhaps inevitable in anniversary publications, by their superficiality and simple judgments. A good example is Marian Czerenski's article, 'The Genesis of Two Historical Dates', published in a special English language edition of the Polish Press Agency's bulletin devoted to the anniversary of independence. 'Looking back', he writes,

> at the last five decades from the historical perspective, it may be said that the year 1918 has gone down in the history of the Polish nation as a historical date of the recovery of state independence, that is also as a turning-point on the road of Poland's national destinies, permitting independent work on the construction of a better future of the Polish nation. But both the considerable shortcomings resulting from the many years of slavery, the far from perfect system of the new state, the strung-out, inconvenient frontiers, the conflicts with neighbours, the preservation in the new state of principles inconsistent with the new needs, and particularly the cultivation of backward social doctrines alien to the idea of social justice, the poverty of the broad masses of workers and peasants, the lack of a large independent industry, the cultural backwardness of the majority of the people, the heterogenous national composition of the country, in which national minorities represented more than 30 per cent of the population, the political scission among the Polish people, first the uncontrolled system of the debauch of the leaders of various parties, followed by the dictatorship marked by the Brest and Bereza, and the erroneous foreign policy—did not create proper conditions indispensable for a systematic and undisturbed effort. It was, nevertheless, a period marked by more than one achievement, especially as regards economic, cultural, administrative, organizational, as well as political affairs, as regards levelling the differences between the various Polish provinces, the restoration of the all-national spirit and the resurrection of the state instinct of the Poles [sic.].[15]

AS regards more detailed monographs and articles on the inter-war period, the standard has, for the most part, been much higher. The most valuable work done has been, predictably, the publishing of collections of documents, memoirs and selections from writings and speeches. It has proved far easier to let the documents speak for themselves than to hazard historical analysis. As far as one can tell, the documents have not been tampered with and there has been no return to the falsifications of the Stalinist period. There have, however, been cases in which inconvenient documents have not been included, as in the case of the report of a meeting of the Central Committee of the Peasant Party on 14 Octo-

[15] M. Czerenski, 'The Genesis of Two Historical Dates', *The First Special Issue Devoted to the 50th Anniversary of the Independence of the Polish State* (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 15–16.

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ber 1937, which showed the leading role played by Witos in the peasant strike of 1937. This was omitted from the two-volume collection of documents on the strike published in 1957, though it later appeared in the *Yearbook of the History of the Peasant Movement.*[16] Problems of space preclude my giving a comprehensive list of the documentary material which has appeared in print since 1956, but a number of items do merit individual mention. A great deal of light has been shed on the workings of the Piłsudski regime in the Marshal's last years and on the crisis which followed his death in the extracts from the papers of Kazimierz Switalski, a prominent member of the *Sanacja,* which Andrzej Garlicki has published in *Kultura.*[17] The attitudes of the democratic opposition have been greatly clarified by the publication of Witos's letters to the exiled socialist leader Lieberman in *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski,*[18] and by the reports on the congresses of the PPS by government spies printed in *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski* and *Z Pola Walki.*[19] The study of the history of the KPP has been made much easier too by the reprinting of its theoretical journal, *Nowy Przeglad,* which has now reached 1929. As for memoir material, rather less has been published, though one must mention the diary of Maciej Rataj, a prominent peasant leader and Marshal (Speaker) of the Sejm from 1922 to 1928,[20] the memoirs of General Romeyko, which describe the impact of the Pilsudski regime on the army,[21] and the extracts from the Lieberman memoirs published in *Kultura.*[22]

However, when one comes to new books and articles, the situation is much less satisfactory. A great deal has been written, but it has for the most part been concerned with very limited topics and has usually avoided the central issues of inter-war Polish politics. Polish foreign policy between the wars has given rise to a large body of work of rather varied quality. The crude oversimplifications of the Stalinist period, in which Beck was seen as an agent of nazi Germany, prepared to join the Germans in a crusade against the Soviet Union, have now been almost entirely abandoned.[23] Indeed, the best Polish work on the diplomatic

[16] *Roczniki Dziejow Ruchu Ludowego,* vol. VII. See also the discussion of this question by Jan Borkowski in *Polityka,* no. 7, 1965.

[17] 'Zapiski Kazimiera Switalskiego' ('The Notes of Kazimierz Switalski'), *Kultura,* nos. 51–52, 1966.

[18] 'Listy Witosa do Liebermana' ('Witos's Letters to Lieberman'), *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski. Materiały i studia z okresu 1914–1939.* vol. VI, pp. 160–91.

[19] 'XXI Kongres P.P.S. (1–4 XI 1928)' in J. Zarnowski, ed., *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski,* vol. VI (1963), pp. 289–96; 'XXII Kongres P.P.S. (23–4 V 1931) w relacji Komunikatu Informacyjnego Komisariatu Rzadu w Warsawie', in J. Zarnowski, ed., *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski* vol. II (1959), pp. 217–46; 'XXIII Kongres P.P.S. (1934) w materialach i relacjach agenturalnych Komisariatu Rzadu m. st. Warsawe', in H. Marek, ed., *Z Pola Walki,* vol. I (1958), pp. 159–202.

[20] M. Rataj, *Pamietniki* ('Memoirs', Warsaw, 1965).

[21] M. Romeyko, *Przed i po Maju* ('Before and After May', Warsaw, 1967), 2 vols.

[22] H. Lieberman, 'Pamietniki' ('Memoirs'), *Kultura,* nos. 9, 11 and 12, 1967.

[23] This was the view of S. Arski in *Przeklete Lata* ('Accursed Years', 2nd ed., Warsaw, 1953) and M. Staniewicz, *Kleska wrzesniowa na tle stosunkow miedzynarodowych 1919–1939* ('The September Catastrophe Seen Against the Background of International Relations', Warsaw, 1952).

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history of this time, such as Marian Wojciechowski's *Stosunki Polsko-Niemieckie 1933–38* ('Polish-German Relations 1933–38', Poznan, 1965), has been of a very high quality. Two features on the treatment of international relations should, however, be noted. In the first place, there has been an increasing tendency to blame the Western powers rather than the Poles themselves for the Polish catastrophe. This is evident in, for example, Stefania Stanislawska's *Polska a Monachium* ('Poland and Munich', Warsaw, 1967), which argues, perhaps correctly, that the Polish responsibility for Munich was far less than that of the Western powers. Second, there is still virtually no significant discussion of Polish-Soviet relations. The works of Karol Lapter and Jaroslaw Jurkiewicz, almost the only detailed discussions of the subject, are marked by their ideological primitivism and their insistence that Soviet policy is above criticism.[24]

IN internal history, a great deal of attention has, as might have been anticipated, been devoted to the parties of the left. Paradoxically, rather little of this has been focused on the history of the Communist Party of Poland. (The KPP, with its Luxemburgist inheritance, its predominantly Jewish membership, its rigorous intellectualism and its Trotskyite leanings, has always been something of an embarrassment to the rulers of People's Poland.) Apart from Kowalski's two books and a number of articles, mainly in the journal of the Party Historical Institute, *Z Pola Walki*, there has been little secondary material published on the Party. What has appeared since 1956, such as Felicja Kalicka's two books,[25] has, characteristically, concentrated on the period when the KPP favoured a popular front and has stressed the need for the unity of the workers' movement. The conclusion of her *Z zagadnien jednolitego frontu K.P.P. i P.P.S. w latach 1933–34* points the moral clearly:

> It is only after many years and many tragic experiences that, in the new conditions of People's Poland, of the different and often contradictory tendencies in the Polish workers' movement, those have triumphed which have led to its unification.[26]

More work has been concerned with the various legal communist front organizations which were a feature of the inter-war period (the KPP being illegal operated underground). Collections of documents with long introductions dealing principally with the PPS-left wing, the Independent

[24] K. Lapter, *Zarys Stosunkow polsko-radzieckich w latach 1917–1960* ('An Outline of Polish-Soviet Relations, 1917–1960', Part I, Warsaw, 1960); J. Jurkiewicz, *Pakt wschodni: z historii stosunkow miedzynarodowych w latach 1934–1935*, ('The Eastern Pact: Studies on the History of International Relations in the Years 1934–1935', Warsaw, 1963).

[25] F. Kalicka, *Problemy jednolitego frontu w miedzynarodowym ruchu robotniczym 1933–1935* ('Problems of the United Front in the International Workers' Movement 1933–1935', Warsaw, 1962), and *Z zagadnien jednolit ego frontu K.P.P. i P.P.S. w latach 1933–34* ('On the Problems of a United Front of the KPP and PPS 1933–34', Warsaw, 1967).

[26] p. 486.

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Peasant Party and the Left Peasant Union have been brought out.[27] Selections have also been published of the works of a number of communist leaders, including Adolf Warski, Julian Lenski and Maria Koszutska.[28]

Even more has been published on the non-communist parties of the left. Indeed, there has been an increasing attempt to see these parties as the antecedents of People's Poland as much as, and in some cases even more than, the KPP. The PPS has received a good deal of attention, and its activities between 1935 and 1939 have been the subject of a highly competent scholarly work by Janusz Zarnowski.[29] Although he holds to the traditional line of distinguishing between the 'reformist' leadership and the 'revolutionary' rank and file of the party, the book is in fact a very sophisticated account of the dilemmas which the party had to face in the last years before the war. It is particularly effective in the way it sets these dilemmas against the general evolution of Polish politics in the period. There have also been a number of articles devoted to the PPS, of which the most significant is that by Marian Drozdowski and Aleksandra Tymieniecka on the principal party ideologist of the thirties, Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski,[30] an article which problems of censorship prevented from appearing in book form. However, there is still a great dearth of memoir material. The only volume of selected works of a socialist activist in the inter-war period which has been reprinted is that of Norbert Barlicki, one of the main spokesmen of the left wing of the party.[31] The activities of the party in the twenties have also been rather neglected. Very little has been written on the other workers' parties, though there has been one rather uninformative article on a pro-communist secession from the main Jewish socialist party, the *Bund*.[32]

One subject which has enjoyed fairly detailed treatment has been the centre-left, the alliance of six parties of the centre and left formed in 1929 to oppose the Pilsudski regime and demand the return to a fully democratic system. This alliance, which included the PPS, the three peasant parties, the Christian Democrats, and the National Workers'

[27] L. Hass, ed., *P.P.S.—Lewica 1926–1931 Materialy zrodlowe* ('PPS—Left Wing 1926–1931 Source Material', Warsaw, 1961); S. Jarecka, *Niezalezna Partia Chlopska 1924–1927* ('The Independent Peasant Party 1924–1927', Warsaw, 1961); B. Dymek, L. Hass, *Zjednoczenie Lewicy Chlopskiej 'Samopomoc'* ('The Left Peasant Union "Self-Help"', Warsaw, 1964).

[28] A. Warski, *Wybor pism i przemowien* ('Selected Writings and Speeches', Warsaw, 1958); J. Lenski, *O front ludowy w Polsce 1934–1937* ('On the Popular Front in Poland', Warsaw, 1956); M. Koszutska, *Pisma i Przemowienia* ('Writings and Speeches', Warsaw, 1960).

[29] J. Zarnowski, *Polska partia socjalistyczna w latach 1935–1939* ('The Polish Socialist Party in the Years 1935–1939', Warsaw, 1965).

[30] M. Drozdowski, A. Tymieniecka, 'Mieczyslaw Niedzialkowski', *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski*, no. 9, 1965, pp. 39–85.

[31] N. Barlicki, *Wybor przemowien i artykulow z lat 1918–1939* ('Selection of Speeches and Articles 1918–1939', Warsaw, 1964).

[32] J. Auerbach, 'Ogolno-zydowska Partia Pracy' ('The General Jewish Party of Labour'), *Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, no. 50, 1964, pp. 37–58.

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Party, took the line that it should work within the framework of the existing system, and it is hoped either to reach a compromise with Pilsudski (a view more popular among its left-wing elements) or to persuade the Marshal to resign by defeating him in an election. However, the alliance suffered a crushing defeat in the elections of November 1930, partly as a result of government repression, partly because of their own miscalculations. While it existed, the centre-left was consistently attacked, and, indeed, vilified by the KPP as a bourgeois trick to defuse the revolutionary sentiments of the masses.

Three books have appeared on the centre-left,[33] each written from a rather different point of view. Steborowski's is closest to the contemporary communist assessment, attacking the centre-left for failing to mount a revolutionary onslaught on the fascist regime, though it is also critical of communist 'sectarianism'. Its moral is relentlessly underlined:

> The fear of setting the masses in motion, the result of reformist principles, nationalist encumbrances and the anti-communist neurosis, also affected in later years the policies of the rightist leadership of the socialist and peasant movements. These were the reasons why, in the years 1935–38, the leaders of the PPS and the Peasant Party rejected the frequently repeated proposals of the communists for a common struggle to overthrow the *Sanacja* governments, why, in spite of the attitudes of the broad socialist and peasant masses, the leaders did not effect the unification of the forces of the democratic camp and hesitated to undertake a decisive struggle for the democratization of Poland, at that time the fundamental condition for maintaining its independence.[34]

Czubinski's line is similar, but he is rather more sympathetic to the centre-left. It is true, he claims, that it failed to take up a consistent position, that it was reformist and hostile to communism; however, it played an important role in the 'social-political life' of the country, defending democracy and delaying the introduction of a fascist constitution by five to six years.

The best account of the alliance, both because of its relatively balanced attitude and because of the new information it provides, is that of Lato. He shows the reasons for the adoption of the political tactics employed by the *Centrolew*, and though it is criticized for not co-operating with the KPP—the defeat of the alliance is held to prove that 'a lasting worker-peasant alliance is impossible without the participation in it of the revolutionary party of the working class, which must play the leading role'[35]—the failure to achieve this co-operation is attributed, to a considerable extent, to the policy of the KPP.

[33] S. Steborowski, *Geneza Centrolewu* ('The Origins of the Centre-Left', Warsaw, 1963); A. Czubinski, *Centrolew* (Poznan, 1963); S. Lato, *Ruch Ludowy a Centrolew* ('The Peasant Movement and the Centre-Left', Warsaw, 1965).

[34] Steborowski, op. cit., p. 409.

[35] Lato, op. cit., p. 236.

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A CERTAIN amount of work has also been done on the history of the different peasant parties, a characteristic feature of the political life of Poland as of most of Eastern Europe, and on the United Peasant Party which emerged in 1931 and remained, until the outbreak of the war (and indeed until the communist takeover), the most powerful organization in the Polish countryside. We are still without a history of this party or its precursors, the Piast and the Liberation, although a rather inadequate, almost hagiographical study of the Peasant Party (*Stronnictwo chlopskie*), the third of the groups which combined to form the United Peasant Party, has been published.[36] On the other hand, a good deal of interesting material has come out in the *Yearbook of the History of the Peasant Movement*,[37] published by the Historical Institute of the United Peasant Party, the communist-dominated body which is a member of the Front of National Unity. Of the four volumes of documents published on the history of the peasant movement, two have dealt with the inter-war period.[38]

Another field which has attracted attention has been the period between Pilsudski's death and the outbreak of the war, a period in which the defects of the regime he established became glaringly apparent. Again, the work has been of varying quality. Among the more impressive contributions are Zarnowski's book on the PPS between 1935 and 1939, which we have already mentioned, and Tadeusz Jedruszczak's study of the formation of OZON,[39] the Camp of National Unity, the pro-government party created in February 1937 to replace the rather less ideological BBWR (Non-Party Bloc for Co-operation with the Government) which had been dissolved in 1935. Jedruszczak's book is refreshingly free of jargon and provides a valuable account of the political struggles within the government party which followed Pilsudski's death. Its main weakness is its rather limited scope, for it does not go beyond February 1938 and is in fact somewhat weak on developments after the actual formation of OZON in the previous year. In a rather more orthodox vein, Turlejska's book *Rok przed kleska*[40] describes developments between September 1938 and September 1939. It is intended for a rather more popular audience than most of the books we have discussed so far, and has already reached its third edition. Although it is one of the few general historical narratives dealing with the inter-war period and one which discusses a number of questions often avoided, as, for instance, the problem of anti-semitism and the position of the Ukrainian minority in Poland in the last years before the war, in general it is a fairly straightforward apologia for the foreign policy of the Soviet

[36] A. Wiezikowa, *Stronnictwo Chlopskie* ('The Peasant Party', Warsaw, 1963).
[37] *Roczniki Dziejow Ruchu Ludowego.*
[38] *Materialy zrodlowe do historii polskiego ruchu ludowego* ('Source Material for the History of the Polish Peasant Movement', Warsaw, 1966), vol. II, 1918–31; vol. III, 1931–39.
[39] T. Jedruszczak, *Pilsudczycy bez Pilsudskiego* ('The Pilsudski-ites without Pilsudski', Warsaw, 1963).
[40] 'The Year before the Catastrophe', Warsaw, 1965.

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Union in the thirties and, more particularly, a detailed defence of the nazi-Soviet Pact which, it is claimed, was the result of Britain's attempt to negotiate secretly with Hitler while ostensibly carrying on open negotiations with the Soviet Union.

One final area which has attracted a certain amount of interest, though not perhaps as much as Marxist doctrine might prescribe, is economic and social history. Economic history has been particularly fully treated, both in outline form and in detailed monographs. It has given rise to one of the few books covering the whole period of independence, Landau and Tomaszewski's *Zarys historii gospodarczej Polski* 1918–1939,[41] which in spite of its fairly rigid orthodoxy contains a good deal of useful material. A number of more specialized monographs have also been produced, some of very high quality.[42] One aspect of the economic life of pre-war Poland which has attracted particular attention has been the large role of the state in the economy—by the 1930s perhaps 40 per cent of the economy was in state hands. This has inspired a number of important works.[43] Social history has been rather less well treated, but it has provided two of the most significant books on inter-war Poland, both written from sophisticated Marxist positions, and thus perhaps showing that what is wrong with Polish historiography is not so much the ideological as the political framework within which it is contained. These are Mieszczankowski's invaluable study of the agrarian structure of pre-war Poland [44] and Zarnowski's detailed and revealing analysis of the pre-war intelligentsia.[45]

THE summary given above, though necessarily brief, reveals not only which subjects from the inter-war period have been treated, but also which have been neglected. The whole of the history of Poland between the wars was overlaid by the conflict between the followers of Dmowski, the national democrats, and Pilsudski and his adherents. The hostility between these two groups, which had for a time been allayed in the aftermath of independence, had flared up anew with the Polish-Soviet war, through which Pilsudski hoped to ensure the security of Poland by dislodging White Russia and the Ukraine from the Soviet Union, but which the national democrats saw as a dangerous reversion to the gentry's political romanticism of the nineteenth century. The Constitution of March

[41] 'Outline of the Economic History of Poland 1918–1939', Warsaw, 1962.

[42] E.g. J. Tomaszewski, *Stabilizacja waluty w Polsce 1924–1925* ('The Stabilization of Currency in Poland 1924–1925', Warsaw, 1961); Z. Landau, *Plan Stabilizacyjny 1927–1930* ('The Stabilization Plan 1927–1930', Warsaw, 1963).

[43] R. Gradowski, *Niektore problemy kapitalizmu monopolistycznego* ('Some Problems of Monopoly Capitalism', Warsaw, 1959); *Przyczynek do zagadnienia kapitalu panstwowo-monopolistycznego w Polsce 1918–1939* ('Introduction to the Problem of State and Monopoly Capitalism in Poland 1918–1939', Warsaw, 1965). Both these books are far more interesting than their orthodox-sounding titles might indicate.

[44] M. Mieszczankowski, *Struktura agrarna Polski miedzywojennej* ('The Agrarian Structure of Inter-war Poland', Warsaw, 1960).

[45] J. Zarnowski, *Struktura spoleczna inteligencji w Polsce w latach 1918–1939* ('The Social Structure of the Intelligentsia in Poland 1918–1939', Warsaw, 1964).

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1921 was designed by the national democrats to prevent Pilsudski's again exercising the power he had enjoyed after 1918, and the coup of May 1926 which brought the Marshal back to power was provoked by the fear that the new centre-right coalition being formed under Witos would lead to the permanent dominance of the national democrats in politics. The Pilsudski-ites then governed Poland until its collapse in September 1939. Yet until fairly recently, very little had been written on either of these groups. A rather popular but quite competent history of the years 1918–26 [46] is still the nearest we have to an account of the May coup, undoubtedly the central event in inter-war Polish politics. On the Pilsudski-ites before 1926 there are only two slim works by Jozef Lewandowski,[47] and on the period of Pilsudski's rule, from 1926 to 1935, there is still nothing to supersede the hopelessly unsatisfactory series of documents published with a commentary in a completely Stalinist style by Tadeusz Rek in 1956.[48] We have seen that the period after the Marshal's death is better covered, but there is still no account of the functioning of the government between 1935 and 1939. The national democrats have been even worse served, for they have had little more than a few articles devoted to their activity.[49]

This gap has not yet been completely filled, but a more adequate picture of the nature of pre-war Poland has been presented in two recent books which are without doubt the most significant historical works published in Poland since 1956. It is interesting that they were not written by a professional historian, but by a young Catholic journalist connected with *Znak*, the liberal Catholic organization, Andrzej Micewski.

His first book, published in 1964 but not easily available until some time later, was entitled *On the Political Geography of the Second Republic. Political Sketches.*[50] It freely disclaimed any academic pretensions, based as it was entirely on secondary material, and was for the most part polemical and journalistic in tone. Micewski set himself the task of describing the history of what he called the 'Right' between 1918 and 1939, though as he admitted the concepts of 'right' and 'left'

[46] A. Ajnenkiel, *Od 'rzadow ludowych' do przewrotu majowego : Zarys dziejow politycznych Polski 1918–1929* ('From the "Popular Governments" to the May Coup: An Outline of the Political History of Poland 1918–1926', Warsaw, 1964).

[47] J. Lewandowski, *Imperializm slabosci. Ksztaltowanie sie koncepji polityki wschodniej pilsudczykow 1921–1926* ('The Imperialism of Weakness. The Evolution of the Pilsudski-ites' Concepts of Eastern Policy 1921–26', Warsaw, 1967); *Unia Narodowo-Panstwowa czyli Kryzys liberalizmu polskiego* ('The State-National Union, or the Crisis of Polish Liberalism', Warsaw, 1964).

[48] T. Rek, *Pierwsze lata dyiktatury Pilsudskiego* ('The First Years of the Pilsudski Dictatorship', Warsaw, 1956).

[49] R. Wapinski, 'Dzialalnosc Narodowej Demokracji na Pomorzu Gdanskim w latach 1920–1926' ('The Activity of the National Democrats in Danzig Pomerania 1920–1926'), *Zapiski Historyczne*, xxix, no. 1, 1964, pp. 7–37; 'Niektore problemy ewolucji ideowo-politycznej Endecji w latach 1919–1939' ('Some Problems Connected with the Evolution of the National Democrats in the Years 1919–1939'), *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 4, 1966, pp. 861–77.

[50] A. Micewski, *Z geografii politycznej II Rzeczypospolitej. Szkice polityczne* (Warsaw, 1964).

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are extremely vague. He was primarily concerned with the centre and right and the Pilsudski-ites, all of which held power during the inter-war period. His treatment is openly political. The discussion of the achievements and failings of these groups had been grossly neglected in Poland not only after 1945, but even after 1956. Hence a certain confusion had been created:

> There are fewer and fewer people in Poland who, in a travesty of Talleyrand's well-known saying from the time when he was serving the cause of the French Revolution, that he who had not lived before 1789 could not comprehend the true joy of living, could or would wish to say the same of the period before 1939. Nevertheless, in the political consciousness of large sections of Polish society there still persist many ambivalences in the understanding of the political problems of the inter-war period.[51]

It is the clarification of these ambivalences which Micewski hopes to achieve. 'Society', he affirmed,

> needs swift and harsh judgments on the past for the use of the present, to help chart the direction of its future path. . . . The striking of a reckoning with our most recent past has an important influence on the political attitudes of today.[52]

His aim was thus to describe, not in terms of the political criteria of today, but in accordance with the atmosphere and circumstances of the time, the way in which politics functioned in the inter-war years. He recognizes the many achievements of independence—the extension of national consciousness to the overwhelming majority of the Polish people, the unification of the different partitions and the development of Polish culture—but he is also aware of the weaknesses which plagued the new state. As an attempt to present the problems which the inter-war period poses, his *Political Sketches* is indeed an enormous advance on anything previously written in People's Poland. A historian might object to Micewski's dislike of chronological narrative and to his tendency to divorce political developments from their social and economic context, but he must admire the breadth of his interest and the way in which he has been able to deal with a large number of thorny ideological problems without any recourse to jargon or dogma. The book takes the form of six more or less unrelated sketches. The first is a penetrating account of the ideological development of Roman Dmowski, perhaps the most important political thinker in Poland in the early twentieth century, whose views stressed that the principal enemy of Polish independence was Germany and that the Poles were therefore bound to seek a compromise with Russia—very similar to the prevailing orthodoxy in Poland today. Micewski is aware of the less attractive features of Dmowski's thought, in particular his anti-semitism and his

[51] Ibid., p. 9.
[52] Ibid., pp. 8 and 12.

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partiality towards fascism in the late twenties and thirties. But he is also aware of the penetrating character of Dmowski's writing, which he illustrates by extensive quotation, and of the degree to which his political position parallels that of People's Poland. The other sketches deal with the conflict between Dmowski's national democrats and the followers of Pilsudski; the reasons for the weakness of Christian Democracy in inter-war Poland; the transformation of political life after Pilsudski's death; the opposition to Pilsudski represented by the *Front Morges* and General Sikorski; and finally there is a conclusion with a summing up of the different political traditions in Poland. A great deal could be said about the treatment of all these topics, which is extremely balanced and level-headed. However, particular attention must be drawn to the way in which Micewski describes the conflict between the more authoritarian and the more liberal elements among the Pilsudski-ites after the Marshal's death, and to the discussion of the likelihood of the establishment of a fascist system in Poland had the war not taken place.

'POLITICAL SKETCHES' concentrated above all on Dmowski and his followers, and it was to counter the objections of some reviewers that he had made himself an unwitting apologist for the national democrats that Micewski brought out a second book of essays, *In the Shadow of Marshal Pilsudski*.[53] It was an attempt to assess the nature of the Pilsudski regime by describing the thinking of the various groups which rallied to the Marshal's support before and after 1926. However, it must be admitted that this second book is not nearly so successful as the first. Partly this results from the defects of Micewski's method. Whereas it proved fairly easy to discuss the development of the national democrats in terms of the ideological transformations which the party and its offshoots underwent, it is more difficult to do this with Pilsudski and his followers. As Kajetan Morawski once wrote, 'There was no post-May system. There was only . . . Pilsudski.' It is true that the first chapter is a neat description of the political development of Pilsudski until the May coup, which, though it does not contain anything particularly new, does illustrate, with fairly detailed quotations from his works, the way in which he evolved from an adherent of the Russian revolutionary movement to the creator of the Legions which fought alongside the Central Powers in the First World War. However, the succeeding chapters, describing various Pilsudski-ite ideologues from Adam Skwarczynski to Stanislow Mackiewicz while interesting themselves, do not greatly illuminate the nature of the Pilsudski regime, the task which Micewski sets himself. The last chapter, in which he attempts to analyse the general evolution of the Pilsudski regime, is particularly disappointing. One may well doubt whether a reader who was not familiar with Polish politics in the thirties could make much sense of the mere catalogue of personalities which forms the greater part of it.

[53] *W cieniu marszalka Pilsudskiego* (Warsaw, 1968).

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In more general terms, Micewski poses here rather more problems than he attempts to solve. He argues that the pre-1939 regime was not fascist, although there was a danger of its becoming fascist particularly through the coming together of the authoritarian elements in the national democrats with those in the government. But though he compares the Pilsudski regime to those which have since emerged in various underdeveloped countries, he does not attempt to follow up this line of thought. His discussion of the social origins of the leading Pilsudski-ites is also very crude. Finally, the book seems to have been written far more than *Political Sketches* under the impact of Polish political 'reality'. This is seen particularly in the discussion of foreign policy, in which Pilsudski is praised for his awareness that one could not put any faith in the Western powers even though other aspects of his foreign policy are criticized. The primary responsibility of the Western powers for the Polish catastrophe is also stressed. Nevertheless, this does remain virtually the only book published since 1956 to deal with the way in which the Pilsudski regime functioned while the Marshal was still alive.

THERE remain to be mentioned those fields which have still been overlooked in the historiography of the period. Micewski notwithstanding, there is no adequate discussion of the nature of the Pilsudski regime, the reasons it came to power, its political activity and its social basis. There is also no real discussion of the development of fascist ideas in Poland, either among the various splinter groups which broke off from the national democrats or in the government camp itself, particularly after 1935. The development of the parties of the left, especially the PPS until 1935 and the KPP after 1935, is very under-researched. Finally, although it is widely admitted that one of the principal reasons for the unsatisfactory way in which politics functioned in Poland between the wars was the failure to deal effectively with its multinational character, there has been little discussion of the nature of these minority problems. A good deal has been written on the Germans in Poland, mostly designed to show how they became a fifth column for Hitler.[54] However, little, apart from a straight statistical study, has been written on the Jews[55] and virtually nothing has been done to illuminate the sources and nature of anti-semitism. The Ukrainians and White Russians have also been almost entirely neglected, apart from a few articles describing the communist organizations formed

[54] See, e.g., M. Cyganski, *Mniejszosc niemiecka w Polsce centralny w latach 1918–1939* ('The German Minority in Central Poland between 1918 and 1939', Lodz, 1962); R. Staniewicz, 'Mniejszosc niemiecka w Polsce—V kolumna Hitlera?' ('The German Minority in Poland—A Fifth Column for Hitler?'), *Przeglad Zachodni*, no. 2, 1959, pp. 395–438.

[55] S. Bronsztejn, *Ludnosc zydowska w Polsce w okresie miedzywojennym* ('The Jewish Group in Poland in the Inter-War Period', Wroclaw-Warsaw-Cracow, 1963).

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in the areas of Poland where they were in a majority.[56] Micewski is obviously right when he claims that a clear understanding of the Polish past is a basic prerequisite for the adoption of policies suited to Poland's present situation. Nevertheless, one may well doubt whether the Poles will have much freedom to choose in this sphere, and indeed, whether Poland's growing nationalist mood, mirrored in the rise of the Partisans, will not lead rather to a whitewashing of the less creditable aspects of the Polish past. An exaggeration in this direction could be just as harmful, both to historiography and to political awareness in Poland, as the Stalinist blackening of all that took place before 1939.

There have been, it is true, a number of hopeful signs in the last year. Of these the most important was the creation of a quarterly journal, *Dzieje Najnowsze* ('Contemporary History'), from the formerly annual publications *Najnowsze Dzieje Polski*. The first issue of the journal contained a number of interesting articles,[57] but subsequent issues have been disappointing. Indeed, the general anti-intellectual and chauvinistic climate prevalent in Poland at present is having an increasingly harmful effect on the study of contemporary history.

[56] E.g. S. Bergman, F. Karwacki, W. Stankiewicz, 'Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Bialorusi' ('The Communist Party of Western White Russia'), *Nowe Drogi*, no. 5, 1959, pp. 86–93; M. Szczyrba, 'Komunistyczna Partia Zachodniej Ukrainy' ('The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine'), *Nowe Drogi*, no. 5, 1959, pp. 79–86.

[57] See, for example, E. Rudzinski, 'Kształowanie systemu prasy kontrolowanej w Polsce w latach 1926–1939'; R. Stawecki, 'Niektore aspekty udziału wojska w życiu politycznym w Polsce w latach 1926–1939'; and R. Wapinski, 'Miejsce Narodowej Demokracji w życiu politycznym II Rzeczypospolitej'.

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Soviet Art and Literature

VADIM SIDUR

M. S.

A considerable amount has been written in recent years about non-conformist artists in the Soviet Union, their interest in modernism and their attempts to get round or broaden the officially approved manner (it hardly ranks as a style) of Socialist Realism. Many of their works have been bought by Western diplomats and journalists and there have even been exhibitions of their paintings. Little, however, is known about Soviet sculpture—with the well-publicized exception of Ernst Neizvestny, about whom a book has only recently appeared.* Vadim Sidur, a few of whose works are pictured here, is one of the first to break that barrier.

Sidur is a Soviet sculptor in his middle forties. A member of the Artists' Union, he was invalided out of the army in 1944 after being shot in the face by a sniper, a wound from which he nearly died. He then trained as a doctor for a short while before enrolling in the sculpture department of the Moscow College of Art, from which he received his diploma in 1950. During subsequent years he worked, among other things, on the Palace of Science and Culture in Warsaw and on the Lenin Stadium in Moscow, and at this time there was nothing to distinguish him from the thousands of other sculptors working within the general limits of Socialist Realism.

The turning point came in 1961 when Sidur experienced a severe heart-attack. He emerged, he says, a different man, and it is from then that he dates his career as a real artist. Everything done before that date he now repudiates.

Sidur's artistic credo is a relatively simple and straightforward one. He does not believe, unfortunately, in talking about art—he maintains that what the artist *says* is worthless and that his 'message' must be sought in his works. Nevertheless, in response to questions, he has stated his main preoccupation as follows: 'My aim is to express eternal themes (birth, life, love, etc.) in a harshly contemporary style—as I understand it at least. For me the main thing is suffering. So long as men are suffering, being punished, tortured, hanged, I find it impossible to live at peace with myself. I passed through the war and no matter how optimistic I might feel, I cannot rest while someone is having his bones broken and his veins torn out. I am haunted by human suffering. It all comes from my own experience.'

It is this overpowering emotion that has dictated the entire development of Sidur's work since the date of his heart attack. It can be seen in

* John Berger, *Art and Revolution, Ernst Neizvestny and the Role of the Artist in the USSR* (London 1969).

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many of the series of works that he has sculpted, such as the models for monuments to various 'victims' (of war, invasion, revolution, etc.), sculptures on the theme of invalids, medical operations (including heart transplants—Sidur's first ambition was to be a surgeon) and also his treatment of the opposite side of suffering—the instruments of oppression, such as soldiers with weapons. Notable among these is his series of machine-gunners, again reflecting his own position during the war. Other themes that fascinate Sidur are motherhood and the Passion of Christ, particularly the Crucifixion, for which he has done dozens of drawings and studies. It is not known, however, whether he has treated this subject in three-dimensional form.

In going his own way Sidur has naturally departed from the rules for sculpture laid down by the Artists' Union. He claims the main influences on his work to be Egyptian and Mexican sculpture and the work of Henry Moore. He first saw the work of the latter, apparently, illustrated in the UNESCO *Courier,* and his friend, Andrei Voznesenski, brought back further illustrations after his visit to Moore on one of his trips to England. It is clear from other of his works that Sidur has also assimilated the devices of Cubism, but the mingling of these disparate influences in his work does not produce a clash of styles. Rather do they merge, at their best, into something personal and distinctive, something that is not aggressively modern—indeed, like most modern Soviet artists who have attempted to break away from Socialist Realism, Sidur has the effect of seeming decidedly dated to Western eyes—but at the same time is far and away more vital, more interesting and more alive than the typical products of Socialist Realist sculptors.

Yet Sidur is not a conscious rebel, nor is he politically motivated. He accepts the status quo to a large extent, merely qualifying his acceptance, in so far as it affects his own position, as follows: 'It seems to me that in a material sense our artists are very well taken care of (with a few exceptions), so long as they are employed on state commissions. If only there could be a greater breadth of taste in this matter the system would be acceptable. The "social command" is acceptable when it coincides with the artist's taste. I personally would be very glad to be commissioned for such works as "A Monument to the Victims of Treblinka", "A Monument to the Victims of Bombing", "A Monument to the Oppressed", etc.'

At the same time Sidur insists on following the artist's age-old compulsion to be true to himself. As a result, he receives almost no official commissions and is reduced to living in conditions of hopeless poverty in the middle of Moscow. His small basement studio, until recently at least, was shared by two other sculptors (Silis and Lemport) working on a shift basis, while practically his only income is from infrequent commissions for book illustrations. Nevertheless, Sidur belongs to a group of intellectuals—mainly artists and writers—who can be said to constitute the avant-garde of Soviet culture. His friends include

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Voznesenski and Evtushenko and a number of leading scientists (well-known patrons of modern art in the Soviet Union), and he is particularly close to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, of whom he has done not only an excellent ikon-like portrait sketch (see illustration) but also a clay bust. Indeed their preoccupations as artists can be seen in many ways to be closely similar.

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THE RESTORATION OF ANCIENT MONUMENTS IN THE USSR

S. T. Palmer

THERE is a fascinating reference in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle* to a lovely sixteenth-century Moscow church. The time is 1949 and Yakonov, the head of research at Mavrino Prison, after a severe reprimand by the Minister goes on a long walk late at night in Moscow to calm his depression. Unconsciously he makes his way to the confluence of the Yauza and Moscow rivers and climbs some white steps up a hillside. It suddenly reminds him of his youth 20 years ago, when his sweetheart Agnia had said she would show him the most beautiful place in Moscow. They had walked up the same white steps in 1927 to a small church with a wonderful view of the rivers, the old merchant quarter, the Kremlin and, beyond it, the Cathedral of Christ the Redeemer. Agnia had remarked sadly that the church was certain to be pulled down; that Moscow was vanishing. Yakonov, in 1949, stood on the same spot and, instead of the church, saw 'a building of curious shape which had the air of a ruin yet of something that had somehow remained oddly intact'. It reminded him of a bombed-out structure. Lower down was the building site of a future skyscraper. Today the skyscraper stands on Kotelnicheskaya Naberezhnaya, some 40 storeys high, dominating the skyline, but if you retrace Yakonov's path you can still see the same white stone steps that lead up from the river. Now they take you not to a ruin but to an enchanting white church complete with refectory and bell tower. It is the Nikita '*chto za Yauzoi*' (not, as Solzhenitsyn says, the Church of St John the Baptist) which was meticulously restored 10 years ago (see photograph) by Davyd, a well-known restorer and head of the Central State Restoration Workshop. As he restored the church in its original form with its seventeenth-century belltower, it differs somewhat in detail from Solzhenitsyn's description of it, but the location of the church and the fact that it was always well-known for its excellent view of Moscow before the skyscraper was built leave little doubt that it is the church mentioned in *The First Circle*. Although the wedding-cake skyscraper has blocked the view of the confluence of the rivers and the Kremlin beyond, it is still one of the most beautiful places in Moscow.

The complete restoration of this church from the sparse remains described by Solzhenitsyn is typical of the new-found respect today in the USSR for relics of the past. Moscow five years after the fall of Khrushchev does not seem to be greatly altered. There is certainly more evidence of the accumulation of wealth, but this could just as easily be said of New York or London or Rome. Yet one cannot fail to be struck by the amount of scaffolding everywhere, not surrounding

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only the modern steel and glass edifices that have become commonplace, but clinging tenaciously also to the buttresses and cornices of churches and palaces, cathedrals and mansions, that five years earlier were in a deplorable, unrecognizable state. For those familiar with Moscow during the latter part of the Khrushchev era this is a striking change. At that time old buildings, especially churches, were neglected and torn down. The anti-religious campaign, which was intensified in the period 1959–64 and which resulted in the destruction of many country churches, contributed to the destruction. The official reason, particularly for the removal of old buildings, was that the little resources available had to be placed at the disposal of the heavy new building programme, that a self-contained flat for every worker's family was more important than the preservation of the relics of a discredited past.

Since October 1964 this policy has been abruptly reversed and a movement encouraged by the authorities has emerged for the careful preservation and restoration of the remaining monuments of the past. This involves, in some cases, the complete rebuilding of a palace or a church from bared foundations, as in the case of the Solzhenitsyn church. In 1966 the All-Russian Voluntary Society for the Protection of Ancient Historical and Cultural Monuments was founded, and at the same time similar societies sprang up in the Ukraine, Belorussia and other republics. They seem to be very popular bodies, the Russian society claiming a membership of over two million, although it is not clear just how influential they are in preserving old buildings. In the last four years a spate of articles has appeared in various journals and in the daily press discussing the protection of historical monuments, many of them criticizing the period of 'nihilism' and 'subjectivism' usually given as the late fifties and early sixties. One of these articles, written by M. Yu. Braichevski for *Istoriya SSSR* (no. 2, 1966), criticizes Khrushchev by name several times—to my knowledge the only article in the Soviet press to have done so.

ALTHOUGH to a cynical Westerner reared on the importance of commerce the renewed interest in historical monuments might seem to be inextricably linked with the tourist trade, on closer inspection it appears to be more a part of a recent revival of Russian nationalism somewhat reminiscent of nineteenth-century slavophilism. There is, for instance, a more critical attitude towards the study of history and, since 1964, there has been a marked increase in works on pre-revolutionary history. Nationalist revival is evident in the writing of popular authors such as Vladimir Soloukhin, in the growing popularity of ikon collecting, and in the pilgrimages, now commonplace, taken by many young intellectuals into the more remote, unspoilt parts of the Russian countryside, particularly northern Russia and parts of Siberia (witness Andrei Sinyavsky's trip to Siberia in 1961). Reminiscences like those of the journalist Gilyarovski of pre-revolutionary Moscow are very popular

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(his *Moskva i Moskvichi* was republished in 1968 and sold out immediately). Even the exceptionally dull Moscow television service has featured a series of programmes on the past, the present and the future of various districts of the city and has had a special programme on Gilyarovski. Public lectures also reflect this reawakening of interest in the past. Sprinkled among the lectures on 'Lenin and Youth', 'Lenin in 1918' etc. are a growing number of illustrated talks on subjects such as Russian period costumes and the history of Russian architecture. Unlike the lectures on Lenin, they are attended by large audiences.

Recent exhibitions have also reflected this now officially accepted interest in the heritage of the past. Exhibitions in Moscow of various categories of ikons—northern painting, ikons of St George, recent acquisitions of the Tretyakov Gallery—have attracted large numbers of visitors. The visitors are mainly from the educated classes but it is not uncommon to find elderly bearded men arguing vociferously with shawled black-clad women over the significance of the Old Testament Trinity or the Last Judgment. An exhibition entitled 'The Art and Culture of Ancient Rus' was held in July this year at the Manege, the largest and most central exhibition hall and one reflecting the highest orthodoxy. It is the third such exhibition; the second was held in 1929 and the first before the revolution. It included exhibits from all branches of the arts, ranging from massive Korin paintings displaying the heroism of the medieval Russian in his struggle against the Tartars, to Scythian gold from the Hermitage, a wonderful collection of ikons, modern graphics of traditional subjects, blown-up photographs of churches before and after restoration, costumes and many fine examples of highly decorated wooden distaffs, sleighs, crosses and window frames. It attempted to encompass the totality of achievement in medieval Russian art with the obvious aim of generating pride in the Russian past.

The history of official policy towards restoration and preservation of old buildings is illustrative of the violent swings first one way and then the other that are characteristic of so many other official policies of the years of Soviet power. With the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution some information was published on the early trials and tribulations of the restorer, and this, along with memoirs, makes it possible to piece the tale together.

IT seems that immediately after the revolution, even before the government had been transferred to Moscow from Petrograd, Lunacharski had set up the All-Russian Collegium for Museums and Ancient Monuments under the Commissariat for Education. The new state, perhaps under Lunacharski's influence, established museums and requested all museum workers to stay at their posts. On 5 December 1918 Lenin signed a decree demanding the cataloguing of all ancient

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historical and cultural monuments and their careful preservation and protection. One of the appeals issued in 1918, before the government transferred to Moscow, gives the flavour of this time:

> Citizens, the old masters have gone, leaving behind a vast heritage. Now it belongs to all the people.
> Citizens, take care of this inheritance, take care of the paintings, statues, buildings—it is the embodiment of your spiritual strength and that of your forefathers. Art is something wonderful, that talented people were able to achieve even under the yoke of despotism, and that bears witness to the beauty and strength of the human soul.
> Citizens, do not even touch one stone, protect the monuments, the old buildings, articles, documents—all this is your history, your pride.
> Remember, all this is the soil from which will grow your new, people's art.
>
> Executive Committee of the Council
> of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Even during the difficult years of the civil war money was spent on setting up a central restoration workshop in Moscow headed by the painter and art historian I. E. Grabar. During the first eight years of the revolution some 10,000 monuments were brought under state protection and some 3,000 of these were actually restored and repaired. The basic methods and philosophy of restoration work were established in these early years.

Since 1964, with a more frank discussion of the mistakes made in the Soviet era vis-à-vis ancient monuments, Lenin, as the repository of orthodoxy, has been given a leading place in the early decisions to preserve monuments. He is represented as having displayed immense concern for the old buildings and for maintaining a keen personal interest in what was happening to them. An oft-told story is of Lenin walking in the Kremlin and noticing a window in one of the cathedrals broken by some children playing nearby. He immediately called on the museum director and reprimanded him for allowing the window to be broken. Braichevski, who quoted this excerpt, added drily: 'that was only for breaking glass'; what would Vladimir Ilich say if he knew of the dismantling of the monuments that happened after his death? Lenin is also credited with having carefully consulted architects and historians before allowing even the smallest change in the old buildings in the Kremlin—not even the widening of a doorway or the alteration of a window. Soloukhin, too, praises Lenin's attitude to monuments. He wrote that Lenin sternly warned the architect Zholtovski not to touch architectural monuments during the reconstruction of Moscow. 'As in many other respects, they did not listen to Lenin', Soloukhin commented bitterly.

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LENIN died in 1924 and in that year the process began by which the activities of the central organs with responsibility for ancient monuments became curtailed and the withdrawal of state protection became evident. Responsibility for the fate of the monuments on the state list was transferred gradually to local authorities who were often not interested in maintaining the expensive albatrosses of the past. In 1927 some of the central organs having a veto over the dismantling of state protected buildings were dissolved, and in 1930 the State Restoration Workshop was also closed. Reconstruction of the cities began, industrialization and collectivization got under way and in the wake of this upheaval many of the country's most interesting examples of architecture were neglected and destroyed. Moscow suffered in particular. Until the 1930s it had had the appearance of a medieval city, sparkling with its golden-domed cupolas, resounding with thousands of bells from its '40 times 40' churches dominating the low, closely-packed houses.

The excavator and the steam shovel took their toll of these beautiful and varied buildings and there arose in their place grey-walled, sombre edifices of the then fashionable palladian style. (Building in Moscow in the thirties retreated completely from the experiments in the constructivist style developed in the twenties.) Some of the purest examples of Russian medieval architecture were thus irretrievably lost. One of the witnesses of these events, Vladimir Soloukhin, in his article 'Letters from the Russian Museum', explains why, reluctantly, he prefers Leningrad to Moscow. He describes how, with the destruction of over 400 ancient buildings, Moscow lost its personality, how it is no longer a city of thousands of golden cupolas. He bitterly lists a number of outstanding churches, some of them three or four centuries old, dismantled senselessly and where nothing was erected in their place. Indeed, if you walk about Moscow you notice an unusual number of vacant lots. One, now used only by ice-cream sellers, across from an entrance to GUM on 25 October Street (formerly Nikolskaya), was the location of the Kazan Cathedral built in 1630. In the centre of Moscow, behind the Bolshoi Theatre where Stoleshnikov pereulok meets the Petrovka, one of the busiest shopping streets, there is now a parking space where the Church of the Nativity in Stoleshnikakh once stood. Around the old Arbat Street, where Pierre watched the burning of Moscow in *War and Peace* and which was once a charming district of early nineteenth-century private houses meticulously rebuilt after the fire had devastated the area, many lovely churches disappeared with the construction of the Metro. An empty space near the Metro in Arbat Square was formerly the location of a beautiful sixteenth-century church, and where the new Prospekt Kalinina narrows, opposite the military shop, there once stood the Vozdvizhenka Church (1709–28), where the satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin was married.

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Soloukhin writes: 'They blew up the Simonov Monastery, they destroyed the Garden Ring Road [site of the fourth city limit in the seventeenth century and made into gardens in the nineteenth century] and they dismantled the Passion Monastery [Pushkin Square, from the bell tower of which the Whites fired on the Reds in Nikitskye Vorota during the Revolution]. They tore out the roots of the Cathedral of Christ the Redeemer which took 40 years to build in honour of the victory over Napoleon, just in order to build a swimming pool!' [The original intention was to erect the Palace of Soviets on this site but the ground proved too marshy for Soviet engineers—although Russian engineers of the nineteenth century succeeded in laying the foundations and building the largest cathedral in Moscow. It led the old ladies to whisper that it was God's revenge for destroying the cathedral. That is why Soloukhin loves Leningrad more.] 'I weep and turn away.'

Braichevski, too, lists a few of the more significant losses. Ours is a destructive age, he writes, and many monuments were lost through war and invasion, but he feels 'particular bitterness' about losses brought on by ignorance and irresponsibility. The most senseless destruction occurred in Moscow. Even the Kremlin was not exempt from the wave of destruction. The Church of the Saviour '*na Boru*', the oldest building in Moscow, disappeared and the buildings of the Monastery of the Miracle were taken down at this time. The Golitsyn Palace in the very heart of Moscow, perhaps the best, least altered example of a seventeenth-century palace, was removed in order to get rid of the kinks in Okhotny Ryad and to erect the Council of Ministers building. The development of Moscow from early times was first to the east and then in three concentric rings around the Kremlin. The immensely thick wall of the first city, Kitai Gorod, survived until recently, but much of it was taken down in the fifties and now only fragments remain. The walls of Belgorod, the second wall, and the earthern ramparts of Zemlyanoe Gorod disappeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Because of the succession of walls there were many lovely gates and towers, substantial buildings used for state purposes. These too suffered tragically with the rebuilding in the thirties. The Sukharev Tower, the home of the first institute of higher education, Peter the Great's School of Navigation; the Krasnye Gates; and the Triumfalnye Gates built in honour of the 1812 war were all dismantled and removed. Braichevski points out that it was not only Moscow that suffered. Because of the Soviet predilection for mimicking everything in Moscow, other cities began reconstructing their centres, and particularly in Kiev, eleventh-, twelfth- and thirteenth-century churches were needlessly removed.

Towards the end of the thirties the tearing down of old buildings began to taper off and restoration work was resumed in a few specific places—Novgorod, Pskov, the Kremlin. This was the aftermath of a renewed interest in Russia's past reflected *inter alia* in the reintroduction

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into the schools in 1934 of the orthodox teaching of history. The war with Germany also resulted in the destruction of ancient buildings both in the areas occupied by the Germans and in the unoccupied 'twilight zone' wholly absorbed in continuing the war and therefore oblivious to what ends the monuments were used. These suffered tragically. At the end of the war special efforts were made to restore monuments that had been deliberately attacked by the Germans, such as the beautiful summer palace of Peterhof near Leningrad, and the Novgorod, Pskov and Kiev churches. Workshops had been set up as early as 1942, again headed by Grabar, to undertake the training and preparation for this restoration. However, the task was too great, many buildings had suffered terribly and the funds needed were scarce. Thus restoration work in the fifties was carried out on major monuments but, in general, lesser known buildings began to receive attention only late in the decade, encouraged by the attitude prevailing after the Twentieth Party Congress.

THE Khrushchev era brought another about-turn in the fate of the remaining old buildings. In the late fifties and early sixties, according to Braichevski, a 'nihilist' view prevailed and ancient monuments were torn down indiscriminately during the anti-religious campaign. Large numbers of them were also removed from the state list ensuring their protection—in the Ukraine it was reduced by 35 per cent.—and the number of buildings assigned for repair and restoration work was also sharply reduced.

The most prominent of these 'nihilists' was Khrushchev. Some remarks he made in his speech to the January 1961 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU had a particularly pernicious influence on the situation of the remaining monuments, the local authorities being only too glad to use his words to justify the removal of expensive white elephants in their areas. Khrushchev said:

> The Lithuanian leaders restored ruined palaces and castles of feudal times, many of which have no serious historical value. And for some urgent needs of the workers Republican funds were insufficient. Is this right, comrades? If we start like this, where will we end up? Only wasters of the people's wealth could do such things; not economical thrifty workers. And near Moscow many unnecessary objects of olden times have been put under restoration orders. You will recall, comrades, that people sometimes throw such matters at you, those who want to warm their own hands skilfully coax you. They say something like this: 'Here you are, a cultured person, you know and understand the meaning of this ancient monument. You understand and value the fact that this famous person walked here, here he sat and considered his plans, and here he angrily spat.' . . . I do not exaggerate, comrades; such outrages happen.

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The tearing down of very old monuments in the Ukraine during this time is a sad tale of destruction. In 1963 a twelfth-century church in Vitebsk was torn down by the local authorities even though protests against this 'barbarous act' were made all over the country. In 1964 some unique wooden churches in the countryside burnt down through neglect and insufficient protection. In Kiev in 1963 the bell tower of the Pyatnitskaya Church was dismantled by the local soviet in order to erect in its place a public convenience!

Although the ordinary Soviet man in the street might be indifferent to the constant tearing down and rebuilding going on around him, the intelligentsia were aroused to protest against the destruction of their monuments. One of the stories about Stalin illustrates this. After the war Stalin decided to move St Basil's Cathedral from its commanding position in Red Square to give better access to the twice-yearly military parades. A leading architect, horrified at the proposal, informed Stalin personally that he would cut his throat on the steps of St Basil's if the intention to move the cathedral was carried out. Stalin relented and St Basil's remains as before, in the middle of Red Square, causing the tanks and rockets and marching men to divide around the cathedral just after they have passed the mausoleum. Another horrified citizen, B. V. Talantov, a teacher of mathematics in Kirov, in protest letters to Soviet newspapers which have been published in Paris, says that from 1959–64 10,000 churches in the Soviet Union were shut by illegal means and some of these were completely and needlessly destroyed. He describes how, during this period, the local authorities in Kirov in order to close the churches removed them from the state list ensuring their protection, shut them down and ruined the interiors. Now, in Kirov oblast, there is not one monument of church architecture of the seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.

Not everyone realized the extent of official antipathy to ancient monuments in the early sixties. In 1962 the literary journal *Moskva* published an article entitled 'Future Building in Moscow' by four authors: Korobov, an artist; Revyakin, an architect; Tydman, an engineer; and Chetunova, a writer. The article arose from a conversation the authors had had with employees of the Institute of the General Plan of Moscow, and the editors expressed the hope that the article would give rise to a wide discussion in the pages of their journal. They were too optimistic.

The article criticized the concentration of industry in Moscow, the lack of information available to the public about the intentions of the planners, such as secrecy over how much Mossoviet paid to build the 'Rossiya' Cinema in Pushkin Square and tear down the old buildings in its way (the Passion Monastery). They upbraided the planners of the thirties for erecting over-luxurious façades and for concentrating new building in the already overcrowded centre of Moscow, in contrast to the twenties when new building was confined to the empty spaces on

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the outskirts. The new avenues, built in boring, straight lines, cut through the naturally twisting streets. Thus, 'transgressing the Lenin law of the inviolability of historical monuments taken under state protection, ignoring popular opinion, they destroyed the irreplaceable treasures of the people's architecture'. The authors list a number of lost 'treasures', including the Sukharev Tower, the Krasnye Gates, the Golitsyn Palace, the gardens of the Ring Road, etc. They concede that this changed in 1954 when a more sensible planning policy became acceptable, but point out that old traditions linger. A suitable quotation from Khrushchev to support their views was apparently exceedingly difficult to find and they could only quote his remarks during his visit to India. On seeing the Taj Mahal Khrushchev was inspired to say it revealed 'feelings encaptured in a great people, its art, its culture, its craftsmanship which blossomed centuries ago'.

The article was ahead of its time. Instead of wide discussion in the pages of *Moskva*, it was *Pravda* (10 May 1962), in a short article criticizing 'excesses' in architecture (the prevalence of decorative pillars in Houses of Culture, etc.), which mentioned the *Moskva* article. It commented that the employees of the Institute of the General Plan of Moscow were not in full agreement with the authors' views and that the whole content and tone of this article showed that neither authors nor editors had done enough preparation to commence a broad discussion with readers on such a serious subject. This rather mild reaction was followed the next day, again in *Pravda*, by a long, violent attack on the *Moskva* article signed by 21 architects and engineers, eliciting a humble apology from the editors of *Moskva*. The 21 signatories of the *Pravda* article were the persons most concerned with the General Plan of 1935 and subsequent planning, and their reactions were, perhaps predictably, venomous. They wrote of the 'scandalous irresponsibility, professional ignorance and malignity of the four authors', singling out the architect Revyakin for particular abuse. They accused the authors of 'tendentiousness', of using the pages of a respectable journal for dragging out the 'long-since-decided, politically bankrupt idea of preserving the historically formed part of Moscow as a museum city, of subjecting the entire life of our capital to the traditions of antiquity'.

IN 1964 official policy towards the monuments changed and Braichevski, in 1966, was able to defend the four authors and accuse the 21 architects themselves of having played a decisive role in the destruction of precious historical monuments. He said that 'fortunately the October 1964 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU put an end to subjectivism in decisions of socially important questions'. The policy of the Soviet state towards ancient monuments had been elaborated in 1918 and 'the principles of this policy are compulsory for every citizen of our country regardless of what post or position he holds'.

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The change in policy was dramatically illustrated in Moscow by the building of the Rossiya Hotel (1964–67). It is the largest hotel in Europe, occupying a vast area to the east of the Kremlin almost bordering on Red Square, the area formerly known as '*zaryadye*' because it was located behind the rows of shops in the square. When buildings in the area were razed to the ground to make way for the hotel it seemed that the churches around it were due to disappear. Russian acquaintances lamented over the expected loss of '*Zachatye Anny na Uglu*', a delightful sixteenth-century white church formerly built into the sharp corner of the Kitai Gorod walls. I was surprised on returning to Moscow several years later, after the resignation of Khrushchev, to find the church perched charmingly in the grounds of the hotel in beautiful condition. Behind the hotel, on ulitsa Razina, a whole row of churches and palaces greet the eye, the only part of Moscow to give the impression of how it must have been before the '40 times 40' churches were thinned out. They are not all restored yet but work is continuing very rapidly. Some of these churches, which include the buildings of the Monastery of the Sign, were hidden by other buildings until the work began on the hotel. One of the buildings revealed when dismantling of later layers took place has turned out to be the first house assigned to the British emissaries by Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century, after Richard Chancellor had negotiated the agreement setting up the Muscovy Company and a monopoly of trade. It is now being carefully restored. It had been over-built by many layers and was the Library of Foreign Literature in what seemed to be a modest nineteenth-century house until a few years ago. As there are only a handful of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century secular buildings in Moscow, this is an exciting discovery.

ALTHOUGH the political climate is now more conducive to the protection of old buildings, there are several problems facing those responsible for restoration. One is the connexion between the restored buildings, most of which are churches, and the official policy of atheism. Possibly for this reason some writers, aware that this ambiguity may be disquieting for some Party officials, go out of their way to emphasize that there is no contradiction between official atheism and a policy of preservation of churches.

Their argument makes use of the fact that although no one would doubt the atheistic convictions of Lenin, he was in fact responsible for protecting old buildings, the majority of which were churches. In reality, they say, neither churches nor ikons nor crosses have of themselves religious content; religious content is introduced only by man, who can therefore also remove it. It is as ridiculous to destroy churches because they are religious as it would be to tear down the Winter Palace and the Admiralty in Leningrad because they are 'Tsarist institutions'. However, one writer, Braichevski, seems to invite criticism.

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He suggests that the best use to which restored buildings can be put is the one for which they were originally intended and, as functioning churches will soon cease to exist altogether, church buildings, as a temporary measure, could be used for their original purpose. 'I must emphasize I am not speaking about deliberately preserving functioning churches but only in favour of preserving some particular monument.' He was referring to old churches in the depths of the provinces where no other interested organization would look after the building. Functioning churches of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are thus closed and the priests are left with an uninteresting late nineteenth-century building. The earlier church, used as a warehouse or stable, falls into disrepair and finally falls down altogether, while the building the priests have newly moved into is maintained in very good condition. After all, 'why should not church money be used to maintain the older, more valuable buildings by allowing services to be held there'. The only criticism of Braichevski's article was of this suggestion to preserve churches as functioning places of worship.

In addition to the problem of justifying the preservation of religious buildings in an anti-religious society, Soviet restorers, in common with restorers everywhere, are worried about the financing of their work. It is generally agreed that tourist exploitation of the monuments and a more helpful attitude on the part of Intourist could easily overcome this problem. Indeed it is suggested that the monuments, instead of costing the state money, could increase its wealth by proper exploitation. Rothschild, on seeing the panorama of Suzdal, is reported as having said he could double his wealth in two years with such a town. At present the restoration workshops and museums are hindered by miserly budgets. Even the price of tickets and the sale of literature do not come under the restoration bodies. One suggestion is that in accordance with the 1965 economic reforms museums should operate on a self-accounting basis and be allowed to retain part of their profits. Money earned from tourism could then be used directly to maintain and restore monuments.

There are still those who object to the attention being given to restoration of ancient monuments, most of which happen to be churches. On 6 May 1969 *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* possibly the most conservative of the central Soviet newspapers, published an article by V. Petrov criticizing the tourist organizations for 'religious deviation' in tourist programmes. He particularly objected to taking tourists first to churches and monasteries. He says that this 'deviation' is also evident in the restoration of monuments. He asks whether church architecture, ikons and frescoes are an important achievement in the development of the culture of the Russian people? In his opinion the 'undue preoccupation with gold cupolas detracts from what has been achieved during 50 years of Soviet power. . . .' *Krokodil*, too, seems to take a jaundiced view of preservation and restoration. A recent cartoon depicts a group of

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bulldozers on a huge building site gathered in frustration around a small dilapidated building on which there hangs a plaque which reads, 'Somebody who once knew Princess So-and-So once lived in this building'. Another shows a run-down village club badly in need of repair next door to a shining, well kept church.

However, these criticisms seem to be out of key with the official policy of what appears to be generous support for restoration. The pendulum has now firmly swung in its favour. (Petrov says that expenditure on restoration in the RSFSR has doubled in the last two years.) The Triumfalnye Gates, erected in honour of the victory over Napoleon and dismantled in the thirties in spite of the protests of the specialists, were carefully and secretly put in boxes and stored. This year the arch was taken out of its boxes and just as carefully re-erected, not in its old place by the Belorussian station, but on Kutuzovski Prospekt at the entrance to the city. There are rumours that the much lamented Sukharyev Tower, some parts of which have also been carefully preserved, may be rebuilt. Of the six defence-monasteries that were built to protect the southern and eastern flanks of the city in medieval times, five have been restored or are under extensive restoration and the sixth, the Danilov Monastery, is due to be restored after sufficient research has been carried out. The surviving churches in Moscow, at any rate, seem to be either sparkling with new paint or nearly hidden under massive scaffolding. Barring another abrupt change of policy, it appears unlikely that permission will be given for the removal of more churches in the capital. Perhaps the most fantastic of the rumours regarding restoration is the project for the rebuilding of the fabulous wooden palace at Kolomenskoe on the outskirts of Moscow. Catherine the Great refused to pay for repairs and the palace was taken down in her time, but before it was dismantled she ordered that an exact model of it be made; it is this model that would make possible the rebuilding of the palace with its domes and cupolas and fairy-tale appearance. A leading restorer, when asked what would be restored in the near future, replied very simply, although perhaps over-optimistically, 'everything'.

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COMRADE BULATOV'S ITALIAN JOURNEY

Stuart Hood

IN September 1969 *Oktyabr* published the first instalment of a new novel by its editor, Vsevolod Kochetov, called *What Do You Want?* Two further instalments followed in November and December. A *roman à clef*, the book is full of easily recognizable and highly libellous portraits of men and women in the Soviet Union and in the West. As a novel it is old-fashioned, constructed on the layer-cake principle, and written with a naïve conception of human psychology. As a work of literature it merits little attention; but politically its importance is considerable; for it is a primer of Stalinism. Its targets are those of Russian conservatism: long hair, American dancing, modern art, dissident writers, dissident communists. The plot concerns a conspiracy to subvert the Soviet Union culturally in which are implicated the CIA, UNESCO and an English publishing house, situated near Charing Cross and filled with tweed jackets and miniskirts, which bears the name of *New World*. It is clearly conceived of as a pendant to that other *New World—Novy Mir*—which is one of Kochetov's political targets within the Soviet Union. The riches of Kochetov's latest novel are almost inexhaustible. There is, for instance, the visit to Turin of Comrade Bulatov, that prim Soviet literary figure and sentimental Stalinist, in whom we must see a portrait of Kochetov himself. The whole incident is of extreme interest as a revelation of conservative attitudes within the Soviet Union to the policies of the Italian Communist Party and of Kochetov's basic ignorance of Western politics. The reaction to it in the Italian press from the Liberal *La Stampa* to *l'Unità* and *Rinascita*, the weekly which bears the sub-title, 'Founded by Palmiro Togliatti', has been understandably vigorous.

Comrade Bulatov finds in Turin a young Soviet woman unhappily married to a young communist intellectual, Benito Spada. The reasons for her discontents are numerous. It has come as a shock to her to learn that her husband is called after Mussolini. He has other defects less easily forgiveable. He is an office worker and not a true proletarian. He is critical of the Soviet Union, its standards of culture, its treatment of dissidents. He subscribes to 'Trotskyist' literature from the United States. He believes that the February Revolution was the true revolution. He is a deviationist who is willing to play the games of Western parliamentary democracy. He has even a soft spot for Mussolini, who was at least a strong man. Given her unhappy situation, it is natural that Lyera should take to the father-figure of Bulatov, with whom she goes towards the Italian people bringing to them Soviet caviare, tinned crab and a sausage 'like a policeman's baton'. Comrade Bulatov is soon able to take down in his notebook the authentic reactions of the Italian

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people. Their view is that the CPI includes a number of members who are no good at anything except criticism of the Soviet Union. Fortunately they have never had power, have never been answerable for the fate of their country. They will defect sooner or later; in any case the workers will deal with them. One worker elaborates on the theme. 'Whoever criticizes the Soviet Union today is no communist. . . . Russia is the mother-land of Communism. Only a swine would set on its mother with its hooves.' He is taken up on his metaphor by a comrade. Wouldn't *donkey* be better than *swine*? No, he explains, because the pig is the filthiest of animals and is capable of eating its own young knowing they are its young. These are the same people who 'dream of being elected to parliament, of enjoying the privileges of parliamentary deputies . . . to occupy well-paid posts and put aside a bit of capital'.

IN *l'Unità* on 2 October 1969 Gian Carlo Pajetta reacted.

> Let me say at once that there is no doubt that Kochetov is free to write what he sees fit. If any doubt arises it is because of the claim, which we often come across in his writings and in his periodical, that the same right should be denied to other authors and other publications, which are nevertheless printed not far from the *Oktyabr* presses. But if Kochetov is free to write what he likes about Italy and Italian communists . . . no one can deny us the right to as 'what does he want?' . . . There is no obligation on anyone who has made a trip to our country to write a book. And since we are forced, by what we have read of his first instalment, to exclude the zeal of a researcher or the inspiration of a poet, it is with the political pamphleteer that we must deal. . . .
>
> The Turin workers, about whom the editor of *Oktyabr* claims to know so much, know—among other things—that a seat in parliament in Italy is not more rewarding financially than the editorship of a literary review in Moscow. They know that their deputies have had among their privileges those of being sacked by Fiat, of being deported to Germany, of being imprisoned for long periods by Mussolini, of having fought with the partisans. Before writing an 'Italian Journey' for the Soviet comrades to read, it might not have been a bad idea to make a journey through the history of our country.
>
> But perhaps the real aim of the pamphlet is to discredit a communist intellectual with whom Kochetov has personal scores to settle, because of what one might call a polemic between men of letters? If we understand it aright—and the affair is so crude that it seems difficult to go wrong—the person challenged is a comrade whom we may have criticized over this or that judgment, over this or that position, but whom, in our view, it is inadmissible to address in the tone employed by Kochetov.
>
> One of those people who are called 'critics of the Soviet Union' and are therefore defined as 'swine' or 'donkeys', he has done so much to make known Soviet culture and Russian literary and revolutionary culture, that fortunately a malicious man of letters cannot destroy his work with a few sallies.

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> We might go so far as to wonder—seeing that one of the basic rules of Kochetov's *aesthetic* is that literature must always *educate* and always serve immediate political ends—if he is in fact offering us a new political line. Perhaps it is with this in mind that one of his characters expresses the hope for a right-wing government [in Italy] so that we can stabilize our political system more rapidly. Thank you for the strategy!

The comrade under attack published his own indignant reaction in *Stampa Sera* of 2 October. He is Vittorio Strada, who fills some of the requirements of Kochetov's Benito Spada in so far as he lives in Turin, has a Russian wife, is an expert on Russian literature (he studied at the Lomonosov Institute) and has been attacked by the CPI for his non-conformist views on Soviet politics, literature and art. It is one of his tenets, for instance, that a work of art is no mere political instrument but has its own artistic autonomy. Kochetov, he wrote to *Stampa Sera*, had produced in his 'pasquinade' of a novel 'a situation and a character so absurd and unlikely that they could only be the product of a petty, insane imagination. Yet it is clear that the intention of the author is to strike at me—and through me—at the Italian Communist Party.' He did not intend to dwell on the vulgarity and stupidity of Kochetov, however, but to explain the reasons for them.

> The explanation is to be found in my books—in *Soviet Literature 1953–63* and in my recent *Tradition and Revolution in Russian Literature*. It is clear that my work as a scholar, which has made known in Italy Soviet writers like Solzhenitsyn, Bulgakov, Platonov, Bagritski, Olesha, Nekrasov and others, could not be to the taste of this extreme representative of Soviet ultra-conservatism. By attacking me and the CPI (for the coherent and bold position it has adopted in favour of the Czech 'new road' and the autonomy of communist parties), he is simultaneously attacking with equal violence those Soviet writers who are both innovators and socialists —and, above all, naturally Tvardovski's journal *Novy Mir*. As a communist, therefore, I cannot but feel myself honoured by his attacks even if I must deplore their desperate triviality.
>
> I know Kochetov personally. I had already criticized in the pages of the communist papers for which I work his unpleasant and reactionary novels. During the meetings I had with him at Turin and Varigotti in 1966, I did not fail to express my opinions openly to him—they are opposed to his on present Soviet and non-Soviet problems. His attacks are part of the open polemic which has been going on for some time and which will certainly not end today.

Strada followed up next day with an interview to *La Stampa* in which he remembered that when Kochetov was his guest in 1966, he 'gave the impression of being a cold, narrow petty-bourgeois figure'. But he was, he added, not unaware of Kochetov's importance. 'The most serious thing is that Kochetov is not just any man of letters but a leading functionary of the Party.'

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It was not until a week later, however, that Strada developed his full counter-offensive. He did it in the columns of *Rinascita*. He once more attributed the reasons for Kochetov's 'rabid anger' to the fact that he had had to deal critically with Kochetov's work, which, as he put it, had led him into some nasty boggy areas of literature. What was important, in his view, was something else: What was the reason for, what was the meaning of, such an unprecedented gesture?

> What must be laid on Kochetov's shoulders is the slanderous nature of his attacks, the denigratory methods he employs, the incredibly low level of the nonsense he talks. I must confess that although I know the hateful attitude Kochetov has adopted towards persecuted Soviet intellectuals, I did not think he would go as far as he did, in view of the fact that—at the pressing insistence of an official of the foreign committee of the Soviet Writers' Union—I received him in my own house with the courtesy one normally uses towards a guest (even if not of one's own choosing) and particularly if he is an open and declared enemy.

Strada had found himself, he explains, attacked as a 'bad' character on whom all ideological vices are heaped, including 'the ritual accusation of Trotskyism', which here 'with a stupidity that surprises one even in Kochetov, is mixed with a lively sympathy for Mussolini and enriched by a passionate love for parliamentarianism'. A 'positive' character, on the other hand, offers an original path towards socialism in Italy—'force the politicians into extreme right-wing positions and the game is won'!

Strada then takes up Kochetov's assertion that there was no fifth column in the Soviet Union because Stalin's terror had purged the country of traitors. This argument he finds logical on Kochetov's part. 'Kochetov says unequivocally what he wants—he wants Stalinism and with complete logicality rehabilitates Stalin's massacres.' As for the fifth column, 'then as now, they are the intellectuals, who allow themselves to be enchanted by the sirens of bourgeois democracy and by democratic socialism instead of yielding to the peremptory "proletarian wooings of Kochetov"'.

'Kochetov', he goes on, 'draws no conclusions, but in his modest way puts his analysis at the services of the ruling organs of the Soviet Union, the only ones that can draw the proper practical conclusions from his denunciations. Using a technique as old as the hills, but for all that always new, he cloaks his real anti-intellectualism with a pseudo-working class ideology. His ideal would be for the masses themselves, properly organized, to do away with the Soviet intellectuals by "revolutionary" methods.'

Strada draws some comfort from the reflection that 'the ruling organs of the Soviet Union, although not without a certain sympathy for Kochetov, take up a more moderate position'. His final words are a

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warning to Kochetov that 'the interests of the workers and the intellectuals coincide and that anyone who attacks the intellectuals in the name of the "workers" does not do the people a service but enslaves them'.

IT was now Kochetov's turn. Interviewed by the Moscow correspondent of *La Stampa* (16 October), who did not fail to point out that in 1956 Kochetov was made a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of its control commission, Kochetov denied that Strada was Spada. The Russian for *strada* (street), he disingenuously pointed out, is *doroga*, the Russian for *spada* (sword) is *shpaga*. He is not, in any case, inclined to waste on Strada the labour and research he used to create Benito Spada. Strada, he asserted, has only used the occasion 'to make himself more important'. His attacks on Kochetov are couched in the language of a silly woman. His novel, he explained to his interviewer, is 'a political-ideological work' dealing with the struggle of the Soviet Union against US imperialism, which as is well known has bases in Italy. He denied that he had attacked the CPI—his target was merely the opposition within the Party. Questioned on his attitude towards the concept of 'unity within diversity', he said: 'I have no suggestions to offer the CPI.' He was, however, sure of one thing. 'The dictatorship of the proletariat is the essential of communism—if it is lacking, communism is impossible.' Curiously, his attitude to Stalin's purges was less precise. 'It would not be true to say that I approve of them, nor would it be true to say that I condemn them.' The interviewer then passed on to his attitude towards dissident writers in the Soviet Union. Here Kochetov was more forthcoming. 'Solzhenitsyn is a good-for-nothing; he is the anti-writer', who indulges in 'political sensationalism'. He is no danger, however 'but would be if his novels were published in the Soviet Union, if the Soviet people read them and shared his ideas'. Soviet literature, he added in a lyrical outburst, 'is a blooming garden where you may gather whole bunches of flowers'. As for his own work, 'the day I heard that the Fiat workers criticize what I write, only then would I feel uneasy'.

Strada replied in a letter to *La Stampa* published the following day. It was headlined: *Who is Kochetov really*? Strada was in a polemical mood. He began by saying that Kochetov is described by his compatriots as 'the Soviet Bulgarin'. Bulgarin, he recalled, was one of the blackest figures of the reign of Nicholas I, 'who is remembered in history in particular for his links with the Third Section, that is to say, with the Tsarist political police, for his enthusiasm for censorship and for his denunciations of the progressive political and literary forces'. The definition, he finds, fits Kochetov well, 'even though it seems indisputable that the Tsarist Bulgarin possessed much more literary talent than the "Soviet Bulgarin"'.

He would have had nothing to add had not Kochetov's interview with *La Stampa* forced him to make clear that Kochetov was a common

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liar not only when he wrote 'romances' but also when he made statements to the press. He recalls the hospitality he extended to Kochetov in 1966 and adds that various Soviet friends had afterwards rebuked him for his naïveté. He recalls that Kochetov was present at a partisan rally in June 1966 at which Secchia and others spoke. He recalls that in Turin Kochetov asked for as a present a book on ikons by Princess Trubetskoi published by the YMCA press in Paris. He recalls that he had been attacked by name earlier in 1969 in *Oktyabr* by Kochetov's 'literary ideologue', Alexei Metchenko. Further, he points out, he is aware of attacks made on him—using a technique adopted with graver results towards Solzhenitsyn—in the course of special 'closed' meetings of the Soviet Writers' Union. 'Word of these slanderous attacks, which are concerned with the publication in the West of Russian literary texts blocked by the Soviet censorship, had been passed to me beforehand by an official of the Writers' Union itself; Kochetov is certainly one of those responsible for them.'

Kochetov, he goes on, is a liar not only in little things but in big ones as well. One might think, reading his interview, that his new novel is an innocent work, full of pious sentiments and noble ideals. Kochetov makes the grave error of thinking that his readers are fools. 'In the Soviet Union *What Do You Want?* has already been seen to be an appeal for a strong hand to take a grip on the country. Unfortunately, one has to admit that Kochetov does not lack followers.' He comments that Kochetov lacked the courage to reply to Pajetta's article in *l'Unità*. Naturally, neither the CPI nor individual intellectuals either in Italy or in the Soviet Union can find their 'reflection' in Kochetov's puppets. Kochetov is too experienced in slanders not to know this. 'But the essence of his novels is this: to make political accusations in narrative form, which are at once easily decipherable and carefully distorted, without having the courage to accept an open polemic.'

What has probably happened, Strada speculates, is that someone high up was dissatisfied with the mess Kochetov had made and the ensuing scandal, so that Kochetov has now attempted to smooth over, for the benefit of Western readers, the nastiness of his book. His ideological strip-tease has been too daring, he has buttoned himself up again, even though in the course of the interview he could not refrain from attacking Solzhenitsyn, 'that authentic socialist writer who suffers from censorship and persecution'.

Kochetov sets himself up as a champion of socialism. It is sad, Strada comments, that the methods he uses are far from honest and that socialism is the first to suffer from them. 'Kochetov makes demagogic appeals to the workers, but when, as in Czechoslovakia, the working class takes up positions opposed to Kochetov—that is to say, socialist positions—the Soviet man of letters talks of counter-revolution and praises armed intervention. Perhaps the "Soviet Bulgarin" does not know that the Italian working class has not the slightest desire to be saddled with a dictatorship of bureaucrats like Kochetov.'

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KOCHETOV was not without his defenders, however. In *Rinascita* of 31 October he found one in Paolo Robotti.* After rebuking Strada for 'venting his spleen' in the bourgeois press Robotti went on to suggest that he 'hates socialist realism because he hates real socialism'. It was in any case 'not proper to criticize a book and a writer which can be known only to a tiny minority of Italians'. Kochetov, he pointed out, was elected a member of the control commission of the Party at the Twentieth Congress; this alone vouches for his integrity. Robotti's letter was too much for *Rinascita's* editor, Luca Pavolini, who in an editorial comment pointed out that Kochetov's book 'is not a literary event but an attack by a writer whose political opinions against the Italian communists and against the line of our Party are well known .

The second instalment of Kochetov's novel had meantime been described by *l'Unità* as a 'vulgar pamphlet'. '*Oktyabr* does it again and looks to the past', ran the headline. The article by a staff-member with a Moscow by-line said that Kochetov had launched an attack 'on everything in the communist movement that draws its inspiration from the ideas of renewal which had their source in the Twentieth Congress'. The article went on:

> The second instalment of the pamphlet by the editor of *Oktyabr* has in common with the first the vulgarity, the inaccuracy and the absurdity of the previous attack, which is launched from positions which we consider to be out-dated in the communist movement, whether in Italy or in the Soviet Union. . . . The second instalment clearly demonstrates that if one remains stuck in a Stalinist posture one finishes up today fighting against the socialist and Marxist culture of the USSR and naturally incapable of understanding the realities of the Italian situation or the policy of our Party. From this point of view the piece is a textbook example. Suffice it to say that there are hints of the evils that might befall Italy because it has been deprived of the good fortune to have as its head . . . a man like de Gaulle. An *Italian communist*, who is a leading figure in the book, is represented as being afraid to take part in a street demonstration against NATO, because of his fear of the police; he sends his wife instead.
>
> It is clear that during his journey Kochetov never chanced to see a street demonstration nor to talk with people who have taken part in them nor to meet communists who did not allow themselves to be used as extras in his script. It is only by omitting any examination of the realities, therefore, that this 'realist' author is able to go on talking about the 'opportunists', 'revisionists', 'liquidators', who are supposed to have insinuated themselves into the ranks of the CPI that he is able to set up against them two

* Robotti is no ordinary communist. The brother-in-law of Togliatti, he was himself arrested during the *Yezhovshchina*, tortured and imprisoned. Released by the intervention of Togliatti, after the war he was a Stalinist propagandist in the CPI and even after the Twentieth Congress he refused to condemn the system under which he had suffered.

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positive heroes. They are, as it happens, the wife of the Italian communist—a Soviet citizen—who fights to raise from the dust, where the revisionists are supposed to have dropped it, the banner of class war in Italy and, finally, an ex-member of the SS in a state of crisis; he has the merit of being Russian, in fact 'a great Russian', who has been sent back to his own country by the Americans on a fantastic mission of 'ideological diversion' but in the end is able to redeem himself. Naturally, the two Russian citizens . . . , grotesquely drawn though they are, share the same ideology as their author. . . . Here the trick is an easy one. Kochetov has blown himself up in the disguise of Bulatov until he transforms himself into the entire Soviet Union or at least into its only true representative. What else are the Italian communists busy doing, according to the pages of *Oktyabr*, but 'launching anathemas at Bulatov, at his ideas, at his books in the company of the White Russian press, the BBC and the Voice of America'?

Let us merely say in conclusion that, even in Moscow, there are not many people who think that Kochetov/Bulatov is the man, for all his endeavours, to represent the Soviet Union. In fact there are many people who think that Kochetov/Bulatov by no means represents 'the Marxism-Leninism of today'. It is the ill-digested stuff of yesterday which attempts to survive as the weapon of a pressure group. Perhaps it may serve to show that there is still much to be done to free the working-class movement from the weight of negative elements of an epoch to which the name of 'Stalinist' attaches. It is an epoch which facile people abroad cancel out crudely along with everything that has meaning for the construction of socialism and which facile people within the USSR wish equally crudely to reimpose as an ideal. But the Soviet Union, Soviet literature and Soviet thought are not represented by Kochetov. The problems of Soviet culture and the Soviet intellectuals will be solved by men who face them very differently.

IT was in the pages of *l'Unità* that on 12 November Kochetov drew a letter from one of his Turin workers.

At last the Russian writer, Kochetov, has finished spitting his poison at the Italian communists. The really surprising thing is that his last attack took place at the very time when thousands of communists—workers, peasants, students and intellectuals—were rallying in all the cities of Italy to celebrate with enthusiasm and pride the anniversary of the October Revolution. . . . One has only to look through any bourgeois paper to see how they seized on this fellow Kochetov to intensify their anti-communist campaign, to make our life more difficult, to attempt to provoke divisions. But they should not delude themselves.

To Kochetov we Italian communists can only say that he is irresponsible in view of the fact that, over and above the harm he tries to cause us, he is also going against the policies of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU which the present Soviet rulers are carrying out. To the bosses' papers we can reply—we do it every day—by

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fighting with renewed vigour to support the line the CPI has adopted to reach socialism.

Fraternal greetings,
Giuseppe Gribaudo
worker (Turin).

On 14 November Strada returned to the attack in the correspondence columns of *Rinascita*. Paolo Robotti's letter, he begins, is not the kind to which one replies, but he has a couple of political observations to make about 'Daddy Kochetov and his Italian descendants'.

'One of the innovations which Stalinism introduced into the working-class movement was the iron spirit of the hierarchy and the flock. Loyalty to ideas and solidarity among comrades were superseded and crushed by deference, obedience, obsequiousness. First towards Stalin himself, then towards "the leading country", and the authorized "doctrine".' He recalls that the psychological effects were that the victims of the system collaborated with their executioners (did he have Robotti in mind?) and that those who survived, in gratitude, continued to denounce their comrades. 'It was possible to believe that the age of these distortions was over. On the contrary, the mentality of those who are faithful *perinde ac cadaver* is not only repeating itself in the present but is projected into the past.'

In philosophical terms this 'monarchical idolatry' finds expression in 'an idealistic and determinist philosophy of history which sees in the leader the inscrutable agent of a mystical revolutionary spirit. The result is an unprecedented form of "historical servility". The war against Hitler in the USSR was not won by the 20 million Soviet citizens killed during the conflict. . . . No, the "Marxist" on the Stalinist model asserts that the war was won thanks to Stalin's virtues and he genuflects in front of his portrait in his marshal's uniform, and laments that the time of inquisitions on "heretics" and "free thinkers" is over. But is it completely over?'

His second point deals with neo-Stalinism. For what he hopes may be the last time he takes Kochetov as an example.

> In a general and vague sense it is permissible to define Kochetov as a neo-Stalinist. Kochetov looks back with tremendous nostalgia to the worst aspects of the Stalinist era. But if we intend to use 'Stalinism' more precisely it seems to me to be inexact to apply it to Kochetov and gentlemen like him. It is true that Stalin used socialist ideals for a course of action that, in my view, had no connexion with the ends or means of socalism. But it is also true that, for a certain period of time, oppressed humanity throughout the world fought for the realization of genuine and deeply felt socialist ideals in the name of Stalin. Stalin (the man and the system) was an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of the working-class movement; it was owing to a series of historical circumstances that this paradoxical and bloody contradiction was made possible. It is said that History is cunning—frequently its cunning is extremely

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> cruel. One must bear in mind, also, that the state of the world in which 'Stalinist socialism' prospered was oppressive and gloomy and left almost no margin for collective choices—the alternatives left open to individuals were then, as always, wide. For this reason it seems to me wrong to use the expression 'Stalinism without Stalin', not only because the monstrous personality of the Georgian statesman was absolutely essential but because 'Stalinism' in the true sense of the word was bound up with a particular moment in world history. I am not saying that the present world is much better than it was at the time of the 'cult'. But there has been undoubted progress in the sense that certain illusions, although it is still possible to have them (particularly if one wishes to delude oneself), are more difficult and the area of socialist choice, although still limited, is much wider than in the past—particularly for us.
>
> That is why the appeal to Stalin today takes on a sense which can only serve a naked policy of power and brute force. It is a consolation that the ideologues of this policy are forced to this 'backward look' and, in spite of all their efforts, cannot use for their ends either Marx or Lenin.

Kochetov, he concludes, if you examine him closely, is not a Stalinist writer—allowing that he is a writer at all.

> The Stalinist writer *par excellence* was Fadeyev, to whom not even his opponents can deny those moral and intellectual gifts which allow him to take up his due place in Russian socialist literature. His very suicide, which occurred when he saw his fellow-countrymen, fellow-writers and comrades, whom he had labelled traitors and enemies, returning acquitted of their crimes, is a token of his seriousness. The Kochetovs cannot even be described as 'Stalinists'. They are beneath such an 'accusation'. 'An anti-Soviet writer', that is how an old, honest, intelligent teacher of mine at Moscow University, whose name I prefer not to quote, described him.

There, as far as the Italian side goes, the argument rests. But events in the Soviet Union have demonstrated that in their attack on the 'New World' Kochetov and his friends have been able to exert pressures and to assert their Stalinist logic. The proof of their success lies in the dismissal of Tvardovski from the editorship of *Novy Mir*. The fact that Kochetov himself was criticized at the same time in the official *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (11 February 1970) indicates that he will not be the one to benefit personally from Tvardovski's downfall. But the cause of the liberal writers, represented and defended by *Novy Mir* for so long, has suffered a resounding blow. Strada's fears have been amply fulfilled.

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DOCUMENTS: SOVIET UNION

Despite the attempts of the Soviet authorities to stamp out manifestations of free thought which have grown up in the post-Stalin era, the series of trials and the underground publications testify to the resistance to neo-Stalinism. One of the most startling proofs of this is the regular Chronicle of Current Events, *the first issue of which was published on 30 April 1968, an underground information periodical giving details about both repressions by the authorities and the resistance activities. We publish below issue no. 5 of the* Chronicle. *The text of this and other issues of the* Chronicle *will appear in the forthcoming book edited by Peter Reddaway,* Underground Russia: The Civil Rights Movement in the USSR.

The other document published below is a collection of letters to Alexander Solzhenitsyn written to him by the readers of One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. *This revealing collection, edited by the author, circulates through* samizdat *in the Soviet Union.*

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

Issue no. 5, 31 December 1968

> Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
>
> Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19.

Review of 'Samizdat' for 1968

'SAMIZDAT' is a specific form of exercising freedom of expression in our country. During the last few years *samizdat* has evolved from a predominant concern with poetry and fiction towards an ever greater emphasis on journalistic and documentary writing. This is particularly true of 1968—in this year *samizdat* has not been enriched by a single major prose work, as it was in past years by such works as the novels of Solzhenitsyn, the memoirs of Ginzburg, the collections of stories by Shalamov, novels by Chukovskaya, Maksimov, and others; during 1968 no literary miscellany such as *Syntax* or *Phoenix* has appeared. On the other hand, the readers of *samizdat* (they are also its volunteer publishers) have received during the year a regular flow of documents, open letters, speeches, commentaries, articles, news items etc. In other words, *samizdat,* in addition to its role as a supplier of books, has begun to fulfil

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the functions of a newspaper. The following survey will probably not be a full one. Furthermore, the notes on some of the materials are too brief—but this is due to the force of circumstances and does not mean that they are of lesser importance. We have not always been consistent in deciding whether to include materials relating to 1967 which were circulated mainly in 1968. We feel that the task of giving readers a survey of the *samizdat* now in circulation is so important that we do not wish to restrict ourselves by considerations of a formal bibliographical nature.

1. Materials on Czechoslovakia

Translations of Czechoslovak Articles and Documents

THE FIRST DOCUMENT in this category was a speech made last year by Ludvik Vaculik at the Fourth Congress of Czechoslovak Writers. This speech gave a detailed account of the workings of a totalitarian regime. Attacking an undemocratic regime based on the triumph of 'mediocrities', Vaculik emphasized in the strongest terms that 'in criticizing the state power, I am not casting aspersions on the ideals of socialism, for I am not convinced that all that has happened in this country was inevitable and, furthermore, I do not identify the power in question with the idea of socialism . . .'.

In the spring and summer of 1968 a great variety of material from Czech and Slovak newspapers and periodicals was circulated. Among them were interviews with the widows of Slansky and Clementis, and other material about the trials of the fifties; speeches by Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Cisar and other leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Particularly important was the fact that *samizdat* made available the full text of the declaration known as 'Two Thousand Words', which in the official Soviet press was described in a misleading way. *Samizdat* has also put into circulation an example of a truly free, non-totalitarian polemic: Josef Smrkovsky's 'One Thousand Words in Reply to Two Thousand Words'.

The 'Czechoslovak spring' was interrupted by brute force at the end of the summer. There are several *samizdat* documents relating to the first days of the occupation: leaflets addressed to Soviet soldiers, and messages to the population. 'On the third day of this treacherous aggression we are still free', begins a message from the historians of Prague to their fellow citizens—'this brutal invasion has not brought our people to its knees'.

In the months since the Moscow agreement only very few Czechoslovak documents, unfortunately, have come into circulation via *samizdat*. The most important of these was the speech by Josef Smrkovsky on 29 August, in which the President of the Czechoslovak National Assembly said outright that 'the country has suddenly been occupied by overwhelming military force'. He admitted that the Czechoslovak leaders in Moscow had been forced to accept a tragic compromise which had been dictated, however, not by cowardice but by

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a feeling of responsibility towards the population of the country. 'The talks and the decisions arrived at weigh heavily on our shoulders', Smrkovsky said in conclusion—'we are obliged to conduct this debate in the shadow of the tanks and aircraft that have occupied our country. The only way out of these difficulties is through the unity of the people and the government, through obedience to the call: "we are with you, as you must be with us".'

Of the later documents one may mention the appeal of the Czech writers of 31 October and the 'Ten Points' of the Students' Union of Bohemia and Moravia which formed the political basis of the student strike of 18–20 November. The Ten Points are an expression of complete support for the Action Programme of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; they condemn any return to press censorship and government by an inner caucus, and demand guarantees of civil rights and liberties.

Open Letters and Articles by Soviet Authors on the Question of Czechoslovakia

ALREADY BEFORE THE SOVIET invasion of Czechoslovakia, at the end of July 1968, when the Soviet press was conducting a particularly violent campaign against 'democratization' in Czechoslovakia and when the threat of intervention seemed more real than at any time before or after, there appeared two documents expressing sympathy for Czechoslovakia and indignation at the propaganda campaign: a letter to all members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the whole Czech people signed by five communists, P. Grigorenko, A. Kosterin, V. Pavlinchuk, S. Pisarev and I. Yakhimovich; an open letter by Anatoli Marchenko to the newspapers *Rude pravo, Prace,* and *Literarni listy.*

The dispatch of Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia under the guise of 'fraternal help', unanimously approved in the pages of the Soviet press, met with various forms of protest from individual Soviet citizens. Among the *samizdat* reactions to these tragic events may be mentioned: the letter of Ivan Yakhimovich; 'September 1968' by Valentin Komarov; 'The Logic of Tanks', an article by an anonymous author; 'An Appeal to Communists' signed 'Communist'; a letter by P. Grigorenko and A. Kosterin, and also a letter from A. Kosterin to the Central Committee of the CPSU resigning from the Party, 'which has become the gendarme of Europe'.

All these documents, though differing in style and form, make the same points: a) the intervention in Czechoslovakia is the result of a revival of Stalinism; b) the real reason for it was a wish to suppress democratization, freedom and the rule of law, and to destroy a dangerous experiment in combining socialism with democracy; c) the invasion was a moral defeat for the occupiers; d) our people and intelligentsia are collectively responsible for what has happened, and all honest thinking people in our country must unite.

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2. Materials on the Trial of Galanskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolski and Lashkova

THE MAIN LETTERS ON THIS TRIAL were listed in the first issue of the *Chronicle*. Apart from these, there are *samizdat* versions of the speeches by the defence lawyers B. A. Zolotukhin and D. I. Kaminskaya, as well as of the final pleas of the defendants Alexander Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, for whom they appeared. There is also the letter to the editors of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* from Vadim Delauny, in which he shows from his knowledge of the preposterous evidence given by Dobrovolski in the investigation of the case in which he (Delauny) was implicated together with Bukovski and Kushev, that the sentences in the [Galanskov] trial were based on false evidence by Dobrovolski. Also circulating in *samizdat* are letters sent by various people to Larisa Daniel and Pavel Litvinov after their statement [about the Galanskov trial]—the best known of these is the letter signed by 24 schoolchildren.

Among the people listed in the second issue of the *Chronicle* as having been subjected to sanctions without any process of law were the schoolteachers Yuri Likhenbald and Valeria Gerlin, who were dismissed from their jobs after signing one of the letters on the trial. Their dismissal was carried out in such a flagrantly illegal way that the school had to reinstate them after a court order. The record of a discussion of Gerlin's case at a trade union meeting at her school and in the education section of the local soviet is circulating in *samizdat*. Apart from its purely documentary value, which derives mainly from the light it throws on how little the concept of law means to our rank-and-file intellectuals, this record is one of the few documentary works of the past year which can be read for literary pleasure as well as for the information it provides.

3. Materials on the Forcible Confinement of Alexander Volpin and Natalia Gorbanevskaya in a Mental Hospital

THIS EVENT WAS REPORTED in the first issue of the *Chronicle*. The confinement of Volpin in a mental home gave rise to a whole number of documents: the note which he left for his wife when he was taken from his home; a record of his conversations with the doctors; his appeal to his friends; a letter from his wife, Victoria, to the Minister of Health, V. V. Petrovski; a letter from 99 mathematicians in his defence; a note written by his wife and his mother about the conditions under which he was held in the hospital; the text of the order by which he was forcibly confined; and other documents.

The story of how Gorbanevskaya was sent to the mental hospital is told in her own account, entitled ' Free Medical Aid '.

4. Materials Concerning the Demonstration in Red Square on 25 August

THE MAIN LETTERS CONNECTED with this were listed in the fourth issue of the *Chronicle*. In addition, there is now a letter addressed to

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the deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the RSFSR. The main point made in this letter is that the sentence on the five demonstrators is an infringement of fundamental civic rights. It was signed by 95 people, including the leading actor Igor Kvasha, the writer on church affairs A. Krasnov (Levitin), the biologist A. A. . . . . ., the writer Viktor Nekrasov, the historians Leonid Petrovski and Peter Yakir, the literary scholar L. Pinski and the pianist M. V. Yudina.

Some of the most striking *samizdat* items of 1968 were the final pleas at their trial of Larisa Daniel, Pavel Litvinov, Vadim Delauny, Vladimir Dremlyuga and Konstantin Babitski, and the speech made in her own defence by Larisa Daniel.

5. The Case of the Demonstration in Pushkin Square on 22 January 1967

THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS CASE were gathered together by Pavel Litvinov. Included among them are verbatim records of the trial of Viktor Khaustov, and of Vladimir Bukovski, Vadim Delauny and Evgeni Kushev. A number of other documents are quoted in this collection, which has been circulating in *samizdat* since the beginning of 1968. In the autumn it was also published in London but, unfortunately, this volume, for some unaccountable reason, omits the letter of P. G. Grigorenko which forms the logical conclusion to the whole collection.

6. Andrei Sakharov's 'Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom'

THE AUTHOR OF THIS STUDY, an academician and 'Father of the H-Bomb', attempts a scientific approach to world problems. He shows that the world is threatened by a number of dangers: thermonuclear destruction, famine for half of mankind, uncontrolled changes in the environment, threats to intellectual freedom, the growth of racism and nationalism and the emergence of dictatorial regimes. In Sakharov's opinion the only solution is to be found in overcoming the divisions in mankind, attempts to bring the two economic systems closer to each other, a scientific and democratic approach to the formulation of internal and foreign policies, intellectual freedom, aid to underdeveloped countries through a drastic reduction of military expenditure, and the observance of geo-hygiene. In line with these basic propositions academician Sakharov makes concrete recommendations to the leaders of our countries.

Sakharov's study has evoked a response from representatives of the technical intelligentsia of Estonia. In an article entitled 'Hopes or Deeds?', they maintain that Sakharov 'puts too much faith in scientific and technical means, in economic measures, in the goodwill of those who control society, and in people's commonsense', and that 'the root causes he sees and the remedies he advocates are external, material ones, while the inner, spiritual, political and organic ones are ignored'. The article says that what we need most of all is a moral revival of society, since

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'having destroyed Christian values, the materialist ideology has not created new ones'. This has given rise to a society in which solidarity is an external, mechanical thing, and which is actually based on socially-alienated individuals who are fearful of their neighbours and feel insignificant and lonely before the state machine. New moral values are essential. The authors of the article demand not only intellectual freedom, but also political freedom, real democracy and a renunciation of the doctrine of militant, aggressive communism in foreign policy. The authors of the article conclude that the 'leading minds of our society' should apply themselves to working out new social, political and economic ideals.

7. Appendix to Anatoli Marchenko's 'My Testimony'

MARCHENKO'S BOOK WHICH GIVES an account of the life of Soviet political prisoners during the current decade came into circulation in 1967. One can form a partial idea of it from the letter by Marchenko included in the second issue of the *Chronicle*. This letter, together with a number of other documents, forms part of an appendix to the book compiled in the autumn of 1968, when Marchenko was sentenced for infringement of the regulations on residence permits, and sent to a 'strict regime camp' in the north of the Perm region. The appendix includes: Marchenko's letter to A. Chakovski, editor of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, in reply to a sentence in the latter's article, 'Answer to a Reader', about political prisoners being kept 'at public expense'; Marchenko's open letter to the President of the Soviet Red Cross and to a number of other officials about the situation of political prisoners; the reply to this letter from the Vice-President of the Soviet Red Cross, F. Zakharov; Marchenko's open letter to the Czechoslovak newspapers; a statement by eight friends of Marchenko concerning his arrest; Larisa Daniel's letter 'On the Arrest of Anatoli Marchenko'; a statement by the same author in connexion with the arrest of Irina Belogorodskaya.

8. Documents Concerning Solzhenitsyn

THESE CONSIST OF: Veniamin Kaverin's letter to Konstantin Fedin; Solzhenitsyn's correspondence with the secretariat of the Union of Soviet Writers and a record of the discussion in the secretariat of his novel, *Cancer Ward*. For an account of these documents see the second issue of the *Chronicle*.

9. Two letters by Lidia Chukovskaya

THE FIRST ONE ('Not an Execution, but Thoughts, Words') was written in connexion with the 15th anniversary of Stalin's death and is about the threat of a revival of Stalinist methods of ideological repression. The second ('The responsibility of a Writer and the Irresponsibility of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*') is concerned with Solzhenitsyn, his readers and his critics.

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10. Letter from P. Grigorenko to Yu.V. Andropov

THIS IS AN ACCOUNT of a 'prophylactic talk' held with the author of the letter in the KGB.

11. Speech of P. Grigorenko at a Dinner in Honour of the Seventy-second Birthday of A. E. Kosterin

THIS SPEECH IS ABOUT Kosterin's life, the support which he has given to the cause of the Crimean Tartars, and the tasks which confront their movement.

12. The Funeral of A. E. Kosterin

THE WRITER ALEKSEI Evgrafovich Kosterin died on 10 November. He had been a member of the CPSU since 1916; he was a former prisoner of Stalin's camps and an active fighter for the rights of man and justice for small nations. He was buried on 14 November. Between 300 and 400 people were present at his funeral. The *samizdat* documents on this event consist of a preface by the compiler; a description of the funeral ('Yet Another Mockery of Sacred Feelings') written by Grigorenko; an obituary written by a group of Kosterin's friends and read at the morgue of the Botkin hospital by Anatoli Yakobson; speeches at the morgue by Muarren Martynov (Crimean Tartar poet), S. P. Pisarev (member of the CPSU from 1920), Ablamit Borseitov (schoolteacher), Dzhamalev (engineer); speeches at the crematorium by Professor Refik Muzafarov (literary scholar) and Grigorenko; speeches at a memorial meeting by Peter Yakir (historian), Khalid Oshayev (Chechen writer), Andrei Grigorenko (technician), Zampira Asanova (doctor), Leonid Petrovski (historian), and an unknown man whom the compilers of this collection of documents have given the pseudonym 'Christian'.

13. Information Bulletins Issued by Representatives of the Crimean Tartars in Moscow

AS IN PAST YEARS, these bulletins continued in 1968 to describe the activities of the Crimean Tartars' representatives in Moscow and to provide information about the persecution of individual members of the movement as well as about large-scale acts of repression (such as the events at Chirchik on 21 April and in Moscow on 16-17 May). The bulletins also contain various appeals by the Crimean Tartars' representatives to cultural figures and to world public opinion. One of these appeals is reproduced in the second issue of the *Chronicle*.

14. 'Crimean Tartars on Trial'

THIS ANONYMOUS PAMPHLET described the tragic expulsion of the Tartars from the Crimea, the struggle waged by them for their rehabilitation and recent repressive court proceedings in which 'every document containing information about the national movement . . . is regarded by

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the local authorities as being anti-Soviet', and peaceful demonstrations and meetings . . . are described as 'mass disorders'. The author of the pamphlet recalls the events in Chirchik, the police raids in Moscow and the Crimea, and the suppression of the national movement for justice for the Crimean Tartars.

15. Nikolai Aleksandrov: 'Our Short Memory'

A PAMPHLET ABOUT HISTORICAL 'forgetfulness' which is not only an insult to the memory of millions of innocent victims, but also a real threat to the future of our people.

16. Anatoli Krasnov: 'Christ and the Master'; 'Stromati'; 'The Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church'; 'Drops Under the Microscope'

'CHRIST AND THE MASTER' is an attempt to discuss several basic questions of Christian teaching through a literary and philosophical study of Bulakov's novel *The Master and Margarita*. The thread of the argument is provided by the chapters in the novel about Christ. The book is written in a free, discursive manner with frequent digressions into the author's personal reminiscences and reflections.

The Greek word 'stromati' means literally 'carpet', but in the figurative sense of 'miscellany' it was used by various ancient teachers of the Church as the title for their books. Written in the form of observations loosely tied together by the general theme of the part a Christian should play in society, Krasnov's book deals with such questions as the moral responsibility of a Christian to society, the role of the Church in the life of society, and the collaboration of Christians with people of different views in the solution of common moral and political tasks. The author gives a brief survey of the various political trends at the present time and states his attitude towards them. At the end of the book the author gives his political credo, which he defines as 'democratic humanism', and calls on people of different persuasions to unite on this basis.

His letter on 'The Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church' is addressed to the Pope and it gives an account, based mainly on the author's personal observations, of the attitude of different generations of Russians to religion and the Church, the way in which some young people are turning to the Church, and the relations between different faiths. He raises the question of the need for an inner revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, and examines the difficulties in the way of this. The author speaks of the criticism which he and others have made of the Russian bishops, and contends that such criticism is both justified and necessary. The question of uniting the Western and Eastern Churches is also touched upon in this letter.

The article 'Drops Under a Microscope' is about the difficulties which have arisen at the parish level in the Russian Orthodox Church as a result of a change in the parish administration. This change consisted

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of taking the administration of parish affairs out of the hands of the priest and transferring it to the council of 20 laymen headed by a church elder. The author shows that this reform is in conflict with the canonical tradition, and he points out the practical consequences which it entails in conditions of constant interference by the authorities in the life of the Church: infringement of the rights of the priest, unchecked power for the elder who is appointed by the state authorities, etc. As an illustration, the example of Nikolo-Kuznetski Church is described in detail. The author also treats the more general question of the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church has been denied its rights in the Soviet Union, and of the responsibility of the church hierarchy itself for this state of affairs.

17. Two Letters by the Pskov Priest Father Sergei Zheludkov

IN A LETTER TO PAVEL LITVINOV, S. Zheludkov expresses his support for the appeal by Litvinov and Larisa Daniel 'to world public opinion' and speaks of the aims shared by all 'people of goodwill' irrespective of how they define their views.

The 'Letter on the Day of St Nicholas and Victory Day' (9 May) is addressed to the heads of the various churches. It was written after reading Marchenko's book 'My Testimony'. Referring to this book, the author of the letter speaks of the grievous situation of political prisoners in the USSR and calls on all Christians, and particularly their spiritual leaders to speak up in their defence.

18. Archbishop Ermogen: Letters to the Patriarchate; 'On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Re-establishment of the Officer of Patriarch' (Note on the Historical, Canonical and Legal Aspect)

THE FIRST OF THE LETTERS written by Archbishop Ermogen to the Patriarchate (in which he disputes the legal validity of his dismissal) was written in November 1967, and the second in February 1968. In these letters he shows not only the illegality of his dismissal brought about under pressure from the authorities as a reprisal for his staunch resistance to actions detrimental to the church, but also attempts an analysis, from the point of view of both canon and secular law, of the whole question of relations between Church and state in the USSR.

There is an even more detailed study of this question in his article 'On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Re-establishment of the Officer of Patriarch' (25 December 1967) which makes numerous references to the decision of the Universal and Local Council of the Orthodox Church (including the Local Council of the Russian Church 1917–18).

19. Open Letter from the Kiev Community of Baptists and Evangelical Christians

THIS LETTER IS THE LATEST in a series of similar ones which appeared in 1967 and is in defence of the Baptist preacher G. P. Vins who was

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arrested in 1967 and is being subjected to cruel treatment in a camp. The letter is signed by 176 members of the community in the name of 400 Kiev Baptists and Evangelical Christians.

20. B. V. Talantov: Statement to the Prosecutor-General of the USSR

THIS CONTAINS PROTESTS AGAINST the persecution to which the author, who lives in the city of Kirov, is being subjected for his opposition to interference by the Soviet authorities in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, and against the acquiescence in this interference by the church hierarchy.

21. G. Pomerants: 'Three Levels of Being'; 'Man of Air'

THE FIRST ARTICLE is about the roots of religious feelings in man. The author examines the various levels of being which arise with the awaking of different layers of the human psyche. The author concludes that there is an 'amorphous' mystical sense of religion, which is outside the Church and is not limited to the dogmas and Holy Scriptures.

The second article is about the concept of 'the People'. The author concludes that the concept has no real content.

22. Verse

IN 1968 THERE WERE THREE new collections of verse: Alexander Galich, 'Book of Songs'; Natalia Gorbanevskaya, 'The Wooden Angel' (Verse, 1967); Yuli Daniel, 'Verse 1965–67'. Apart from these there are, as usual, many individual poems circulating in *samizdat*—they include 'Farewell to Bukovski' by Vadim Delauny, and several poems by unknown authors written under the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

23. Human Rights Year in the Soviet Union: 'Chronicle of Current Events' (Four Issues)

NO. 1, 30 APRIL 1968: Description of the trial of Yuri Galanskov, Alexander Ginzburg, Aleksei Dobrovolsky and Vera Lashkova. A list of the main newspaper articles on the trial. A list of the main letters concerning the trial. Information about the first cases of reprisals against signatories of such letters. The appeal to the Presidium of the consultative meeting of communist parties in Budapest. Information about the trial of the members of the All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People. Items in brief.

No. 2, 30 June 1968: Cases of extra-judicial political persecution in 1968. Appeal from the Crimean Tartars to world public opinion. Materials on Solzhenitsyn. Letter by Anatoli Marchenko about the situation of political prisoners, and the reply from the Soviet Red Cross. Items in brief. Corrections and additions to no. 1.

No. 3, 31 August 1968: The shortest issue of the *Chronicle*, concerned almost entirely with events during the invasion of Czechoslovakia

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and those preceding but closely linked with it. There is information about the arrest of Anatoli Marchenko and his trial; about other arrests in Moscow and Leningrad; about various forms of protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia (including the demonstration in Red Square), and about the trial of Bogoslovski, an inhabitant of Leningrad.

No. 4, 31 October 1968: Court proceedings in the case of the demonstration of 25 August 1968 in Red Square (exile for Babitski, Larisa Daniel and Litvinov; short commentary; the Soviet press on the trial; *samizdat* documents concerning the case). Information about some political prisoners condemned for 'treason'. A 'new method' of carrying out house searches. Supplement to the collection of materials (known as the 'White Book') on the case of Sinyavski and Daniel. Items in brief.

* * *

Court Proceedings in Leningrad, 17–26 December 1968

ISSUES THREE AND FOUR of the *Chronicle* gave news about the arrest of several people in Leningrad, and about the circumstances of their arrest. In October two of the accused in this case, Nikolai Danilov and Evgeni Shashenkov, were declared to be not of sound mind and the court ruled that they should be confined for compulsory treatment in a mental hospital 'of a special type' (i.e. in a prison hospital).

Nikolai Danilov, a lawyer by training, worked at the end of the fifties as a KGB investigator in the Ukraine and Sakhalin; he then gave up this work and for a long time did ordinary manual labour; he only recently began to work as a consultant in a legal aid office. He writes verse and has been doing a correspondence course at the Literary Institute. In April 1968, together with Yuri Gendler, Lev Kvachevski and Viktor Fainberg, he wrote a letter to the Prosecutor-General of the USSR about procedural irregularities at the trial in Leningrad last spring. In June 1968 he was expelled from the Institute. He has a nine-year-old daughter.

Evgeni Shashenkov is an engineer. In 1950, while a student at Leningrad University, he wrote a letter to Stalin as a result of which he was arrested and interrogated with all the brutality then prevalent before being sent for the first time to a prison mental hospital. He was sent there a second time in 1963–64, and the same thing is now about to happen to him for a third time. Nevertheless, as far is known, Shashenkov has shown the greatest fortitude under interrogation, refusing to give evidence.

There were thus three defendants at the December trial: Yuri Gendler, born in 1936, legal consultant, father of a five-year-old daughter: Lev Kvachevski, born in 1939, chemical engineer, father of a six-year-old son; Anatoli Studenkov, born in 1935, physical engineer, father of a seven-year-old daughter. The judge at the trial was the deputy chairman of the Leningrad City Court, Karlov; the prosecuting

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counsel was Dosugov; Gendler's defence counsel was Romm, and Studenkov's was Shafir. Lev Kvachevski refused legal aid and conducted his own defence. His elder brother, Orion Kvachevski, a geologist and former inmate of Stalin's concentration camps who was rehabilitated in 1956, wanted to appear for the defence, but was not allowed to, or even to be present at the trial: the day before the trial he was sent off on a trip connected with his work.

The defendants were accused of 'producing, harbouring and circulating' works of 'an anti-Soviet nature'. Among these works were the following books and photo-copies of books: Djilas, *The New Class*; Rauch, *History of Soviet Russia, Bitter Harvest, The American Public*, the journal *Mosty* ['Bridges']; Sokolov, *The Murder of the Tsar and his Family*; Berdyaev, *The Origins and Meaning of Russian Communism*; Goldwater, *Why Not Victory*? and *The Conscience of a Conservative*; Avtorkhanov, *The Technology of Power*; Fedotov, *The New City*, and others. Furthermore, they were charged both in the indictment and in the sentence with harbouring a number of typewritten *samizdat* materials, a precise list of which is not yet available. There is some evidence that the list even featured letters sent by Soviet citizens to the higher Soviet authorities. From the legal point of view the indictment and sentence sound odd when they speak of the accused having entered into 'criminal relations' with P. G. Grigorenko, V. A. Krasin, and P. M. Litvinov, from whom they had allegedly received material of an 'anti-Soviet nature'. Not one of these three was called as a witness at the trial. On the other hand, on the first day of the trial, some unknown persons attacked Viktor Krasin in Moscow, striking him in the face with a knuckle-duster.

Anatoli Studenkov, apart from being charged like the others under article 70, was also accused of illegally distilling vodka, forging documents, and petty larceny. It is clear that this circumstance played no small part in the full and 'sincere repentance' he made during the preliminary investigation, and it was because of this repentance, as well as his full admission of guilt and the readiness with which he gave evidence under investigation and in court that, despite the four articles under which he was found guilty (articles 70/1, 94, 158/1, 196/1 of the criminal code of the RSFSR), Studenkov received the shortest sentence of all.

Yuri Gendler admitted his guilt, but denied any anti-Soviet intent in his actions. He stated that he had been guided only by a wish to help in the democratization and liberalization of Soviet society on the lines laid down by the Twentieth and Twenty-second Party Congresses, and that it was only during the preliminary investigation that he had 'realized the anti-Soviet nature of his actions'.

Lev Kvachevski pleaded not guilty. He admitted most of the facts with which he was charged, but absolutely denied their criminal nature. In his speech for his defence, and in his final plea, he reasserted his innocence and his right to read anything he wished.

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The prosecutor demanded imprisonment in 'strict regime' labour camps for all three defendants: six years for Kvachevski, four years for Gendler and 18 months for Studenkov. Defence counsel for Gendler and Studenkov said that the defendants had been wrongly charged and that they should have been prosecuted only under article 190/1 of the criminal code.

The court sentenced Kvachevski to four years, Gendler to three years and Studenkov to one year in 'strict regime' labour camps.

Additions to the List of Cases of Extra-Judicial Political Persecution in 1968

(a) Additional details on people mentioned in the second issue of the *Chronicle*:

Boris Balter: expelled from the Party by the Moscow City Committee.

Yuri Tsekhmistrenko: it was stated in error that he had been expelled from the Party. In fact he received a strict reprimand.

Valentin Nepomnyashchi: expelled from the Union of Journalists; appeal for restoration of Party membership rejected.

Yuri Gerchuk: demoted.

Ivan Yakhimovich: residence permit cancelled.

Abram Fet: dismissed from his work.

A number of people have been readmitted to the Party on appeal, and expulsion has been replaced by the lesser sanction of a 'strict reprimand'. They include Fedor Suchkov, Yuri Karyakin, Ludmila Belova, Moisei Tulchinski and Sergei Fomin.

The ban on the staging of plays by Vladimir Voinovich has very recently been lifted.

(b) The list of people in the second issue of the *Chronicle* contained 91 names. To these should now be added:

92. Konstantin Babitski: because he signed letters about the Galanskov/Ginzburg trial, the examination of his dissertation has been postponed indefinitely.

93. Nikolai Danilov: expelled from the Literary Institute (but in the interval between the appearance of the second and fifth issues, these two, as reported, have been subjected to judicial persecution).

94. Viktor Krasin: economist at the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics, former inmate of Stalin's camps, signatory of one of the letters on the trial, of the appeal to the Budapest meeting, and of the appeal from the friends of Marchenko—dismissed 'at his own request'.

95. Alexander Zholkovski: linguist at the laboratory of machine translation of the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages, signatory of letter in defence of Ginzburg—examination of thesis indefinitely postponed and constant threat of dismissal from work.

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96. M. M. Gromyko: historian at the Institute of History, Literature and Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, Professor of the University of Novosibirsk, signatory of the 'Novosibirsk letter'—suspended from teaching.

97. Iosif Goldenberg: literary scholar, teacher at Novosibirsk University, signatory of the 'Novosibirsk letter,' suspended from teaching.

98. N. Zorkaya: research worker at the Institute of Art History and signatory of one of the letters on the trial—expelled from the Party and demoted for a year from senior to junior research fellow.

99. Vladimir Miklashevich: employee of the weather bureau, signatory of one of the letters on the trial—dismissed 'because of redundancy'.

100. Vladimir Lebedev: editor on the magazine *Turist* and signatory to one of the letters on the trial—dismissed 'because of redundancy'.

101–125. Cases of Persecution in the Ukraine Resulting from the Letters of Ukrainian Intellectuals and Workers to the Soviet Government about the Political Trials in the Ukraine and in Moscow.

THE PRESIDIUM OF THE UNION of Soviet Artists of the Ukraine described this letter as 'anti-Soviet' and issued a resolution expelling from the Union: A. A. Gorskaya, L. N. Semykina, I. S. Litovchenko, V. N. Lutsak, V. S. Dovgan, V. I. Zaretski, G. Sevruk and A. Zakharchuk. Zaretski also received a 'strict reprimand' as a Party member.

The leading role in this persecution of artists who had signed the letter was played by the sculptor Borodai. The accusations levelled against the signatories were openly anti-semitic in tone, full of abuse and loud allegations about 'enemies of the Soviet regime', 'Banderovites', etc.

The following people were dismissed for having signed the letter from various institutes (in accordance with decisions taken by their learned councils) of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences:

M. E. Braichevski, well-known Ukrainian historian, senior research fellow of the Institute of History, and author of such studies as 'When and How Kiev Arose', 'The Emergence of the Ideas of the State Among the Eastern Slavs' and 'The Origins of Russia'.

I. G. Zaslavskaya, physicist and research worker of the Institute of Semiconductors (prior to her dismissal the Party bureau expressed its lack of political confidence in her).

L. Yatsenko, research fellow of the Institute of Folklore and Art History, member of the Union of Composers of the Ukraine and composer of such well-known songs as 'Verkhovina' and others.

The Learned Council and Assembly of the Institute of Linguistics took a decision to dismiss Z. T. Franko.

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G. O. Bachinski was dismissed from the Institute of Zoology and then from another post which he took up later.

L. N. Kovalenko, a member of the Institute of Literature, received a 'strict reprimand' as a Party member.

Dr G. Dvorko, of the Institute of Physical Chemistry, was expelled from the Party.

Among those in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine who distinguished themselves as ringleaders in this campaign of persecution were N. Shamota, the author of a negative review of O. Gonchar's *Cathedral*, and Skaba, the director of the Institute of History, who was once in charge of ideological work in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. Shamota used the strongest terms in demanding the dismissal of M. Kotsyubinskaya (see the second issue) and Skaba, in denouncing Braichevski, said 'I will not stand for this vermin'. In Kiev University the lecturer V. A. Vyshenski was reprimanded for signing the letter. A research worker in the Department of Physics and Mathematics, V. G. Bodnarchuk, was dismissed from the University by an illegal order, without the sanction of the Learned Council, on grounds that have no basis in law: 'for actions incompatible with the high calling of a Soviet teacher'. The order was hurriedly signed by the Rector of Kiev University, I. T. Shvets, the subject of a celebrated newspaper feuilleton, entitled 'Jack of All Trades'. This was done in spite of the fact that a meeting of lecturers had voted that Bodnarchuk be only suspended from teaching work.

Shvets also distinguished himself as one of the organizers of the whole campaign at Kiev University. He denounced the Department of Applied Mathematics as a 'nest of opposition that should be disbanded', and demanded that Party members who had been 'lenient' should be 'hauled over the coals' in the Party bureau. He would not allow Bodnarchuk to finish his lecture course and conduct the examinations on it.

Symptomatic were the speeches [of denunciation] by corresponding member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, G. N. Polozhi. Polozhi is notorious among mathematicians as the organizer of a campaign against Jews, and also against two well-known mathematicians, B. V. Gnedenko and G. E. Shilova, in 1962. In his speeches he kept saying that mathematicians should not go in for politics: 'certain Moscow mathematicians were not doing so well in their work, so they decided to seek glory in another field'. Demanding drastic measures, he asked: 'Why do you waste so much time on them?', and said at one point that 'the University of SAINT Vladimir' (the pre-revolutionary name of Kiev University) 'sounds just as good as "Shevchenko University"'. Polozhi attacked a colleague in his own department, Lilenko, simply because he abstained in the voting at the meeting on Bodnarchuk and rescinded a decision to recommend him for promotion to an associate professorship.

A meeting of the Institute of Mathematics recommended that

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corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, Yu. Berezanski and A. V. Skorokhod, should not be allowed to teach in the University.

The poet Ivan Drach was expelled from the Party.

A. V. Zaboi, a fifth-year woman student, has been expelled from the Kiev Institute of Fine Arts.

The schoolmistress L. Orel has twice been dismissed from different schools.

The mathematician Leonid Plyushch has been expelled, 'on account of redundancy', from the Institute of Cybernetics: not only did he sign the collective letter, but also wrote one of his own about the trial in Moscow last winter.

126. G. MINYAILO: dismissed from his work in the Kiev Institute of Micro-instruments after organizing a discussion club (with the permission of the Komsomol).

127. R. Motruk: dismissed 'on account of redundancy' from the Kiev radio station because she disregarded a warning from her superiors not to go to the Shevchenko monument on 22 May. On that day, which is always observed by Ukrainians as the anniversary of Shevchenko's funeral, the Kiev authorities had done everything possible to prevent a demonstration—they organized an official programme, with artistic performances, at the monument and mobilized members of the Komsomol, the *druzhina* (auxiliary police) and even the armed forces. But people for whom it is a national tradition to go to the monument on this day were warned at their places of work that they should not do so.

128-136. *Persecution in Gorky*

FIVE THIRD-YEAR STUDENTS (V. Pomozov, E. Kupchinov, V. Buidin, and two others whose names are not yet known) at the Historical Faculty of Gorky University wrote a collective study entitled 'Socialism and the State', which is based entirely on an analysis of Marxist-Leninist sources. All five have been expelled from the Komsomol and the University, and drafted into the army. During the Komsomol meeting held at the University to vote on their expulsion, a student of the Department of Mathematical Linguistics, I. Goldfarb, announced her resignation from the Komsomol.

As a result of the circulation of the study mentioned above and other *samizdat* materials, the following persons were subjected to house searches and then dismissed from the University: Tavger, Associate Professor of Physics; V. V. Pugachev, Professor of History; S. Pavlenkova, lecturer in the Department of Foreign Languages, and V. Pavlenkov, lecturer.

137. YEVGENI GORONKOV: research worker at the Ural Polytechnic Institute and one of the leading members of its singing club. In May the club invited Yuli Kim to come and sing in Sverdlovsk. Kim was

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met at the station by members of the *druzhina* who told him to go back home. His performance was cancelled, but Kim sang some of his songs in the apartment of one of the people who had invited him. Two weeks later his host was arrested by the KGB, falsely accused of murder and intimidated into handing over all the tape recordings made of the songs, and giving evidence of the sort required by the KGB.

All the persons holding office in the singing club were replaced by others and Yevgeni Goronkov was stopped on his way to Poland (he was going there on official business), and told to return home, where he was dismissed from his work.

138. Boris Feldman: a student of the Urals Polytechnic Institute, expelled for his involvement in *samizdat*.

139-142. *Reprisals in Obninsk. Obituary Note on Valeri Pavlinchuk.* VALERI ALEKSEYEVICH PAVLINCHUK was born in 1938, graduated in physics at the Sverdlovsk Polytechnic Institute and then worked in the Physics Institute at Obninsk, first as a senior laboratory assistant, and then as a junior research assistant. At the same time, he was taking an external degree at the Institute. He had been elected a member of the Council of the Institute Club, and helped, as an editor and translator, in bringing out the book *Physics with a Smile*. Until his expulsion from the Party he had been secretary of the Party bureau of one of the departments in the Institute. The local press wrote favourably about his work as a Party member.

The sudden death of Pavlinchuk was reported in the third issue of the *Chronicle*. We have some details about the aftermath of his funeral in Obninsk. Despite the fact that none of the people who spoke at his funeral went out of their way to mention the political side of his activity, those who came to honour his memory were nevertheless subjected to Party and administrative sanctions. This was done on the initiative of the newly appointed Obninsk Party Secretary Novikov, and the first secretary of the Kaluga Provincial Committee, Kondratenkov:

R. Toshinski: research worker in physics—Party reprimand.

R. Levit: economist—expelled from the Party and dismissed 'at own request'. It was also held against Levit that he had once taken part in the publication of the well-known collection, 'Pages from Tarussa'.

M. Yu. Lokhvitski, editor of the local newspaper—expelled from the Party and dismissed from his post.

All three were members of the Obninsk City Party Committee. They were held responsible, in particular, for the presence at the funeral of the 'anti-Soviet persons', Litvinov and Larisa Daniel.

Unjustified reprisals were also taken against Pavlinchuk's friend, A. G. Vasilev, head of a laboratory in the local branch of the Karpov Institute of Physics and Chemistry. A. Vasilev is the author of 50 works on physics. At the moment he has found work as a sanitary inspector in the housing department of Obninsk. This happened after a session of

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the standing rules committee, headed by the director of the Institute, Nazarov, had passed a decision to deprive Vasilev of access to secret work. He was also, incidentally, accused of once having invited to the Institute club (as a member of its council), the writers V. Kaverin and A. Sharov, who allegedly gave anti-Soviet talks there.

143. GENNADI ALTUNYAN: Major in the Soviet army, radio engineer, lecturer at the Military Academy in Kharkov, one of the 10 inhabitants of Kharkov whose homes were searched on 9 August. These searches and subsequent interrogations were made on the basis of article 190/1, but nothing was said about precisely how the law had been broken. Shortly after this, Altunyan was dismissed from active service and from his teaching post.

144. V. Kaidan: student of the Department of Mathematical Linguistics in the Department of Language and Literature at Moscow University. He was mentioned in the fourth issue of the *Chronicle* in 'Items in Brief'. Subsequent information now enables us to give a fuller picture in his case. He was one of the several third-year students who in the spring of 1968 refused to join in condemning the teaching record of Shikhanovich when the latter was being expelled from the University (see second issue). These students were themselves threatened with expulsion. At this time a letter from Kaidan to his wife was intercepted (see fourth issue). At the beginning of the academic year in October, Kaidan three times faced an inquiry—once at a general meeting of the Komsomol activists, in the presence of representatives of the faculty's Party committee. A group of his fellow students condemned his 'activities', but spoke against his expulsion, asking that they be allowed to stand as surety for his good behaviour. Kaidan himself made a statement of regret in writing, but this statement was rejected as 'false' because he refused to name the person who had let him read the appeal by Larisa Daniel and Litvinov. At all the meetings on his case it was decided to expel Kaidan from the Komsomol and to recommend to the Rector that he be expelled from the University. It is said that Kaidan now suffers most of all on account of having written a statement of regret. He did in fact go into the Kashchenko mental hospital, but rumours that this happened after a suicide attempt cannot be confirmed.

145–148. Four students who, like Kaidan, refused to denounce Shikhanovich have been expelled from the University for 'lack of progress in military training'.

149. Bopolov; a student of the Institute of Foreign Languages who wrote a letter to the 'Voice of America' condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia; he did not send the letter and lost it, but it was later found by somebody in the Institute; a meeting of his fellow students voted his expulsion from the Komsomol and recommended to the Rector that he be expelled from the Institute. Three hours later Bopolov threw himself into the Moscow river, but he was saved and put into a mental hospital.

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150. Marina Melikyan, a lecturer in the Department of Russian for Foreigners at Moscow University, voted against a resolution expressing approval of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and was dismissed 'at her own request'.

151. Tatyana Bayeva, a student of the Institute of Historical Archives, was detained in Red Square on 25 August and a few days later was expelled from the Institute.

152. Vladimir Gershovich, mathematician, lecturer in the training department of the Likhachev automobile works, was outside the court room in which the demonstrators were being tried and argued with some of his students, members of the *druzhina* of the automobile works; after they had denounced him to his superiors, he was dismissed from his work.

153. Irina Yakir, a student of the Institute of Historical Archives, went and stood outside the court room on 9 October; on 10 October, after classes, she was summoned to the Komsomol committee and told not to go there any more, whereupon she said: 'My friends are on trial there and if I had been in Moscow on 25 August, I should have been with them.' She was expelled from the Komsomol.

154. Oleg Melnikov, a student of the Faculty of Biology at Moscow University, was outside the court room and signed a petition demanding that those who had gathered there should be admitted to the proceedings. The dean's office of the Faculty (it is headed by Professor N. P. Naumov) ordered his expulsion from the University—this two months before he was due to take his final examinations.

The editors of the *Chronicle* would like at this point to emphasize the need to establish the names, so far unknown, of other students who have been subjected to reprisals in Gorky and in Moscow.

Items in brief

IN THE CRIMEA THERE ARE periodic police raids on Tartars who have returned home. On 15 July 1968, 11 Crimean Tartar families were brutally manhandled at the 'Bolshevik' state farm in the Red Guard district. After the publication of the decree of 5 September 1967, only 18 families and 13 single persons were given permits to reside in the Crimea. At the same time 12,000 have been expelled from the Crimea. Seventeen Crimean Tartars have been condemned to various prison sentences there, and two more are still being held under investigation.

The deputy head of the Crimean militia, Lieutenant-Colonel Kosyakov is reported to have said to the Crimean Tartars: 'The decree was published not for you, the Crimean Tartars, but for the newspapers, the foreign ones included. . . . Turkey—that's where you belong and that's where you should go!' In this he was backed up by Lieutenant-Colonel of the militia Nazim, who added: 'If tomorrow we get the order to shoot you, we shall shoot you.'

These facts, together with others already known to readers of the

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Chronicle, are quoted in an appeal from the Crimean Tartars to all people of goodwill, democrats and communists. The Crimean Tartars asked that their rights should be safeguarded, that they should be protected from arbitrary and illegal treatment, and that they should be helped to return home to the Crimea. Tens of thousands of people have already signed this appeal and signatures are still being collected. At the same time, signatures are being collected for an appeal from representatives of Soviet public opinion in support of the Crimean Tartars' demands.

* * *

Vyacheslav Chornovil, sentenced in 1967 for compiling a collection of materials on political trials in the Ukraine, carried out a hunger strike in the camp from 30 May to 17 June as a protest against the confiscation of the documents concerning his trial. He ceased the hunger strike when some of the documents were returned to him.

* * *

In October Vladimir Bukovski received concussion when a pile of timber collapsed on him. He was unable to work as a result, but was accused of malingering and put in a punishment cell. He started a hunger strike in protest. Against the usual rules he was put in a general cell and his cell-mates declared a 10-day hunger strike in support of him. Only after this was Bukovski transferred to hospital for a while.

* * *

In March 1968, in Kiev University and at the Agricultural Academy, leaflets were distributed calling for resistance to the Russification of Ukrainian culture. In connexion with this a worker of the Kiev hydroelectric station, V. Nazarenko, was arrested. Nothing more is known of his fate at the moment.

* * *

In July 1968 the Lvov KGB kept the literary critic Ivan Svetlichny under constant surveillance during his visit to the western Ukraine. In the end he was detained and searched. At about the same time, General of the KGB Poluden, speaking at a meeting of Party activists of the Lvov intelligentsia, denounced Ivan Svetlichny, Ivan Dzyuba and others. One of his accusations against them was that they maintained contact with Yuli Daniel through the latter's wife. 'What do they want with this Yid?', Poluden asked out loud.

* * *

On 24 December Moscow City Court, under the chairmanship of Judge Monakhov, ordered compulsory medical treatment for Viktor Fainberg and his confinement in a mental home 'of a special type'. Fainberg is still held in the Lefortovo prison while awaiting the results of his appeal,

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and he is in a poor state of health because of a recurrence of Basedow's disease. According to reports received so far, he is going to be put in a hospital in Kazan—not in Leningrad where his aged parents live and where there is a similar hospital. The reason for this is that the Leningrad hospital is supposedly for 'politicals'.

* * *

In Moscow the investigation in the case of Irina Belogorodskaya has been completed (see third issue).

In Moscow the investigation in the case of Ilya Burmistrovich is nearing completion (see second issue).

In Tashkent the investigation has been completed in the case of the group of Crimean Tartars consisting of Rollan Kadyev and others (see fourth issue).

* * *

On 19 November the Supreme Court of the RSFSR heard the appeal in the case of Larisa Daniel, Konstantin Babitski, Vadim Delauny, Vladimir Dremlyuga and Pavel Litvinov.

The sentence of the Moscow City Court on all the defendants was confirmed. At the beginning of December they will all be sent to their places of exile. Their addresses are: Vadim Delauny: Tyumen 14, P.O. Box 34/21. Vladimir Dremlyuga, Murmansk 9, P.O. Box 241/17. Konstantin Babitski: Komi ASSR, Krasnozatonski Post Office. Larisa Daniel: Irkutsk Region, Post Office at Chuna station. Pavel Litvinov is still in transit. It is known only that he is being sent to Chita province.

* * *

In December, after a long journey, Anatoli Marchenko arrived at his camp. The address is: Permskaya Province, Cherdynski district, Nyrob Post Office, P.O. Box Sh Z 20/16T.

* * *

On 19 November there was a new series of house searches [in Moscow]. This time they were carried out 'at the request of the Tashkent KGB' and nominally in connexion with one of the cases involving the Crimean Tartars. There was a search at the home of Ilya Gabai—the second in recent months, and the second time it has been done in his absence. P. G. Grigorenko's home was searched and practically the whole of his files were seized—the search gave permission to seize only materials 'maligning the Soviet social and state system'. According to Grigorenko, the materials confiscated include: *The Declaration of the Rights of Man;* all the works of A. E. Kosterin; academician Sakharov's essay; *The Russian Road to Socialism* by academician Varga; *Notes of an Intelligence Officer* by Colonel V. A. Novobranets; 'My Testimony' by Anatoli Marchenko; Akhmatova's 'Requiem'; verse by Tsvetayeva; a

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poem by Korzhavin; Hemingway's *For whom the Bell Tolls;* various personal letters; materials on the Crimean Tartar movement and Volga German movements; translations of articles from the Czechoslovak newspapers; notes for a work on military history by Grigorenko himself, and many other items.

A large part of these materials was not itemized in the record—it was simply dumped into a sack, sealed and taken away.

On the same day, in the town of Zhukovski in the Moscow region, there was a search at the home of Simode Asanova, the sister of Zampira Asanova. In Simferopol there was a search at the house of Doctor Esma Ulanova—all her files, including a large number of documents relating to the Crimean Tartar movement, were seized.

All this happened a few days after the funeral of A. E. Kosterin, and one may assume that the true (and illegal) purpose of these searches was to confiscate the texts of the speeches made at his funeral.

Corrections to Previous Issues

IN THE SECOND ISSUE Lev Skvortsov was described as having helped to provide expert evidence in the case of Sinyavski and Daniel. In fact, he had nothing to do with it and the work was actually done by Kostomarov, who is presently director of the Centre for Teaching the Russian Language at Moscow University. In the description of the trial of demonstrators in the fourth issue it is stated that one witness, a militiaman, was summoned for questioning by the KGB in the interval between submitting his two reports. In fact he was summoned by the Prosecutor's office. Incidentally, the name of the witness is Rozanov and his photograph may be seen on the inside cover of the magazine *For Traffic Safety* (no. 11. 1968).

Human Rights Year Continues

READERS OF THE 'CHRONICLE': 10 December was observed as Human Rights Day all over the world. Human Rights Year, declared by the United Nations, has now come to an end. From the five issues of this *Chronicle* one may form some ideas of how human rights and the movement for them have been suppressed in the Soviet Union. No participant in this movement can feel that his task is ended with the end of Human Rights Year. The general aim of democratization, and the more particular aim pursued by this *Chronicle,* are still to be achieved. The *Chronicle* will continue to come out in 1969.

The Chronicle is in no real sense an illegal publication, but the difficult conditions in which it is produced are created by the peculiar notions about law and freedom of information which in the course of many long years have become the established ones in certain Soviet organizations. For this reason the *Chronicle* cannot, like any other journal, give its postal address on the last page. Nevertheless, anybody who is interested in seeing that the Soviet public is informed about what is going on in

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the country, may easily pass on information to the editors of the *Chronicle*. Simply tell it to the person who gives this copy to you, and he will pass it on to the person who gave it to him, and so forth. Only, unless you wish to be taken for a police informer, do not try to trace back the whole chain of communication.

HOW PEOPLE READ 'IVAN DENISOVICH'

(A Survey of Letters)

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

THESE are letters that I shall keep. They will be precious not only to me. Our fellow-countrymen too seldom have the opportunity to express their views on social questions; this applies even more to former prisoners. They have already been disillusioned, deceived, too many times, but all the same, this time they believed that the age of truth was beginning, and that they could write for themselves. And it was as if a combined shout went up. (And they were, of course, deceived, for the *n*th time . . .)

Well, there were some who were careful. As one wrote: 'I am not giving my name because I am watching my health for the remaining days of my life.'

Others were even more careful—they did not write at all (after all, they will find out from the handwriting, it has often happened here; it's easy enough).

I think it is appropriate to leaf through these letters: from the reception given to the first scanty, muffled account of the camps we can measure what will happen when the truth is revealed in its entirety.

A. Former Prisoners Read 'Ivan Denisovich'

WHEN FORMER PRISONERS learned from the combined blasts of all the newspapers that some story about the camps had appeared, and that the newspaper men were vying with each other to praise it, they decided unanimously: 'More lies! They've managed to work in lies, even here!' That our newspapers, with their usual lack of restraint, should suddenly begin to praise the truth—you have to admit it, it is inconceivable! Others did not even wish to see the work.

But in the end they find out.

Markelov: 'Ivan Denisovich? That's me, SZ–209. And I can give all the characters real names, not invented ones. Which camp? Ukhta, 29th encampment. Or Steplag, Balkhash, 8th section.'

Mumrikov: 'It's the no. 8 Vorkutin mine.'

N. A. Ivanov from Cherepovets: 'We were in the 104th brigade with you, lived in the same hut.'

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Voichenko: 'Solzhenitsyn did not even change Tyurin's name. I knew him, and worked in the 104th brigade. . . . I remember equally well the senior guard, Ivan Poltor, from the western Ukraine, always looking for a ruble on the side. He was a big fellow with black eyes that bulged frighteningly. His real name was Burdenyuk. . . . I shall never forget the head of corrective training, Sorodov, introduced in the story as Volkovoi. He did not walk round the compound, he strode majestically in a short, tanned skin coat, in smart new felt boots (made by a prisoner) —quite a picture! . . . I also knew Shukhov under another name. There was one like him in every brigade.'
F. V. Shavirin: 'You have taken a picture of quite a day. . . . Reading your story and comparing it with the camp, it is impossible to distinguish one from another. They are alike as two peas—the arrangement of the compound, the punishment block, and the attitude to the prisoners.'
B. D. Golitsin: 'In the story I was first of all looking for things that rang false, that were invented or came from the author—and I did not find one.'
S. M. Rudkovski: 'You would think that you yourself had been in a camp.'
Posya admits that he really is Shukhov: 'I wore the number A–691 for 10 years because I was imprisoned by the Germans for two days, and I did not even see any Germans.'

And *yet another person* admits that he is the captain of the second grade ('*kavtorang*'). 'The captain suffered because of a gift—I suffered because of a letter from the USA. I was dismissed from service in the navy; there was discrimination against me everywhere, even in my personal life.'

How They Read Ivan Denisovich

Rudkovski: 'Read it through with difficulty—I was there myself.'
Belski: 'I could not sit still. I kept leaping up, walking about and imagined all those scenes as taking place in the camp I myself was in.'
Zarin: 'When I read it, I literally felt the blast of cold as one leaves the hut for inspection.'
Voichenko: 'Reading it my hands trembled.'
Kravchenko (Yakutiya): 'Now I read and weep, but when I was imprisoned in Ukhta, for 10 years I shed not a tear.'
P. V. Sharapov (Barnaul): 'Although I wept when I read it, I felt myself a citizen with full rights among other people. Up to then I felt their chilly glances and they reminded me of Pechora and Norilsk.'
E. Ya. Zaitseva: 'I received it on one New Year's night!'
Svetlana Lesovik: 'I am only a nurse, and there were professors and university teachers in the queue for the book. But because I know someone in the library, and because I was there myself, I was given it for the New Year without waiting in the queue . . . . It seemed as if you were writing about the camp I was in.'

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Mark Ivanovich Kononenko: 'In Kharkov I have seen all kinds of queues—for the film 'Tarzan', butter, women's drawers, chicken giblets and horse-meat sausage. But I cannot remember a queue as big as the one for your book in the libraries . . . . I waited six months on the list and to no purpose. By chance I got hold of it for 48 hours.'
Olga Chavchavadze: 'After reading it, the only thing left to do is to knock a nail into the wall, tie a knot and hang oneself.' (She was not in prison herself—her husband perished.) And a young female student, both of whose grandfathers perished *there*—'I flicked through it.'
Kaidanov from Debaltsevo: 'I bought a picture book (*roman-gazeta*) for four rubles instead of 12 kopecks. . . . My personal life is described here exactly. . . . A loudly dressed lady with a gold ring said, "I don't like this story, it's too heavy". I answered her, "It's better to have a bitter truth than a sweet lie".'
G. Benediktova: 'It has so much life, so much pain that one's heart might stop beating. People who have not been there exclaim in horror, even say that those who informed on others should be arrested. . . . Just a little sympathy for those who perished is beginning to penetrate those people, and the chill of isolation is beginning to give way to warmth.'
M. I. Kalinina also gave it to various other people to read. 'A teacher at the kindergarten read it avidly, and was shaken to the core, but the head of the kindergarten, a middle-aged Party member, said, "Hm, just a lot of swearing". Young workers at evening classes seized the chance to read it; a Komsomol secretary said, "I don't like that kind of book". My neighbour read it, started drinking and drank for a week.'
V. I. Zhukov, sentenced back in 1941 for 'terrorist acts against Stalin', in the years after that lost his family, possessions and apartment; he did not even read *Ivan Denisovich* itself, but a review in *Ogonek*, and at last made up his mind to write and ask for rehabilitation! (through ignorance he did not realize that he could have had it long ago). He wrote to the Prosecutor-General's office and soon received it.

Appraisal

G. F. Polev: 'Surely the time cannot be coming when people will begin to find out?'
Anna Matveyevna Lukyanova (Yaroslavl): 'It is a joy to realize that Shukhov's dreams—"We will live through everything, may God grant an end to it"—have come true.'
Shavirin: 'We hope that this story is a forerunner of others. Let it be painful and bitter, just let there be the truth!'
I. Dobryak: 'This story has opened the eyes of many people to whom we were a mystery.'
Lilenkov: 'Truth has triumphed, but too late.[1] The Far East and Siberia were created by unjustly condemned men who perished on the construction works.'

[1] Who cares about triumph!

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P. N. Ptitsyn: 'Our man, guilty of nothing, reduced to the situation of the lowest of cattle, threw all his soul into toiling. . . . And when he had finished the task (bridge, tunnel, road, palace, aerodrome) he lay dying on sackcloth, pouring out his starved, bloody insides. Eternal praise and remembrance to those unknown toilers who laid down their bones in the wild, frozen outer regions of our homeland. . . . Real criminals are not capable of genuine toil. Truly it is the Ivan Denisovichs who achieved something genuine. . . . What a drama: an enemy of the people is friend to the people. They seek to drive out a man, and he does a good deed.'

Sushikhin, military engineer: 'Some critics mock Ivan Denisovich for doing little things, earning extra money. I, however, who have two higher degrees, but had no parcels or money, had to repair fountain pens, compose applications. I should like to see any of those critics in the position of a prisoner!'

N. I. Ryabinin: 'People, brought to total physical and moral exhaustion, perished in their hundreds of thousands. Those, however, who exercised this tyranny, in the majority of cases did so in full consciousness of what they were doing. And they are still walking around, although their place was long ago the other world.'

P. R. Martynyuk: 'When reading this story one is forced to consider the question—how could it come about, that the people were in power and that the people permitted such oppression? . . . I built the White Sea and Volga-Moscow canals, and by a miracle stayed alive. What is described in the story is a tiny part of what I personally had to see and live through.'

L. Terenteva-Mironova (Yalutorovsk) did not suffer imprisonment—she is the wife of one who died. She has a double-barrelled name because she changed it to escape persecution. 'I see, I hear this crowd of hungry, freezing creatures, half people, half animals, and amongst them is my husband. . . . Continue to write, write the truth, even though they won't print it now! Our floods of tears were not shed in vain—the truth will rise to the surface in this river of tears. . . .[2] My husband wrote to me from Taishet that one of his companions in misfortune would come to me some day and tell me about him, and give me a ring that he made for me there, in the torture chamber. But nobody came to me, and now will never come. . . .'

V. P. Tarnovski: 'And he broke up his food ration,
And with it returned to me all Russia.'

N. A. Vilenchuk: 'We believed in the Party and *we were not wrong* (I spent 17 years in the camps). We still need to show our heated arguments.'

M. Kononenko: 'You have described a comparatively bearable camp, not a punishment camp. From your story there is no answer to the question: why did so many never return?'

[2] Oh, will it ever rise?

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V. M. Eremenko: 'I am amazed that Volkovoi allowed you to publish this story. Tell me, there is something worrying me, were you not in the punishment block?'
F. Shults: 'I am astonished that they have not put both you and Tvardovski away.'

We are astonished too. . . .

B. Present-Day Prisoners Read 'Ivan Denisovich' (prisoners of the 1950s and 1960s)

WE TALK ABOUT ALL THIS as past history, but for them it is actuality. We have served our sentences (a long time ago?), but they are still inside. For them this story has no truth, truth does not lie in a story, if there will be no continuation, if something will not be said further *about them*: that today—things are just the same. They want this to be said, and for something to change! If words are not about a deed, and do not call forth action, then what good are they? A dog barking at night in a village?

All the commotion in the newspapers around this story, shifting with the requirements of foreign whims, has been saying that 'it happened, but will never happen again!' As always, they lied about the most important thing: it is as if a load had been dragged out; the load is still there. And this has particularly provoked present-day prisoners.

Their letters were also a combined shout. But it was a shout: 'What about us?!'
P. A. Lepekhin: 'Citizen Solzhenitsyn! Help to revise the rules and administrative regulations in the penal settlements! On the basis of my letter I beg you to print in the newspaper *Izvestia* a criticism of the accursed past system.'
I. G. Pisarev: 'One thing I do not understand—did you want to say that *that* no longer exists or that what there was before still remains?'
A. D. Korzukhin (st. Reshety): 'The day you have described has stepped down from the screen of life.'
Yu. K-i: 'Nothing has changed since the days of Ivan Denisovich except the external forms. A prisoner will read your book, and he will be hurt and embittered that everything has remained unchanged.'
Bratchikov: 'Yesterday I read your story which has a reality that will last. In court one often hears: "You are keeping quiet, but in your heart you are still the same criminal you were 10 years ago." I think these words apply most of all to the person who is speaking. People talk and write a great deal about the cult of Stalin, but what has changed if the laws about 25-year imprisonment, promulgated under him, are still in force?'
V. D. Ch-n and others: 'Why are people like the head of corrective training Volkovoi still unpunished, for people like this even at the present time are working as "educators" in corrective penal institutions,

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with the one difference that they have exchanged the wolf's skin for a sheep's? '

V. I. Knyaginin: 'Probably there is no one who could write satisfactorily for the present time.'

A joint letter from Ust-Nera: 'For us now it is considerably worse (than in the story). We are not beaten, but the soldiers like to say that we should be exterminated. Where do lads of 18–20 years of age get such hatred? Evidently someone is stirring them up. . . . In December 1962 (when the story appeared) out of 300 men in the compound there were 190 suffering from malnutrition.'

V. E. Milchikhin: 'Black obscurity has covered us and no one sees us. . . . You at least were allowed to receive parcels, and to earn extra bread. We, on the other hand, receive 700 grammes and no parcels . . . . Nowadays you writers are discovering the injustices of the days of Beria. But why does not one of you touch on the life of *today's prisoners*? Why is not a single writer interested in the life of prisoners now? Why does no one deign to come to a camp and see who is inside? [3] Of course, you can send me politely to hell, but once you have decided to reveal the truth, you should take it through to the end. . . . For example, why are we, murderers, inside? (Murder in the camp.) People who had hanged and executed Soviet citizens were released under article 58, while we have to stay in prison.'

Everything is piled up together here—truth, and envy, and nonsense. One's own pain is so close to the heart that it seems quite unnecessary to write about the past (as if books about it came out every day). There is no need to release anyone under article 58, as long as I am released! *Ivan Alekseyev* really took me aback: 'Minds like yours turn away real help. Your position is that of the rear-guard.'

The letters of today's prisoners tell about the most recent situation in the camps; and take it upon themselves to answer some general questions.

Lepekhin: 'Prisoners' complaints to the higher judicial organs are consistently turned aside. After all, if one is really to understand a case and release someone, then one is liable to be dismissed oneself.' (There is definitely some truth here. Not of course a legal truth, but self-preservation is the most important goal of the present legal system.)

Yu. K-i: 'If the "bosses" (from the industries) appear, they are taken round the best huts, shown Potemkin villages. Beforehand they are frightened with tales about encountering abnormal degenerates . . . . They blacken us as best they can in order to justify their own existence and to show that they have a difficult task too. Starting with the shabby warder and ending with the director, all have a vital interest in maintaining the existence of the camps. The inspectors' commission concocts a resounding resolution about any insignificant affair; senior officers blacken individual dossiers; the head of the administration, signing a

[3] Such a simple idea, but how wild it sounds to us!

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compendium of all infringements of the regulations for the quarter, adds some more. We, who are serving 25 years and are the bread and butter on which those who are called to improve us feed, are virtuous, even though at heart we have faults. Did not the colonizers make out that Indians and Negroes were not fully human in this way. . . . It takes nothing at all to arouse public opinion against us. It is enough to write an article in the paper called "Man in a Cage" or to describe how a degenerate criminal violated a five-month-old baby girl, and tomorrow the people will organize meetings to demand that we be burnt in furnaces. Either Nikita Sergeyevich is friend to a thief, or else a shady character.'

C. 'Practical Workers' and the Well-Intentioned Read 'Ivan Denisovich'

WHAT ARE 'PRACTICAL WORKERS'? It turns out that they are the masters and guardians of the camps. The description is priceless; we had not heard it before.

Let us hear the other side, as is duly laid down. More precisely, let us receive our directives.

Not all correspondents reveal themselves here; maybe there are some who never wore blue flashes, and whose only bunch of keys belongs to his apartment, but they are all of one mind, all of the same ilk. They are the people whose pictures are never in the papers, but who wield the power. (One of them—S. I. Golovin—says he is a former prisoner. We must believe him.)

They are not victimized for reading this book, they have time to read it, to take notes, break it down into headings.

About Shukhov

> Ivan Denisovich is a boot-licker. As a prisoner of the Germans he would be able to earn his 'bread' even though after it there would be one less prisoner of war in the hut (*Oleinik, Vladimir Vasilevich*, Aktyubinsk).
>
> I do not want heroes like that—all stomach and no brain (*Pastukhova, T. S.*, Bogorodsk).
>
> The principal character of the story, Shukhov, is shown negatively, like all the others, who, as the story shows, disorganized life in the camp (*Grigorev, A. I.*, Monino, Nelidovsk raion, practical worker).
>
> If he is not allowed to return to his family, then he has nothing at all to do with his freedom. Is this picture of the Soviet man of the fifties true? You feel neither sympathy nor respect for Shukhov, nor do you feel any particular anger at the injustice done to him (*Yu. Matveyev*, Moscow. He very likely lives with his family.)
>
> When he had washed the floor he threw the sopping cloth behind the stove and poured the dirty water on to the path used by the authorities. This shows how he respects communists and looks after socialist property . . . . All he hopes for is the sick-bay. After

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all he is in a corrective labour camp, even if he is innocent, so he ought to set an example to the others, like a good Soviet citizen, and show how to fire the others with enthusiasm and not go to pieces! (*Zakharova, A. F.*, worked for the MVD since 1950, Lesogorsk, Irkutsk oblast).

Shukhov was rightly condemned. At the interrogation *no one could force him*, after all it was not 1937. He had his reasons: he was afraid of going back to the front (*V. I. Silin*, Sverdlovsk, practical worker).

Vladimir Dmitrievich Uspenski from Moscow attacks Shukhov in the greatest detail of all. (He is either an investigator or a camp administrator.) Disregarding the text of the story as obviously false testimony, he *winds up* Shukhin's case absolutely in the spirit of *those days*:

Srukhov is not ill, since he could work today. But he is afraid for his health, and so rushes off to the medical orderly!

The only place he did a decent job of work was on his own log cabin; everywhere else he is a sloppy worker.

He never shares anything with anyone; he is a fully qualified, resourceful and merciless jackal. He is a total egoist, living only for his belly.

He brings a knife into the camp *in order* to sell it, and a man is knifed with it.

He was the first to put up his hands and hastened to give himself into captivity, he is a real traitor to his country.

In a word, 10 years is too little for Shukhov. He should have received four times that!

About the other characters

Millions of Soviet people labour at felling timber and sing the praises of this form of toil (!), but the heroes of this story regard it with fear (*A. F. Zakharova*).

You show a captain of the second grade humiliated and deprived of his feeling of self-respect. Why is he alone in his indignation, and why is the director of the factory reconciled to this? (*Oleinik*).

The Tyurins never worked in the camp . . . (*P. A. Pankov*, Kramatorsk).

Why is Tyurin inside? The sons of kulaks were not imprisoned (??). And there were *very few* Estonians and Latvians in the camps; generally they were deserters from the Red Army (*Uspenski*).

Since when has *Novy Mir* taken upon itself the mission of defending bourgeois nationalists from whose bullets thousands of activists perished? (*Belousov*, Uzhgorod).

About Camp Regulations

Why give someone who does not work a lot to eat? His strength

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will remain unspent. . . . Prisoners were dressed *according to the season*, and were fed no worse than the free labour force. . . . The criminal world is still treated too gently (*Sergei Ivan. Golovin*, Tselinograd, served 10 years).

How dare you slander camp regulations in this way? In the camps there is less misuse than in any other Soviet institution?! (Patriotically said.) I maintain that things have grown *more severe* in the camps now (*Karakhanov*, foreman).

Nothing has changed even now, for example, in the searching, or to use the language of the author, in the frisking of prisoners on being led out and on re-entering the camp. And repeated searching if people do not agree. . . . And nowadays also they always walk with sub-machine guns at the ready, and at a fixed distance go men with dogs. As regards the food regulations it must not be forgotten that *they are not at a resort*. For this reason they must redeem their guilt by honest toil (Senior official *Bazunov*, Oimyakon, 55 years old, has grown old in the camp service).[4]

How is it possible to discontinue the searches when prisoners try to take out of the camp letters of a slanderous nature attacking the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government? . . .

(About the whip.) We all know perfectly well that corporal punishment was discontinued in our country with the coming of Soviet power. . . .

Solzhenitsyn describes the working of the camp as if there were no direction from the Party. Earlier, as now, Party organizations existed and directed all activities as conscience required (*Zakharova*).

Once there is a camp, arbitrary individual acts are possible (*P. A. Pankov*).[5]

About Informers

According to Solzhenitsyn, if one of the prisoners who is more conscious of his duties tells something to the authorities, then it is 'self-preservation at the price of someone else's blood'. Some patriot, I must say! The Soviet people should say only thank you to this prisoner who has come to a proper understanding (*Zakharova*).

How informers are murdered is described as if it were a good action. Everyone knows what is a *spy-informer*. In the Soviet Union *these* people are respected, because they are progressive, politically aware people, who help to bring into the open the enemies of Soviet power and to unmask traitors. In the camps they are those prisoners who have recognized their guilt. If there

[4] Bazunov's wide-ranging letter was sent to a *closed* journal of inspection and security with the noble title 'Towards a New Life'. In the general excitement the journal had been foolish enough to print a sour but positive review of my story, and in answer was showered with indignant letters from its readers. The spell was still so great that the editors sent me Bazunov's letter for me to reply. This I willingly did, but times had changed and my answer was indefinitely delayed.

[5] They had not got together!

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were no informers, there would be escapes. And what is a prisoner *doing at liberty*? (*Silin*).

About the Convoy

But the main thing which astonishes—I make bold to express myself thus—in this story, is the fact that the author so defames our soldiers and convoys. A soldier is a soldier, he is true to his oath, carries out all the commands of his superiors. . . . What a serious and responsible task has the soldier, who takes out the brigades to work. . . . This story insults soldiers, sergeants and officers of the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order [MOOP, now MVD]. The people are the creators of history, but how are the people represented in the figures of soldiers, sergeants and officers? They are represented as parrots, blockheads, idiots in greasy field shirts and torn overcoats (*Bazunov*).

To my mind there is no shame in protecting the peaceful toil of Soviet people. But according to Solzhenitsyn there is nothing more shameful. The people have glorified our heroic Soviet troops, but Solzhenitsyn makes them into parrots. . . . And what would happen if the convoy stopped doing this service? Let the people suffer? ! (*Zakharova*).

About the 'Practical Workers' Themselves. About Camp Administration and Surveillance

Solzhenitsyn has spoken out against workers who are carrying out a difficult but worthy task. The entire day of the story is filled with the negative behaviour of the prisoners without any indication of the role of the administration; if it is mentioned at all, it is only negatively. But the keeping of prisoners in camps *is not a cause of the period of the cult of personality*, but is linked with carrying out the sentence. . . .[6] An operative is called a 'sugar daddy'; only isolated negative prisoners would call him that. . . . The negative attitude of the prisoners to the authorities . . . does not correspond to the tasks laid down at the present time (*Grigorev, A. I.*).

The security forces did not know why people were put inside[7] (*Karakhanov*).

Of what are the staff and the officers guilty? Are they guilty of being called by the Party and the government to bear the heaviest burden of our time—work with the criminal world? . . . We, the officials, living on the outer edge of everything are deprived of all elementary human conditions in comparison with the inhabitants of towns and districts. Occasionally we do not have enough to eat (!) . . . We are working with the rejects of society, we carry the most difficult burden for the good of the whole of the people. So why are our names besmirched? . . .

(About the authorities in the story.) They only fulfilled the requirements of the situation, their instructions and regulations.

[6] 'We only carried out orders', 'We did not know'.
[7] Very significant testimony. Present-day convicts say the same.

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They thought up nothing of their own on the spot, did not take advantage of the freedom from restraint afforded by the period of the cult of personality. *The same people are working now who worked then* (!).[7] Maybe about 10 per cent are new—and were encouraged more than once for good work, and they are in a good position as workers (!).

Solzhenitsyn calls an operative a 'sugar daddy'. Who gave him the right to insult a post laid down in the statutes of the MVD? . . . And what are we to think about 'blockhead guards'? They hold responsible positions. . . .

In Ozerlag, to my knowledge, there was no thieving.[8] But he calls everyone a thief (*Zakharova*).

And why be displeased that convicts are building a house, for free people to live in? (*Bazunov*).

About the Story as a Whole

If your story is a work of art, then it should *summon* one to something.

Instead of depicting the destruction of the most loyal people in 1937, the author chose 1941, when by and large it was self-seekers who were ending up in the camps.[9] In 1937 there were no Shukhovs,[10] and they went to their deaths grimly and in silence, thinking *for whom is this necessary*? [11]. . . They did not lick basins there (*Oleinik*).

I feel no pity or sympathy for these convicts. Surely the communists who got into trouble were not like that? (*Anon.*) [12]

Not one of those who were unjustly punished ever blamed comrade Stalin for his misfortunes—the thought did not even occur to them. This is the watershed dividing those who suffered while innocent and the real criminals. The latter, as a rule, abused both Soviet power and Stalin (*Vinokur*, engineer).

He has practically no victims of 1937, *in other words* innocent peope (*Medna*, Elgava).

They are not the people of 1937, but are all part of the post-war crowd. I feel no pity for them.[13] These miserable people with foul deeds in their hearts *were sentenced too mildly*. I am not sorry for the dubious personalities of the Patriotic War (apart from captives) (*Ignatovich*, Kimovsk, worked as a foreman on public transport in Karaganda).

How much unbelievable effort the Chekists have put into restoring lost folk to society! Why did he not show how our people worked for 24 hours at a stretch, not because of the threat of the stick, but because they knew in wartime what wolfram and

[8] Perhaps this is why there was such a careful search for letters at the exit?

[9] Indeed; simple people, prisoners of war.

[10] How many were there even then!

[11] What intellectual depths we have reached! By the way, they did not really go in silence, but with constant recanting and pleading for mercy.

[12] He too is concealing himself, just in case: the devil only knows which way the wind may blow next!

[13] Of course they are only the simple people with no Party affiliations.

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molybdenum were? In what a frenzy about 1,000 people worked 72 hours together up to the knees and waist in cold water. Who was able to inspire such a feat of patriotism?—The Chekists![14] (*S. I. Golovin*).

The work process of the convicts, which is the basis of their re-education, is similarly not shown in a positive light in the story. The prisoners in the story do oppressive (!) things not only in their daily life, but also in productive work. . . . The story teaches a careless attitude to socialist property—'They broke off wires to make spoons, concealing them in the corner'. . . . In our opinion, Shukhov's days inside the camp should not be filled with this. If such negative acts on the part of the convicts did actually take place, there was continuous work to extirpate them, about which the story says nothing. Really, how much of positive value there was, and still is? Surely such inadmissible acts on the part of the prisoners would not be tolerated. The story would have had a positive influence if it had responded to the tasks set before corrective labour establishments[15] (*Grigorev*).

I have never before had to tolerate such rubbish. This is not only my opinion; there are many like us, *their name is legion.*[16]

The author is making use of his unsuccessful work to attach himself to the great task which has already been performed by our Party, namely, the task of clarifying the harm done and the consequences of the cult of personality (*Bazunov*. He adds: 'This is not only my opinion, but that of all military personnel who have read the story.')

I am deeply disturbed, like all the officials of MOOP. All are burning with wrath and indignation. It is quite astonishing how much bile there is in this work . . . (*Zakharova*).

And more briefly: 'The story told by Solzhenitsyn should be removed immediately from all libraries and reading rooms!'

This in fact was done, only more gradually.

And finally: 'This book should not have been published; the material should have been handed over to the MVD' (*Anon.;* child of October).

And it nearly did happen like that; the dear child guessed. . . .

What about the Author Himself?

You, who are not in a fit state to stand firmly on your feet (?), trample into the dirt honest Soviet people. . . . You have taken up a good subject in a spirit that is not quite pure . . . Why (in the story) does no one protest at the practice of bribery? It is repulsive to Soviet man. Or did you *yourself* hasten to freedom for the price of a bribe? (*Oleinik*).

[14] The reader will see that this deep comment also outlines the general tasks of literature.

[15] Yet another comment outlining the general tasks of literature.

[16] It is true that they are legion. Only in their haste they forgot to check the Gospel. The legion is of *devils*.

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You have been slobbering, comrade Solzhenitsyn; we cannot sense in you any faith in a new life (*Kamzolova*).

Spite has clouded the gaze of this man Solzhenitsyn, and so he cannot assess soberly what is around him. He thinks that only his petty personality, embittered by spineless malice, is typical in literature. . . . This man is not capable of understanding the great things in life (*N. D. Marchenko*, st. Udelnaya).

He deliberately incites the people against the organs of the MVD. . . . And why do they permit him to mock the people who work in MOOP? *It is dishonourable*! (*Zakharova*).

Hear that! *It is dishonourable*! A cry from the heart! They printed a story, and it is dishonourable!

Finally, and more broadly: *the philosophical approach.*

You wish to infect Soviet man with theories from the past (*Oleinik*).

History never needed a past (!!) What about a future? and the history of socialist culture needs one even less (*A. Kuzmin*).

We paid too dearly for Soviet power to allow its activities to be debased (*Golovin*).

I would not have published. For what reason and for whom is it? You are trying to cover up and not reveal the flaw on your own body. We need neither sympathy nor charity (*Medne*).

Criticizing the cult of personality is necessary and inevitable, and we are all doing it at the moment. It is not however necessary to mention those who bear *no relation* to this. . . . The authority of MOOP has been finally undermined before the people and cannot now be restored . . . (*Zakharova*).

Why do we have to make a big fuss over what was done during the personality cult? The unmasking of illegal acts began like an infection, writers and poets are trying to kick a dead lion. . . . Perhaps Stalin and his toadies thought up the class enemy as well? . . .[17] What is the point of rooting about in the dirty linen of a past which has vanished for ever into the waters of Lethe? . . . .

Do you hear that, Russia,
On our consciences
There is not a single spot! (*Anon.*)

Once again that accursed 'incognito'! One would just like to know whether he shot people himself, or just sent them to their death, or whether he is just an ordinary orthodox citizen—that is your 'Anon.'. And he is without spot!

And here at last is the more ordinary historical view, the first scientific explanation of all our misfortunes:

After the original (?) slogan, 'the son is not responsible for his father', the broken remains of the privileged classes strove to insinuate themselves into every part of the Soviet system, never abandoning thoughts of revenge for the privileges they had lost.

[17] Of course! Why ever not?

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> They were particularly active in 1937(!).[18] They collaborated in the police forces of the enemy in 1941; from the very first day after landing in the army, they shouted, 'Save yourself if you can!', and dragged others after them into captivity (*Pankov*).

So at last all is clear: the class enemy slaughtered the Party, and enticed Hitler to Stalingrad, after which he handed things over to the talented generals and the wise Generalissimus.

This is what is frightening—that this is how they write history. . . .

[18] i.e. the day after the 'original' slogan they had all already seized the NKVD and established their authority over the Party.

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LENIN AS A BOOK REVIEWER

Ralph Carter Elwood

VLADIMIR Ilich Lenin was a many faceted individual. This year's centenary of his birth focused attention on his varied vocations: Lenin the would-be lawyer, the author, the newspaper editor, the factional leader, the professional revolutionary and, of course, the first head of the Soviet state. The occasion has been used to remind us of his diverse avocations as well: bicycling, mountain climbing, skating, chess and classical music. Perhaps some new biographer will even expand on the growing but problematical list of Lenin's romantic attachments. My contribution to this deluge of Leniniana is to note that for reasons of profit, pleasure and pedagogy Lenin was also a fairly prolific book reviewer—a distinction which he shares with very few other heads of state.

Throughout his life Lenin was a voracious reader, particularly in the fields of politics, economics and philosophy. He read critically, as his notebooks on imperialism and the agrarian question will testify, littering his margins with asterisks, exclamation marks, *nota benes* and underlining his texts in a fashion that would horrify the average bibliophile. Although he at times read superficially and too much under the influence of his preconceptions, it cannot be denied that he reacted to what he read; indeed, some of his earliest writings are pamphlet or book length critiques of particular works which he had perused. Later, after he had become the editor of various social democratic newspapers, he wrote articles and editorials by the score in response to the writings of his contemporaries. Strictly speaking, none of these commentaries can be classified as reviews owing to their polemical nature and lack of systematic evaluation. Lenin did, however, write some 14 formal book reviews as well as two journal reviews and at least five articles about specific books that are sufficiently systematic and critical to be considered as reviews. It is on this corpus of 21 items that his 'reputation' as a book reviewer rests.*

LENIN'S activity as a book reviewer was concentrated in three periods of relative physical isolation and political inactivity. During 1898–99, while in Siberian exile, he wrote eight reviews; in the first half of 1914, while in self-imposed, semi-exile in Austrian Galicia, he reviewed four books; and during the last few years of his life, while trying to recuperate outside Moscow from an assassin's bullet and the debilitating effects of arterio-sclerosis, he wrote five additional reviews. Quite obviously he turned to reading and reviewing in part as a means of escaping from the boredom which circumstances imposed upon him. It is interesting that Lenin, like some academics who review during the winter when teaching precludes serious research and travel, saved

* These reviews, plus the letters cited below, will be found in the fifth edition of his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 55 volumes (Moscow, 1960–65).

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the summer months in Siberia and Galicia for hunting or hiking and consequently reviewed only from November to May.

Lenin also used these first two periods of isolation to study problems relating to the industrial and agrarian development of Imperial Russia. Thus the books he reviewed were often ones that he found mentioned in his research and which he subsequently either requested from the editor of some journal or bought or borrowed and reviewed on his own initiative. Lenin, in addition, reviewed as a means of learning foreign languages. Almost a quarter of the books which he commented on were written in German, a language which he knew fairly well but still read with the aid of a dictionary. By his own admission his English was less proficient, which perhaps explains why he did not do justice to the one English book he reviewed, H. M. Hyndman's *Record of an Adventurous Life* (London, 1911).

Still another motivation for reviewing, at least before the revolution, was to supplement his income. Lenin lived largely by his pen. While in Siberia he received 750 dollars in royalties for his *Development of Capitalism in Russia* (St Petersburg, 1899), 500 dollars for translating the Webbs' *Industrial Democracy* (Russian ed., St Petersburg, 1900), and 50 to 100 dollars for some of his articles. He also made an arrangement with Peter Struve, the editor of the Marxist legal monthly *Nachalo*, that he would be paid for his reviews in either cash or more books. It is perhaps indicative that Lenin, who published extensively in illegal émigré newspapers, chose to submit all of his pre-war reviews to legal and presumably remunerative journals in Russia such as *Nachalo, Mir Bozhii* and *Prosveshchenie.* Precisely because of their legality, the politically suspect Lenin had to send his manuscripts to his mother, sister or brother-in-law for forwarding. Those that reached their destination were published either anonymously, under his pseudonym 'Vl. Ilin', or simply with his Christian initials 'V.I.'.

His reviews were always subject to the whims of Tsarist censorship. On one occasion, a book by S. N. Prokopovich which he had reviewed from a pre-publication copy was held up by the censor and eventually appeared only in a truncated version. Lenin's review was thus obsolete and unpublishable. On another occasion, his review of Karl Kautsky's *Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm* (Stuttgart, 1899) remained in manuscript form when *Nachalo* was forced to suspend publication by the police. Like many another reviewer, Lenin sometimes turned down a suggested book for review, he had at least one review rejected and left one unfinished, and he complained that some of his editors failed to acknowledge receipt of manuscripts let alone reply to his letters.

After 1917 Lenin reviewed more for pedagogical than financial reasons. He often chose books that would allow him to preach a particular lesson to the Russian people. Thus he felt that Alexander Todorski's forgettable work, *A Year with Rifle and Plough* (Vesegonsk,

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1918), 'should be distributed as widely as possible' since it showed the advantages of employing 'class enemies' in the rebuilding of the Soviet economy. He reviewed 18 issues of *Kommunismus*, the South-east European edition of the journal *Communist International*, solely in order to attack two Hungarian Marxists, Bela Kun and Georg Lukacs, for falling victim to 'the infantile disease of left-wing communism'. And he even praised in a left-handed fashion the anti-Soviet satirist, A. T. Averchenko, for reflecting the rejected views of a bygone class in his book *A Dozen Knives in the Back of the Revolution* (Paris, 1921).

LENIN exercised many of the tricks of the book review trade. He recommended the translation of two books by Kautsky, and then in each case volunteered his services as translator. He was not above calling attention to his own books when reviewing the works of another author. He suggested that 'no respectable library could do without' N. A. Rubakin's compilation *Among Books* (Moscow, 1913), perhaps because it contained a section which he had contributed on the history of Bolshevism. And on one occasion he tried to write a 'diplomatic' review since he believed the author, R. Gvozdev, to be a personal friend of *Nachalo's* editor. Much to his chagrin, he later found out this was not the case. In a letter to his sister he lamented:

> It is too bad that 'the writer' [Lenin's code name for Struve] did not inform me about Gvozdev [earlier]. I wanted to curse him for all I was worth. But when I saw that he was a contributor to the journal, I considered myself obligated to be as gentle with him as possible. It would have been strange to insult each other in the same journal. Perhaps 'the writer' wanted to break with 'the Gvozdev school'. . . . I did not know this. . . . It is so difficult to judge from far away.

Like most reviewers Lenin sometimes guessed wrong. In his first review, written in Siberia when he was 27 years old, Lenin praised a book by one 'A. Bogdanov' as 'precisely what an account of political economy should be like' on the mistaken assumption that 'Bogdanov' was a pseudonym for George Plekhanov, the doyen of the Russian Marxists. He even refused a commission to write his own textbook on political economy since 'it would be difficult to compete with Bogdanov's *A Short Course of Economic Science*, (Moscow, 1897). Ten years later Bogdanov was to become one of Lenin's most bitter political rivals within the Bolshevik movement. Kautsky's *Die Agrarfrage* (Stuttgart, 1899) was described by an enthusiastic Lenin as 'the most important contribution to modern economic literature since the appearance of the third volume of *Das Kapital*. Until now Marxism has lacked a systematic study of capitalism in agriculture. Kautsky has filled this gap.' Twenty years later Lenin was less enthusiastic when he reviewed Kautsky's *Die Diktatur des Proletariats* (Vienna, 1918): 'this

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renegade has completely forgotten, distorted and thrown overboard everything Marx and Engels have taught for 40 years'. A. I. Helphand's (Parvus) *The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis* (Russian ed., St Petersburg, 1898) was also 'recommended highly', although he too later lost Lenin's favour for collaborating with Leon Trotsky on yet another book.

Perhaps it is unfair to recall a reviewer's early indiscretions, but in this case it seems justified since Soviet critics have conveniently chosen to forget their master's words of praise about authors who were subsequently found to be 'renegades'. For whatever the reason, Lenin did not choose to review books by his colleagues in the Russian socialist movement after 1899 and thus saved himself further future embarrassment.

One of the unexpected bonuses from reading Lenin's reviews is that we sometimes find in them the genesis of his later contributions to Marxism-Leninism. It is often noted that he borrowed from John Hobson's *Imperialism* (London, 1902) when he wrote his own *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (Petrograd, 1917). What is not noted is that his review of Hobson's earlier *Evolution of Modern Capitalism* (Russian ed., St Petersburg, 1898) picked up ideas concerning the moderation of the class conflict in highly developed industrial economies which both the author and the reviewer expanded upon in their more famous works. Likewise, Lenin's theories about the nature of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, which he later developed in *State and Revolution* (Petrograd, 1918) and *The Proletarian Revolution* (Moscow, 1918), find early and concise expression in his reviews of the journal *Jugend-Internationale* (Zurich, 1916) and of Kautsky's wartime writings. One area where he unfortunately retrogressed, however, was in his definition of a kulak. In his review of Gvozdev's *Kulak Usury* (St Petersburg, 1899) Lenin correctly defined a kulak as a rural moneylender or 'village usurer bloodsucker'. After the revolution, the word kulak became an opprobrious term inappropriately applied by Lenin to anyone who owned enough farmland to make a decent living.

AT his best, Lenin was a very good book reviewer. In his Siberian reviews especially he carefully noted the contents of the works under discussion, he commented on the quality of the translations, he suggested changes for subsequent editions and he called attention to weaknesses in approach and errors in execution. While he often used his reviews as forums for his own ideas and as convenient occasions to attack his personal opponents of the moment—be they populists, liberals or the leaders of the Second International—he nevertheless rarely failed to relate his remarks to the book in question. Even his later and weaker critiques are written with a commendable verve and show clear evidence that he had read the works under review.

Perhaps some modern reviewers should take a leaf out of his book.

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HISTRIONICS AS HISTORY IN TRANSITION

Zbigniew Brzezinski *

'WE reject the world, we are no longer even "traitors", since this would imply an affinity with what we are betraying. We are the Viet Cong of thought. . . . The philosophy of tomorrow will be terrorist: not a philosophy of terrorism but a terrorist philosophy allied with an active policy of terrorism.'[1] These words of a young Sorbonne philosopher convey the degree to which emotion has come to substitute for reason as a result of the reaction to what many feel has been the failure of rationalism in action. The 'rejection' of the world is in essence the rejection of prevailing modes of thought and the substitution of ecstasy and action in the service of an abstract concept of revolution. Yesterday's 'escape from freedom' has its equivalent in today's escape from reason.

IN its extreme form, this mood—dramatized by the student riots in California, at Columbia University, throughout France, in West Berlin, in London, Rome, Belgrade, Warsaw, Tokyo, and much more lethally at the University of Mexico (where scores of students were killed in the autumn of 1968), to say nothing of the many less publicized imitations elsewhere—has elevated action for action's sake into a moral principle. 'Action is the only reality; not only reality but morality as well', proclaimed Abbie Hoffman, the leader of the American Yippies.[2] He was echoed both more belligerently and more ecstatically by his German counterpart, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the 1968 French student strike who declared that 'violence is happiness'.[3] As two observers sympathetic to the new radical movements explained it, the contemporary rebels 'think that the ivory-towered men of ideas have cheated them, lied to them, and that action and spontaneous experience will show them the truth'.[4]

From this attitude is derived the view that reason by itself is suspect, that it must be buttressed by emotion, and that if a choice has to be made, emotion is a better guide than reason. Seeing in the world around them both hypocrisy and the failure of reason—with reason in the service of evil, which either makes it a slave of ideology

* Adapted from Zbigniew Brzezinski's forthcoming book, *Between Two Ages*, to be published in 1970 by Viking Press of New York.

1 Pierre Trotignon in *L'Arc*, no. 3, Paris, 1966–68, as cited by Raymond Aron, 'At the Barricades', *Encounter*, August 1968, p. 23.

2 Abbie Hoffman, *Revolution for the Hell of It* (New York, 1968). The best analysis of the ideology of the 'student revolution' is the article by Leopold Labedz, 'Students and Revolution', *Survey*, July 1968.

3 As cited by N. Molchanov, 'Students Rebel in the West: The Meaning, the Causes and Goals', *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 November 1968.

4 Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, *The New Radicals* (New York, 1966), p. 7.

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or employs it as a scientific tool to improve war-making efficiency—even moderate dissenters condemned contemporary liberals for their lack of passion.[5] In cold reason they saw, more than a mere absence of moral indignation, a commitment to the status quo, a willingness to effect only marginal change, and a determination to avoid confronting the more basic moral issues.[6]

Reliance on passion and action had the added advantage of not requiring a programmatic blueprint. In contrast, the old ideologies offered both a critique of the present and a blueprint for the future, thus opening themselves to criticism on the level of both practicality (is their utopia attainable?) and performance (why hasn't the utopia been achieved?). The politics of ecstacy do not require a programme to generate action, and their adherents were therefore not greatly troubled by the patronizing criticism of their programmatic vacuity advanced from the socialist Old Left and from the established communist parties.[7] On the contrary, they argue that it is not through institutional reforms spelled out in programmes but through the creation of a community of emotion that true freedom can be attained. By creating that emotional state, the rebels of the late 1960s hoped to overcome the sexual oppression and 'one-dimensional' quality of modern industrial society. Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* has provided them with an intellectual frame of reference (much as Frantz Fanon's books exalting racial violence have done for the rebels in some areas of the Third World), though his advice and programme are limited: 'For the moment the concrete alternative is still only the negation.'[8]

[5] In December 1968, at a major international conference held at Princeton on the subject of America's future, one of the accusations made by a student leader was that the established liberal participants tend to rely on reason at the expense of passion. This charge prompted Arthur Schlesinger to remark, 'Reason without passion is sterile, but passion without reason is hysterical. I have always supposed that reason and passion must be united in any effective form of public action. I can imagine nothing worse for our society than a rejection of reasoned analysis by the young. If we succeed in destroying the discipline of reason, if we make politics a competition in passion, a competition in emotion, a competition in unreason and violence, the certain outcome would be the defeat of the left.'

[6] This charge has even been levelled against scholars engaged in studies of the future, and their 'futurism' has been interpreted by critics as an immoral escape from the social dilemmas of the present. It has led to some unconsciously humorous situations, such as the one at the above-mentioned Princeton conference, where a millionaire radical attacked 'futurists' for neglecting the role of wealth in American society. Shedding his sartorial elegance in favour of the more revolutionary open-necked shirt uniform, he urged the assembled to 'choose equality and flee greed'.

[7] Max Eastman spoke for many old socialists when he expressed himself as 'kind of sorry for these young rebels today. . . . they have an emotion not unlike ours. . . . they want to make a revolution but they have no ultimate purpose. I have a certain emotional sympathy for them, but they are rather pathetic because they have no plan. They just seek a revolution for its own sake' (as cited by the *New York Times*, 9 January 1969). Communist spokesmen expressed themselves more pungently, condemning the aspirations of the new rebels as 'half-baked pie peppered with sexualism and narcomania' (*Trybuna Ludu*, 9 May 1968).

[8] Speaking in 1967 at the Free University in West Berlin, as cited by Labedz, op. cit., p. 6.

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The call for 'true freedom', however, permits the subversion of conventional freedom, and herein lies one of the basic contradictions of the movement. Leopold Labedz perceptively noted the striking resemblance between the romantic anarchism of the contemporary student revolution and the views of Max Stirner, who asserted in 1845 that 'a people cannot be free otherwise than at the individual's expense'.[9] Thus, the rebellion against the 'oppressive freedom' of the West can entail both limitation on the freedom of those who do not share the ideals of 'true' freedom and relative indifference to the suppression of freedom in the East. Moreover, the right to speak or write freely can be denied and its exercise disrupted by violence, since that violence is motivated by an emotional commitment to freedom and is designed to assert it. The definition of freedom is thus derived from a subjective inner conviction that one is right and not from the external pattern of relations guaranteeing choice and protection to the individual, whatever his views.

The intellectual—though not the social—seriousness of this phenomenon was further diluted by a certain artificiality on the level of political expression. Though every genuine revolution inescapably partakes of the past, it acquires its own distinctive character, style and rhetoric precisely because it is a revolution: a sharp break with the past. The Paris Commune differed in these respects from the French Revolution, and the Commune in turn was not reproduced by the Bolshevik Revolution. Yet in recent years a great deal of the student rhetoric, symbolism and personal behaviour have taken the self-conscious form of a histrionic 'happening' designed as a historical re-enactment.

At times it was the French Revolution that seemed to provide the scenario—especially in France—but more often it was Petrograd and Havana that were being re-enacted. The student leaders imagined themselves as historical figures, but in their imitativeness they often verged on the absurd. During the 1968 crisis at Columbia University the leader of the student militants issued a pamphlet bearing Lenin's title, 'What Is to Be Done?', and students occupying one of the buildings proclaimed themselves 'a commune'. The headquarters of the West Berlin militants were called 'Smolny'. Revolutionary beards (in styles ranging from Lenin to Castro to Marx) and combat fatigues à la Guevara were almost mandatory costumes against a décor of either red or black flags.

Even the violence was often more theatrical than real. In Tokyo it took the form of stylized battles, in which armoured combatants employed shields and spears; in Paris a tacit agreement between the police and their opponents limited weapons to those used in the Stone Age: rocks, cobblestones and clubs.[10] Only in Mexico was violence

[9] Ibid. p. 7.

[10] In all of France—despite the apparent temporary collapse of authority in May 1968—only one person died, and somewhat accidentally at that.

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genuine, in the sense that all available means were employed, as is true in real revolutions.[11]

To define the historical significance of these events, it is necessary to look beyond the violence and the slogans, beyond the superficial similarity among the outbursts that swept so many cities in so many parts of the world in so short a time. A closer analysis immediately reveals an important distinction: some aspects of the manifestations were clearly political in character and purpose; others—though linked with the political, though sharing with it a certain universality of aspirations, and though providing it with a mass emotional base—were much more socio-psychological in origin and vaguely moral and ethical in content. Linked together, each tended to obscure the specific character of the other.

THE distinction between the two is important to an understanding of what was involved and of what it portends. The political manifestations are in some respects easier to dissect and analyse. Broadly speaking, they fell into two categories. In the West, and particularly in the United States, the politically motivated militants drew on both the ideological legacy of the Old Left's attack against capitalist society and on the more recent sense of outrage about the war in Vietnam. As the 'imperialist' and 'capitalist' society par excellence, the United States provided the major target. The war served as a catalyst for emotions, as the basis for international unity

11 But though the style and the format of the student rebellion was contrived and its aspirations almost deliberately unattainable (one of the most popular slogans of the May 1968 outbreak in Paris was 'Be realists, demand the impossible!'), at least its youthfulness was authentic. The same cannot be said of the middle-aged admirers of the militants, who—though most often physically passive—outdid themselves in their efforts to drink again at the fountain of youth by vicarious identification with youth's exuberance. Verbal excess was most often the means used to attain this identification. Thus, one American scholar accused those critical of the abuses perpetrated by some militants of literally waging 'a war against the young', which he compared to the war in Vietnam; he called for a 'cultural revolution' in America! (Richard Poirier, 'The War against the Young', *The Atlantic*, October 1968).

Cases of middle-aged exuberance were not isolated phenomena. As Labedz put it, 'There can be little doubt that in many cases *les parents terribles* are worse than *les enfants terribles*. Some of them have moved from revolt against "poverty amidst plenty" in the thirties to a revolt against affluent society in the sixties, at the time as they themselves moved from poverty to affluence, to practise alienation at 50,000 dollars a year. The revolutionary Establishment of New York and London, thrilled with revolutionary prospects, and displaying the characteristic *Salon-Maoismus*, contributes to the orgy of snobbery attendant upon the current Utopian wave. Long before the "Black Power" spokesman asked the students assembled at the London School of Economics to establish the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation, whether they know how to make a petrol bomb, the *New York Review of Books* published a diagram of and a recipe for a Molotov cocktail on its cover page. This has not prevented, of course, its political writers from deploring "*American violence*". In France the self-abasement of the elderly "*progressives*" reached its peak during the May "revolution". At the meeting of Jean-Paul Sartre with the students at the Sorbonne, Max Pol-Fouchet exclaimed with pathos appropriate to the occasion: "Representing a generation which has failed, I ask you not to fail!"' (Leopold Labedz, op. cit., pp. 25–26).

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among the young militants, as a bond between the Old Leftists and the new, and as a link between the political-minded and the ethically concerned.[12]

Those motivated by strictly political concerns appear to have been a relatively small minority of the restless youth, but they provided influential leadership. It was the political-minded who resuscitated the anarchist critique of organized society, who revived the Trotskyite slogan of the permanent revolution; and it was they who defined the more specifically political objectives (such as the call for immediate United States withdrawal from Vietnam). As the movement gained momentum and broadened its appeal, the political objectives—perhaps responding to the less clearly defined ethical and psychological needs of the following—were widened and became both vaguer and more demanding. It was no longer a matter of ending a particular governmental policy or of effecting a specific reform; the underlying 'system'—capitalist in character and hence fundamentally irremediable—had to be undone before true reforms could be achieved. The specifics remained obscure, while the programmatic language ranged from Cohn-Bendit's exaltation of action—and rejection of communism[13]—to a rather simplistic repetition of Marxist cant.[14]

In the initial phases of the campaign against the Vietnam War, communist support—judging from approving communist pronouncements—was perhaps involved, but communist approval waned rapidly when the anti-institutional character of the movement became increasingly evident. In the eyes of many political militants, the communist system also represented bureaucratic conservatism, since its original revolutionary ideals had fossilized into institutional beliefs. Communist endorsement gradually shifted to criticism and then to

[12] The war thus served the same function as the earlier campaigns against nuclear bombs in allowing for the expression of essentially moral concerns by the adoption of an anti-United States political posture. Frank Parkin, in his *Middle-Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament* (Manchester, 1968), shows how the British CND mobilized middle-class support, drawn from among those with a tradition of moral concern, into a campaign against 'evil'. The campaign relied heavily on small symbolic gestures, such as eccentric dress, beards and other forms of distinctive behaviour.

[13] Because of this, the *Pravda* propagandist Y. Zhukov, with his customary crudeness, characterized Cohn-Bendit as a 'werewolf' (*Pravda*, 30 May 1968).

[14] The following may serve as an example: 'Marxism is coming more and more to be the common denominator of all student movements in North America and Western Europe, even so in the new left SDS in the United States. I think this is inevitable and is a tribute to the growing sophistication and maturity of the international student new left, inasmuch as Marxism is the most developed, refined and coherent revolutionary philosophy or world-view today and one that as a systematic social theory corresponds to the objective realities of the capitalist era, and inasmuch as it testifies to the realization by the student movements that they must align themselves with the working class in order to achieve the type of social transformation requisite to break the power of monopoly capital and create a new, non-repressive and truly free social order' (Stanley Gray, 'Student Radicalism: An American Import?' a speech delivered to the 1968 Couchiching Conference, *McGill News*, November 1968, p. 22).

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condemnation; the views of the militant New Left were characterized by a Soviet writer as 'Mamaism, which incorporates ideas of Marx, Marcuse and Mao, a completely artificial combination'.[15]

Though the political manifestations in Mexico City, Madrid, Prague and Warsaw partook of the same reaction against institutionalized belief and similarly capitalized on some of the ethical and psychological strains in modern society, they were much more specific in focus, less predisposed toward emotion, and more inclined toward a programmatic political approach. In all four cases, the demonstrators' demands were concerned with the loosening of direct political restraints, and the leaders did not have to construct an elaborate 'one-dimensional man' thesis to prove that liberal democracy can also be oppressive and that its tolerance is in fact a masked form of constraint.[16] As a result, at least on the political level, their demands took the familiar form of the rejection of overt political dictatorship: abolition of censorship, the right of free assembly, freedom to travel, political democracy, and the abandonment of both ideological monopoly and oppression by secret police. The similarity of the politically libertarian demands of the students in these four cities in striking.[17]

It should also be noted that the students who demanded direct political freedom acted in the context of a much more hostile political environment. The student militants in the United States, in Western Europe and in Japan literally basked in publicity: front-page pictures, television interviews, ecstatic endorsements by middle-aged supporters, epic songs immortalizing their deeds, and books in which the various confrontations were recorded in prose and in photographs.[18] Given the pluralistic nature of the Western societies and the competitive character of their communications media, youthful militancy was rewarding to the ego—and thus also infectious.

This factor must be taken into account both in analysing the dynamics of events in the West and in comparing them with events in less pluralistic societies.[19] There the mass media either ignored the demonstrations or condemned them. The student leaders were abused

[15] Molchanov, op. cit.

[16] See Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Boston, 1965).

[17] Compare, for example, the demands of the Warsaw students, adopted in March 1968, with the demands of the Mexican students of September of the same year (*Survey*, July 1968, p. 114; *New York Times*, 28 March and 9 September 1968).

[18] The publicity bestowed on three female college militants (Peter Babcox, 'Meet the Women of the Revolution', *New York Times Magazine*, 9 February 1969) was characteristic. Similar deference was not paid to girls serving in the Peace Corps or in the war on poverty. In this connexion, it was revealing to observe the satisfaction with which the militants would watch themselves on television replays or specially prepared documentaries. The publicity surrounding the militants brought considerable social pressure to bear on those who were less involved.

[19] This point is well made by Professor Z. Bauman, a well-known Warsaw sociologist expelled from Poland in 1968 after the student outbreak of March, in his introduction to a special documentary volume on those events, published in Paris by Instytut Literacki, *Wydarzenia Marcowe 1968*, 1969.

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and arrested. Communications between institutions—not to speak of cities—required great personal effort, sacrifice and risk. Youthful militancy was not rewarded with social acclaim; Madrid and Warsaw responded with prison sentences for the leaders and university expulsion for the participants.

The political environment clearly helped to shape the emphasis and the scope of the students' demands. In a strict authoritarian context, the demands had a politically libertarian content. In a looser, more pluralistic environment, the demands were either focused on more immediate university affairs or took on the form of a broader—and thus inevitably somewhat vaguer—social critique. Accordingly, the more specific and libertarian character of the demands made by the student leaders in the authoritarian states provided little basis for a common front with the militants of the West. In fact, there does not appear to have been much actual contact and co-ordination, although it was charged in Poland's political youth trials in late 1968 that the Brussels headquarters of the Fourth International (Trotskyite) provided ideological assistance to some Polish activists. If the charge is true, the Trotskyite link was perhaps the sole connexion between political activists in the West and in the East.

The two movements appear to have been independently led and to have been motivated by profoundly different political aspirations.[20] The slight direct contact that there was between the respective leaders turned out to be abortive. In 1968, in a BBC discussion of the student rebellion, the leader of the English militants attacked the spokesman of the Yugoslav students, while the head of the West Berlin SDS received a rather cool reception from Prague students, who found his political views primitive.[21]

Nevertheless, important similarities between the respective political youth movements should also be noted. In both cases they were led by the abler students, who on the whole came from more socially established families. According to a study conducted at the University of California, the arrested undergraduate and graduate students tended to have much better than average grades; many of them held scholarships or had won awards.[22] In Poland official comment made much of the fact that the activists came from the relatively well-to-do homes of officials, and some university professors stressed the fact (in conversation

[20] It is also noteworthy that strictly politically oriented student movements in Mexico, Spain or Poland avoided such manifestations as the 'foul language' splinter that developed in California in the aftermath of the crisis, the fascination with drugs, and the deliberate adoption of deviant social behaviour as in the case of the Yippies. To be sure, these manifestations were also the product of peculiarly American conditions, but their appearance as a side-effect of the student rebellion was made possible by the less focused and also less oppressed character of the rebellion.

[21] See Melvin Lasky, 'Revolution Diary', *Encounter*, August 1968, pp. 88–89.

[22] *The New Left*, memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 23, citing also data from Jack Newfield, *A Prophetic Minority* (New York, 1966).

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with this writer) that their best students were involved. After the demonstrations were suppressed measures were taken to favour the admission into the university of workers' and peasants' children. Even in Rumania, where the student unrest was suppressed relatively quickly, official reaction emphasized the fact that the young 'hooligans' were in the main children of 'building-site managers, university professors, instrumentalists in the Philharmonic Orchestra, physicians, engineers, white-collar workers, militia staff members'.[23]

As in the West, the political leadership for the restless young was in many cases provided by the offspring of former left activists; hence not by rebels against the older generation but, rather, by young people who shared the ideals of their parents but felt that these had been corrupted in practice by the ruling communist élite. In Poland the most outstanding student rebels included the children of high Party officials, while in the United States children of the Old Left formed a high percentage of the activist leaders at Columbia and Berkeley. In both the East and the West the rebel leaders came from environments that were not indifferent but ideologically concerned.

Another similarity between the student militants in the West and in the East was the vagueness of their long-range objectives. Though the specific and immediate goals of the students in the more politically oppressive regimes were somewhat more precise, their 'demands' rarely went beyond a statement of immediate complaints. To be sure, the transformation of a police dictatorship into a multi-party democracy, or at least into something resembling the Yugoslav model, was a more defined objective—with experiential examples available—than the Western students' plea for a participatory democracy; however, the more specific ramifications of the desired social and political systems tended to be vague in the East as well as in the West.[24]

Though this may have been a weakness from the strictly political point of view—as was charged by the critics of the militants—it also helped to provide a wider bridge between the political leadership and the more generally restless younger generation. It is doubtful—and this is especially true of the more pluralistic societies—whether a highly specific political programme would have attracted the wide support generated by the more undifferentiated attack against the Establishment,

[23] 'The Hooligans of Peace Square', *Scinteia Tineretului*, 5 July 1968.

[24] One of the more extensive critiques of the existing Polish system was prepared by two young Warsaw sociologists, J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, several years before the student outbreaks of March 1968. (The authors were promptly sent to prison.) Entitled 'Open Letter to the Party', it became the source of much of the theoretical inspiration for the politically-minded leadership of youth. Written from a Marxist point of view, it provided a scathing critique of the degeneration of Polish communism into an institutionalized bureaucratic despotism, with vested interests suppressing the egalitarian idealism of socialism. When it came to offering a programme, however, the authors confined themselves to urging a new revolution from below led by workers and intellectuals determined to create a new social order characterized by few institutions, workers' self-government and true social egalitarianism. In late 1968 Kuron and Modzelewski were again sentenced to prison for having allegedly inspired the March events in collusion with the Fourth International (Trotskyite).

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vested interests, the status quo and institutionalized beliefs. The reliance on emotion rather than on reason, on felt aspirations rather than on concrete programmes, struck a more responsive chord in a generation that was the most directly affected by the pace of contemporary change and that was the very product of that change.

IN our time the student generation represents one of the most dynamic variables of change. The growth in their number as well as the simultaneous growth in the number of radios, televisions, telephones (all items that affect personal relationships, both making possible and encouraging the rapid dissemination of ideas) make for a subjectively dynamic mood that stands in sharp contrast to the relatively slower rate of change in such items as income (national or per capita), the switch from rural to urban employment, the population shift to larger urban centres, or the average number of people living in a room. The overall result is the contradiction between the pace of change in the state of mind and in material reality.

In the words of a student of modernization, contemporary man—and this is especially true of the younger generation—'is less under the domination of his environment . . . and to this extent he is freer, but at the same time he is less certain of his purpose and in times of great unrest he is prepared to surrender his freedom in the interest of purposeful leadership'.[25] In that fluid setting the present becomes difficult to comprehend, since it is no longer defined by either religion, nationalism or historical-ideological perspectives.[26]

Writing about the waning of the Middle Ages, the historian Huizinga described a world of discontinuity, a world marked by the collapse of traditional beliefs, uncertainty about eternal salvation, widespread pessimism and intense violence. Psychological refuge was sought by many in mystical cults, while individual behaviour was dichotomized, ranging from emphasis on the saintly to indulgence in depravity and cruelty. Shifts from one extreme to the other were common, as men desperately sought social anchorage in absorbing commitment.[27]

A similar crisis, marked by much more secular forms of expression, occurred again in the West when nationalism and industrialization combined to change the character of society. Massive national and class conflicts, as well as acute social and psychological tension, spawned all-encompassing ideologies that seemed to provide both authority and a sense of direction. Writing about the cataclysm of the Second World War, Czeslaw Milosz, in *The Captive Mind*, drew perceptive portraits of East European intellectuals as they moved from one faith to another

[25] Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966), p. 31.

[26] On this, see also Kenneth Keniston, 'Social Change and Youth in America' *Daedalus*, Winter 1962.

[27] See Johan Huizinga, *Waning of the Middle Ages*, especially chap. 1 on 'The Violent Tenor of Life' (New York, 1954).

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in a search for the personal stability that their environment failed to provide.

Today's mood has many parallels, but it also differs significantly in scope and content. The industrial revolution, to say nothing of the culture of the Christian Middle Ages, was territorially confined, and only gradually—in the course of more than a century and a half—did it spill over to affect more and more societies. Its appearance was accompanied by the rise of nationalism and other secular ideologies, in which broad concepts were reinforced by the institutions embodying them. In contrast, the current crisis of institutionalized belief takes place in the context of the technetronic revolution, a revolution which is not territorial but spatio-temporal.

This new revolution almost simultaneously affects the entire globe, with the result that fads and new forms of behaviour move rapidly from society to society. The student generation lives in this new technetronic age, even if in some cases their immediate societies do not. Unlike the industrial age, which required that a society undergo extensive industrialization before the new proletarian class could become socially significant, the spatio-temporal technetronic revolution directly reaches those receptive to it because they have access to communications and because their state of mind is formed by factors outside their immediate social context. The contemporary student mass is precisely such a group, and that is why forms of behaviour peculiar to Berkeley were within a year repeated elsewhere (West Berlin students even wore sandals in the cold November Central European weather!). American student activists studying abroad—and highly critical of American society—have tended to play an important energizing role in this process, and are evidence of the extent to which America, the first to experience the technetronic age fully, has replaced Europe as the principal source of social change.

The problem facing the rebels of a century and a half ago was how to integrate meaningfully the unprecedented, incomprehensible changes wrought by the industrial revolution. The same problem is posed by the onset of the technetronic age, with its apparent threat to human values, its impersonality, its over-rationalization, its simultaneous intensification of personal experience, and its spatial immediacy to every human suffering anywhere on the globe. For many in the nineteenth century—especially those who were most affected, either vicariously or directly, by the industrial revolution (that is, the intellectuals and the workers)—Marxism provided the integrative response. Today the search is on for some new source of intellectual mooring, and the searchers have begun by rejecting established answers.

The younger generation is the one most directly affected by the transition into the new age, and it contains the most active opponents and includes the majority of those who feel themselves to be victims of the technetronic revolution. In their reliance on emotion and violence, many of the opponents are reminiscent of the Luddites of early

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nineteenth-century England, who reacted to the machine age with primitive passion, destroying that which they did not understand well enough to harness. Often supported by local public opinion, the Luddites—well organized and highly motivated—shattered machines and decried the frequently very real injustices that their appearance had precipitated. The fear, hatred, and incomprehension of the computer current among some people echoes the denunciations of the textile machine a century and a half ago.[28]

Like the Luddites, the contemporary opponents of the technological and electronic revolution represent, especially in the more advanced Western states, a response to the new modes of life. The Luddites were threatened by economic obsolescence and reacted against it. Today the militant leaders of the reaction, as well as their ideologues, frequently come from those branches of learning which are most sensitive to the threat of social irrelevance.[29] Their political activism is thus only a reaction to the more basic fear that the times are against them, that a new world is emerging without either their assistance or their leadership.[30]

The attraction that a segment of the younger generation in the more developed world now feels toward poetry, lyricism, and emotion—and their contempt for reason and intellectual concepts—may be indicative not so much of one tradition replacing another but rather of a clash between emotion and necessity. On the one hand are the feelings and attitudes prompted by the breakdown of institutionalized beliefs and intensified by the new modes of communication—all stimulating or creating an overwhelming desire for emotional escape, or at least emotional release through 'concrete' feelings and associations. On the other hand is the tedious necessity to master by intensive conceptualization the techniques of computers, mathematics, systems control, and the like, on which the resolution of many contemporary social problems depends.[31]

[28] In early February 1969, rioting students in Montreal vented their anger at the 'system' by destroying with fire-axes a one-million-dollar university computer.

[29] On this, see Mark Gerzon, *The Whole World is Watching* (New York, 1969), pp. 52–54, 73 and 189–90.

[30] The insistence on total solutions prompts, at the same time, their characteristic unwillingness to become involved in the more mundane process of making partial improvements, of gradually adapting new techniques, of really becoming involved in the world. John Ardagh, in *The New French Revolution* (New York, 1969), notes this paradox in regard to the French intellectual left: 'Sartre and his friends have preached that literature must be *engagée*—but in practice they have always shied away from realistic political action. . . . Sartre and his friends have always demanded utopia or nothing . . . so the technocrats have stolen the Sartrians' clothes' (p. 358).

[31] Compare, in this connexion, Noam Chomsky's attacks on the new breed of American intellectual-experts (*American Power and the New Mandarins*, New York, 1968) with the attacks on Plato, who was accused of the sin of 'intellectualizing' reality. There are other tantalizing parallels to ancient Athens. The author of a recent study of the impact of Plato's philosophy on the society of his time argues that the term 'philosopher' was relatively new and was used by Plato to identify 'the man who is prepared to challenge the hold of the concrete over our consciousness, and to

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Though this clash may be a profound one, it is doubtful whether the student generation represents a new revolutionary class of the twentieth century. A truly revolutionary class must master the contemporary techniques of social organization, rather than reject them. This may be difficult for the student 'revolutionary class' to do, since it is necessarily transitional in character and subject to constant change. This does not preclude the possibility that student militants might well opt out of society permanently and become—especially after hardening prison experience—professional revolutionaries and that the inflow of new students may keep alive the feelings of restlessness and rebellion. It is not, however, certain that the older ex-student revolutionaries will be able to maintain their ties with the new generation of younger students, from whom they will be increasingly separated by age. They will run the risk of becoming rebels outside of a 'class'. Each student generation will then have to create its own leadership, its own aspirations and techniques, before it too fades from the scene. It is perhaps no accident that history is, after all, a cemetery of revolutionary youth movements.

Moreover, the coming waves of students may enter an environment gradually more willing to tolerate the existence of altogether deviant subcultures and offering social support even to those who choose to divorce themselves from society. Many of the contemporary younger rebels—especially those who are pathological rather than political in their motivation—may well choose that path. Finally, as social change contributes to the spread of education and knowledge, the distinctive characteristics of the student may be blurred; as society becomes more knowledge-oriented and the student more socially involved, the gap between student life and society will narrow.

Nevertheless, the challenge of the student generation as a whole to rigid hierarchies and institutionalized beliefs and to the social order of the industrial age has had the effect of reopening the more basic questions concerning the purposes of social organization. What should be the balance between the internal and the external qualities of life? What is the relationship of personal liberty to social equality? These questions acquire new meaning and call for new definitions whenever a major historical crisis dominates our consciousness of reality.

substitute the abstract' (Eric A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 281). The concentration on the abstract was associated with the appearance of a new technique of communication—the written, which first supplemented and then displaced the antecedent oral tradition (pp. 292–95). Epic poetry relied on narrative, which both stimulated and depended on emotionally shared experience; the more abstract categorization of reality became possible with the introduction of the alphabet and writing, and it opened the doors of history to conceptualization. Both Christianity and Marxism stepped through these doors.

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MOSCOW, PEKING AND BLACK AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Robin Alison Remington

FROM the late 1920s until Stalin's death Moscow's position on the Negro liberation struggle [1] was unrealistic but clear-cut. Soviet theorists treated American Negroes as part of an over-all nationality problem. Stalin had personally contributed to formulating the slogan of Negro self-determination [2] and separatism in the Black Belt. Accordingly, American Negroes were considered an oppressed national group whose only road to liberation was in setting up an independent Negro Soviet Republic in the southern part of the United States. In industrial urban areas the appeal for self-determination was subordinated to a call for united action with the white proletariat.

After Stalin's death the Soviets began tentatively to move away from his interpretation.[3] Particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow tried simultaneously to recognize and deny Negro advances. An equal ambivalence existed towards the slogan of Black self-determination. The *World Marxist Review* reported radical changes in American communist thinking on integration.[4] However, when

[1] It has become increasingly difficult to know how to identify dark skinned Americans of African descent. This is true whether one's own skin is black, white or brown, because by now all the possible choices have ideological implications. Currently the Chinese use 'Afro-American'; the Soviets have retained 'Negro'. For the purposes of this article I have tried to stick with the vocabulary of either the period or the document under discussion. The bulk of the following pre-1969 documentation appeared in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies monograph series as 'Revolutionary Role of the Afro-American: An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Polemics on the Historical Importance of the American Negro' (October 1968).

[2] Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (New York, Viking Press, 1960), pp. 334 ff.

[3] See R. Ivanov and T. Timofeyev, 'Tsenny trud po negrityanskomu voprosu v SShA', *Kommunist*, no. 8, 1955, pp. 120–27, and Valentin Zorin, 'Negrityanskoe dvizhenie v SShA na novom etape', *Kommunist*, no. 3, 1957, pp. 89–99. Zorin did not mention the issue of self-determination.

[4] 'A New Day in the Life of the Party (Statement by the National Secretariat of the Communist Party, U.S.A.)', *World Marxist Review*, no. 3, 1960, p. 69. For an earlier comment see James E. Jackson, 'Some Aspects of the Negro Question in the United States', ibid., no. 7, 1959. Background on the attitude of American communists towards the Negro problem may be found in Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York, Viking Press, 1957); Wilson Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1951) and *Race and Radicalism* (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1964); Joseph C. Mouledous, 'From Browderism to Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Developments in the Communist Position on the American Negro', *Phylon*, no. 1, spring 1964, pp. 79–90 and John W. Van Zanten, 'Communist Theory and the American Negro Question', *Review of Politics*, no. 4, 1967, pp. 435–56. For a more ideological treatment, see William Ash, 'Marxism and the Negro Revolt', *Monthly Review*, no. 1, 1966, pp. 19–30 and Harold Cruse, George Breitman and Clifton DeBerry, *Marxism and the Negro Struggle* (New York, Pioneer Publishers, 1965).

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Kommunist reprinted Gus Hall's 'Keynote Address' to the Seventeenth CPUSA National Convention, his interpretation of the Negro question was one of the few sections omitted.[5]

Soviet doubts were evident. Although Moscow did not ignore the CPUSA's shift from self-determination to integration as a path for solving the Negro problem, it did not officially sanction the new American Party line until 1962. Then for the first time a Soviet author took the position that the struggle of American Negroes for liberation had reached a new stage.[6]

The author, V. P. Murat, agreed with the CPUSA's assessment that 'within limits' Negro advances were possible even under capitalism. Interestingly enough, the weight of his analysis rested on evolving internal conditions in the United States combined with the individual initiative of Negro leaders. Although he credited consolidation of the socialist camp and African gains with inspiring American Negroes, Murat paid little attention to the significance of international developments for the Negro liberation struggle.

AS for China, Peking's attitude towards Black liberation is intrinsically tied to Sino-Soviet antagonisms, among which the question of race has been a persistent, if subsidiary, theme. By the spring of 1963 the Chinese were obviously manipulating racial feelings in their challenge to Soviet participation in Afro-Asian front organizations. Open conflict had broken out at the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi (4–11 February 1963).[7] Although Peking's attempt to exclude observers (i.e. pro-Soviet representatives from Eastern Europe) during preliminary negotiations in Cairo had failed, the Chinese continued to combine their call for militant action throughout the revolutionary Third World with the suggestion that the Russians, being white, were automatically removed from genuine Afro-Asian interests.[8]

Indeed, the assiduous lobbying of Chinese and Soviet delegates for support against each other annoyed many Afro-Asian representatives to the point of condemning the intrusion of the dispute into the conference as a waste of time. Despite the distaste among other delegates at Moshi for Sino-Soviet haggling, however, Peking's drive

[5] Gus Hall, 'Doklad na XVII Natsionalnom sezde Kompartii SShA', *Kommunist*, no. 4, 1960. For analysis, see Van Zanten, op. cit., pp. 446–47.

[6] V. P. Murat, 'Novy etap v osvoboditelnom borbe Negrov SShA', *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, no. 2, 1962, pp. 51–59. For more detailed analysis of Murat's article, see Van Zanten, op. cit., pp. 449–51. There is evidence, however, that Moscow still felt a certain uneasiness about this shift. See E. L. Nitoburg, 'O negrityanskom voprose v SShA', *Novaya i Novelshaya Istoriya*, no. 5, 1963.

[7] For coverage of the Moshi meeting, see *Le Monde*, 2, 6–9 and 12 February 1963. For an analysis, see William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1964), pp. 124–26.

[8] Speech by the Chinese delegate Liu Ning-i, *Peking Review*, no. 7, 1963, pp. 7–9; also NCNA reporting in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), no. 2916 and no. 2920, 1963.

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to extract the national liberation struggle from Soviet influence succeeded in relegating Soviet representatives to observer status at the Jakarta Afro-Asian Journalists' Conference in April. For the first time Moscow was reduced to second-class membership in a communist front organization. The Soviets countered by denouncing Chinese behaviour at Moshi as racist and accusing the leader of the Chinese delegation of telling Soviet representatives that 'the whites have nothing to do here'.[9]

By August 1963 the American Negro had been dramatically added to the ranks of Mao's Third World forces.[10] There was no immediate Soviet reaction. However, given the tentative evolution of Soviet theory on the Negro problem, it is not surprising that Moscow did not respond directly to Mao Tse-tung's first statement supporting the struggle of Negro Americans. Indeed, throughout August and September 1963 Soviet polemicists devoted most of their energy to refuting Chinese attacks on the nuclear test ban treaty. Yet mingled with the charge that Peking showed callous disregard for future victims of a thermonuclear war was a recurring worry at Chinese attempts to erect 'barriers within the international communist and national liberation movements, dividing according to skin colour'.[11] Soviet concern focused primarily on Asia and Africa, where Chinese factionalism had been active since late 1962. Mao calculated that:

> At present it is the handful of imperialists headed by the United States and their supporters, the reactionaries in different countries, who are oppressing, committing aggression against and menacing the overwhelming majority of the nations and peoples of the world. We are in a majority and they are in the minority. At most, they make up less than 10 per cent of the 3,000 million population of the world. I am firmly convinced that, with the support of more than 90 per cent of the people of the world, the American Negroes will be victorious in their just struggle.[12]

The implications of this can hardly have been lost on Moscow. Peking had placed American Negroes firmly in their Asian, African, Latin American context.

Differing Sino-Soviet perceptions of the revolutionary significance of the American Negro struggle for liberation crystallized as a result of the 'freedom march' on Washington of 28 August 1963. Peking presented the march as Black America's confrontation with the Kennedy administration; a rejection of 'so-called civil rights' legislation. Moreover,

[9] Open Letter from the CC CPSU to Party organizations and all communists of the Soviet Union, *Pravda*, 14 July 1963 and Griffith, op. cit., Document 3, p. 296.

[10] Mao Tse-tung, 'Statement Supporting the American Negroes in Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by US Imperialism', *Peking Review*, no. 33, 1963, pp. 6–7. See also Wu, Yuan-li, *As Peking Sees Us: 'People's War' in the United States and Communist China's American Policy* (Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1969).

[11] Soviet government statement, *Pravda*, 21 August 1963.

[12] Mao's August 1963 statement, op. cit.

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Chinese references to the 'freedom march' contained a direct slap at Moscow's support for non-violent advances. For example, the exiled black militant, Robert F. Williams, was quoted at length:

> The masses of our people are beginning to meet violence with violence. This is one of the prime reasons why the Kennedy administration is so fearful of the proposed march on 28 August. . . . Despite the great efforts of the non-violent brainwashers, there is great fear in official circles that mass violence may erupt.
>
> One of our greatest disappointments has come from some so-called socialists who denounce our moral right of militant struggle and violent resistance. We who advocate a policy of self-defence against racist savages are labelled racist divisionists by these pseudo-Marxists. These hypocritical chauvinists urge us to be patient and long suffering.[13]

Conversely, Soviet newspapers described 28 August 1963 as the 'birth' of a nation-wide Negro mass movement for freedom, equality and jobs.[14] The march was welcomed as a proclamation of the 'solid determination of Negroes to put an end to any kind of segregation in public life'.[15]

This difference was more than a matter of wording. It implied a fundamental distinction that later would be made explicit. In short, the Chinese considered Afro-Americans to be in the process of opting out of US society and of allying themselves with the coloured majority of the Third World. To the Soviets the American Negro was a discriminated against minority working for equality within the existing system. Moscow saw the Negro struggle for liberation as ever more closely linked with the general struggle of American workers. Much Soviet reporting centred on factual details; Chinese accounts were entirely polemical.

Then in July 1964 the killing of a 15-year-old boy by police precipitated riots in Harlem. The New York ghetto exploded from heat, frustration and despair. A series of long hot summers had begun. Not surprisingly, Chinese analysts saw the Harlem riots as confirmation

[13] Robert F. Williams, 'Mao Tse-tung's Emancipation Proclamation for Afro-Americans', NCNA, 26 August 1963. In 1955 Williams had returned from the Marines to Monroe, N.C., where he became president of the local NAACP chapter. After continued harassment by the Ku Klux Klan, Williams openly advocated Negro violence in self-defence. By 1961 he had fled first to Canada, then to Cuba, and eventually to China. In 1969 he returned to the USA. For a brief biographical sketch see 'Robert Williams—Wanted by the FBI', *New Republic*, 30 September 1967. In his own account, *Negroes With Guns* (New York, Marzani and Mansell, Inc., 1962), Williams wrote, 'I wish to make it clear that I do not advocate violence for its own sake, or for the sake of reprisals against whites. Nor am I against the passive resistance advocated by the Reverend Martin Luther King and others. My only difference with Dr King is that I believe in the flexibility of the freedom struggle' (p. 40). Nevertheless, when forced into a communist exile, the ex-Marine became more extreme and the mentor for such organizations as the violence-oriented Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM).

[14] *Izvestia*, 31 August 1963.

[15] Moscow Radio, 29 August 1963.

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for Mao Tse-tung's theory of sharpening race and class struggle. This emphasis on race was a Chinese addition to Marxist theory both exaggerated and consistently attacked by the Soviets, who attempted to make it appear that Peking had abandoned Marx's concept of class struggle for a perverted Asian racism.

According to the Chinese, the riots proved that the 'so-called' civil rights bill contained an empty promise; that non-violence was a fraud to pacify Afro-Americans fighting for their liberation. Once again Peking simultaneously attacked modern revisionists for spreading illusions about US imperialism and for advocating non-violence instead of supporting the Negro struggle. The *People's Daily* noted that as comrade Mao Tse-tung had pointed out:

> The reactionaries of every country are this kind of fool. Their multiform persecution of revolutionary people can only end in arousing the people to wider and more intensive revolution. . . . Contrary to reactionary wishful thinking, the fact is that the more people the reactionaries massacre, the greater becomes the strength of the revolution and the nearer the reactionaries come to their doom. This is an irresistible law. This is also entirely applicable to the revolutionary movement of the American Negroes.[16]

Nor was the accusation that 'the modern revisionists towed the line of US imperialism [and] dared not support the American Negro struggle'[17] a total misrepresentation. The Soviets were hardly following dictates from Washington. However, having declared the 'birth' of the Negro mass movement for freedom, jobs and equality some 11 months earlier, Moscow showed a marked reluctance to reinterpret the American scene—a lack of enthusiasm most likely fostered by the fact that any such re-evaluation would undoubtedly support the Chinese image of the coloured masses as world revolutionary tinder.

The Soviet press virtually ignored the New York riots. TASS coverage condemned US racists, but was, for the most part, brief and factual.[18] The civil rights bill was rather gently dismissed as more of a good intention than a reality; Moscow strongly denied that the CPUSA had had any hand in the events; and no theoretical implications were drawn whatsoever. Clearly, Soviets and Americans alike found it convenient to consider mass violence in Harlem an isolated case.

Although rioting in Watts in 1965 temporarily narrowed the gap between Soviet and Chinese analysis, on the whole the same pattern of reaction maintained until 1966, when Moscow and Peking alike faced the challenge of responding to the demand for Black Power.

AS early as March 1965, the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) had begun talking about the Negro 'revolution'. Then in the spring of 1966 James Meredith planned a one-man 'march

[16] *People's Daily*, 24 July 1964.
[17] 'Peking Rally Supports US Negroes' Struggle'; NCNA, 8 August 1964.
[18] *Pravda*, 24 and 28 July 1964.

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to end fear' across Mississippi. He was shot in the back before finishing the first 30 miles of the 200-mile trek. Contingents from SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) took up the march. Before it ended, the chant of 'Freedom Now' had given way to that of 'Black Power'.[19] Soviet reaction to the cry for Black Power was decidedly unenthusiastic. Moscow reported the march with a standard condemnation of US racism.[20] The slogan Black Power did not appear in the Soviet press nor was the CPUSA article interpreting this new demand reprinted in the *World Marxist Review*, as had been customary with other major American communist analyses of the Negro movement.[21]

Subsequently, *Pravda* redefined Black Power in such a way that it appeared its advocates neither wanted to be exclusively black nor sufficiently powerful so as to pose a serious threat to the existing Establishment:

> The slogan Black Power emerged back in the early summer during the heroic freedom march through Mississippi. All capitalist America, from the government to the conciliatory leaders of the 'black bourgeoisie', attacked the slogan and branded it an expression of 'Negro nationalism'. But this is not so at all. As leaders of Negro organizations explain, what it means is fighting, where Negroes are in the majority, for the election of their own people to local government bodies—be it a district council or the office of sheriff. This by no means excludes co-operation with white fighters for equality, the true friends of the Negro people.[22]

This is a strikingly unrevolutionary definition at a time when Stokely Carmichael was talking of tearing down courthouses, while one of his aides was quoted as saying that 'white blood' would flow.[23] Undoubtedly Moscow agreed, at least in principle, with the CPUSA's attack

[19] *New York Times*, 21 June 1966. Black Power had become SNCC's rallying cry, much to the dismay of many of the older organizations fighting for Negro rights. Martin Luther King immediately issued a statement repudiating the 'extremist' meaning of Black Power, stressing that responsible Negroes wanted only a 'share' of power so that they could act in their own interests (ibid., 26 June 1966). For his account of how the term originated, his reservations and subsequent reinterpretation, see Martin Luther King, *Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community?* (New York, Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 23–66. See also the excerpts from the SNCC paper on which the Black Power philosophy was based, *New York Times*, 8 August 1966, and Stokely Carmichael, 'What we Want', *New York Times Review of Books*, 22 September 1966.

[20] *Pravda*, 8 and 10 June 1966; *Izvestia*, 8 June 1966.

[21] James E. Jackson, 'The Meaning of Black Power', *Political Affairs*, no. 9, 1966, pp. 1–9. Not that Jackson had been particularly revolutionary in his interpretation of 'the real substance of Black Power', which he described as 'a policy of united action, the creating of local bases of political power and strength, thereby ending the isolation of individual ghettoes'. For a more recent CPUSA definition of Black Power as 'a share in the power structure of this country', i.e. the existing Establishment, see Claude M. Lightfoot, *Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation* (New York, International Publishers, 1968), p. 109.

[22] S. Vishnevski, *Pravda*, 26 October 1966.

[23] *New York Times*, 3 July 1966.

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on 'ideological provocateurs' who 'waved the phrase Black Power before the eyes of the nation with alarming interpretations'.

The Chinese interpretation of Black Power was predictably alarming, if inexplicably delayed. Then early in August, just before the third anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's first statement in support of the American Negroes, *Peking Review* noted that the slogan had been raised on a freedom march in Mississippi during which the marchers also 'demonstrated the bankruptcy of non-violence'.[24] A *People's Daily* editorial described demands for Black Power as an important new development in the Negro liberation struggle. However, on the whole Peking has been almost as unenthusiastic about Black Power as has Moscow. For by implication Black Power is incompatible with the coloured majority of the Third World led by Mao Tse-tung, i.e. Yellow Power. Thus it is not surprising that the pro-Chinese Progressive Labor Party attacks black nationalists for 'their militant sounding words and their ability to take the profund Marxist thinking of communists like Mao Tse-tung and twist it to serve their narrow ambitions'.[25] The new slogan was considered important primarily because it confirmed Chairman Mao's wisdom that all revolutionary struggles are aimed at seizing power and consolidating it. Now, according to the editorial, American Negroes had come to realize not only that power must be seized but also to understand that it must be seized by violence. Robert Williams spoke eloquently of Black Power as 'a dissident force challenging the racist, white power structure'.

From the Soviet view, Williams' definition of Black Power must have been almost as unpalatable as his contention that

> We of the Afro-American liberation movement resolutely condemn and oppose all counter-revolutionaries and purveyors of white supremacy whether they cloak their treachery in the garb of Marxist-Leninist phraseology or the hideous bedsheets of the Ku Klux Klan and its phoney Christian Doctrine.[26]

These implied attacks on Moscow were mild in comparison with that of Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People"s Congress. He saw American racial strife as still further proof that US imperialism was a paper tiger at the end of its tether. The Negro people had shaken the roots of US imperialism. Its days were numbered. He went on to call for a 'genuine international united front against imperialism'. This united front must on no account include such 'flunkeys' and 'lackeys' of US imperialism as the Soviet Union. He accused the Soviet leadership of 'willingly serving' US imperialism, of vainly 'attempting to undermine this genuine anti-US united front in a thousand and one ways under the

[24] 'Negro Struggle in USA—Breaking the Fetters of "Non-Violence"', *Peking Review*, no. 32, 1966, p. 28.
[25] 'Cultural Nationalism—Dead End for Blacks', *Challenge*, August 1968.
[26] 'Speech by US Negro Leader, Robert Williams', *Peking Review*, no. 33, 1966, p. 26.

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signboard of united action'.[27] At no time, however, did he mention Black Power or clarify its role in this anti-US united front.

In 1966 Robert F. Williams left Cuba for China. His departure was occasioned at least in part by the difficulties in publishing his newsletter, *The Crusader*, created by Havana. The Chinese, undoubtedly due to their own differences with Castro, have published hints of his discontent.[28] Williams himself, however, has been quite blunt.

> The Cuban story is a great revolutionary tragedy of this age. It is not a tragedy born of too much revolution, but because it had too little of it. It is a revolution laboring mightily under the strain of both internal and external subversion. . . .
>
> The Negro is again becoming a pathetic victim of race prejudice and discrimination. . . . Afro-Americans are beginning to feel the pinch of subtle but fast-returning racism that was part and parcel of the old order. The face of the Cuban government is becoming whiter and whiter. . . .
>
> It has always been my policy to oppose racism to the nth degree whenever I encountered it. This charge against the bourgeois pseudo-socialists of Cuba by no means leaves margin for the reactionaries of US imperialism to level criticism against the island Republic. From the standpoint of comparison, as for brutal racism, the savage USA still outstrips Cuba by a distance comparable to that from earth to moon.
>
> Strange things are taking place in Cuba. I talked to 'Che' Guevara for more than two hours shortly before his disappearance. He told me that he knew I was having problems in Cuba and that he was going to see to it that I got more assistance.[29]

THE summer of 1967 was long, hot and bloody. Rioting in Newark and Detroit surpassed the upheavals in Watts, making it clearly impossible to consider early mass violence as isolated incidents. Peking's analysis of the international implications of these events followed the same vein as in 1965. US imperialism's policy of aggression abroad and its 'fascist rule' at home were digging its own grave. And, in a direct attack on Moscow, 'no help from the Soviet revisionist clique could save it from extinction'.[30]

For the first time the CPUSA was also denounced in scathing terms:

> The revisionists of the CPUSA who are pawns in the United States of the Soviet revisionist clique are hysterically vilifying

[27] Speech by Kuo Mo-jo, *Peking Review*, no. 33, 1966, p. 23.

[28] See Williams' interview in *People's Daily*, 21 February 1967. Peking was not, however, willing to go to the extent of publishing his impassioned letters to Fidel Castro (28 August 1966) detailing the harassments in Cuba that Williams has circulated privately.

[29] *The Crusader*, no. 3, 1967, p. 8.

[30] 'World People Stand by Afro-Americans', *Peking Review*, no. 31, 1967. See also 'People Not Reactionaries are Really Powerful in US', *People's Daily*, 30 July 1967.

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> and opposing the Afro-American armed struggle against tyranny. Misusing the banner of 'unity' between black and white Americans, they are trying to control the struggle of the Afro-Americans and bring it into an orbit tolerable to US monopoly capital. These running dogs of US monopoly capital are traitors to the Afro-Americans and to all the working people of the USA.[31]

Although this could have been a concession to Williams, who had little or no liking for American communists, it may simply have been part of the general branching of the uses to which Peking fitted the Afro-American battle for liberation. By 1967 Mao's 1963 statement had been elevated to 'a brilliant work of Marxism-Leninism, giving the Afro-American people's struggle a powerful ideological and theoretical weapon'.[32] According to Williams on the fourth anniversary of the 1963 statement:

> This is the era of Mao Tse-tung, the era of world revolution, and the Afro-Americans' struggle for liberation is a part of an invincible worldwide movement. . . . Our people will further develop and master people's warfare. Every battle will be a glorious monument to Chairman Mao's 8 August, 1963 statement.[33]

Not unexpectedly, Moscow did not see it that way. In the first major theoretical analysis of the Negro movement since 1963, a Soviet commentator, V. Likhachev, stressed the spontaneous nature of the American tragedies acted out in Newark and Detroit.[34] He charged US ruling circles with preparing a 'political iron fist' to destroy the Negro movement. Civil rights laws since 1964 had changed nothing but the externals of racist oppression. He described in detail the increasingly desperate economic situation of black Americans. Yet Likhachev's conclusions were not as pessimistic as his facts.

First the masses must acquire a leadership and level of organization 'worthy of their revolutionary power'. This was possible, for the objective laws of socio-economic development worked against the American ruling class. Only through political struggle in firm alliance with the workers' 'entire and national democratic movement', would American Negroes become free. Likewise he considered the 1967 National Conference for New Politics a significant step in that direction.

Most important was the fact that:

> The American Negroes are not alone in this struggle. Their movement is indivisibly linked to the world *anti-imperialist front*. It finds extensive moral and political support on the international arena; the socialist world gives the Negro movement an inspiring example of how to resolve the national problem; it is supported

[31] 'Afro-Americans' Just Struggle Will Triumph', *People's Daily*, editorial, 8 August 1967; *Peking Review*, no. 34, 1967, p. 30.

[32] 'Afro-Americans' Just Struggle Will Triumph', op. cit., p. 29.

[33] NCNA, 7 August 1967.

[34] V. Likhachev, 'Osvoboditelnaya borba amerikanskikh negrov', *Kommunist*, no. 14, 1967, pp. 100–109. See also V. Korionov, *Pravda*, 27 July 1967.

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> by the political successes of the national liberation movement in the former colonial countries. The USSR and the other socialist countries have loudly proclaimed that one of the principal objectives of their foreign policy is the struggle 'for the final liquidation of colonialism and racial discrimination in all their forms and manifestations'. The world liberation movement considers the struggle of the American Negroes as its own cause. In turn, the experience acquired by the Negro movement in the USA is of tremendous value to all the anti-imperialist forces. Imperialism has proved its organic inability to resolve the national problem both on the scale of the entire 'Third World', as well as in individual capitalist countries, even the most developed ones. True national liberation, i.e. all-round and total equality, may be achieved only in the struggle against imperialism, through systematic and profound democratic and social changes dictated by the single laws governing the world revolutionary process.[35]

Likhachev had left a foot in the door. For there was absolutely no indication as to whether this 'total equality' would take place within nations as they now exist or in the utopian post-national era of the 'withering away of the state'. In either case, however, the achievement of total equality through 'systematic and profound democratic and social changes' is hardly the revolutionary role of Afro-Americans envisioned by Mao Tse-tung and Co. Moreover, the Soviet author roundly condemned black nationalists—i.e. the group most attracted to Mao's theories of violent revolution—for expressing the 'narrowly selfish interests of the most reactionary segment of the Negro bourgeoisie'. In an unusually sophisticated breakdown, he distinguished between integrationists, black nationalists and Black Power advocates on the American scene. And, also for the first time, he gave official Soviet sanction to the CPUSA interpretation of Black Power.

THE assassination of Dr King provided the occasion for Mao Tse-tung's second statement in support of black American militancy.[36] The differences between the two statements are more interesting than the similarities. Both language and purpose had changed. Even in citing his earlier declaration, Mao showed a significant lapse of memory. Reference to 'American Negroes' disappeared, and the 1963 proclamation was retitled 'Statement Supporting the Afro-Americans in Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by US Imperialism'. Yet his sensitivity to the current distaste of black Americans for the term Negro was combined with an attempt to place them prominently within the Chinese revolutionary entourage. A similar shift occurred in the vocabulary of his Afro-American supporters in China. Thus Williams called the enemy 'a paper tiger', and the widow of W. E. B. Du Bois,

[35] Ibid., p. 109. This was a complete shift in emphasis from the Murat article in 1962, which stressed the importance of internal successes rather than outside help.
[36] 'In Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression', *Peking Review*, no. 16, pp. 5–6.

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Mrs Shirley Graham Du Bois, asserted that Afro-Americans had realized the truth 'that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'.[37]

In 1963 the Chinese had been primarily interested in stirring up a community of racial sentiment from all segments engaged in struggles for national liberation. For the most part, reaction to Mao's statement came from African and American Negroes and centred on the universal evil of discrimination. Much of the commentary avoided any mention of other areas of Sino-Soviet tension.

This was not so in 1968. Responses to Mao's second statement on racial strife in the United States seemed to place more emphasis on the revolutionary brilliance of the Chinese leader than on the plight of Afro-Americans. Many of the statements republished by Peking came from splinter communist parties. They supplemented a direct attack on Soviet revisionists as the 'number one accomplice of US imperialism in suppressing the Afro-American struggle'.[38] For the first time Peking devoted a major polemic against Moscow's lack of militancy on the Negro question. On the face of it, Soviet press coverage of King's assassination precipitated the Chinese outburst.

> Following Martin Luther King's assassination by the US imperialists, the Soviet revisionist press collected and spread US official humbug about the incident to absolve the US ruling circles from their crimes. Singing the US official tune, it played up the statements of Johnson, Humphrey and others about the 'grief' and 'shame' they felt when they learned of the assassination.[39]

Although based on quotations widely out of context, Peking's charges had more than a grain of truth. Soviet reaction to the shooting of Martin Luther King had shown an uncomfortable ambivalence. The initial TASS report of the shooting was brief and factual. Subsequent coverage of ghetto rioting balanced a NAACP official's statement that Negroes would stage mass actions in response to 'this racist crime' and the SNCC accusation that the assassination was a new example of genocide against the black population with statements of President Johnson and Vice-President Humphrey referring to American grief and shame. On 6 April *Pravda* ridiculed American democracy as the 'freedom to kill'. However, on the same day an *Izvestia* article noted that President Johnson had called upon Americans to keep order, not to resort to 'blind violence' (a phrase bitterly derided by Peking).

[37] 'Chairman Mao's Statement Inspires Afro-American People to Greater Resistance, says Robert Williams', SCMP, no. 4162, 1968, p. 22 and 'Widow of Dr Du Bois Hails Chairman Mao's Statement', ibid., p. 23.

[38] 'Moscow Acts as Washington's No. 1 Accomplice of US Imperialism in Suppressing Afro-American Struggle', NCNA, 25 April 1968.

[39] Quoted from 'Soviet Revisionism—No. 1 Accomplice of US Imperialism in Suppressing Afro-American Struggle', *Peking Review*, no. 20, 1968, p. 27.

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More analytical dispatches emphasized the parallels between United States violence against Vietnam and the plight of American Negroes struggling for freedom. King's statement that 'freedom is indivisible' and his opposition to US fighting in Vietnam were reiterated.[40] Yet an important distinction was made. 'Reactionary' America had killed Martin Luther King. 'Progressive' America mourned him. Nor was the division between 'reactionary' American officials and 'progressive' citizens fighting for change a clear-cut one. In an account of King's funeral, entitled 'Progressive America in Mourning', *Trud*, the newspaper of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, included senators and congressmen in the ranks of the mourners along with the leaders of the Negro movement for civil rights, workers and farmers. Thus, by implication, 'progressive' America could include Vice-President Humphrey, since the article mentioned his presence at the funeral. The Chinese accused *Trud* of going

> . . . so far as to hoax the black people in the United States by saying that once the war in Vietnam is brought to an end the US monopoly capitalist class and its chief steward, the Johnson administration, which are riding roughshod over the people of the United States, may 'turn to devote the country's enormous wealth to the oppressed people'.[41]

This was at best an exaggeration. Yet the trade union newspaper had quoted King: 'I have a dream—with the end of the war in Vietnam the enormous wealth of this country will be given to eradicate racism.'[42] It was a tentative formulation; but Moscow did not, as might have been expected, draw the conclusion that King's dream had died with him.

INDEED, the Soviets assiduously avoided Peking's conclusion that King's death and the riots that followed had proved the bankruptcy of non-violence. Radio reports of Negro rioting counted the dead, referred to destruction and described the use of troops to maintain order. Although *Pravda* quoted an American Negro journalist's view that in killing Martin Luther King America had declared war upon its own black citizens, Soviet analyses did not predict that American society would crumble—splintered by the contradiction of black-white antagonism. On the whole, the Soviets avoided drawing 'lessons' from King's death. There was only one reference to the tragedy which supported a 'Marxist' thesis—i.e. that it is not possible to be a free people while suppressing another people.[43] Polyanov concluded

[40] See especially N. Polyanov, *Izvestia*, 7 April 1968. The Soviets had long held King in high esteem. See L. N. Mitrokin, 'Sotsialnaya filosofiya Martina Lutera Kinga', *Voprosy Filosofii*, no. 7, 1965, pp. 114–25.

[41] 'Soviet Revisionism—No. 1 Accomplice of US Imperialism in Suppressing Afro-American Struggle', op. cit., p. 27.

[42] *Trud*, 11 April 1968.

[43] *Pravda*, 8 April 1968.

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his description of the life and death of Dr King by saying: 'But the day will come when the progressive citizens have the awakening of conscience of the United States on their side and they have our warm sympathies on their side also.' During the bleak days immediately after King's death it was hard to find that much optimism in Washington. Even the 'reactionary' *New York Times* was credited with pointing out that Negro riots would stop only after the Negroes had attained equal rights.

The bulk of such statements were for a domestic Soviet audience. On 5 April a Moscow Radio broadcast to Asia presented the assassination of Martin Luther King as 'another link in the chain of crimes' in present-day America, symptomatic of its 'decaying and rotting society'. However, Polyanov and 'Radio Peace and Progress' could not both be right. And indeed, the ambivalent response of the Soviet Union to the implications of King's assassination for US society's capability to survive was typical of the ambivalence that had marked Soviet handling of the American Negro question since the late 1950s.

As for the Chinese, on 26 April TASS dismissed Peking's attack on Soviet press coverage of Martin Luther King's assassination as an anti-Soviet slander which proved that 'the Maoists could not care less for the interests of the Negro people'. Indeed Peking had had little love for Martin Luther King. In August 1967 Peking had specifically condemned the 'humbug' of Martin Luther King and his ilk. King was accused of having 'gone beyond just supporting the Johnson administration's counter-revolutionary violence' and of 'parroting Johnson's theme'.[44]

To the Chinese, ghetto riots demonstrate the bankruptcy of non-violence, show US imperialism tottering towards its grave and reveal the revolutionary brilliance of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Yet there has been a shift of purpose. Whereas Mao's first statement in support of American Negroes was designed largely to turn a community of racial feeling in the ranks of the national liberation movement into psychological capital for Peking, from 1966 Chinese support for Afro-Americans began to serve as a vehicle for attacking other communist parties.

The 1963 statement had condemned Soviet complicity as much as American policy in describing the inner link between the reactionary racism of the Kennedy administration at home and US aggression abroad. Chinese speeches in support of that statement included direct attacks on the test ban treaty. By 1966, however, Robert Williams had become an instrument expressing Chinese dissatisfaction with the revolutionary purity of Cuba; in 1967 the rally in support of the 1963 statement turned into a platform for denouncing the CPUSA. The attack on Soviet revisionists as the number one accomplice of Washington in suppressing the Afro-American struggle followed.

In short, Peking's support for black American militants is designed

[44] *People's Daily*, 1 August 1967.

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to serve two increasingly incompatible functions: (1) As a stick with which to beat the Soviets and (2) as an integral part of the revolutionary image China hopes to project towards Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to increase its influence there.

Within Afro-Asian front organizations, Peking's efforts in this direction have been consistently frustrated. Sino-Soviet wrangling over the Algiers AAPSO conference succeeded only in having it postponed indefinitely. AAPSO underwent a final split in February 1967 when the Soviets manoeuvred a meeting of the AAPSO council into deciding to hold the fifth meeting in Algiers instead of Peking. A similar split has occurred in the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau. Nor have the Chinese been able to gain any substantial foothold in Latin America. Although Peking enjoyed initial success at the First Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, Castro has kept a tight rein over the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS). Indeed, by the summer of 1967 Sino-Cuban antagonism had deepened to such an extent that some pro-Chinese groups were excluded from the first OLAS conference.

Faced with these setbacks, Chinese attempts to woo Afro-Americans could have been expected to increase. Yet there is no evidence that they have done so. In any case prospects for substantive gains are dim. Despite a fondness among Black Panthers for quoting Mao, it is, as the largely isolated Maoist Progressive Labor Party (PLP) complains, to serve their own ambitions. Thus in 1969 the Black Panther newspaper devoted only two issues to any extensive coverage of Chinese developments, both at a time when the Panthers were attempting to create a parallel organization within the San Francisco Chinese Community.[45] Known as the 'Red Guards', this group's 10-point programme is closely modelled on the Panthers' 10 demands. Its 'Minister of Information' has acknowledged that 'the Panthers helped us get organized last March'.

Moreover, there is open hostility between the Panthers and the PLP. PLP members along with the CIA and Ron Karenga's 'US' organization were barred from the Panther United Front Against Fascism Conference in July 1969, at which time they were accused of 'deviating from Marxist-Leninist ideology on the national question' and called 'traitors'.[46] Peking, which clearly considers the Progressive Labor faction its vanguard in the Afro-American revolution,[47] has never so much as referred to the Black Panther Party

[45] *The Black Panther*, 16 and 23 March 1969.

[46] Quoted by Ronald Steel, 'Letter from Oakland: The Panthers', op. cit. For the Progressive Labor version that the Panthers are dupes of the FBI and the CPUSA, see Bill Epton, Fred Jerome and Walt Riley, 'Baiting the Panther Trap', *Progressive Labor*, no. 2, 1969, pp. 14–23.

[47] See 'American PLP Vice-President Emphasizes Leading Role of Black Working Class', SCMP, no. 4365, 1969, p. 23; 'Progressive Afro-Americans Study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Course of Struggle', SCMP, no. 4376, 1969 (this item does refer both to PL and 'some progressive Afro-Americans' that could be the Panthers without specifying); and 'American Progressive Labor Party Leader on Party Building', SCMP, no. 4386, 1969, p. 29.

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by name. An NCNA report of 6 November 1969 attacking the court-room gagging of Panther Chairman Bobby Seale during the Chicago conspiracy trial identified him only as 'a black leader who participated in the struggle against the war of aggression in Vietnam'.

THE gap between Sino-Soviet interpretations of the prospects for black American revolution remains as unbridgeable as the Sino-Soviet schism itself. On the ideological plane it is one small segment of the old argument between Lenin and the Indian communist M. N. Roy come to life.[48] Is the main force of revolution the developing Third World of Asia, Africa and Latin America or the socialist states acting in union with the international proletariat and the Third World? Are wars of national liberation to take precedence over other interests of the world socialist system? Is the priority Europe or Asia? And, specifically, are black Americans an oppressed colony within the United States, i.e. a part of Third World revolutionary forces, or a discriminated-against minority fighting for equality within the system?

Equally, if not more important, these differing interpretations reflect concrete conflicts of interest on the part of the interpreters. The Soviet position is closely tied to Moscow's concern for peaceful coexistence, détente and perhaps even eventual rapprochement with the United States. Thus, almost ironically, the Stalinist demand for black self-determination has been set aside just as it becomes more objectively applicable to the American scene[49] and, despite Moscow's approval

[48] At the Second Comintern Congress Roy strongly opposed Lenin's position that it was tactically necessary for communists to support 'bourgeois-democratic liberation movements'. Roy argued for development of purely communist movements in colonial and semi-colonial territories on the grounds that revolution in Europe could only be successful if European capitalists were deprived of their colonial profits by revolution in Asia. See Gunther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution: History and Methods* (New York, Praeger, 1961), pp. 59–60.

[49] According to a study released by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 'it was found that about 6 per cent wanted a separate black nation here and this implies that 200,000 Negroes in these 15 cities feel so little a part of American society that they are withdrawing allegiance from the United States' (Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hall, 'Who Riots? A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots', quoted from the *New York Times*, 28 July 1968). See also statement by Stokely Carmichael to the *Guardian*, 31 August 1968.

Moreover, in September 1968 the Third National Conference on Black Power met in Philadelphia and recommended creating 'a separate, free, independent nation for black people' in the five southern states by 'force of arms if necessary'. The idea was introduced by Milton R. Henry of Michigan, First Vice-President of the Republic of New Africa, founded earlier in the year in Detroit. Interestingly enough, Robert F. Williams was elected president of the Republic in absentsia (*New York Times*, 2 September 1968). Williams, who returned to the United States in September 1969, is currently fighting an attempt to extradite him from Michigan to North Carolina to face the charges of kidnapping that forced him into exile eight years ago. The Panthers have expressed sympathy and support for him personally although they do not as yet agree with the call of the Republic of New Africa for a separate black nation. (Message from Huey P. Newton, *The Black Panther*, 6 December 1969.)

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of Black Panther united front tactics,[50] their emphasis on violence has an uncomfortably Chinese ring. It is highly improbable that any significant Soviet support for the Panthers will be forthcoming. For within the Sino-Soviet context, Moscow has shown no desire to take heed of evidence pointing to the correctness of Peking's preference for violent revolution above 'peaceful coexistence'. Indeed, the Soviets have relied heavily on esoteric polemics rather than on direct attacks on Chinese support for revolutionary Afro-Americans, reflecting their ambivalence on the Negro question.

In these circumstances the most serious danger is not black militants' contacts with Moscow or Peking, but that official American frustration, ghetto mutiny and nervousness at the Black Panthers' activities will magnify the importance of those contacts and result in the continuation of repressive policies which tend in fact to increase such contacts.

[50] I. A. Ganęvski, 'History of the Black Panther Party Traced', *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*, no. 1, January 1970, pp. 115–18 and I. Lapitski, 'Why the Black Panthers?', *New Times*, 13 January 1970, p. 24.

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INSIDE THE WARSAW PACT

Peter Bender

'PEACE and security', 'security and disarmament', 'security and co-operation', 'a security system for Europe'—since the beginning of the 1950s these are the concepts which, either simultaneously or successively, have filled the notes, declarations, speeches, newspaper articles and radio and television programmes, not only of the Soviet Union but also of the other member states of the Warsaw Pact. But what do they mean?

Walter Ulbricht says: 'The problem of European security . . . reduces itself essentially . . . to the need to frustrate the vengeful and expansionist policy of the West German imperialists and their struggle for ascendancy in Western Europe.' [1]

A Pole says: 'A united socialist Germany? We are not suicide cases!'

A Czech says: 'I will never forgive the Russians for one thing: that they allowed the Germans to march in with them on 21 August.'

A Hungarian says: 'To us security means providing the Soviet Union with as much security as possible so that it will leave Hungary as much political latitude as possible.'

A Rumanian replies to the question: What would replace the military alliances after their dissolution? 'Imagine you are lying under a bus. People come and lift the bus off you. Do you ask what they are going to put on top of you instead of the bus?'

A Bulgarian says: 'The best thing would be if both—the Americans and the Russians—would withdraw their fleets from the Mediterranean.'

Only some of these statements are of an official character, but they are all in accord with the interests of the countries concerned and, in the main, with those of the ruling parties as well. But to what extent do they correspond to the interests and wishes of the great common ally to the East? If we look at Moscow's European policy during the last three to four years we see that the Soviet Union still wants to have its cake and eat it. Forced to acknowledge that the disintegration of both blocs are inter-dependent, it is still prepared to draw the inevitable conclusions only in a limited and hesitant way. So its policy swings between the preservation of cohesion in its own camp and cautious attempts at a détente in so far as advantages might accrue from it: a more complete dissolution of NATO than of the Warsaw Pact, or at least a lulling effect on NATO activities; a formal Western confirmation of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe; a calming and stabilizing effect in the Old World, which would be very useful to Moscow in view of its

[1] At the Seventh Party Conference of the SED in April 1967.

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difficulties in Asia, particularly with China. Within certain limits the Soviet Union is also prepared to allow its allies their own West European policy. But the prime condition for any concessions was clearly defined on 21 August 1968: the cohesion of the camp and agreement that communist parties may liberalize but may in no circumstances democratize, because in the end this jeopardizes their authority.

Within this framework the policy of the satellites moves between East Berlin, Warsaw and Sofia. Yet the same framework, the same ideology and the community of the last 20 years in no way alter the fact that the security problem is different in each country. Each country is a special case.

LET us begin with the most special of these special cases, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Of all the members of the Warsaw Pact, the East German state indisputably has the greatest security problem vis-à-vis the West. The results of the *First* World War are accepted by the whole world: it would occur to no one to question the national existence of Poland or Czechoslovakia. The results of the *Second* World War, on the other hand, have never been formally acknowledged, they are simply tolerated. For the Poles and Czechs only territorial areas—though in some cases vitally necessary ones—are involved, but for the GDR its very existence seems to be in question. As the chief area of concentration of Soviet military power in Central Europe, the East German state is, indeed, regarded as an unalterable fact of power policy, not as a legally unimpeachable power. Of course, today, the Soviet Union guarantees the existence of the East German state militarily and politically, but security is a ticklish question: in matters of life and death, foresight is preferable to insight.

Nevertheless, the East German communists are also aware of the facts of the atomic age. They neither believe nor claim convincingly that anyone in the West is deliberately planning a nuclear world war. But what East Berlin fears, or at least regards as a possibility, is an attempt by the West German 'militarists' to occupy the GDR in a conventionally conducted 'lightning strike'. In the East, Western theories on 'local' and 'limited' wars look aggressive: since even the Soviet Union is afraid of nuclear world war with the USA, the men in Bonn might be calculating their chances of occupying the GDR without a nuclear retaliation. Of course, this would be a catastrophic miscalculation by Bonn, but the German 'imperialists' have, so the SED thinks, sometimes miscalculated before, so one must assume that they may do it again.

Of course, even in East Berlin a military threat to the GDR is regarded as conceivable only under certain conditions. The East German view of this resembles in many points the thinking one encounters in Warsaw. Among its fixed components is a considerable increase in the power of West Germany in Western Europe, which would reach a particularly dangerous level if it included access to nuclear weapons.

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It would become critical as soon as the Bonn 'hegemony' in the Western sector of the continent coincided with periods of weakness in the Eastern sector: with, for example, such a mighty Soviet engagement in China that Moscow could no longer adequately or convincingly fulfil its protective obligations in Europe; with internal unrest in the GDR; and with signs of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, such as were developing, in the view of the occupying powers, in the Prague reform programme. So it is with reservations that the East German communists contemplate the plan to dissolve the military pacts and with dismay that they regard the possibility of Soviet troops leaving the GDR. Even now conditions are being laid down for this eventuality: the Federal Army must be disarmed to a specific extent, and the mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union and at least with Warsaw and Prague must be maintained.[2]

However wrong it may seem to dismiss East Germans' fears of a military threat as mere propaganda (to a great extent they are, of course), it is just as important, on the other hand, to emphasize that these fears are only of a secondary or even tertiary order. The essential point in the thinking on security among the SED leaders was made clear in Ulbricht's speech at the Moscow world conference in June 1969. The subject was 'The struggle against imperialism', yet the East German leader spoke more of economy than strategy, and for him the 'main field' of the East-West conflict was 'the struggle for the greatest labour productivity, for the most effective form of socialist planning, leadership and organization of all social processes, in other words, the struggle for a life of social security, peace and happiness for the people'. This is none other than Khrushchev's 'contest of systems'; but what was once intended by the dynamic head of the CPSU as an offensive policy appears to his successors today mainly as a defensive obligation. This applies in particular to the SED. As the economically strongest ally of the Soviet Union, the GDR has developed considerable internal stability; but as the smaller, poorer and weaker portion of a divided country, East Germany seems particularly threatened in respect of ideology. The chief danger is what Ulbricht calls 'penetration': 'finding an entry into socialist countries by Trojan Horse tactics and opening the doors to ideological subversion, economic dependence and counter-revolution'.[3] The developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were a perfect example of what the East German communists wanted to avoid. In the case of Prague they were faced not only with the danger of infection, but with the fear which was spurring them on to intense activity even in the years before: of being isolated in their own camp by the *Ostpolitik* of the Kiesinger/Brandt government.

It is only possible to understand this when one considers the possibilities of an accommodation between Bonn and Moscow. Past

[2] Peter Florin (Deputy Foreign Minister of the GDR), *Zur Aussenpolitik der souveränen sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1967).
[3] *Neues Deutschland*, 10 June 1969.

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experience teaches that as soon as Soviet-West German relationships seem to be improving, East Berlin grows nervous. The SED leadership has its 'Rapallo' fears, too, and as it is in the Soviet interest never to let these fears become completely dormant, it is to be assumed that they will persist. As far as their justification is concerned, one barrier at least must be observed. An accommodation between Moscow and Bonn which jeopardized the existence of the GDR is unthinkable and there can hardly be anyone left who fears this today even in East Berlin. It is possible, however, to conceive of a number of arrangements which would make it very difficult for the authorities in the GDR to pursue their policy of aloofness towards the Federal Republic. Even a considerable improvement in the climate between the Soviet Union and West Germany would affect the monopolistic claim of the GDR to be the 'only German "Peace State"'; the pretext that West German 'imperialism' must be deterred would be less and less capable of justifying the policy of isolation of the SED towards the West. The GDR would be increasingly obliged to legitimize its existence in an open 'contest of systems' with the Federal Republic—but for this, in the opinion of the leadership, the conditions will not exist for some time.

East Berlin's main preoccupations accordingly have one thing in common: a unification of internal and external policy. Only an actual or presumed insecurity at home would allow 'ideological subversion', liberal developments in other socialist countries or an understanding between Bonn and Moscow to become a danger. The question of internal stability therefore largely determines the requirements and planning of the external security of the GDR. Reduced to a formula, this plan consists in creating as many *faits accomplis* as possible, in order to prove externally as well as internally the unalterable nature of a socialist German state. To the military deterrent supplied by the alliance with the Soviet Union, East Berlin is trying to add a political deterrent: the GDR is to be stabilized to such an extent that the 'imperialists' will also abandon all political attempts to liquidate it or alter its structure.

The consequence of this plan is that in East Germany some three-quarters of all policy is security policy, or has an important security aspect. Economic policy plays an important role here—for two reasons in particular: (1) with its economic potential, the GDR tries to confirm the interest of other Eastern countries in its security; and (2) since East Berlin can produce neither a national nor a liberal policy worth mentioning, there is only one thing it can do to reinforce internal stability, i.e. to make the people tolerably content and 'de-politicize' them by raising the standard of living. The results have been noticeable for some years now.

Its foreign policy is founded on the alliance and any other possible form of close association with the Soviet Union. The unity of the socialist camp comes second, for only this enables East Germany to offer a determined resistance to every type of Western threat, from military pressure through ideological subversion to economic enticement.

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The prevailing tendency in the SED is conservative. At home, conservatism means no experiments, except in relatively politically neutral areas such as the economy. Abroad, conservatism means as little change as possible and aloofness towards the West, as long as there is no gain in prestige for the GDR or economic advantage in prospect; but it also means particular discretion in relation to the Federal Republic, which the GDR is trying to hold off with a batch of demands.

The ruling party in East Germany has a fixation on West Germany. A few years ago the word 'Europe' barely existed in its vocabulary; anyone speaking of European prospects, even for the Germans, met with a total lack of understanding and even today Europe and European security mean little more to East Berlin than a vehicle for the promotion of the special interests of the GDR. But what does East Berlin want from Bonn? On examination the list of demands amounts in the end to just *one* wish: that the Western—and unfortunately stronger—portion of Germany should finally and conclusively come to terms with the existence of a differently organized Germany and grant it the right to exist. When in East Berlin they say that recognition as a state is not the decisive point, this is partly, but not entirely, a matter of tactics. Recognition as a method of making a more effective political attack on the East German state is for the SED only a new variant of ideological subversion. What it wants is recognition as an expression of willingness to accept the other for what he is and to treat him as having equal rights, not only diplomatically but also socially (in every sense of the word). Here insecurity in the psychological and strategic senses are interdependent. The concrete demands made by East Berlin on Bonn are in the last analysis only a means to an end: they are intended to confirm and guarantee a change of attitude towards the GDR.

HISTORICAL experience and an analysis of the security problem can scarcely have led to such unequivocal results for any East European country as it has for Poland. The year 1939 showed Poland wavering between the Soviet Union and Germany, which facilitated their coalition against Poland. An alliance with the Western powers, even if they took their responsibilities as allies seriously, was quite useless. Consequently, in order not to be the victim of a German-Soviet collaboration once again, Poland had to link its destiny firmly with one of its two great neighbours—and as things stood, that one could only be the Soviet Union. When the first Polish decision was awaited in 1945, no decision was possible, because Germany no longer existed and Poland had fallen into the Soviet sphere of power. This meant that any later decision was largely prejudiced as well. Moreover—despite Katyn—experience with the Germans had been worse than with the Russians. The unofficial but popular formula for this was: 'The Russians only want to govern us, the Germans wanted to wipe us out as a nation.'

But other important reasons also militated in favour of the alliance with the Soviet Union. There was no chance of regaining the territories

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lost to the Soviet Union in 1939. The Soviet Union kept what it had, but wanted no more than it had taken. This secured Poland's frontier to the East. At the same time Moscow obtained and secured compensation for the Poles in the West against their losses in the East. The western frontier of Poland on the Oder and Neisse is reliably guaranteed by the Soviet Union. It was long challenged by the West Germans, however, and is still not recognized as definitive today. The other NATO countries indirectly let it be known that they regard this frontier as unalterable, but they too have not confirmed it formally. One circumstance is decisive, however: if there is an increasing readiness in the Federal Republic to accept the loss of the Eastern territories, this originates not only, but predominantly, in the view that there is no hope of revising the Oder-Neisse frontier. The argument of power politics is the strongest in the endless West German debate on this question. So if the Poles can ultimately expect recognition of their frontier from Bonn as well, they will owe this to the fact that the second world power, the Soviet Union, is guaranteeing the frontier. Last but not least, there is added to all this the fact that Poland is governed by a communist party to which the support of the Soviet Union must appear necessary.

So both national and socialist interests ordain the alliance with Moscow. The emphasis is on interests: 'There are love matches and marriages of convenience; our alliance with the Soviet Union is in the second category.' But the grounds of convenience are actually very strong. Anyone who ignores this and overestimates the undoubtedly considerable resentment against Russians and Soviets will be misled. Nevertheless, it is clear that the intimacy of the link with Moscow is largely dependent on the extent of Polish fears of the Germans. Of course, there are now two Germanies, a state of affairs which must be in the interests of Poland.

The existence of the GDR is important to Warsaw for three reasons. It recognizes the frontier, it reduces the power of the German potential by division and it forms a buffer against the Federal Republic, which does not recognize the frontier. It has been argued on occasions that if Poland also receives a West German guarantee of its frontiers, it must be interested in the reunification of Germany because it would then no longer be cut off from direct contact with the West. Yet even if one disregards the security considerations, which are clearly opposed to this theory, does a common frontier with the West really benefit a communist state seeking greater independence? Anyone who, like the Yugoslavs and the Albanians, leaves the alliance must not be surrounded by Soviet or Soviet-aligned territories. Anyone who will not and cannot leave the alliance—and both apply in the foreseeable future to Poland—may be better off in the pursuit of their national interests if their country does not, like Czechoslovakia, border on a NATO country. The chance of the Kremlin tolerating independence of outlook seems greater for a state in Rumania's geo-

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graphical position, which would scarcely permit it to escape from the Soviet treaty system. So there is much to support the idea that Khrushchev tolerated the events in Poland of October 1956 partly because the GDR—as well as the 20 Soviet divisions there—was screening them from the West.

Gomulka's successors must also be presumed to have a powerful interest in the undisturbed continuance of the GDR. Solidarity with East Berlin has its main basis in security considerations, but it has its limits there, too: 'A united socialist Germany—we are not suicide cases!' All the historical memories come back to life. A unified Germany, allied ideologically, politically and perhaps even militarily with the Soviet Union, would reduce the Poles to the same ghastly position as they have suffered several times in the last century: 'Seventy-five million Germans, two hundred and thirty million Russians—what can thirty million Poles in the middle do?'

At present the German problem for the Poles certainly centres on their relationship with the Federal Republic. This is naturally influenced by factors which for many years have encumbered and sometimes embittered this relationship: the unambiguity with which banished officials, and the ambiguity with which responsible politicians, approach the frontier question. In Warsaw, particularly since Gomulka's speech of 17 May 1969, a new appreciation of the conditions in West Germany can certainly be observed.

The importance of the Federal Republic in Western Europe has increased and will continue to increase, giving rise to a danger that West German claims against Poland will find a broader, i.e. a West European, basis. Not only in the NPD, but also in the CSU and elsewhere, a rising tide of nationalism can be seen. On the other hand, in the SPD and elsewhere as well, an increasing realism is beginning to prevail, coupled with a readiness to recognize a *fait accompli* and to convert the eternal speeches about reconciliation into reality. The conclusion to be drawn from this new appreciation has been clear since the summer of 1968: the authorities prepared to reach agreement in Bonn must not, as in the past, be discouraged by rigid demands, but must be supported by reasonable offers. The prospects of achieving a settlement of the frontier question will probably be more favourable in the next few years than later, when right-wing politicians may be in power.

But why is such great importance paid in Poland to West German confirmation of the frontier—in view of the Soviet guarantee, in view of the GDR, whose international recognition the planners in Warsaw regard as simply a question of time? The answers, mostly only hints, give a relatively true picture of what Warsaw fears or does not fear. For the great majority of Poles the frontier problem is *the* national problem. Foreign policy experts and leading politicians may have the realistic judgment, that is the certainty, that this frontier is secure. The population has no such view and, apart from most recent times,

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the government has not troubled to disseminate a truthful picture of the Federal Republic. West German recognition of the frontier therefore has—for any Polish government—an internal political significance.

Foreign policy considerations can as yet only be inferred. They appear to be going in three directions: the formal recognition by as many countries as possible—especially NATO countries—of the Oder-Neisse line would greatly restrict the scope of revisionist circles in West Germany. The same would be true if the Federal Government took this step. Until recognition, anyone who questions the Oder-Neisse line can still claim that he is in line with government policy. After recognition any attitude opposed to the frontier would be in contradiction to government policy—and that means a lot in Germany!

The third consideration falls under the heading 'Rapallo'. It is not easy to ascertain how great the fears in this direction really are and how many Poles share them. As in the case of the GDR, a real alteration of the existing situation cannot be in the Soviet interest, for as soon as Moscow accepts just *one* frontier revision, all other demands for revision will be given free rein; between Poles and Czechs, Hungarians and Rumanians, Bulgarians and Yugoslavs. And finally, the Soviet Union itself would have to expect Poles, Slovaks and Rumanians to call it to account. Moscow has the most urgent interest in seeing to it that the status quo in its sphere of influence is absolutely inviolate. Nevertheless, one of the classical methods of government is to allow a last tiny fragment of uncertainty to persist, especially effective when a feeling of insecurity grounded in history exists on the other side: '99·9 per cent security is better than 99·8 per cent' was one of the statements made on the significance of a West German recognition of the frontier.

Certainly there is an apparent growth in Poland in the numbers of those—mostly young people—who calculate purely rationally, or really know conditions in the Federal Republic. When occasion demands they make this lapidary retort to the question why the frontier must be confirmed: 'Because I would like to go to Hamburg, where I want to buy myself a Volkswagen.' The Oder-Neisse line, no longer as a security requirement, but as a prerequisite of an East-West détente—this is a viewpoint which can also be detected behind many an official declaration.

Such utterances must, of course, not blind us to the fact that a profound mistrust still exist vis-à-vis the Western neighbour. What Warsaw fears and wants from the Federal Republic is—despite many differences—the same thing that occupies the minds of people in Prague, Budapest and East Berlin: no one sees an acute danger, yet the answers become more hesitant, more uncertain, more dubious when talk is no longer of the present but of the future, some 10 years hence. What creates the doubt is the unpredictability of what is going to grow out of this strong Western Germany. People would therefore like the economic giant to remain a political dwarf; they want a guarantee that

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these restless Germans will keep the peace; they want guarantees that German nationalism will never get another chance. This interest—bordering on involvement—in West German internal policy and the relationship between the two German states originates in this need for bases for security. From the same source come the foreign policy demands to Bonn, which are mostly of a purely rhetorical nature: recognition of frontiers, declaration of the invalidity of the Munich agreement from the outset, relations laid down by treaty between Bonn and East Berlin, etc.—all this has a meaning only, or primarily, as a symbol of a change in thinking and outlook.

Like East Berlin, however, Warsaw also demands recognition not only of the territorial, but also of the political status quo. How great was the Polish administration's fear of 'ideological subversion' and of signs of a dissolution of the alliance, was shown by its actions vis-à-vis the Prague reformers. The security of the country undoubtedly played a part in this, but the security of the political élite played a greater one.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA shares some historical experiences with Poland. It too was the victim of the Germans in 1939 and its alliance with the Western powers did not help it at all. But the differences are at least equally important. England and France went to war for Poland; they surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler without a struggle. Above all, however, the Russians played a different role here. While they made common cause with Hitler against Warsaw and occupied half of Poland, they were prepared to back the Czechs and Slovaks against Germany. To stay with the Soviet Union after the war appealed to Prague because 1939 had taught the Czechs that a country of this size and position cannot be neutral but needs a powerful ally. The alliance with the Soviet Union was further aided by the fact that the relationship with the Russians was not encumbered by any historical conflicts, but rather encouraged by pan-Slavic sentiments. In addition, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, which was the first to propagate the alliance with the Soviet Union, was stronger, even in pre-war days, than most of its fellow-parties in the Soviet area today. Apart from Bulgaria, there was nowhere where the Soviet Union had such a good chance of being received as a friend and ally by the population.

Undoubtedly, Stalinism spoiled a great deal of this. The younger generation grew up with the conflict against narrow-minded Party doctrinairians; for them the German occupation was history and, in comparison with that of Poland, less oppressive and less bloody. Even among the middle-aged and elderly, though the memory did not pale in the course of time, the fear of a repetition did. The often senseless exaggeration of the German peril, the caricature which the propagandists drew of the Federal Republic, achieved the opposite effect to the one intended. Under Dubcek this type of propaganda, too, was terminated.

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Nevertheless, the crisis which shook the traditional friend-foe image in Czechoslovakia from the bottom up was 21 August: '1968 was worse than 1939: the Germans were our enemies, they did what enemies do. But the Russians were our friends. . . .' No one can tell how the feelings of the Czechs and Slovaks and the assessment of their security problem will develop in the long term. As time passes since the shock of 21 August a degree of balance may prevail as regards fears of their Russian and German neighbours.

For, naturally, the Germans are still a problem for the Czechs—less for the Slovaks—and very little has changed in Prague's former outlook: the division of Germany is an advantage to Czechoslovakia, but the sharp confrontation between the two parts is a disadvantage. Therefore a mutual approach between Bonn and East Berlin would be a gain in security for Czechoslovakia and for the whole of Europe, and would increase the prospects of a détente. Recognition of the GDR could increase all these advantages and form a good basis for the gradual democratization of the GDR. A unified socialist Germany is not in the interests of Czechoslovakia, however.

But what fears exist in relation to the Federal Republic, and how strong are they? First of all it is clear that memories of the German occupation still count for something. It also seems clear that despite a few remnants of a feeling of insecurity in the Sudetenland the German phobia has essentially abated: 'A consumer society does not want war and conquest. Such intentions are hardly to be expected even of the politicians at present in power at Bonn. If they really existed the Americans would prevent their realization.' But the security problem which does remain vis-à-vis the Federal Republic can be stated in one sentence: 'They are 60 million, we are 14.'

The position of a small country in relation to a large one is a problem which is much more pressing for Prague now in the East than in the West. The scale of perils, far more urgent now since August 1968, ranges from indirect pressure by the Kremlin, through renewed intervention by Soviet troops, to the establishment of a Soviet military regime. It was in order to prevent the most extreme of these possibilities, the military regime, that Dubcek and Svoboda accepted after the invasion the Moscow communiqué with its injunctions to 'normalization'. To deflect and reduce all these dangers is the most important task of the government under Husak. This is essentially a question of internal policy, but also partly one of defence policy—though in a perverse reversal of fronts. If the politicians in Prague and Bratislava affirm their unalterable allegiance to the Warsaw Pact and if Czech and Slovak soldiers join in manoeuvres with their Soviet occupants, this has little enough to do with the security of Czechoslovakia against the West, but a great deal to do with their security in relation to the East. To court the confidence of the suspicious Soviet leadership is the first order of the day for Czechoslovak security now. Whether Husak and his conservative colleagues are doing more than is necessary

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may be disputed—there is no doubt as to the necessity for courting confidence.

FOR the prospects of normalizing—in the true sense of the word—Czechoslovakia's position, optimists can point to Janos Kadar. However little Hungary in 1956 may be comparable with Czechoslovakia in 1968, nevertheless Husak must try today, as Kadar did then, to reconcile the irreconcilable, namely, to win the confidence of the Russians and of his own compatriots at the same time. Kadar was remarkably successful. In the Soviet sphere of power today Hungary appears as the country in which there are the least internal tensions and liberalism is linked to the greatest possible extent with stability. Naturally this is relative. Stability exists on the unspoken but bitterly learned condition that Hungary belongs irrevocably to the socialist camp; liberalism exists only to the point beyond which the sovereignty of the Communist Party and the sovereign influence of the Soviet Union would be compromised.

For the security of Hungary this means in the first place less susceptibility to ideological threats. The Hungarians can hardly be 'softened up' any more because they have been already, but after the shock of 1956, the waves of which are still being felt, there is no danger of explosion here. As far as external security is concerned, people have the feeling in Budapest today that their national territory has reached a minimum. Not from north or south, not from east or west, has anyone any territorial claims to make. So Hungary's security can be threatened only if the whole country falls under foreign domination. But this is not the case, either: 'We do not feel threatened, either by a Western attack, or by the possibility of being drawn fully into the Soviet Union. After all, there are large and small countries, and—on economic grounds as much as any—the small must adapt themselves to the large.'

Naturally, this is where questions of definition begin: where is the borderline between unavoidable adaptation and unwarrantable restriction? For most Hungarians this borderline seems to have been preserved; and, measured in the relative terms which apply to everything in Budapest, this means that Kadar has solved Hungary's security problem eastwards as far as possible under existing conditions.

But at what a price! Hungarian foreign policy sometimes appears quite independent, if one listens to so many of the speeches—at least by the Foreign Minister. But as soon as one tries to discover something about their realization, one is quickly frustrated. Budapest has—apparently—made the classic deal with Moscow, buying itself political latitude at home in exchange for political docility abroad. In Hungary, in serious discussions, people do not speak of 'peace' and 'security'. They say: 'We want to be left alone.' At present, it seems, the average citizen of Budapest is interested only in raising his standard of living and the politicians only in economic reform. To promote

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and accomplish this reform—unimpeded by suspicious dogmatists in Moscow and East Berlin—Budapest is apparently prepared to yield, and even surrender, more than is compatible with its own principles and interests.

IN Rumania the security question is akin to that in Hungary. But the conclusions drawn by Bucharest are quite different. It is true that more Hungarians live in Rumania, that is, in Transylvania, than the Hungarians think just, but this does not constitute a genuine security risk for Rumania. Bucharest does not feel threatened from the West, either, and is indifferent to the German question unless this develops into a war risk for Europe as a whole. The security of Rumania is endangered, if at all, only by the Soviet Union.

To meet this threat, the Bucharest administration avoids anything which could give Moscow a reason or even a pretext for fearing that the internal stability of Rumania and the authority of the Communist Party there might be impaired. Naturally, the rigid administration of power in Rumania continues principally for reasons of home policy; yet at the same time it is more than simply a defensive statement when Bucharest, especially after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, says: the security of the country makes it imperative to maintain the leading role of the Party absolutely.

Thus Ceausescu's behaviour is the opposite of Kadar's. Kadar holds back in foreign policy in order to gain latitude in his home policy; Ceausescu holds back at home and his reforms are very cautious because he wants to retain more independence abroad. This gives him a certain advantage. Other countries—this is emphasized not only in Hungary, but also in Czechoslovakia and Poland—could not achieve self-determination in foreign policy à la Bucharest without being confronted with a similar degree of home policy demands from the population and the Party; this would necessarily introduce developments which Moscow would not contemplate passively for very long. The lower level of development in Rumania, which allows the administration to measure out internal reforms with great economy, accordingly constitutes one of the prime conditions for the policy of independence which Bucharest outwardly pursues. This internal stability—regardless of the causes and the means by which it arose—also allows the administration to pay little heed to the danger of an ideological threat from the West.

However, the fact that the Soviet Union has agreed to Rumania's self-determination up to now has arisen to a certain extent as a result of that country's geographical position: it has no frontier with the West, only with neutral Yugoslavia; otherwise it is surrounded by territory which is Soviet, Soviet-bound and Soviet-occupied; and it is of little strategic importance to the defence of the Soviet Union against NATO. Finally, Moscow's forbearance in relation to Bucharest is easily explained by the fact that, with all his efforts towards independence, Ceausescu also observes definite limits. Despite massive criticism of

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the military alliances and a desire to dissolve them, no one in Bucharest doubts that they will remain members of the Warsaw Pact as long as it exists. Rumania will also be renewing the bilateral alliances in the fairly near future; the treaty with Moscow has been ready since 1968.

The signatures under Eastern assistance pacts are part of Rumania's security policy—although in the paradoxical sense where a country buys security against its allies through an alliance against a third party. If, of the whole camp, the Rumanians are the most vehemently in favour of eliminating the military pacts without replacement, this is consistent from their point of view. The Warsaw Pact holds no advantages for them: Rumania has nothing to fear from the West, against which the Pact is directed; in the East it creates only burdens, duties and restrictions for Rumania—and even increased insecurity, because, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, it can serve as a pretext for intervention by Moscow. For those who find it difficult to accept the elimination of the military pacts, Bucharest offers the following argument: 'Even after the blocs have gone, the balance and spheres of influence of the super-powers would remain, and that means that for all the participants the present degree of security would remain, if and in so far as this is created by the blocs.' And the present degree of insecurity, too! The Rumanians are much too realistic not to see that even the removal of the military pacts cannot prevent, but at best only impede, interventions such as that of 21 August 1968. Nevertheless, they are working consistently to avoid consolidating the bloc and to encourage its dissolution.

Thus in Bucharest they distinguish, for instance, between the dissolution of the military alliances and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The underlying consideration is clear: the Kremlin would rather forgo the Warsaw Pact than the presence of its troops in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. To Rumania, where, as everyone knows, there are no Soviet troops, the question of troop withdrawals is, of course, not meaningless, but not as important as for the countries concerned.

If one asks how the planners in Bucharest actually see the alternative to present policy, that is, preserving security by a deterrent, the answer is always: 'There is only one way and that is childishly simple: one must improve relationships between the individual countries, between each country and the next. Only in this way can the causes and conditions of conflict and, above all, of suspicion be gradually removed.' Of course this is the elevation to a general principle of something that is mainly to the advantage of the Rumanians themselves. The same applies to the constantly reiterated emphasis on the principles of 'respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs', etc.

To improve relationships and to allow each his rights—that is just what Rumanian foreign policy wants and needs. For instance, to be on such terms with the Americans that President Nixon would come to Bucharest, and to be able to ask the Russians to tolerate this. Nevertheless, the Rumanian principles are more than a vehicle for Rumanian

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interests. For one thing, there is certainly a great deal of truth in the assertion, made in Bucharest and also elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that an improved atmosphere is something quite substantial and constitutes a genuine factor in policy. On the other hand, it is not necessarily a utopian dream to strive economically, culturally and politically to create such an intimate involvement between the countries in a particular area that wars become impossible and military guarantees unnecessary. This state of affairs has actually been achieved today within Western Europe without an East-West confrontation and without the Americans' NATO surveillance. Is it inconceivable that it should gradually spread to the whole of Europe?

In pursuing their own interests the Rumanians have gone a step further, both theoretically and practically, than all the other allies of the Soviet Union. For instance, if sovereignty is sovereignty for them—that is, unrestrictedly and unconditionally valid for *everyone* and to be respected by *everyone*—this is of basic importance. It constitutes the transition from partisan thinking to objective thinking; it involves renouncing the idea that the interest of world socialism is the ultimate criterion; it introduces a 'de-ideologization' of external relationships which is the only possible basis for far-reaching East-West agreement and consequently for security throughout Europe.

THE position of Bulgaria is—in every sense of the word—different from that of Rumania. Bulgaria borders on two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey. It does not adjoin the Mediterranean, true, but in places it is only a few marching hours for armoured troops from the Aegean coast and above all it is close to the Dardanelles. Among the inferences drawn from this situation in Sofia, one is clear. Official, private and foreign observers all agree that Bulgaria in the sixties has gone as far as it can discreetly go in order to normalize its relationships with Athens and Ankara, and with some success. Even relations with the Colonels' regime in Greece are correct and in Sofia they believe they are safe against any threat to Bulgaria from Greece or Turkey.

But doubts are expressed as to whether there might be a danger to Bulgaria in the fact that both countries are members of NATO: 'Almost all conflicts in the Balkans have been initiated by the Great Powers and ended to the advantage of the Great Powers.' Bulgarian press campaigns are certainly directed only against the American fleet in the Mediterranean; but there is also anxiety over the rivalry exhibited by *both* super-powers on the southern flank of NATO.

Naturally it would be in the interests of Sofia to detach itself from the Soviet Union sufficiently to be able to stand aside from any possible conflict between the Americans and the Russians in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. But tighter limits are imposed on Sofia than on Bucharest: 'Had things developed in Bulgaria as they did in Prague in 1968, the Russians would have invaded us by February.' However exaggerated this may be, the strategic interests of Moscow in Bulgaria

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are undoubtedly great, as a springboard to the Aegean and the Dardanelles, as a base against Yugoslavia and as a wedge for Rumania.

But even if the Bulgarian administration could, it seems scarcely conceivable that either it or its putatively more nationalist successors would want to abandon the treaty with the Soviet Union. Even if the pacts were dissolved, Sofia would presumably insist on maintaining the bilateral treaty with Moscow. 'We are a small country, which always won battles but always lost wars. Without the support of a Great Power there is no security for us. Nor have we the ambition to play a role in world politics.' The only Great Power which was at all conceivable as a support for Bulgaria after the war was the Soviet Union. It was occupying the country and helped the communists into power. But this is not sufficient explanation. For Bulgaria the Soviet Union is almost the ideal ally. The two countries have no common frontiers and no historical disputes. In fact, Bulgaria was freed from the Turks by Russia and since then there have been sentimental (sometimes interrupted) political and, recently, close economic relations, from which the Bulgarians derive by far the greater profit. They are a sort of favourite child of the Russians and when Zhivkov goes to Moscow—as he quite often does—the word goes round Sofia: 'He's gone begging again.'

On top of all this comes the question of internal security. Even in Bulgaria, hopes hung on the reform movement in Prague and Bratislava, and the wave of dismissals which arose in journalistic, literary and artistic circles in association with 21 August showed how worried the regime was in this respect. Otherwise, ideological dangers threaten less from the West than from Yugoslavia, which offers Bulgaria an example of a standard of living and liberalization which it would be quite possible for the Bulgarians themselves to emulate.

It is even more difficult in Sofia than elsewhere to disentangle the motives for the connexion and alliance with the Soviet Union: the question of internal and external security doubtless plays a part; but at least equally powerful factors are the force of circumstances and the possibility of industrializing the country with Soviet aid. However much the Bulgarian administration—often to the annoyance of its population—may behave like a satellite, one is taking a superficial view if one forgets that this is a very calculating satellite. Here convenience probably outweighs necessity.

HOW does the balance stand? First, in six countries six sets of conditions, interests and views prevail, all different again from those of the great common ally, the Soviet Union. There are similarities and often the same conclusions are drawn from different causes. But seen as a whole the differences appear so great that it is not surprising that there is lack of unity in Eastern Europe—either unity *with* the Soviet Union or *against* it.

Only in two respects do the important questions in all these countries seem to be answered unanimously: no one seriously thinks that the

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Americans or the Russians want war; no one has a clear and concrete idea of how the pan-European security system, of which everyone talks so blithely, should really look. (Though in places they seem seriously prepared to set to work.) It is difficult not to see a connexion between these two statements. If no one really sees the peace of Europe or its security as being threatened from the West, then no one is going to be too worried about a security system, either. Of course there are fears. Here are three ideas of how a war might start in Europe:

Local wars, such as in Vietnam and the Middle East, could also involve both world powers in a military conflict which would then encroach on Europe.

Changes such as those in Czechoslovakia in 1968 might lead to an East-West confrontation.

A similar development in East Germany, nationalist tendencies in West Germany, or the two together, might conceal the danger of an explosion.

Each of these possibilities is feared only by some people in some countries, and not too urgently at that; only the SED may be an exception. One must not be afraid, but one must take precautions—this seems, though it is risky to generalize, to be the general attitude. It is difficult to find people in Eastern Europe who become excited by talk of the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace; but there are plenty of people in almost every country who reply to a question about European security with complaints about obstacles to East-West trade and the like. With some exaggeration, one might say that European security means:

To the GDR, its recognition as a state.

To the Poles, recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

To the Czechs and Hungarians, more freedom of movement westward.

To Rumania, more independence from the East.

And to Bulgaria, the release of the Balkans from the rivalry of the super-powers.

But there is general agreement—perhaps with certain reservations in the GDR—on the principle of the Budapest appeal for 'security and collaboration', that is, to create more security by more collaboration and to encourage more collaboration by more security. The second is already the more important here and will become increasingly so in the future. 'It would be better to put it the other way round: "collaboration and security"', a Pole suggested. The only, but essential, objection to this process lies in the fact that it might compromise the internal stability of some regimes in the East—actually or allegedly, or in the eyes of the Soviet Union. Collaboration with the West reduces the external risk but increases the internal one—the main problem of East European policy seems to lie in this contradiction.

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The Mediterranean Threat

HAS STRATEGIC PARITY BEEN ACHIEVED?

Lawrence L. Whetten

THE most dramatic change in the Middle East over the past 20 years has been the establishment of a viable Soviet military presence. In the Stalinist era Moscow was largely indifferent to the political fortunes of the Middle East and during the Cold War was primarily concerned with worldwide Western encirclement. For two decades its strategy was designed for the defence of the continental front—the USSR and its immediate sphere of influence. Political manoeuvres against the West during this period were mainly defensive, designed to erode the cohesion of Western containment barriers and to keep the West off balance. By 1964 Soviet warships had appeared in the Mediterranean in unprecedented numbers. Since then there has been mounting evidence that the USSR is developing a capacity to support its ambition as a global power. An appraisal of the Soviet military capabilities in the Mediterranean and a comparison with the relative strength of NATO may provide insight into Moscow's abilities and intentions to apply force as the matrix for its inroads into the politics and its designs for Great-Power relations in this region.

The Kremlin has laid the foundation for an overseas military strategy through the use of replenishment-at-sea techniques and limited repair facilities at selected friendly Arab ports. Since 1964 Soviet military forces in the Mediterranean have shown a steady quantitative and qualitative improvement. In 1968 Soviet ship-days in these waters increased by 40 per cent over 1967.[1] The number of vessels in the summer of 1969 totalled nearly 70, including a balanced force of nuclear missile-equipped surface combatants, submarines, intelligence collecting vessels and auxiliary ships.[2]

WHILE the military build-up in the Mediterranean is significant, it is more impressive when related to the Soviets' attainment of intercontinental nuclear parity. The Secretary of the US Air Force, Robert O. Seamans, has pointed out the significance of the Soviet build-up in intercontinental offensive and defensive strategic weapons:

[1] *Washington Post*, 31 August 1969; and the *New York Times*, 21 August 1969. This build-up represented a tenfold increase in vessels between 1963 and 1966, but nearly a 400 per cent increase in total operating days for the same period (Ambassador Harland Cleveland, 'The Transformation of NATO', *NATO Letters*, November 1967, p. 5). The *Washington Post*, 19 December 1969, claims that total operating days for the Squadron exceeded 16,000 in 1969.

[2] *Washington Post*, 20 September 1969; also Admiral Sir John Hamilton, 'The Military Importance of the Mediterranean', *NATO Letters*, August 1967, p. 24.

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> The Soviets have surpassed us in the number of ICBMs and are still building both land-based missiles and ballistic missile submarines. Counting the ICBM sites that we know to be under construction, they have about twice as much missile payload as our own ICBM and Polaris force—payloads that can be very threatening to us if an expanding force is converted to multiple warheads. If we take no action and the Soviets continue their present rate of SS-9 deployment, they could have the capability of destroying most of our land-based missile force by the middle 1970's. The Soviets have developed a long-range system of some 60 Galosh ABM missiles and they also have deployed the Tallinn belt of defensive missiles. They have now tested an improved ABM which can coast or 'loiter' above the atmosphere. We don't know the Soviet intentions, but their ABM sites as well as several of their other weapons raise certain questions.[3]

Current estimates indicate that these questions are rapidly being answered: Moscow has not been satisfied with a 'sufficiency' strategy, it is striving for supremacy in silos and megatonnage. What is the effect of this new intercontinental posture on the structure of its Mediterranean force concepts of employment?

As more ICBMs become operational, Moscow will be able to release a corresponding number of medium-range delivery vehicles for operations in adjacent theatres, such as the Mediterranean Basin. Precedents for such deployments have been established by the visits of Soviet medium bomber aircraft to Damascus and Cairo. Likewise, a greater number of medium-range ballistic and cruise missile submarines can now be transferred to Mediterranean duty. Indeed, the number of Soviet U-boats in these waters reached an unprecedented peak in 1969. The possibility can no longer be overlooked that the USSR now has the ability to saturate the Mediterranean with U-boats where the poorest sonar conditions exist in the world. Thus, intercontinental parity has increased the potential Soviet nuclear and conventional firepower in the Mediterranean Basin far above that indicated by the mere numerical strength deployed at any given time.

Intercontinental parity also affords Moscow for the first time the possibility of exploiting the natural advantages inherent in its strategic Mediterranean posture. For example, intercontinental parity means that the USA will use its vast nuclear strategic resources only in the event of provocations endangering vital interests. Yet the introduction of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons into the Mediterranean introduces an additional nuclear threshold that must be assessed in any Great-Power confrontation. The introduction of a second, but lower intensity, threshold increases the uncertainty in any Great-Power confrontation. The flexibility of the nuclear threshold in the Mediterranean allows Moscow to capitalize on the conventional portion of its force mix and minimize its persistent weaknesses. With this combination Moscow

[3] *Air Force Policy Letters for Commanders*, no. 8, 1969, pp. 2–3.

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TABLE I NAVAL STRENGTHS OF SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN POWERS (*Military Balance*)

Class Vessels	*Britain*	*Italy*	*Greece*	*Turkey*	*Portugal*	*France*	*Spain*	*Yugoslavia*
Aircraft carriers	2	—	—	—	—	3	—	—
Helicopter carriers	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
Cruisers	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Guided-missile light cruisers	—	4	—	—	—	2	—	—
Destroyers and destroyer escorts	2	2	12	10	—	18	8	3
Guided-missile destroyers	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ASW destroyers and destroyer escorts	—	20	—	—	—	—	—	—
ASW frigates	19	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Other frigates	—	—	—	—	12	26	16	—
Other escort vessels	35	23	—	15	13	14	6	20
Submarines	22	10	2	10	4	19	4	4
Fleet ballistic-missile submarines	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Minesweepers	45	61	16	16	16	55	25	19
Minelayers	—	—	2	7	—	—	4	—
Patrol boats and motor torpedo boats	—	12	13	8	43	—	6	65
OSA-class missile patrol boats	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
Commando-assault ships	4	—	—	—	—	2	—	—
Amphibious ships and craft	—	—	26	—	5	32	11	70

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TABLE II TACTICAL AIR POWER FOR SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN STATES (*Military Balance*)

Country	*Tactical Aircraft*	
	Combat Aircraft	*Specialized Aircraft for the Middle East*
Britain	750 (Air Force)	20 Vulcan bombers, Shackleton and Canberra Recce
	250 (?) (Naval Air)	Buccaneer bombers, Phantom and Sea Vixen fighter/bombers
France	475 (Air Force)	1 sqd. A—1D, Madagascar 1 sqd. A1—D, Somaliland
	275 (Naval Air)	53 fighter/bombers, 38 interceptors, plus Recce and ASW
Greece	215 (Air Force)	
	7 sqd fighter/bombers	
Italy	450 (Air Force)	
	7 sqd fighter/bombers	
	3 sqd ASW	
Portugal	100 (Air Force)	
	3 sqd fighter/bombers	
	1 sqd ASW	
Turkey	500 (Air Force)	
	16 (?) sqd fighter/bombers	
Spain	186 (Air Force)	
	5 sqd fighter/bombers	
	1 sqd ASW	
Yugoslavia	315 (Air Force)	

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can raise tensions to a high but not critical level. Moreover, if Moscow should miscalculate and regional tensions should reach a critical point, they would carry little risk to vital Soviet national interests or those of its principal allies—yet any destabilizing situation in this region endangers vital interests of many NATO members. Furthermore, regional stability is not as important to Soviet economic interests as it is to the West: the USSR can sustain a reprisal in kind for attacks on Western sea and air lines of communication without fear that interdiction would seriously impair its economic or security interests. Finally, at the same time as ultimate weapons are becoming progressively less appropriate as military instruments, regional political instability is increasing, providing opportunities for the application of a minimum amount of conventional power for the extraction of large political profits. Thus, the combination of intercontinental parity and the powerful position of its forces in the Mediterranean places the Soviet Union in the strongest military position outside its immediate continental confines it has ever enjoyed.

Admiral S. G. Gorshkov has emphasized this new posture: 'The Soviet navy has been converted, in the full sense of the word, into an offensive type of long-range armed force . . . which could exert a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in theatres of military operations of vast extent . . . and which is also able to support state interests at sea in peacetime.'[4]

Thus, at a minimum cost, the Soviets have presented a challenge to NATO naval defences in the Mediterranean and have by-passed the US strategic deterrence. Indeed, the Soviet challenge has forced the West to reorient its Mediterranean strategy and has imposed new concepts of naval warfare in a theatre formerly governed exclusively by Western concepts of operation. For example, one of the chief advantages formerly enjoyed by the USA was the mobility, firepower and range of its 15 attack carriers. Because of excellent aircraft turn-around capabilities, the conventional firepower of a carrier-borne aircraft wing was superior to all other means of attack except the B-52 heavy bombardment aircraft. This rating remains valid in uncontested areas, but has become partially neutralized in the Mediterranean. In these waters an increasing number of naval aircraft are now dedicated to fleet protection, either in air defence roles or counter-ship attacks. Consequently, the contribution of carrier-based air support for land operations has been partially reduced.

This significantly increases the burden on land-based tactical aircraft in providing air support. In US unilateral engagements, e.g. in support of Israel against the Arabs, one or more of the host countries, in which US tactical air power is currently stationed, may withhold approval for the conduct of operational missions from its territory.

[4] TASS, 28 July 1967; also 'Admiral Baikov's Speech', Leningrad Radio, 27 July 1969.

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The present US structure of bases is seriously inadequate for conducting sustained tactical air missions if operating rights are denied by Turkey or Spain. Furthermore, in areas beyond the littoral, e.g. the Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula or Ethiopia, land-based tactical aircraft, even with aerial refuelling, can accomplish little more than a show of force.

THE Soviet squadron is confronted with several weaknesses and handicaps as it attempts to demonstrate convincingly its military strength. Most important, it is faced with the overwhelming naval and tactical air power of NATO. Tables II and III [5] reveal several factors that Moscow must consider. First, naval forces assigned to Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) retain a preponderance of conventional surface firepower, amphibious landing capabilities, naval air support, reconnaissance and fleet escort assets. Greek and Turkish destroyers and mine layers can block the Dardanelles, effectively patrol the Aegean Sea and protect their important maritime centres. The Portuguese navy with assistance from other NATO members can effectively block the Straits of Gibraltar. The Italian navy can conduct screening operations in the Otranto Straits, participate in a barrier of the Sicilian Straits, as well as provide cruisers for offensive operations. The French Mediterranean squadron, though not firmly committed to NATO, is itself superior conventionally to the Soviet force.[6] If Spain should participate, its navy could contribute to the defence of Gibraltar. This superiority would allow NATO sufficient forces to seal and defend the Mediterranean and leave the Sixth Fleet, the British naval commando assault group, plus other NATO naval forces, free for offensive operations.

The bulk of NATO's nuclear and conventional striking power in the Mediterranean consists of the US Sixth Fleet and one wing of US Air Force Phantom fighter/bomber aircraft. The Sixth Fleet consists of approximately 50 warships and support vessels, divided into two carrier task groups and a marine assault task group. The carriers normally have a complement of 80–100 aircraft. Escort and screening duties are performed by destroyers and frigates and fire support is provided by cruisers and frigates accompanying the assault group. This is the most powerful fleet of warships permanently on duty anywhere in the world. Moreover, these forces can be rapidly reinforced from NATO vessels in the Atlantic.

Allied tactical air power is also a formidable force (Table III). The bulk of the land-based aircraft are assigned nuclear strike and conventional ground support missions. The immediate threat to Soviet vessels would come from aircraft assigned to the 3–5 Allied carriers. If the conflict became protracted, Allied tactical air units could be

[5] *Military Balance* (Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1969).
[6] Horacio Rivero, 'Cincsouth Meets the Press', *NATO's 15 Nations*, October–November, 1969; also Robert H. Magnus, *United States Interests in the Middle East* (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968).

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shifted rapidly from ground to naval support, and attack missions or carrier reinforcements from the British Home Fleet and the US Second Fleet could be expected.

NATO has recently supplemented these forces by the creation in November 1968 of a Maritime Air Surveillance Command (MARAIRMED) in Naples, utilizing air reconnaissance resources of the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom. The task of this Command is to maintain continuous surveillance of all Soviet warships and merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. From a control centre, processed intelligence on accurate ship locations is passed to AFSOUTH and appropriate subordinate commands, providing tactical air and naval units with current data on potentially hostile warships.[7]

In May 1969 NATO created a combined on-call naval squadron composed of three destroyers from Italy, Britain and the United States. These vessels are designated for immediate action within the Mediterranean and can be augmented by three additional vessels from other member states. The main purpose of the new formation is psychological rather than military. A decision to deploy a multilateral force would indicate to an opponent the degree of NATO cohesion that he must accept as the risks associated with any contingency.

While the Soviet squadron would have few options against such a formidable air and naval armada, a sustained submarine campaign would significantly complicate NATO defences.[8] The Soviets can be expected to saturate the Mediterranean before hostilities with medium-range submarines. This decision would probably be based on the assumption that the early disruption of maritime communications could facilitate the opening of a second front in the Mediterranean and the eventual collapse of NATO's Southern Flank. The West's vulnerability is illustrated by the presence of about 2,600 merchant ships in the Mediterranean in any day—roughly half belonging to NATO members. The principal trading nations in the area, Italy, Greece and Turkey, depend upon sea lanes for the delivery of 160 million tons of goods per annum[9] and are highly susceptible to Soviet attack by conventionally armed missiles and submarine torpedoes. NATO ASW operations against this threat are severely hampered by the prevailing sonar conditions. Accordingly, significant losses can be expected from a determined Soviet submarine campaign in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the bulk of the remaining merchant vessels plying the Mediterranean on any day belong to the USSR and other

[7] Ibid.; and *NATO Letter*, January 1969, pp. 20–23.

[8] Rear-Admiral Edward C. Outlaw, recent commander of the ASW force, Sixth Fleet, stated in a public interview, 'We do not have enough assets on the scene, in aircraft or in surface ships, to handle the Soviet submarine threat. We have neglected the Mediterranean and Atlantic. . . .' This view was supported by Vice-Admiral David C. Richardson, CINC Sixth Fleet, in *San Diego Union*, 16 November 1969.

[9] Curt Gasteyger, 'Conflict and Tension in the Middle East', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 51, September 1968, p. 5.

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Warsaw Pact members. These and other communist vessels in NATO ports or waters would become important hostages during crises involving the Alliance. In a highly critical situation, Moscow would be faced with the choice of curtailing its commercial schedules and confining its merchant fleet to port, knowing the West would regard this as an indication of escalation, or of sacrificing the bulk of its commercial carrying capacity in the hope of preserving an element of surprise. Such sobering options are likely to induce prudence rather than recklessness, and to encourage behaviour based on respect for traditional maritime customs and admiralty law.

NAVAL hostilities in such confined waters as the Mediterranean would only be a rational policy if they were conducted as a phase of a larger global conflict or if the Soviets gained assured control over one of the three access routes. At present there is little likelihood that Moscow will secure the benevolent neutrality or direct control from one of the sovereign states involved. The Suez Canal will probably remain closed for many years, and Soviet operations from Algerian ports could hamper naval movements but not guarantee access through the Gibraltar Straits. The Turkish Straits are too shallow for submerged transit, denying the possibility of unobserved naval movements, and, like the other two routes, can be blocked by land forces. Consequently, Soviet lines of communication into the Mediterranean are vulnerable to blockade by powerful NATO forces or to the whims of the controlling authorities. These restrictions were probably responsible for the USSR's circumspection in not seeking regional political advantages from its first naval base in the Mediterranean maintained in Albania until 1961.

In contrast, the NATO navies have distinct resupply advantages. The NATO navies will be operating in the vicinity of home ports with much broader maintenance and logistic support available than the Soviets can expect from jointly used Arab facilities. While Gibraltar remains under British jurisdiction, the US fleet will be assured of facilities for convoys from US eastern ports, as well as of those naval stores maintained at Spanish and Italian bases. The Soviets' relatively complicated resupply problems could become critical in a protracted confrontation.

An additional diminution of Soviet military potential centres on the political stability of the Balkans. Aggressive operations in the Mediterranean will require dominance of the Black Sea and Turkish neutrality, both being contingent upon the formal support or pacifity of the Balkans.[10] Resistance to Soviet efforts by Yugoslavia or Rumania would compromise the moral support needed to justify an aggressive thrust into the Mediterranean and force the diversion of Soviet resources into the Balkans for flank protection of the lines south. The probable

[10] Ibid.

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inability of Moscow to secure endorsement by the Balkan nations reduces the possibility that Moscow can draw on the Warsaw Pact to endorse operations in non-contiguous areas. In view of the Kremlin's historic aversion to unilateral operations abroad, its allies' abstention further reduces the prospects that Soviet military power in the Mediterranean will be used to challenge NATO. The continuing viability of NATO, therefore, highlights the contrast between Western unity and Moscow's isolation in the Middle East from its traditional allies.

PROBABLY the weakest facet of the Soviet strategic posture in the Middle East is the reliability of its new 'allies', its client Arab states. No formal legally binding defence pacts have been signed between Moscow and the Arab states, but the client states have a prominent place in Soviet strategy. Moscow's political commitments were significantly increased after the June war by its willingness to underwrite once again the rearmament of Arab armed forces.

The total quantity of Arab arms is now approximately the same as it was before the June war, but the quality is superior to any weapons delivered outside the Warsaw Pact—including the Asian communist countries: 'It is now estimated that Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq presently have a superiority of more than 2 to 1 in tanks and combat aircraft over Israel, which now has about 800 tanks and 270 combat aircraft.'[11] The costs of this rearmament are shown in the following chart.[12]

TABLE III

Selected Middle Eastern Defence Budgets 1964–1969
(expressed in millions of US dollars)

	Before 1967	1969
UAR	415 (1965)	805
Syria	90 (1963)	195
Israel	271 (1964)	829

Soviet diplomatic setbacks in the Middle East under Khrushchev were in part a result of Soviet policy oversights and shortcomings; the 1967 defeat, however, was caused primarily by Arab military incompetence and political rivalry. The UAR lost nearly two-thirds of its 500 combat aircraft in three hours. Two Egyptian armoured divisions, five tank brigades and as many as 12 armoured artillery regiments were routed in 60 hours, losing 800 of their 1,000 tanks and guns. Despite successive improvements in Soviet equipment and training, the Arabs' third clash

[11] 'Western European Union Report on the Soviet Threat in the Mediterranean', *NATO Letter*, June 1969, p. 3.
[12] *Military Balance*, op. cit.

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with Israel resulted in their most crushing defeat. Moscow's determination to overcome or compensate for these failings has resulted in a sharp increase in Soviet involvement.

It is problematic, however, whether the USSR has been able to establish a degree of control over Arab policy corresponding to the amount of aid it has extended. The USSR has initiated a comprehensive programme to improve the combat effectiveness of Arab armed forces, primarily those of the UAR. Some 4,000 Soviet advisers are now installed at all levels of command, down to tactical operational units. They are believed to be supervising planning, training and logistics administration. Soviet advisers have imposed an exacting training programme, including day and night operations, joint air and naval exercises, combined operations with other national forces and exercises at battalion and brigade levels. On Soviet advice, measures have been taken to improve command and control, thoroughness in staff work and preparedness against surprise attack.[13]

The growth in Middle Eastern defence budgets—the highest percentages in the world—and improvements in combat effectiveness without adequate controls embody several potential dangers. First, new conflicts fought with more advanced weapons make containment more difficult. Second, they have already accelerated changes in the nature of the arms race by calling for better and more expensive weapon systems, as well as for an ever-growing number of them. This could lead ultimately to demands for unconventional weapons. Finally, should external intervention be required in a climate of arms escalation, the foreign powers will have to calculate on employing forces equal to the weapons they have supplied, raising the dimensions of Middle East conflicts to hitherto unanticipated levels.[14] Thus, improvements on both sides in weapons, force employment concepts and training should be assessed not only for the immediate tactical impact, but for their effect upon escalation, regional stability and the degree of control by the Great Powers.

Only inconclusive evidence is yet available defining the actual extent of Soviet authority over the policy of its clients. There appears to be a clear gap between Moscow's willingness to discuss with Washington political measures for relaxing tensions and the Arabs' determination to rely on hostilities as the preferred means for inducing a favourable settlement. Soviet authority may be greater in purely tactical military operations—the level of control depending upon the intensity of the anticipated engagement. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that while Moscow may wield sufficient negative pressure to block or modify Arab policies that might be detrimental to Soviet interests, it does not yet exert the positive authority in the Mediterranean that the US can through unity with its NATO partners. The difficulties in

[13] John Valdeleur, *Daily Telegraph*, 8 February 1969, provides a detailed account of the Soviet training programme and Egyptian reactions.
[14] Gasteyger, op. cit.

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translating negative to positive influence hold serious risks and uncertainties for Soviet planners.

THE successful Soviet ensconcement in the Mediterranean is a genuine historic turning point. Whether this physical asset can be converted to political profit depends upon the extent to which Soviet influence has reached parity with that of other regional powers and the susceptibility of local governments to alien pressures. There is no such thing as military equality or absolute parity. The influence of one state on the policies of another state or a group of states depends largely upon their calculation of the power that can be applied against them and their estimate of how it will be used. No amount of official pronouncements, threats or promises will compensate for power that either is dissipated elsewhere or cannot be utilized. (For example, Egypt's heavy commitments in Yemen increased Israel's confidence that the rapid destruction of Egypt's Sinai units would paralyse the nation's total armed forces. On the other hand, smaller non-nuclear powers, e.g. North Vietnam and North Korea, have concluded that the US will not use its strategic nuclear force against them regardless of the level of local provocation.)

Strategic parity in a given region, then, is a function of symmetrical deterrence and the calculation of risks and uncertainties inherent in any policy or action that may alter the status quo to the detriment of an adversary. While strategic parity is a relative factor, it can be measured by several criteria: to what extent can the Great Powers protect their respective interests in any given crisis, unilaterally if necessary; to what extent can either power exploit the weaknesses of the other; to what extent is either prepared to protect or is capable of protecting the interests of clients or allies. By these standards, both Great Powers suffer important constraints, yet enjoy significant manoeuvrability.

In terms of military power the Soviets have achieved powerful deterrence against the US by their operations in the Mediterranean. If the Soviets achieved complete tactical surprise and launched a pre-emptive nuclear strike against American capital ships and key bases in this region they could inflict severe damage and it would be some time before sufficient replacements could be deployed to restore the balance. On the other hand, if both sides had adequate warning of an impending nuclear engagement to initiate appropriate defensive precautions, the Soviets would probably sustain such losses that surviving units would no longer constitute a viable fighting force, while the USA would likely forfeit several key warships and a few aircraft. In a protracted bilateral conventional engagement the USA would have sufficient advantages from the outset to neutralize effectively the Soviet forces and reinforcements in the region. If only the southern flank of NATO were involved in a conventional conflict with the Soviets and Arabs it would likely end in the West's favour as a 'superb live-

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fire exercise'. The number of forces alone ensures that the West can sustain significant losses and still protect its interests. Thus, military parity exists in direct proportion to the level of conflict: at the lower end of the spectrum, the West retains sufficient advantages to impose asymmetrical deterrence when important interests are threatened, but has diminishing advantages as the scale progresses towards a no-warning nuclear war.

Despite their bombast, the Soviets have shown a sensitivity to the risks associated with their deficiencies. Accordingly, they probably envisage a relatively constrained mission for their naval power. Admiral Gorshkov stated circumspectly on Navy Day 1968: 'With the growth of the Soviet Union's economic might, its interests are becoming increasingly widespread over the seas and oceans; consequently new demands are being made of the navy for the defence of these interests from imperialist encroachments.'[15] Gorshkov strongly implies that the USSR has deployed its warships primarily for an anti-ship role. Soviet naval cruise missiles are ideally suited for attacks on slow-moving merchant vessels or warships beyond the range of hostile guns. Soviet policy has raised the classical naval mission of sea lane protection to a new dimension and omitted the customary step of seeking control of the high seas by matching a rival gun for gun. Under low-risk circumstances, Moscow can now intervene militarily by invitation, in combination with local forces, or unilaterally, with sufficient force and staying-power to present NATO with a *fait accompli*. The recent escalation of Soviet involvement in the Israeli-Egyptian conflict confirms that the Kremlin now feels strong enough to try to alter the status quo in its favour when propitious conditions occur.

[15] TASS, 27 July 1968; also V. Kasatonov, 'The Mediterranean is not an American Lake', *Soviet Military Review*, January 1969, pp. 53–55; and N. Smirnov, 'Soviet ships in the Mediterranean', *Red Star*, 12 November 1969.

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THE DECLINE OF ITALIAN DEMOCRACY?

Victor A. Velen

FOR the past year Italy has been sinking more and more deeply into a crisis that while manifestly political is also profoundly social and psychological. The unquestionable need for change, resulting both from the intrinsic backwardness of the Italian social structure and from the Italian industrial and economic revolution, has created a generalized demand for more advanced, more progressive policies and solutions. Unfortunately—and this is a phenomenon true not only of Italy—the communists have succeeded in persuading an important segment of the population that 'progressive' is equivalent to 'communist'. The trade unions, the most vocal youth groups and leading intellectuals now consider that only a 'government to the left' (that is, one dominated by the Communist Party) offers the possibility of solving Italy's problems. For them, communist ideology, despite its factionalization and 50 years of Stalinist repression, has lost none of its magnetism.

The general crisis in society also reflects the upheaval of a generation which has not yet learned how to solve problems democratically, which rejects 'bourgeois democracy' as such, and whose ideological requirements have become ever more clamorous and chiliastic. As students have shut down the universities or taken over their classrooms (now for the third year in a row), in the name of undefined and undefinable goals expressed in neo-anarchist or Maoist slogans, parliamentary democracy in Italy is becoming increasingly impotent to reproduce, reinterpret and reinforce its image. It cannot compete with communism, since it fulfils no need for faith. It therefore has no heirs.

Nothing, in fact, is counterposed to the new forces of action. In the recent years of unprecedented prosperity the Italian bourgeoisie and the non-communist intellectuals have been cultivating a kind of 'qualunquism' or ostrich policy. Their indifference is illustrated by such frequent comments as, 'nothing ever happens in Italy'; '*tutto finisce con un nulla di fatto*' ('everything ends with nothing being done'); 'Italian politics are no more than the usual Mediterranean politics, not to be taken seriously': 'the communists don't want power; they are no longer dangerous'.

Added to this is the fact that Italy is a country without parliamentary and democratic traditions, and which a generation ago had one of the highest illiteracy rates in Western Europe. For these reasons, the intricacies of the political situation—parliamentary alliances, governmental coalitions, regional and communal problems—are a complex maze to the man in the street. According to a recent public opinion poll, over 50

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per cent of the population do not know the difference between a one-party and a four-party government. How then is the majority expected to understand the Balkanization of the currents, sub-currents and pressure groups within the political parties themselves, or even less to grasp what they represent in terms of ideas?

Finally, the divorce between the people and the ruling class (the so-called political class) has persisted since the period of absolutism. In the course of Italian unification in the nineteenth century, an alien Piedmontese bureaucracy, representing the only region of Italy in which the industrial revolution was taking place, was grafted on to the remnants of the former governing class, the aristocracy and the landowners, thus perpetuating the separation between those who wielded power and the governed. Under fascism some attempt was made to unify the country, but the fascist regime disregarded existing social problems and functioned as a modernized form of traditional rule. In more recent years neither the old ruling class nor the new bourgeoisie have understood that the industrial revolution and the emergence of a consumption society have altered radically their relationship to the working classes, the trade unions and to the entire productive machinery of society. They have failed to realize the necessity for basic structural changes, that an economic miracle must be paralleled by a social miracle.

THESE and other factors, such as the gulf between North and South, mountain and plain, city and country, and political bossism explain why the Italians have never identified themselves with their national government or 'the authorities'. On the contrary, they have tended rather to view them as natural enemies, there to maintain or uphold inequities or injustices, taxes and bureaucracy.

Starting in the 1950s the century-old gap of economic backwardness that separated Italy from its more highly developed West European neighbours began rapidly to dwindle under the impact of a sudden and sustained economic and industrial boom. However, while industrial production and the standard of living have risen, the structure of power, representing industrial, local and other interests, or simply clienteles (local notables who bring in the votes), has remained almost stationary. And a rigid, highly cumbersome and partially corrupt bureaucracy, handed down from absolutism through fascism, is interposed between the people and its elected representatives.

In concrete political terms the crisis—in essence the failure to generate a sound democratic consensus— is characterized by three significant inter-related phenomena. They are the internal instability of the Christian Democratic Party, the emergence of a united trade union front, in which the communist-controlled unions play an important role, and the takeover of important regional and city administrations by communist and communist-backed coalitions.

In the past year, and especially since the Socialist Party split into right and left wings in July 1969, the energy of the Christian Democrats—

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the dominating force of the government since the Second World War—has been largely consumed by the effort to contain the centrifugal pull of the Party's eight factions, and, above all, to mollify its own important left wing, which tends increasingly to align with the positions of the left socialists and the communists. The left Catholics could in fact now be counted among the future components of a government 'oriented towards the left' (one, that is, that would include the communists).

Within the Christian Democratic Party's central governing body the left wing now commands approximately 24 per cent of the vote. Allied with former Premier Aldo Moro's faction, it can count on about 37 per cent. But, more important, it represents the Catholic trade union confederation, the recently formed Catholic political action committee and the Catholic youth.

A leading spokesman for the Christian Democratic left is Donat Cattin, Minister of Labour in the last, one-party government of Mariano Rumor. In recent months he has emerged as a powerful contender for leadership of a possible 'united left' which would encompass the three major trade union confederations. This became evident after the so-called '*autunno caldo*' or 'hot autumn' of 1969, a period of peak labour agitation in Italy. At the time, although a minister in the government, he supported a joint trade union move to challenge the authority of the judiciary to bring legal action against workers who had been accused of causing damage to persons and property during the autumn strikes. He has also sided with a combined student-trade union-Communist Party charge of government 'repression' (against trade union activity, street manifestations, etc.). Donat Cattin has been described by *Corriere della Sera* (2 November 1969) as the 'most striking' figure in the Rumor government, a Catholic with a 'Congregationalist spirit', a 'non-conformist' who has risen through the partisan resistance and the trade union movement to assume the role of 'apostle of the masses'.

An additional factor contributing to the precarious internal equilibrium of the Party is that the Catholic Church has not concerned itself with Italian politics—that is, until it recently put pressure on the government on the subject of divorce. Its interest has been oriented largely towards the Third World. Unlike Pope John XXIII, who encouraged the centre-left coalition as a parellel to the reform of the Church, Pope Paul VI has not taken any official interest in the fate of Italian democracy. He has spoken out primarily on matters of dogma, such as the marriage of priests and the use of the pill.

The recent Vatican intervention against the impending legislation in parliament on divorce—which it finds inadmissible since it is in contradiction to the concordat—has, however, suddenly placed the Church in the centre of the political debate. The divorce issue, an especially thorny and typically Italian problem, was inserted by the Christian Democrats into the negotiations for the formation of a new government at a very late stage, following a note from the Vatican, with the effect

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of nearly excluding the chance for the revival of the centre-left coalition. It is the one issue on which Christian Democrats from the extreme right to the pro-communist left can agree. And possibly for this reason it appeared to the Catholics as the only conceivable platform around which the Party could unite in confronting the always present possibility of new national elections. Moreover, the issue could in the future provide a possible basis for straddling the other centre-left parties (which are committed to a lay policy of separation of Church and state) to reach a direct compromise with the communists, for whom the question is unimportant. It was with the support of the communist vote, in fact, that the Lateran Agreements were incorporated, as Article 7, into the Republican Constitution in 1947. Without communist collaboration at that time, there would have been no concordat, and divorce would not have become an issue.

A communist-Catholic agreement on the divorce question—which the communists euphemistically refer to as 'safeguarding religious peace'—could represent the first step towards a possible Catholic-communist condominium, or in the current terminology a *'repubblica conciliare'*.

THE second major aspect of the political crisis is the new trade union unity, following the lead of the largest Italian labour confederation, the communist-dominated General Confederation of Italian Labour. (Together, the three trade unions have about five million members.) This *ipso facto* trade union solidarity came into being in the spring and summer of 1969. Since that time joint trade union action has been largely responsible for the greatly intensified social unrest in Italy.

While trade union gains have marked a necessary and overdue rise in the economic and social conditions of the Italian worker—a break out of the ghetto—the intensity and prolongation of the strikes resulted in a danger of an inflationary spiral—exemplified by a sudden jump in the prices of consumer goods, up to seven per cent within a year—as well as in a weakening of the competitive position of Italian goods on the world market. A parellel phenomenon has been a steady drain on the lire which is being illegally exported and converted into foreign currency. By the middle of March 1970 the loss amounted to about three and a half billion dollars. This in turn has caused a rapid decline in the value of the lire on the foreign market, with a consequent rise in international currency speculation and a fall in internal investment.

A third and no less important aspect of the crisis is that the national political scene is reflected in the Italian provincial and city administrations, where centre-left coalitions are being challenged or broken up on the local level by communist-left socialist or communist-PSIUP-left socialist coalitions. (The PSIUP is the socialist splinter group to the left of the communists; it is supported largely by student dissenters and left intellectuals.)

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The situation in the local administrations acquires greater significance in view of the approaching elections for the new regional ruling bodies, scheduled to be held for the first time in June 1970. The creation of regional administrations was written into the Italian Constitution and intended as a structural reform to decentralize certain administrative functions. These functions, however, have yet to be specified by law. The reform was conceived in general to give greater autonomy to the historic regions of Italy.

Hypothetically, in the regional elections of June this year, should the communist vote remain the same as or exceed that of the national elections of May 1968, the regions (with their principal cities) in which communist control would be certain are Liguria (Genoa), Emilia-Romagna (Bologna), Tuscany (Florence) and Umbria (Perugia); in the event of a communist-left socialist coalition (again based on the election result of May 1968), communist control would be possible in the Piemonte (Turin) and Lombardia (Milan); regions in doubt, i.e. which could go either way, would be Lazio (Rome), Calabria (Reggio Calabria) and Sicily (Palermo).[1]

The weakening and splintering of the centre-left parties, the Christian Democrats and the socialists, may be attributed in large part to the unremitting challenge, in parliament and at the polls, of the communists. The Communist Party in Italy derives its strength from several diverse factors: its record of resistance against fascism and the German occupiers, its identification with the expectations of the communist millennium, its ties with the Soviet Union, and the fact that it has remained in the opposition (outside the government) and is not equated with the political class.

The future physiognomy of the regional governments was in fact an issue of primary importance, along with that of divorce, in the recent prolonged and tortuous negotiations to revive the centre-left coalition. The left socialists insisted on the right to enter regional coalitions with the communists, while at the same time forming part of a centre-left national government in Rome. Yet for Christian Democrats and for Social Democrats one of the implicit reasons behind the attempt to re-form the centre-left coalition was to *prevent* just this eventuality. In the course of the negotiations the left Christian Democrats, the left socialists, and the communists, while they opposed the revival of the centre-left coalition, also opposed the alternative of the dissolution of the Chambers and a call for new national elections. The left forces favoured holding the regional elections—in which the chances of a left victory appear much greater—before national elections, on the theory that success on the local level will redound to their favour on the national level, as well as of course entrenching their position. In the end the left socialists agreed to back the four-party coalition under Rumor on the condition that the regional elections be held as originally

[1] *Annuario Statistico Italiano*, 1969.

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scheduled. However, the government formula was approved by the left Catholics and left socialists on the assumption that the character of the new centre-left would be 'open' (to the communists) at the regional level, while the rest of the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Republicans agreed on the assumption that it would be 'autonomous', that is, closed to the communists. In sum, the new centre-left government then rests on an equivocal understanding of its own position on a paramount, perhaps critical issue.

The Italian Communist Party has been able to maintain and to increase its strength due to a number of concrete reasons. It possesses a well-organized and well-financed national and capillary apparatus, dependent largely on profit-making, communist-run enterprises, such as co-operatives. It dominates the most powerful trade union in Italy. And it has profited by the spread of Marxist ideology among intellectuals and youth, among the younger Catholic educators, in the universities,[2] in publishing and in the mass media.

An additional and important consideration is that the country's economic growth has brought about a new social consciousness among the working classes, an awareness, hitherto absent, of the obsolete nature of social relationships. For instance, the emigration of poor and partly literate agricultural workers from the South—Naples, Calabria and Sicily (600,000–700,000 abroad, mainly to Switzerland, Germany and France, and two and a half million to the industrial triangle of the North, Turin-Milan-Genoa)—has resulted in their *déclassement*. Once uprooted from family and clan ties—the social structure of the South in which traditionally they remained faithful to their local political bosses, normally Catholics or conservatives, and voted for them—they changed their allegiance. As their living conditions have altered radically the southern migratory workers have become the pariahs of the North and have swelled the mass of the communist opposition, the only alternative offered them.

Finally, the Communist Party has benefited by the projection of a new image as a national party. Its dissent from the Soviet Union over

[2] While the Communist Party has not condoned the activity of the student extremists (who espouse a freely interpreted kind of 'Marxism-Leninism' with various sub-cults ranging from Stalinists to the 'Nazi-Maoists' of Rome University's Faculty of Law), on every occasion following student-instigated riots, in which both police and students have been injured or, in rare instances, killed, the communists have been quick to charge police brutality as responsible. They do not want to be associated with generally unpopular acts of vandalism or violence, but they are anxious to attract and hold the youth. Recently, the students have formed a common front with the communists and the trade unions in denouncing the so-called 'repression' (the Italian non-communist press also puts it in quotes), i.e. legal action taken against students or workers arising from unlawful acts committed during manifestations or strikes. An example of this was the march of protest 'against the repression' in Milan on 31 January 1970, in which an estimated 15,000–20,000 participated. The march was organized and led by the *movimento studentesco* (the left-wing Italian student movement) and included representatives of the trade unions, the left socialists, the PSIUP, workers from the Alfa Romeo and Pirelli plants and youth groups of nearly every political complexion.

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the invasion of Czechoslovakia—it campaigned on the issue of support for the Czech 'new course' in May 1968—has persuaded a good part of Italian and world public opinion that it is a genuinely liberal and independent party. The impression has taken hold, despite the fact that the disagreement with Moscow has been purely formal and that the Italian communists have continued to back basic Soviet foreign policy aims, such as the elimination of NATO and the Soviet position in the Middle East crisis. In the course of the past year the Italian communists have reaffirmed their loyalty to the USSR and have made a concerted effort to close ranks behind a traditional, conformist policy tied to the Soviet bloc.[3] Anti-Soviet dissenters, such as the so-called *Manifesto* group, which espouses the Chinese line, have been summarily expelled from the Party.

THE communists' position has naturally been strengthened by the disintegration of the governing majority, and the resultant power vacuum. And the communists have also gained by the prolonged crisis of the regime, in the course of which democratic institutions have undergone a process of erosion and a number of important local and provincial administrations have become paralyzed in a political stalemate. Judging from these and the other factors working in their favour, the key question then becomes whether a durable governmental coalition can be formed with their continued exclusion from power. Theoretically, this would be possible should new national elections to parliament return a sizeable reformist but anti-communist majority. A popular reaction against the political and economic insecurity and the extremist violence of the past months could turn the tide against the communists. The electoral trend until now, however, has been the reverse—a small but steady gain in the communist vote with each national election since 1948.

Another possibility would be a right-wing military coup. But the conditions for a right-wing upset at this juncture do not seem to exist. No force or personality has as yet emerged on the national scene that would be capable of challenging the power of a 'united front' of the left. And both the police and the army have been largely de-politicized in recent years. On the other hand, with the prolongation of the crisis the chance of a right-wing coup cannot be excluded.

Should these seemingly fragile alternatives fail or simply not materialize, the possibility of the formation of a left Catholic, left socialist and communist majority, in which the communists would be dominant, would be greatly enhanced, if not made inevitable. In this

[3] Communist Party leader and deputy, Giorgio Amendola, in an address given in Rome on the occasion of the celebration of Lenin's birthday in January 1970, stated the Italian Party's position: 'Our Party has been asked to assume a different stand in international politics. Our answer is precise and unequivocal: we have been and shall continue to be faithful to proletarian internationalism' (*Corriere della Sera*, 2 February 1970).

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event the way would be open to the establishment of a 'people's democracy' in Italy.

A primary communist demand in exchange for co-operation would almost certainly be Italy's withdrawal from NATO (an explicitly stated aim of the Italian Communist Party). This could lead to the neutralization of Italy, as well as to a profound change in the future shape of European unity and the Common Market—in other words, a basic shift in foreign policy away from the West.

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Quarterly Notes

THE CENTENARY

NOW that the party is over and the circus has left town one can reflect with some serenity on the recent show of *ersatz* religiosity in the Soviet secular church: the centenary celebrations of Lenin's birth. The ceremony over, the slogans are fading, the posters are torn, the banners are folded and put back into safe-keeping. There is a nagging sense of an anti-climax after such a Niagara of articles, flood of books, avalanche of conferences, superabundance of tributes. Even before, one had had the feeling of reaching a point of super-saturation, and of being left in a state of stupor. We were constantly told that 'Lenin Lives', but it would have been difficult for him to survive the centenary.

The official Bulgarian Party newspaper, *Rabotnichesko Delo* (5 April 1970) admitted that the endless reproduction of Lenin's face in 'flowers, postage stamps, chocolates, and so on' had reached the stage of 'unbridled wildness'. It asked with an air of injured innocence: 'Is it necessary for the window display in a fish shop to be arranged in honour of Lenin?' The mind boggles when faced with the question of what form this particular sacrilege took. The adulatory gestures from other countries ranged from panegyrics by the Congolese poets, Placide Muaipa and Enoku Mabassi, from the Brazzaville 'People's Republic' (*Izvestiya,* 21 April 1970) to homages by 'bourgeois' journalists written in a style well parodied in *Private Eye* (24 April 1970):

> 'To those who knew Lenin well, he was a shy, retiring intellectual, with no taste for violent revolution, or the trappings of power. . . Had he lived how he would have hated the personality cult which has since grown up about his name, typified by the sycophantic articles such as this written by myself'.

And in Moscow itself an irreverent story went round about a furniture factory producing for the centenary a special triple bed for married couples with the motto: 'Lenin is always with us'.

IT was the ending of 'the cult of personality' of Stalin which necessitated the intensification of the cult of Lenin as a basis for the legitimacy of Stalin's successors. The orgy of Leninist worship which has been taking place in the communist press commemorating the centenary can only be compared to what happened in 1949 when *Pravda* printed for months on end articles on Stalin's achievements in all fields, from philosophy to ichtyology, in preparation for his 70th birthday. On the present occasion too its editors, like the advertisers of Hollywood spectaculars, ran short of superlatives and so they were only able to provide tediousness in the extreme. No one, not even the Sovietologists, could have read all these lengthy hagiographical exercises. If Lenin were still alive to read them he would have died of boredom.

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He was embalmed and canonized almost 50 years ago, so one could hardly have expected any surprises in the celebrations of Saint Vladimir's Day, but there was one which did provide light relief. It occurred in the most solemn document of all, the 'Theses' produced for the sacred occasion by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (*Pravda* 23 December 1969). The 14th thesis, dealing with 'the revolutionary strength of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries', contained the following passage:

> In the draft of his report on the fundamental tasks of the Communist International, Lenin enumerated five 'social factors of strength' of the working class: (1) numbers; (2) degree of organization; (3) the place of the working class in the process of production and distribution; (4) activism; (5) education. Since the time when Lenin expressed this idea, the numerical size of the working class has increased enormously, and so has its organizational strength and political activism, as well as its educational and professional preparedness.

Unfortunately the five criteria mentioned were proposed not by Lenin, but by Otto Bauer, and in his report to the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, Lenin quoted them only to dismiss them with scorn. The argument was about the 'ripeness' of Russia for a socialist revolution and Otto Bauer, like other European social-democrats, considered that the backward Russia of 1917 was not ready for it. Lenin furiously rejected his criteria for 'ripeness' as the example of social-democratic 'opportunism', ironically remarking that Otto Bauer deserved a monument in Vienna, that 'such is the nature of present-day opportunism that its struggle with Bolshevism becomes a humorous exercise'. (Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Moscow, 3rd Edition, vol. 25, p. 342).

This time the 'humorous exercise' was enacted in Moscow. One of the schoolmen in the Moscow Institute of Marxism-Leninism who slipped up so badly must now be reflecting that in the same speech Lenin said that Otto Bauer's book, *Bolshevism or Social Democracy*, should be used in examinations to sort out genuine communists from those whose 'communism has not been properly assimilated' and who 'should not join the Communist Party'.

In a recent Soviet book on the publications of Lenin's works since 1897, *Lenin* v *pechati*, it is asserted that Lenin is the most widely read author in the world, that his books have been translated into 100 languages, and that they reached the astronomical number of 350 million copies in the Soviet Union. How many of the Soviet readers have read the 'Theses' on Lenin? And how many of them spotted the mistake in the turgid prose of the 'Theses'? Some reports from East Germany seem to indicate that it was Walter Ulbricht who noticed the error when he read them in *Neues Deutschland* (27 December 1969). Whatever the case, the paragraph in question was omitted from the text published in *Kommunist* (no. 1, 1970, p. 26) and then in pamphlet form.

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The Polish journal of Party history, *Z Pola Walki* (No. 1, 1970) has subsequently described in detail, and quite correctly, both Bauer's arguments and Lenin's criticisms of the social-democratic 'opportunists', without, however, making any reference to the Soviet *faux pas*. On the other hand the Chinese saw here a chance to fire a broadside at their ideological opponents (*Radio Peking*, 16 April 1970):

> In a big fanfare, Brezhnev and the rest of the handful of renegades who have betrayed Leninism put on a show of 'commemorating' Lenin, and on 23 December 1969 they dished up the so-called 'Thesis on the Centenary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin'. In the 'Thesis' they resort to their usual jiggery-pokery, mix Khrushchev revisionism in with Leninism, and pass social-imperialism off as Leninism. To the indignation of all, in broad daylight they viciously attribute to Lenin the nonsense about the 'five social factors of strength' which Otto Bauer, a chieftain of the Second International and an enemy of Marxism-Leninism, wrote in his sinister book *Bolshevism or Social-democracy*. They put his words in Lenin's mouth. Such a filthy lie leaves everyone flabbergasted. . . But this is neither surprising, nor accidental. It is determined by the 'nature of present-day opportunism' . . . To put it bluntly, they are pushing 'Bauerism' (which is rotten to the core) and the revisionism of the Second International. . . No dirty deal is too low for Brezhnev and company, that gang of scoundrels. In an attempt to cover up this scandal which had already become known to the world, they stealthily camouflaged what *Pravda* had published by deleting the name of Lenin, but retaining Bauer's ideas when the 'Theses' were later reprinted in the journal *Kommunist*. This only makes the scandal even more shocking. The more they try to hide it, the more they expose themselves as renegades of Leninism. . . It is by no means an individual or isolated incident that they pass Bauer's words off as Lenin's. It is their customary, despicable practice to tamper with, distort, emasculate and fabricate Lenin's statements'.

Actually, the Chinese communists have done a bit of their own jiggery-pokery here: in the reprinted 'Theses' the Soviets omitted from the relevant paragraph not only Lenin's name but also Bauer's 'five factors of strength' which were wrongly attributed by them to Lenin in the original text of the 'Theses'. The mistake was never explained; the correction was indeed done by stealth, but soon thereafter V. I. Stepakov, the head of *Agitprop*, and three other top ideological watch-dogs were dismissed. It happened before the celebration day for which they were preparing and it could hardly have been accidental, although not in the sense in which the Chinese used that word.

Whether there was something more behind this 'coincidence' is impossible to say. The 'Theses' maintained that Lenin 'energetically fought against attempts to turn the teachings of Marx and Engels into petrified and dead dogma', but the authors of the 'Theses' prudently confined themselves to using Lenin's writings as a holy writ consecrat-

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ing current policies of the Soviet leadership, the time-honoured practice from which the heads of *Agitprop* and other ideological departments are unlikely to deviate on their own.

IN the polycentric communist world selective quotationship is of course no longer the monopoly of Soviet Marxist-Leninist schoolmen (with or without dunce caps) and Lenin's centenary provided a special occasion for competitive quotation-mongering from his writings. Not surprisingly there were as many Lenins as there are different ideological positions among the communist parties, and some of these different Lenins confronted each other not only in the world at large, but even in Moscow itself.

In the course of the Lenin celebrations several international conferences were held in the Soviet Union to demonstrate 'the living thought of Lenin'. One of these conferences took place in Moscow in January 1970 and was devoted to 'the problems of strengthening the role of Leninism in the contemporary epoch and in the criticism of anti-communism'. The Yugoslav daily *Viestnik* (31 January 1970) criticized it for doing 'its utmost to prove that any further development of Lenin's ideas is revisionism'. Yet in point of fact 'Lenin advocated precisely those ideas for which the Yugoslav road to socialism is now proclaimed revisionist'. *Viestnik* quoted him as saying: 'The unity and fraternal alliance among the workers of all countries cannot accept either direct or indirect tyranny over other people.' This allusion to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was followed by a cautious conclusion. The Yugoslav paper remarked that to engage in an argument about Lenin's philosophy 'does not mean that one should be so malicious as to state openly who has really revised Lenin's teachings, or some of his principles. Let everyone think he is right and allow other people to think they are right too.'

On the surface this is indeed what seems to have been the case with the publication in *Pravda* (18 April 1970) of the article on Lenin by Josef Broz Tito himself. It was an occurrence in some ways reminiscent of the publication by the same journal of the article by Herbert Morrison almost two decades ago when Stalin was still alive. Only this time, the polemic was intra-communist and esoteric. Just when Moscow was reiterating the Brezhnev doctrine, Tito put great stress on the principle of the sovereignty of communist states. He paid a fulsome tribute to Lenin, only to claim that he was the spiritual ancestor of the Yugoslav practices:

> The cause of Lenin is at the basis of the ideology, of the revolutionary strategy and practice of the Communist Party, or more precisely of the League of Communists in Yugoslavia. . . As a result of the victorious revolution we have built a specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis of the teachings of

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> Marx, Engels and Lenin and in correspondence with our own conditions . . . Lenin's principled view of the necessity to grant a full self-determination right to nations had a special significance for us . . . Lenin stressed, as did Marx, the class approach to national problems. But he did not do it independently of his recognition of the equality of nations, of their equal rights and sovereignty. Without these, internationalism becomes an empty phrase.

Tito did not criticize directly his Soviet co-worshippers, but the Yugoslav press did assert that Moscow was trying to use Lenin's centenary to revive neo-Stalinist concepts in Lenin's name. Why did *Pravda* decide to publish Tito's article? Presumably because it wanted to show that Moscow is still the Mecca of the communist movement and that even heretics come to kiss the stone of Kaaba. The Yugoslav delegate at the Moscow festivities, Vladimir Bakaric, paid the customary tribute to Lenin, but tactfully abstained from rubbing Tito's points in. He said: 'There are other questions I could touch on, but this festive meeting provides neither the time nor the place' (*International Herald Tribune*, 23 April 1970), an attitude also displayed by the delegates, from North Korea, North Vietnam, and Japan.

The Rumanian visitors to Moscow, while making the ritual gestures to Lenin, asserted their independence. At the January 1970 Moscow conference, the Rumanian delegate, Stefan Voicu, chief editor of the Party monthly, *Lupta de Classa*, made a plea for tolerance of differences of opinion among communists. It was not reported in *Pravda*, but the text of the speech appeared in the February issue of the Rumanian journal. Voicu said that 'differences of views and divergencies in the international communist and working-class movement' must never be 'transposed' into any other form of struggle. It would be wrong to pretend to honour Lenin's memory by 'replacing arguments and ideas by anathemas and invective'. He added: 'No one can claim to have had the last word on any one problem or another, or say that other views are non-Marxist or even anti-communist.'

When Ceausescu came to the Moscow celebration, he also used the occasion to stress that it was Lenin's teachings which inspired Rumania to base 'its relations with all states on the principles of national independence and sovereignty, of equality, of the right of each nation to its own destiny, of non-interference into the internal affairs' of other countries (*Pravda*, 23 April 1970), a point he made more pungently in Bucharest on 17 April.

There was the opposite emphasis in the speech by Gomulka. He ended it by saying that 'the Polish United Workers Party, inspired by the Leninist principles, will be . . . strengthening still further the internationalist tie between Poland, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries' (*Trybuna Ludu*, 22 April 1970). He received for his performance an Order of Lenin, an honour which, needless to say, was not conferred on Ceausescu (or Tito).

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While in Moscow both the Russian temple-worshippers and the Yugoslav and Rumanian pilgrims intoned that 'Leninism is not a dogma', yet expounded their own interpretation of the Leninist iconolatry, in Rome the Italian communists stressed with their customary finesse a special relationship between Lenin's teachings and the 'Italian road to socialism':

> The lessons derived from Lenin's inspiration are present in what is most specific in our politics and in what we have been propagating and constructing in recent years as the Italian road to socialism (Gian Carlo Pajetta in *l'Unita,* 25 January 1970).

The list of Lenin-ventriloquists extends from Santiago Carillo to Adonis Brillakis (representing respectively the underground Spanish and Greek communist parties at odds with Moscow) to Enver Hoxha and Mao. Each of them used Lenin as a dummy to give his own interpretation of him at variance with the Moscow 'Theses'. Peking and Tirana naturally quoted Lenin's writings 'Against Revisionism' to castigate 'Soviet traitors to revolutionary Leninism'. *Jen Min Jih Pao* (21 April 1970) accused them of having 'the impudence to distort the great image of Lenin' and passing off 'their revisionist rubbish as Leninism'.

In his speech (printed in *Pravda,* 25 April 1970) celebrating Lenin's centenary in Havana, Fidel Castro, without naming his targets, attacked such views as being incompatible with true Leninism:

> There are, at present, as we know, ultra-left arch-revolutionary people who could, if you will, be regarded as real 'supermen', people who are capable of crushing and verbally annihilating imperialism in two seconds. Many such arch-revolutionaries, who have not the slightest notion about actual reality or about the problems and difficulties with which the revolution is faced, and moved by such feelings, which are actively kindled by the imperialists, harbour a bitter hatred. The impression created is that they somehow cannot forgive the very fact of existence of the Soviet Union.

He also strongly supported the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia where, he said, 'a counter-revolutionary process was obviously taking place'.

ALL the parties in question, although at logger-heads, wear in one way or another a mantle of Party orthodoxy; what about those communists who have recently fallen short of party orthodoxy, like Ernst Fischer or Roger Garaudy?

In his article 'The Resurrection of Lenin' (*New Statesman* 27 March 1970) Ernst Fisher presented Lenin as 'a revolutionary democrat'. In order to stress the democratic nature of Leninism, Fischer indulged in an historical fantasy in which Lenin is supposed to have been trying to advance 'to a socialist regime without an armed insurrection', a fantasy in which he appears as a most un-Leninist revolutionary, one who apparently never insisted that in a revolutionary situation the art

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of armed insurrection is of essence, but who basically was after 'a peaceful seizure of power'. Fischer wrote that Lenin was concerned that the governmental machinery 'needed to be controlled democratically by qualified communists and non-communists'; he just forgot to mention Lenin's dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

Roger Garaudy began to 'reinterpret' Lenin in the same way a long time ago. He had already strongly stressed the differences between Lenin and Stalin in *Marxisme du XXe siècle* (1966). Later on, in *Lenine* (1967), in *Peut-on être communiste aujourd'hui*? (1968), and in *Le grand tournant du socialisme* (1969), he put the blame on Kautsky for the Leninist concept of the *vanguard* and tried to prove by appropriate quotations that Lenin had been ready to accept 'the peaceful struggle of the parties' in post-revolutionary Russia, that he had recognized in principle the right of the minority to criticize the majority, and how much he was for 'the initiative of the masses' and 'the government by the people'.

Before he was expelled from the Politbureau and the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, Garaudy was sharply attacked in *Pravda* (15 January 1970). The editor of the 38-volume French-language edition of the collected works of Lenin was charged with 'breaking completely away from Leninism', a charge which Garaudy rejected in *Toute la vérité* (1970) as displaying 'the same scheme which previously served against Bukharin, London and Fischer'. His Lenin was clearly not the one whose centenary was celebrated in Moscow.

Also among those who extolled the democratic and anti-bureaucratic character of Lenin was the revisionist editor of the *Wiener Tagebuch*, Franz Marek, who is still a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria. In the April issue of his magazine he wrote an ironical comment on the 'Lenin celebrations':

> Lack of time will prevent festival speakers from showing the full compass of Lenin's thought. The speaker in Moscow will scarcely take the opportunity to recall Lenin's warning against Great Russian chauvinism, or his raging, even on his death-bed, against 'scoundrels and brutal bullies' such as the 'typical Russian bureaucrat' in his dealing with small nations. The speaker in Warsaw will certainly not find it necessary to join Lenin in calling down 'shame and disgrace upon everyone who sows enmity against Jews'. And Husak's interpreter of Lenin will have some difficulty in bringing the present state of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia into harmony with Lenin's famous advice that the Party must understand how to unite itself closely with the masses. . .

It was of course a safe prediction. As we have seen during the centenary celebrations the *apparatchiki* in Moscow, Warsaw and Prague made Lenin in their own image. But so did his other followers. As the *Economist* (10 January 1970) put it, commenting on the anniversary of Lenin: 'One can do wonders with quotations as one can with statistics'.

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There was nothing new in this. Those who want to prove that 'if Lenin had a grave he'd be turning in it' can always find suitable quotations in *State and Revolution* or in the last writings of Lenin, just as 'idealistic' revisionists turn to young Marx for quotations. However, such scholastic exercises have been no less silly—and certainly more boring—on this occasion when Lenin has been hailed as a secular saint.

It is true that Lenin was no Stalin; he had a different mentality and before his death he had increasingly been concerned about the behaviour of the *apparatchiki*, their lack of culture and their Great Russian chauvinism. He felt that the machine of state had slipped out of his hands. But these were the worries of an *apprenti sorcier*.

WESTERN commentators and leader writers writing on Lenin's centenary invariably asked what his attitude would be to communist policies since his death, what would he think now? In an editorial *The Times* (21 April 1970) said:

> Looking back after all that Russia has gone through since then, it is true enough to say that Lenin would have been shocked at the Tsarist panoply with which Stalin surrounded himself. He would have been appalled at the extensiveness and blind wastefulness of Stalin's repression. He would have been dismayed at the arrant nationalist pride that took the place of the old internationalist view.
>
> Yet even though he had only his short time in power, he managed to pass on to his successors the main elements of what was to be the monolithic state: the single party (wrangling at the top this time), the bureaucracy, the secret police, and the ban on organized opposition. These were the basis of Soviet power.

The Economist (10 January 1970) wrote that 'whatever one may think of him, what has happened in Russia since his death is not what Lenin thought would happen', but added in the next issue that 'it is impossible to tell how Lenin's views would have developed if he had not died in his early fifties'. Leonard Schapiro said in *The Listener* (16 April 1960) that 'it is true that Lenin created the system. No doubt he bears the blame for failing to foresee the uses to which such a system could be put. But it was his premature removal from political life which above all cut short any plans that he may have had for modifying and improving a system born out of emergency and panic'. But Bernard Feron in *Le Monde* (23 April 1970) disagreed: 'At the end of his life the creator of Bolshevism seems to have been dismayed by the monster begotten by himself. He asked himself what 'peppery dish' was being cooked up by the Georgian. He saw the professional revolutionaries being replaced by the professional *apparatchiki*. He had a foreboding that the invading bureaucracy might destroy his work. If he had had time to pursue his self-criticism would he have questioned some of his fundamental premises? Some people argue that he was ready to go

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into reverse, to fight bureaucracy by democracy. But nothing in his last writings permits one to conclude that this was the case.'
Tibor Szamuely in the *Spectator* (18 April 1970) made the same point:

> For a few months in 1922–23, between the second and third strokes, the invalid Lenin would reflect at leisure upon the results of his revolution. His last writings reveal his torment. Around him he saw nothing but dishonesty, intrigue, careerism, bureaucracy, moral turpitude, incompetence. All the old warnings had come true. He tried to find remedies for the multitude of evils, but he knew it was hopeless. He also knew that he was dying. Had it all been worth it? Yes, a thousand times, yes. The revolution had triumphed.

Szamuely noted 'a great difference in style between Lenin and his successors', but concluded that 'Lenin lives on after his death in his creation. In an eerie way, today's Russia presents a horrible caricature of Lenin's personality. . . . Yet, however grotesquely misshapen, the features of Vladimir Ilyich are unmistakably there; his parenthood cannot be in any doubt'.

Both *Newsweek* (27 April 1970) and the *International Herald Tribune* (22 April 1970) quoted Zbigniew Brzezinski expressing a similar opinion that it was Lenin who set the Soviet Union on a course that led to the excesses of Stalinism. It was the result of 'Lenin's emphasis on dogmatic belief, intolerance towards dissent, violence, conspiratorial activity, almost total subordination of the individual to the Party, not to speak of his paranoiac suspiciousness'.

Neal Ascherson in the *Observer* (19 April 1970) argued, however, that 'after his death, policies which Lenin meant to be temporary became a permanent buttress of Stalin's tyranny. The new Russia Lenin had worked for was to turn out to be menacingly different.' Yet he concluded that 'if he did awake and open his eyes on the Soviet Union of today', he would recognize and approve that Soviet Union 'with all its enormous faults; it is his'.

On the other hand, Ignazio Silone emphasized in his article of memories of Lenin in *Corriere della Sera* (22 April 1970) the paradoxical continuity between Lenin and Stalin:

> The genius of Lenin resided in his study and knowledge of Russia, and it is on the basis of this knowledge that he refined the technique of the conquest of power. Stalin added then to Lenin's technique another insight constituting the main political lesson left by communism to totalitarianism: the new and decisive role which an efficient and centralized apparatus at the disposal of political power can play in modern mass society in certain circumstances. But the more the monstrous machine grows, the more it devours the substance of the revolution. Then the circle is closed. Lenin invented the revolution to seize power, Stalin invented the apparatus to preserve power. And the machine had devoured the revolution. In 1926, Lenin's widow, Krupskaya, was

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> to say with bitterness: 'If my husband were alive today, he would be in prison.'

A Moscow wit at the time reported that Stalin, infuriated by this remark, threatened to nominate a new 'Lenin's widow'. Now among the voices commenting on Lenin's anniversary there was one favourably comparing Stalin with Lenin. It was by the man whom Lenin overthrew, Alexander Kerensky (*The Sunday Telegraph*, 19 April 1970):

> Unlike Lenin, Stalin was a statesman. During the war he restored the Church and harnessed Russian patriotism for the defeat of Germany and the restoration of the boundaries of the Russian Empire.

But this was exceptional; in Peking, where Stalin has his champions, they have no 'patriotic' Russian reasons for opposing him to Lenin. Elsewhere, the reflections on the centenary were well summed up by the remark of Adam Ulam: 'History may have vindicated Lenin's tactics, but it has also repudiated his hopes' (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1970, p. 469).

FOR those for whom hope springs eternal, or who make it into a ritual, Lenin was a 'great humanist'. According to *The Guardian* (21 April 1970) Lenin's contribution to world history was 'to erect the scientific and humanist alternative of a rational and planned society in place of the endless treadmill of superstition and underdevelopment to which millions are still condemned'. *Tribune* (24 April 1970) wrote that Lenin's 'genius would have been worthless had there not been behind it a great humanitarian ideal: the removal from the face of Russia of man's exploitation by man. That all which Lenin believed in has not come to pass is neither the fault of man, nor basically of the system'. And at the UNESCO symposium organized in Helsinki to celebrate the centenary, Professor Alfred C. Meyer from the University of Michigan presented a paper on 'Lenin, the humanist' (*Le Monde*, 19–20 April 1970).

The fantasy of the 'liberal communists' presenting Lenin as a 'revolutionary democrat' is thus amplified by the 'bourgeois' commentators who present him as a 'humanist'. The latter concept can of course be stretched almost indefinitely, particularly if it is defined only by 'ultimate' ideals of a person, and does not include the means used to achieve them (leaving aside the problem of whether such Utopian ideals are not a form of rationalization for less idealistic motives). On such premises Torquemada was a humanist ('Torture is good for your soul'), and so was Dzerzhinski. On a more mundane level of ethical definitions which include consideration of both ends and means, Lenin can by no stretch of the imagination be described as a humanist, even though he was not as ruthless as Stalin and he had a sentimental streak in him.

The story is often told about Lenin's attitude to Martov as an

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example of his deep humanity. As the myth has it, Lenin let Martov leave the Soviet Union and is supposed to have asked Krupskaya before his own death: 'They say that Martov is dying too. Is it true?' What is forgotten is that after Martov did not return from the congress (which took place in October 1920 in Halle) of the German Independent Socialist Party (USPD), which he was permitted to attend, Lenin wrote about his 'friend' abusively (in an article 'On Tax in Kind') as a 'petty bourgeois Narcissus infatuated with himself'. What is not mentioned either is that in 1921 during the intensification of terror, two brothers of Martov, his sister, his two cousins and his 16-year-old nephew were arrested.

The death-bed is sometimes an effective catalyst for second thoughts and it may well be that this was the case with Lenin. We will never know what were his intimate thoughts during the eleven months between his last stroke and his death. But we can only judge on the basis of his deeds and such pronouncements which corresponded to them (rather than on the basis of 'idealistic' quotations which had no relevance to his down-to-earth decisions). And on such evidence there can hardly be any doubt that Lenin was consistently ready to sacrifice humanist 'sentimentality' on the altar of a ruthless pursuit of what he considered 'the interest of the revolution'.

WHATEVER 'liberal communists' or 'bourgeois liberals' may say about him, Lenin was neither a democrat nor a humanist. He was not as autocratic as Stalin, but he was autocratic nevertheless. He was not over-concerned by what is nowadays so often referred to as the 'Leninist norms of Party life' and he did not set much store by 'inner-Party democracy'. As his innumerable critics in the revolutionary movements, from Plekhanov and Trotsky to Martov and Rosa Luxemburg, predicted, his methods inevitably led to the disappearance of democracy from 'democratic centralism'. Early in 1921, he reproached Bukharin for the latter's 'failure to understand that formal democracy must be subordinated to revolutionary expediency' (Lenin's *Collected Works*, 3rd Edition, Vol. 26, p. 128). He made absolutely no secret of how he understood democracy. Already in March 1918 he wrote:

> There is absolutely no contradiction in principle between Soviet democratism and the use of dictatorial power by single individuals. . . . How can the strictest unity of will be ensured? By the subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one (*ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 462).

He amplified this idea in 1920:

> Soviet Socialist democratism does not in any way contradict one-man management and dictatorship; the will of the class is sometimes given effect by a dictator who sometimes does more alone, and often is more necessary (*ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 119).

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And indeed, although not in a manner comparable to Stalin, Lenin did in fact increasingly exercise power in an autocratic fashion. The resistance to his methods in 1919 and 1920 led to the formation of the oppositional groups within the Party: 'Democratic Centralists' and the 'Workers' Opposition'. At the 10th Party Congress Lenin suggested that they were in some way linked with 'counter-revolution' and proposed the prohibition of the 'factions' thus setting the pattern of all future identification of opposition with treason. He said:

> There is no need for opposition, Comrades. And I believe that the Party Congress will have to draw the conclusion that the time has come to put an end to opposition, to put the lid on it; we have had enough opposition (*ibid.*, Vol. 26, pp. 227–8).

The condemnation of any form of 'factional' opposition was followed by the first great Party purge, setting yet another pattern for Stalin.

These elementary historical facts have been disregarded by U Thant who said in his speech celebrating Lenin's centenary that his ideals are reflected in the United Nations charter, a statement which implies that the U.N. Secretary sees no difference between the principles of the charter and the Leninist 'democratic centralism'. No less farcical was the solemn declaration of the U.N. Human Rights Commission about the historical influence of Lenin's 'humanistic ideas'.

LENIN'S 'humanism' could be seen in his attitude to violence. His record in the use of terror is certainly not comparable to that of Stalin and is often excused on the grounds of revolutionary expediency. The fact remains that it was his Decree of 5 September 1918, entitled 'On the Red Terror', which established the built-in principle of the regime's policy, just as the establishment under him of *Cheka* in 1917 and of the forced labour camp system in 1918 established the institutional means for its implementation. And Lenin used and advocated terror not only during the Civil War, but also later on when there was no longer the excuse of revolutionary emergency. His *Collected Works* offer any number of instances of his attitude to terror. Even minor administrative problems were to be solved by this means. In a telegram to Stalin, who complained about a bad telephone connexion, he gave him the following advice (and it was certainly not wasted as his pupil has later shown): 'Threaten to shoot the idiot who is in charge of telecommunications and who does not know how to give a better amplifier and how to have a working telephone connexion' (*ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 243). He even protested to Zinoviev, the Petrograd boss, for curbing indiscriminate terror in the city: 'It is necessary to intensify the energetic and massive character of the terror against the counter-revolutionaries, particularly in Petrograd whose example is decisive' (*ibid.*, Vol. 35, p. 275). In a letter to the Commissar of Food, Tsyurupa, dated 5 December 1921, Lenin complained about insufficiently severe measures taken against

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food thefts and added: 'There are too few executions' (*Leninski Sbornik*, Moscow, 1933, Vol. 23, p. 178). In a letter to Kamenev written on 3 March 1922, Lenin explained that 'it is a great mistake to think that the NEP put an end to terror; we shall again have recourse to terror and to economic terror'. (*Collected Works*, 5th Edition, Vol. 44, p. 428). And in 1922 he advised the Commissar of Justice that the courts 'must not do away with terror . . . they must supply grounds for it and legalise it in principle . . .' (*Collected Works*, 3rd Edition, Vol. 27, p. 296).

In his conversations with Gorky, Lenin justified his attitude in the following words: 'Is it possible to act humanely in a struggle of such unprecedented ferocity? Where is there any place for soft-heartedness or generosity?' (M. Gorky, *Days with Lenin*, New York, 1932, p. 44). There was no room for soft-hearted humanism in this perspective and when even some Bolsheviks (like Olminski in *Pravda* of 19 December 1918) complained about the terror and the 'scandalous' and 'inhuman' behaviour of the *Cheka*, Lenin resolutely rejected such humanist objections:

> When we are reproached with cruelty, we wonder how people can forget the most elementary Marxism. . . . The important thing for us to remember is that the *Chekas* are directly carrying out the dictatorship of the proletariat and in this respect their role is invaluable . . . (*ibid.*, Vol. 23, p. 274).

It remained invaluable also later on when Lenin's successors inherited the Secret Police as an established weapon and continued to use it with a varying degree of intensity. From Lenin's time on it remained a permanent feature of the regime. When Khrushchev accused Stalin at the 20th Party Congress of 'violating the norms of morality' he did not mention that it was Lenin who not only established the instrument and practice of terror, but also provided philosophical justification for it, a justification which not even the euphoria of the centenary celebrations can make into a manifestation of humanist ethics:

> We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interest of class struggle of the proletariat. . . . At the basis of Communist morality lies the struggle for the consolidation and consummation of Communism (*ibid.*, Vol. 25, p. 393–4).

This ethical tradition of revolutionary utilitarianism which stretches from Pisarev and Nechaev to Lenin and Stalin can hardly be defined as humanist.

AS for Lenin's attitude to nationalities, it is true that before the revolution he repeatedly emphasized the right of all nations to self-determination, but it is after all his political practice in power which must serve as a basis for judging his devotion to this principle, which anyway he explicitly subordinated to what he imagined to be

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'the class interests of the proletariat'. This in effect meant the overthrow by armed force of the newly independent governments in the former Tsarist provinces in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, and in the Ukraine, and the attempts to establish puppet regimes under the control of Moscow in the Baltic states and Poland. Stalin only continued the momentum of the original expansion. And the invasion of Czechoslovakia under Brezhnev has its precedent early enough in the invasion of the Republic of Georgia in February 1921. It is in the perspective of his treatment of the Menshevik Government in Georgia, that one must view Lenin's condemnation of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinski for acting as Great Russian bullies vis-à-vis such Georgian Communists as Mdivani who displayed what Lenin called *nezavisimstvo* (tendency to be independent). Even if Richard Pipes is right in his idea (expressed in his book, *Formation of the Soviet Union*, p. 276) that if Lenin had not been prematurely incapacitated, 'the final structure of the Soviet Union would have been quite different from that which Stalin ultimately gave it', the question still remains how stable or permanent such hypothetical (less centralized) 'federation' would have been and whether it would not have succumbed, sooner or later, either to irridentism or, more likely, to Great Russian centralism which, whatever his ideological inhibitions, Lenin promoted in the first place, despite his 'internationalism'.

IN discussing hypothetical questions about Lenin there is only one on which everybody seems to be agreed: that without Lenin there would have been no Bolshevik seizure of power. Already Trotsky expressed this opinion in his *History* and a number of commentators said it in their articles on the occasion of Lenin's centenary. The historical evidence leaves very little doubt that this is true. But it does not follow from this that without Lenin there would not have been totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Such a proposition appears much more doubtful, whatever Lenin's 'merits' in establishing the foundations of the first model of what eventually became a fully fledged totalitarian state. The distinction is important for the analysis of that other hypothetical question: 'What would have happened, if Lenin had lived?' which became such a prominent theme of the speculations by outside commentators on the occasion of Lenin's anniversary, important and topical because it involves the question of the character of the Soviet state at present and its prospects. Clearly, different opinions on this question imply different assessments of the perspectives of today; any definite view of the relation between Leninism and Stalinism is directly relevant to it. Those who now try to emphasise the contrasts between the two, rather than simply note the differences, tend to overlook an important historical lesson to be learned from the continuity between Leninism and Stalinism.

In the Soviet Union it results in a naïve idealization of the 'golden age' which existed under Lenin. The real contrast which Stalin's

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'times of troubles' present in historical memories prevents the realization that not only did the political and economic practices of Stalin have their roots in Lenin's time, but also that the essential framework of the suppression of cultural liberties had been established then. As Bertram D. Wolfe, in his article 'Krupskaya Purges The People's Libraries' (*Survey*, No. 72, Summer 1969) has shown, it was under Lenin that the censors began to mould the Soviet mind by such methods as banning the classical 'idealist' philosophers, and other 'counter-revolutionary elements' from Soviet libraries. In the words of Bertram D. Wolfe, 'when we hear the nostalgic cry "return to Leninist norms" . . . in the celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of Lenin's birth, we cannot help but think of that first circular of 1920 which librarians were so remiss or reluctant to enforce that it was 'completely neglected with rare exceptions' or was started only in those provinces where there was the direct 'intervention of the GPU'. This strange tree of unknowledge was planted by Krupskaya under Lenin, with his direction and advice.'

In the light of such sober historical facts, the simple faith of the Soviet followers of 'the real cause of Lenin' appears pitifully naïve, as does the heart-cry of a character in Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward*, expressing his puzzlement at Krupskaya's silence at the time of Stalin's horrors: 'What about Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya? Didn't she understand, didn't she realize what was happening? Why didn't she raise her voice?'

In the West there is the no less pathetic phenomenon of the 'liberal communists' and some ex-communists clinging to their Leninist faith. It has found its recent expression on the occasion of the production of the film by Costa-Gavras, *The Confession*, based on the book *L'Aveu* written by the survivor of the Slansky trial, Arthur London (cf. *Survey*, No. 70/1, Winter/Spring 1969, pp. 248–249 and No. 72, Summer 1969, pp. 108–121). The film gives a Kafkaesque picture of the Moscow trial in Prague and its script-writer, the Spanish exile Jorge Semprun, who was recently expelled from the Communist Party, declared: 'For me it is a contribution to Lenin's centenary'. Its two main actors, Yves Montand and Simone Signoret, have been prominent supporters of the French Communist Party for a long time. The review of the film in *Le Nouvel Observateur* (27 April 1970) borrowed for its title the Czech slogan from the time of the Soviet invasion: 'Lenin wake up, they have gone mad'. Another note in the same issue ironically contrasted the film with 'The pseudo-humanist salad *à la* Arthur Koestler'.

Thus those who are somewhat belatedly learning about Stalinism and who supported the crimes of Stalin when they were being committed, are now giving lessons to those who explained and denounced them at the time. They do so in the name of Lenin. Yet the first show-trial in Moscow, that of Russian Social Revolutionaries in 1922, took place under Lenin.

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THE question 'What would Lenin have thought of the Soviet Union today?' is related to, but distinct from, the earlier question of 'What would have happened there if he had lived?' We will never know what evolution Lenin might have undergone. In his last writings he was indeed deeply worried about the state of his Union. But the house that he built was a direct result of his political philosophy and of an attitude to politics which he held throughout his life. After his illness, he might have understood the limits of political action, the utopian character of the idea of an administration which is not corrupted by a monoply of power, he might have discovered the value of political freedom and of the role of pluralism in politics. For all we know, he might have become an ex-communist, like Djilas, who now says that 'there is a lot of pure nonsense in Marx and Lenin' (*Life*, 1 May 1970). But it is unlikely that he would have, unless he had fallen from power. There is certainly no indication in his last writings that he realized the connection between his political premises and the ills which he discovered latterly. It was for him, as before, a matter of political initiatives and administrative measures within the system of the state monopoly of truth.

But even if he wanted to modify some of the worst features of that system by another reorganization and personal reshuffling (such as the elimination of Stalin from the Party secretariat), it is unlikely that he could—even if he would—do much about the more general problem of the rise of the *apparatus*. It was too late for that as all subsequent history testifies. Lenin let the *djinn* out of the bottle and it could not be brought back by exhortation or Party manoeuvres. In his book, *Lenin's Last Struggle*, Mr. Moshe Lewin argues that 'if Lenin had lived' he would have tried to prevent the 'bureaucratic degeneration' and would have shown 'devilish persistence' in attempting to achieve this end. The reasoned argument of Mr. Lewin is gallant and scholarly, but unconvincing. It is based on a premise that 'from an historical point of view, there was nothing essentially utopian about Lenin's aim of achieving a rational dictatorial regime, with men of integrity at its head and efficient institutions working consciously to go beyond both underdevelopment and dictatorship'. The premise flies in the face of Russian history, of Soviet politics, and of all the lessons drawn from past experience by political philosophers, from Montesquieu and de Tocqueville to Acton and Aron, about the corruptibility of unrestrained political power. But Mr. Lewin also says that Lenin might have succumbed and ended like so many others, as a 'deviationist'. This, as Krupskaya realized, was quite possible. The question is whether in such a case he would have persisted, like so many others, in cherishing his illusions, or whether he would have gone beyond Marxism-Leninism. His responsibility for the horrors of Stalin's era is general, not specific. If one admits that personality plays a role in history, one admits that the difference between the personalities of Lenin and Stalin accounts for the difference between

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the scale of terror under the one and the other. Lenin was not a cruel vengeful despot, he was personally modest, but he was a fanatic who thought that he knew the 'laws of history'. When they did not work, he quoted Napoleon, 'On s'engage . . . et puis on voit,' but he did not bear in mind Napoleon's failure. His greatness, like that of Napoleon, is incontestable, and so is his failure in preventing from expanding and flourishing what appeared to him as a menace in the last years of his life. One cannot attribute to him the responsibility for Stalin's crimes, but he did create, as so many commentators during the centenary remarked, 'the instrument of power that allowed Stalin to do as he did, and he formulated the principle that ultimately made all his successor's crimes possible' (*Time*, 27 April 1970). There was no dearth of warnings about where Lenin's methods would lead and about the result of sowing the dragon's teeth through the regular use of political terror. Rosa Luxemburg was not alone in saying that what Lenin did was worse than the disease it was supposed to cure, and history has shown how true this was. As Leonard Schapiro rightly pointed out in *Encounter* (July 1970):

> Rosa Luxemburg's criticism of Bolshevism (written in 1918—what would she have said in 1921?) still retains its validity. Liberty cannot be made subordinate to other aims without losing both liberty, and, as often as not, the other aims as well. In the words of de Tocqueville, 'those who seek in liberty anything other than liberty itself are destined for servitude'.

TODAY the replacement of the cult of Stalin by that of Lenin does not involve a 'return to Lenin', to his dreams or even to his 'norms', deficient as they were, but a manipulation of Leninist texts in the interest of the Party apparatus under Brezhnev. In this post-Khrushchev era, the 'Theses' for the Lenin centenary emphasized the continuity with Stalin:

> The Party rejects any attempt to direct criticism of the cult of personality and subjectivism against the interests of the people and socialism, for the purpose of blackening the history of socialist construction, the discrediting of revolutionary gains and the re-examination of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The Chinese communists on their part emphasised in their critique of the Soviet *Theses* (*Jen Min Jih Pao*, 21 April 1970) that not only has Lenin, but also Stalin, been betrayed by the Soviet leaders:

> Stalin inherited and defended the cause of Leninism in his struggles against domestic and foreign class enemies and against the Right and 'Left' opportunists in the Party. . . Stalin cleared out quite a gang of counter-revolutionary representatives of the bourgeoisie who had wormed their way into the Party—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, and the like. . . After Stalin's death Khrushchev came out with a surprise attack in his 'secret report' viciously slandering Stalin and by every kind of treacherous man-

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> oeuvre usurped Party and governmental power in the Soviet Union. This was a counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat* which turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and which overthrew socialism and restored capitalism. Brezhnev was Khrushchev's accomplice in the counter-revolutionary *coup d'etat* and later replaced him. Brezhnev's rise to power is, in essence, the continuation of Khrushchev's counter-revolutionary *coup*. Brezhnev is Khrushchev the Second.

The Chinese indictment of Brezhnev's oppressive regime was made in the name of Stalinism:

> In the Soviet Union of today, special agents and spies run amuck and reactionary laws and decrees multiply. . . Large numbers of revolutionaries and innocent people have been thrown into concentration camps and 'mental hospitals'. . . The Soviet revisionist new tsars have . . . turned the Soviet Union back into the 'prison of nations'. . . Now one can see clearly that the essence of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique's rise to power lies in the transformation of the socialist state created by Lenin and Stalin into a hegemonic social-imperialist power.

The irony here is that although there was no full rehabilitation of Stalin under Brezhnev, the tendency was to whitewash him as far as possible and in this respect Soviet historiography under Brezhnev presents a striking contrast to the treatment of Stalin under Khrushchev. The comparison of the recent 1969 edition of the Party history with the 1962 edition reveals quite clearly this tendency to 'protect' Stalin. The new edition plays down the importance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, removes all references to the 'unsolved' questions concerning the Kirov murder, soft-pedals the references to Stalin's mistakes in the preparation for war, and while accepting that Stalin had a positive and a negative side, it shows a great reluctance in referring to the latter. As to the former, the *History* is not all that far from the Chinese formulation in its warm praise of Stalin as 'a theoretician and an important organizer who headed the struggle against Trotskyites, Right opportunists and bourgeois nationalists' (p. 577).

The somewhat inconsistent line on Stalin, as shown for instance in the *Pravda* article on Stalin's 90th birthday (on 21 December 1969), reflects not only opposing contemporary political preoccupations, changeable and changing, but also the difficulty of squaring the legitimacy of the past (the cult of Stalin) with that of the present (the cult of Lenin). Lenin recommended as his last act the removal of Stalin from the post of the General Secretary of the Party and this was disregarded by the Party. Now the praise for Stalin centres precisely on this period when his rise to power could have been prevented by the Party adopting Lenin's recommendation. The old question of theodicy is present here in a secular form. Either Lenin was right and the Party was wrong, or the Party was right (and is now right in the interpretation of its history) and Lenin was wrong notwithstanding the present cult of his infallibility.

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SUCH and similar problems account for the fact that, while Lenin is used as a stick with which to beat other 'Leninists', Stalin was not even mentioned in Brezhnev's centenary speech on Lenin (*Pravda*, 23 April 1970). While the Chinese communists put Stalin in a place of honour in the pattern of historical continuity which starts with Marx and culminates with 'Mao Tse-tung thought', the Soviet leaders have to face an embarrassing gap between Lenin and the unimposing figure of Brezhnev. Little wonder that Soviet historiography is now 'beyond surrealism' in what can be called the 'Brezhnev School of Falsification'.

The staid and routine tricks of the old 'Stalin School of Falsification' go monotonously on, even though the mental acrobatics required to make them believable become more and more convoluted. Yet 'Stalin's heirs' defending 'Lenin's legacy' seems incapable of doing anything more original than expunging Khrushchev from the new third edition of the Party *History*, making him into an 'un-person', or cutting a page from the first volume of the new, third edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia* (pp. 543–4). This time it is not the Bering Straits which replace Beria, but a new entry on the Amur river which replaces the old one which might have been used to support the Chinese frontier claims. The third edition of the Party *History* was quickly withdrawn and replaced a few months later by a new version in which some references to the Chinese communists were rewritten. And it is still the same old hack, B. N. Ponomarev, who since Stalin's time has been editing the ever-changing versions of Soviet history. It makes one yawn.

In the polycentric communist world different 'Marxist-Leninist' historiographies offer a rich subject for permutations and comparative analysis. The new edition of the Party *History* brought a protest from the Yugoslav Communists incensed by its blaming Tito for the break between Moscow and Belgrade in the late 1940s. It was also critically reviewed in *l'Unita* (6 and 10 January 1970). But it is the comparison of the actual histories presented by fellow-revolutionaries, each invoking the holy name of Lenin as a patron-saint, that gives one the Alice-in-Wonderland feeling. Each event in Soviet history can now be tabulated on a spectrum ranging from facts to un-facts, according to the position between these two polar points which different 'Leninist' historians take in their selective interpretations. Lenin's centenary offered a good opportunity for such comparisons. At one pole of this spectrum we have the more factual 'Leninist' histories of the Soviet developments in the Italian (Paolo Spriano in *l'Unita*, 22 April 1970), Cuban (Marcos Llanos in *Casa de las Americas*, March–April 1970), and Trotskyite (Jean Jacques Marie in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 4 May 1970) interpretations, while the Soviet and the Chinese present the historical events in the Orwellian manner close to the other pole of the spectrum. The socialist *Tribune* (24 April 1970) has fallen for one of the tricks in the 'Stalin-Brezhnev School of Falsification' by printing a Lenin supplement provided by the *Novosti Press Agency* which included a notorious doctored photograph of Lenin in 1920 from which Trotsky has been

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erased (when challenged by some readers, *Tribune* offered in its next issue the lame excuse that 'there is more than one picture of this scene').

The Chinese comment on the Bauer episode was no less obtuse. They claimed that for the Soviet revisionists 'it is only natural to make fools of themselves' because 'their exercising of a Hitlerite fascist dictatorship' is 'in tune with and a continuation of Bauer's revisionist ideas' (*Peking Review*, 24 April 1970). But Bauer was of course a left social-democrat who never was an 'active advocate of Hitler's fascism' and never 'supported Hitler's pan-Germanism', as the Chinese wrote in their counterblast which was as fraudulent as the Soviet *Theses* they were criticising. The Soviet leaders have indeed made 'fools of themselves' in the *Theses*. This, however, was not because Brezhnev is a follower of Bauer, but because, as Robert Conquest said in answer to a question on what Lenin's feelings might be today, that 'of all the men who have ruled Soviet Russia, the present leaders are the lowest in calibre. Lenin would recognise their incredible mediocrity and narrow-mindedness' (*L'Expresso*, 11 January 1970). Or, as Conquest put it in another article: 'The present Politbureau is the first to show no superiority in ability or prestige over the main body of the Party *apparat*' (*Foreign Affairs*, April 1970). It is not difficult to imagine what Lenin, who refused to be an object of a cult while he was alive, would have thought of his own canonization and of the incipient mini-cult of Brezhnev. It was Lenin who wrote in 1918: 'I find it difficult to read the papers. Wherever you look, they write about me. And those portraits? Everywhere! What is the purpose of all this?'

Nor is it difficult to imagine what Lenin would have thought not only about the present ballyhoo but of the communist polemics accompanying his centenary. It was Lenin who wrote at the end of his life (in a letter dated 28 February 1922 to A. L. Sheinman):

> There is the truth for you, if you want to hear not the sweet communist official lies (with which everyone feeds you as a high mandarin), but the truth. And if you do not want to look at this truth with open eyes, through all the communist lying, you are a man who has perished in the prime of life in a swamp of official lying.

If Lenin were alive would he realise the connection between the premises of his philosophy and its results, between means and ends? Or, for instance, that what he complained about was blatantly present in his own advice to his followers (in *Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*) about how necessary it is 'to resort to all sorts of devices, manoeuvres and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuge, in order to penetrate into the trade unions . . .'

The difference between Lenin and his successors is that Lenin could still distinguish between means and ends. He was perfectly ready to use bad means, but, unlike Stalin, he would not derive pleasure from

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them. In contrast to the present leaders, he was not a chauvinist; he sublimated his power drive in universal, not imperial terms. Unlike Brezhnev who recently received a medal from President Svoboda, Lenin would not have conceived the possibility of getting a decoration from President Jordania for the invasion of Georgia. Lenin's style was different from that of his successors all of whom displayed an increased vulgarity, culminating in the present centenary.

Now that the rites of the second canonization are over, what is particularly ironic is not just the fact that the 55 volumes of Lenin's *Collected Works* can be used as a source of quotations for practically any policy which any of the 57 varieties of his present-day worshippers may wish to implement, however contradictory such policies may be, but that it does not even matter whether the quotations are really his, as the Bauer episode has shown.

The history of dogmatic religions is full of instances of the unceremonial treatment of patristic writings and of attributions of later texts to the Fathers of the Church. It would be interesting to know who will be quoted as Lenin on his bi-centenary, and whether (and how quickly) it will be discovered by the Leninist faithful then.

L.L.

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Amalrik: *Addendum*

A Letter to *Der Spiegel*

Dear Editor,

I have read in your journal of 16 March 1970 an article about myself. It was not signed and therefore apparently expressed the view of your journal.

I was surprised that without offering any concrete evidence, you try to suggest to your readers that my book, *Will the USSR Survive until 1984?*, was written in collaboration with the KGB. Such rumours, as far as I know, first appeared in the American paper, the *Washington Evening Star*, in November last year. I wrote a detailed refutation which was published by some American and British papers to which you, while repeating some of the *Star* arguments, do not refer at all.*

I will not try therefore to refute again in detail the slanderous innuendoes repeated by you that my return from exile and the publication of some of my articles by the *Novosti Press Agency* (whose regular employee I never was) had any relation to the KGB. In fact, the only relation to the KGB they had was that in 1965 the KGB exiled me to Siberia and in 1968 it put paid to my journalistic work for the *Novosti Press Agency*, and other Soviet publishing institutions.

All the same, I consider it necessary to reply to some of your allegations, because I think that they are dictated not by ill will, but simply by a complete lack of understanding of the conditions of Russian life.

Thus your comparisons between myself and Gapon and Malinovsky, or your suggestions that the purpose of my critical remarks about the Russian people was to sow discord between the people and the democratic opposition, are not just slanderous but simply nonsensical.

Unlike Gapon and Malinovsky, I am not a member of any organization, I am not trying to provoke anybody to collective action, I am expressing only my own personal views without trying to present them as opinions of the democratic opposition as a whole. As far as my sharp remarks about Russian history and the Russian people are concerned, I made them because I am Russian myself and think that at present my country is more in need of self-criticism than of self-praise.

Nor do I understand why you assert that my book was written for Western readers and that it is not being distributed by *samizdat*. I published the book first in the West and only afterwards I put it into *samizdat* circulation in order to avoid it being published [in a form which might have been distorted] by agencies which are not *bona fide*

* Amalrik is obviously unaware here that his refutation, which is published in this issue of SURVEY on pp. 102–110, has not yet appeared in full in the West. Only very brief extracts have been published in the *Daily Telegraph* (23 February 1970) and in the *Guardian* (24 February 1970).

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and which are beyond my control. But since the end of last year my book has had an extraordinarily wide distribution through *samizdat*.

Even more nonsensical and slanderous, not just personally to me, but to the whole of independent Russian literature, is the assertion by Mrs. Bronska-Pampuch, approvingly quoted by you, that the sending of *samizdat* publications abroad is controlled, or even carried out by the organs of the KGB. Apart from my writings, in the last few years there were published in the West the novels of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the memoirs of Anatoli Marchenko, the poems of Natalya Gorbanyevskaya, the essays of academician Sakharov and of General Grigorenko, the documentary compilations on political trials by Pavel Litvinov, and many other texts. Do you seriously think that all these were prepared or sent to the West on the initiative of the KGB?

It is true that the KGB has tried to pass to the West a few manuscripts, but only in such instances when it was against the wishes of the author, or could do him harm, as was the case with *The Banquet of the Victors* by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or the diary of Svetlana Alliluyeva. But it would be simply dishonest to generalize from such cases.

In my view the KGB does not at all deserve the high marks which you give it in your article. Although the Committee of State Security is undoubtedly a more active and dynamic organization than—say—the Labour and Wages Committee, it is all the same a part of an ossified bureaucratic system and is affected by the general ways of its functioning. (You write that in my critique I do not include the KGB in the 'bureaucratic elite' which it merely supplies with information. Undoubtedly, the supplying of information about attitudes in the country is mainly the task of the KGB *apparatus*, but it does not follow that the top cadres of the KGB do not belong to the elite. Without wishing at all to underestimate the role of the KGB in the Soviet system—a role fully known only to a few people—I would like nevertheless to note that it is now not quite such an exceptional role as the one played by the secret police under Stalin.)

It is quite possible, as you write, that there are nowadays employed in the KGB well-educated and well-informed young men who 'have no illusions'. However, the clumsy provocations in which Victor Louis, whom you also mention, takes part, do not indicate high 'intellectual sophistication' on the part of the KGB. It would be too great an honour for the KGB to have such people as myself among its collaborators.

I think that the rumours that I am a KGB agent are spread by the KGB itself, perhaps partly through its own people in the Russian emigré organizations in the West. The purpose of these rumours is not only to slander me personally and thereby to harm my book which is embarrassing to the bureaucratic regime, but also to advertise the KGB as an organization which knows everything and controls everything.

Such rumours will undoubtedly meet with success among people whose mentality is conditioned by the awe felt vis-à-vis any organization (be it a national, party, or police organization) and by those who,

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discounting individualism and human personality, believe in the strength of organizations, but not in the strength of man.

The fact that I have not yet been arrested is also used to support these rumours. I can only repeat here what I said before.

After the propaganda failure suffered on the occasion of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, the authorities do not want writers' trials which make a lot of noise, focus attention on their books, and create a bad impression throughout the world of the authorities' cruelty. I am not the only Soviet writer who has published abroad and who nevertheless has not been arrested. The authorities are now more interested in the rumours that I am a KGB agent than in my arrest. But I think that as soon as the interest in the West in me and my writings passes, I will be arrested and tried on some false charge or other and that my writings will not even be mentioned at the trial. Of course, they may deal with me in some other way too.

So far, however, I am in fact enjoying greater freedom than many Soviet citizens. But I owe this only to myself. I WANT TO BE FREE. It is precisely because of this that I act as any free man can and should act: I publish my books under my own name and I want to enjoy all the rights of an author. Even in prison, if they do put me in prison, I hope to remain more free than millions of my and your compatriots who in their time, while 'free', shouted 'hurrah' to Stalin and Hitler and believed in the omnipotence of the organizations created by them.

I hope that you will publish my letter in full in your journal.

ANDREI AMALRIK.

2 April 1970
Vakhtangova Street, No. 5
Apt. 5
Moscow.

Andrei Amalrik was arrested in a country house near Moscow on 20th May 1970.

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Our Contributors

PETER BENDER, who is on the staff of the West German Radio, is the author of *Offensive Entspannung, Möglichkeit für Deutschland* (Cologne 1964) and of *Zehn Gründe für die Anerkennung der DDR* (Frankfurt 1968).

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI is Professor of Government and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University and a former member of the State Department Policy Planning Council. He is author of *The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict, Alternative to Partition, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* and of the forthcoming *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era.*

KEVIN DEVLIN, formerly on the staff of *The Guardian* and a former Senior Fellow at Columbia University, is now doing research on the world communist movement.

RALPH CARTER ELWOOD is Associate Professor of History at Carleton University in Ottawa. His articles on Russian social democracy have appeared in the *Slavic Review*, the *Political Science Quarterly* and the *Canadian Slavonic Papers.*

MAX HAYWARD, a Fellow of St. Antony's College (Oxford), is at present a Senior Fellow at the Russian Institute of Columbia University. He was co-translator of *Dr. Zhivago* and has translated works by Babel, Sinyavski, Solzhenitsyn, Voznesenski and other Soviet authors. He is currently translating the memoirs of Osip Mandelshtam's widow.

STUART HOOD, formerly Comptroller of Programmes of BBC Television, is author of *Survey of Television*, of several novels, among them *Pebbles from my Skull*, and of television plays, including one on the trial of Sinyavski and Daniel, *The First Freedom.* He is a translator of German and Italian literature, and television critic of *The Spectator.*

RICHARD LOWENTHAL is Professor of International Relations at the Free University, West Berlin. He is the author of *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* and other books.

DAVID LUCK is a graduate student in the International Relations Program at Yale University.

S. T. PALMER has lived for some years in Moscow and is at present engaged on research into the history of official policy on art and architecture in the Soviet Union.

ANTONY POLONSKY is Lecturer in East European History at the University of Glasgow. He is at present completing a book on *Politics in Independent Poland: 1921–1939.*

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ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON is a Research Associate at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also a Lecturer in the MIT Humanities Department. She is the editor of *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (1969), and is currently completing a book on the Soviet-East European military alliance, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution.*

WILLIAM RODNEY, Professor of History, Royal Roads Military College, Victoria, Canada, is author of *Soldiers of the International,* and other books and articles.

ANATOLE SHUB was Moscow correspondent of the *Washington Post* from April 1967 to May 1969. He is the author of *The New Russian Tragedy* (1969). His new book, *An Empire Loses Hope,* synthesizing seven years of reporting from communist Europe, will be published in October, 1970.

PAVEL TIGRID is the editor of *Svedectvi* (Paris) and author of *Le Printemps de Prague* (1968) and of *La Chute Irrésistible d'Alexander Dubcek* (1970).

VICTOR A. VELEN has written on East and West European political developments and on cultural subjects for *Foreign Affairs, The New Leader, The Saturday Review,* radio and television.

LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN is a member of the Government and Politics Department of Maryland University. The material in the article is part of a forthcoming book entitled *The Consequence of Great Power Parity.*

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

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

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

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

Alexander Solzhenitsyn

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Vadim Sidur in his studio (1967)

facing p. 160

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